

B. Franklin of Philadelphia.

L.L.D. F.R.S.

Reduced fac-simile after an anonymous engraving from the original painting by Wilson.

History of Civilization.

BEING

A COURSE OF LECTURES

ON

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF MANKIND.

BY

EMIL REICH, DOCTOR JURIS.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS.

AUTHOR'S PUBLICATION.

CINCINNATI, O.

1887.

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MEMORIÆ DILECTISSIMI PATRIS,
LUDOVICI REICH,
NOBILISSIMÆ CARISSIMÆ MATRI,
AMALIÆ REICH.

PREFACE.

By permission of the Board of Trustees, and of the Faculty of the University of Cincinnati, the author of the present book commenced to deliver a public course of lectures on the History of Civilization at the lecture-hall of said University. The first lecture was given on the 13th of November, 1886, and, with a few interruptions, the course was continued on every Saturday. The interest of the general public in the course increased so rapidly that it became a mere matter of necessity to rent a larger hall, and thus, after the fourteenth lecture, the course was continued at the spacious hall of the Scottish Rite Church. As a further manifestation of the unabating interest of the public, the author was most urgently requested by the most competent people of the city to publish his lectures in book form. A list of subscriptions more than sufficient to cover the considerable expenses of the publication was filled in very short time, and the present book is a faithful copy of the lectures as delivered in the course.

In the circular, submitted to subscribers, the book was announced to extend to 400 pages; the book, however, numbers over 550 pages, and the author cherishes the belief that the additional 150 pages will not prove unwelcome to the reader. The highly finished cuts have been selected and furnished by Mr. Otto Reich, of Cincinnati.

The course itself did not comprise an elaborate investigation into the institutions of modern times, and the book, therefore, does not devote special chapters to the discussion of the social and political development of the last three centuries. In every single lecture of the book, however, constant, and, occasionally, very exhaustive reference is taken to institutions of modern countries, more especially to those of the United States of America. Thus

a comparison is being introduced by means of which many points in modern institutions will receive even a fuller light than if treated of separately, without contrasting them with other times.

To every lecture a catalogue of "references" is prefixed. By drawing up a list of such books the author did not intend to imply that the works named in the list are his "authorities." The word "authority" in the science of Institutional History is entirely misleading. No writer commands such an "authority" that a passage of his book, simply because it is a part of *his* book, has to pass for an ultimatum. The "references" are given as a list of those books that the author, in the course of his studies, had found to be most useful, either on account of their "original" supply of facts, or on the strength of their suggestiveness. It is, therefore, not inconsistent to remark that the author frequently differs with the opinions of some of the works adduced among his "references."

The two "Controversial Lectures" were occasioned by a gentleman of the clergy of Cincinnati, Rev. George P. Hays, D. D., of the Second Presbyterian Church, who, in a sermon delivered in the church just named, had taken exceptions to statements supposed to have been made by me in my lectures on the Origin of Christianity. The statements I did make the Reverend Doctor failed to understand; but I have to acknowledge his great skill in refuting statements I did *not* make.

I have to express my profound gratitude to both Mr. Chester W. Merrill, late Librarian, and Mr. Albert W. Whelpley, present Librarian, of the Public Library of Cincinnati, by whose kindness I have enjoyed the full benefit of the precious book collection of this library.

DR. EMIL REICH.

CINCINNATI, 1888, FEBRUARY.

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ERRATA.

- On page 4, line 19, read *Scienza*.
- “ 13, line 8, cancel the word *that*.
- “ 36, line 1, read *thirty millions*.
- “ 53, line 33, read *and* instead of *end*.
- “ 67, line 29, read *develop* instead of *evelop*.
- “ 71, line 29, leave out the three words, *and not dictation*.
- “ 77, line 33, read *eating* instead of *etching*.
- “ 78, line 1, read *omnipotent*.
- “ 79, line 1, read *people* instead of *peple*.
- “ 79, line 18, read *workmanship* instead of *wormanship*.
- “ 111, line 8, read *cult* instead of *culture*.
- “ 160, line 8, read *Bacchus* instead of *Bachus*.
- “ 171, line 2, read *look* instead of *ook*.
- “ 178, lines 1 and 2, read *Hipparchus*.
- “ 181, line 29, read *theorem* instead of *thorem*.
- “ 205, lines 7 and 8, read *Parmenides*.
- “ 224, line 19, read *Aegina* instead of *Aegma*.
- “ 227, line 2, read *Parthenon* instead of *Pantheon*.
- “ 236, line 10, read *chronologically*.
- “ 245, line 6, read *Xenophanes*.
- “ 245, line 24, leave out the word *or*.
- “ 245, line 33, insert *a* between *is* and *great*.
- “ 246, line 33, read *heathens*.
- “ 251, line 35, read *Latin* instead of *latin*.
- “ 252, line 21, read *Latin* instead of *latin*.
- “ 252, line 24, read *Tullius* instead of *Tallius*.
- “ 253, line 20, read *monarchical*.
- “ 253, line 23, read *monarchical*.
- “ 253, line 26, read *Sa* instead of *La*.
- “ 256, line 22, read *Caracalla* instead of *Nero*.
- “ 257, line 1, leave out the word *on*.
- “ 258, line 1, leave out the word *or*.
- “ 258, line 35, read *election* instead of *selection*.
- “ 260, line 9, read *Hostilius* instead of *Hortilus*.
- “ 261, line 19, read *Latin* instead of *latin*.
- “ 263, lines 4 and 5, read *Etruscans*.
- “ 265, line 3, read *Sicyon*.
- “ 266, line 4, read *several* instead of *five*.
- “ 304, line 35, read *fasces* instead of *fasus*.
- “ 314, line 17, read *Hadrianus* instead of *Tryannus*.
- “ 314, line 18, read *next year* instead of *past year*.
- “ 355, At end of line 28 add *I*.
- “ 490, line 35, read “*by far*” instead of *far*.

PRELIMINARY LECTURES.

I.

References:—*A. Comte*, Cours de Phil. pos. *Buckle*, Hist. Civ. Engl. *Herder*, Ideen. *Droysen*, Historik. *Lewis Morgan*. *H. Spencer*, Sociology *I. Vico*, La Nuova Scienza. *Spinoza*, Tractatus theologicus politicus.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:—

Should any of you happen to pick up the works of those historians who wrote until very recently you would be struck by a curious feature, by a peculiar strain of thoughts and conceptions in almost every single writer of history. You would invariably find a most elaborate description of all kinds of battles and sieges and truces. The prominent actors in the play are, with very few exceptions, none but warriors, soldiers, majors, colonels and generals. We hear of the destinies of nations being determined by happy stratagems, by gallant braves, by plucky adventurers of the sword. The most celebrated historians of past ages are inexhaustible in communicating the most trifling, the pettiest occurrences of the life of their worshipped military heroes. We possess exact knowledge of the elegant folds in Cæsar's toga, and we know where he purchased his wig, and what were his witty sayings and scathing remarks in Gaul, in Britain, in Parthia, in Egypt. We are very well informed about more than 580 battles of the Greeks and over 1,460 battles of the Romans. We know precisely the history of every legio (regiment) of the Roman army and almost the very names of every centurio, of every officer in the different regiments.

But if, on the other hand, we should like to know something about non-military things, if we should ask the great historians of Rome *e. g.* about constitutional matters, we would be most frequently left in utter ignorance. It seems to be almost incredible that we know but very little,

indeed next to nothing, about that all-important question of Roman history, the right of voting in the legislature, in the *comitia centuriata* and *tributa*. In other words, we have no reliable information as to who had the right of voting in these *comitia*. We do not know whether the son of a Roman citizen who was not yet freed from the paternal power could or could not vote in the *comitia centuriata*. The Romans had a very peculiar system of eluding the right of suffrage which was granted in principle at least to every single citizen of Rome. Without going into unnecessary details, let me only state the fact that our knowledge of the right of suffrage in Rome is more than scanty, it is absolutely insufficient. And now imagine an inquirer of American institutions who would pile up all sorts of facts apparently bearing on the history of the United States, but who would be utterly ignorant of the American system of voting in county, state and national conventions. Is it not a mere matter of course that all his facts can avail him but very little, that he must needs be incapable of grasping the real purport of events in America?

The same difficulty besets our study of history on every side. If we turn to the mediæval times we meet an endless series of annalists, chroniclers and historians. In order to give a faint illustration of the riches of chronicles in several countries, let me mention the precious collection of Buchon, which comprises the chroniclers of the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries written in French, excluding the still greater number of Latin chroniclers, and consists of forty-seven thick volumes. You all remember the many societies in England for historical inquiries, and the amazing number of volumes they publish. The Camden Society has given us over 140 volumes of original mediæval writers on history. The collections of Italian scholars, especially of Muratori and Tiraboschi, cover almost the

history of every single hamlet in mediæval Italy. In Germany the Prussian Academy took the lead in publishing, under the superintendence of Pertz, a series of all annalists and historians of the mediæval German Empire, together with the laws and customs of every county, or as it was called, Mark, Dorf, Gau, Hof.

It seems to be rather a hazardous assertion that in the face of so many and variegated sources of historical events there should be a grievous lack of proper information. We should rather expect to behold everything in the full daylight of truth. But the sober fact is this, that whenever we ask for information about matters not connected with military institutions or wars and battles we generally get very unsatisfactory answers. The historians of these countries seem to be perfectly bewildered by the glaring splendor of Romantic chivalry, by the daring and gallant noblemen and their private affairs and by the graceful charm of their ladies. Their attention is never, or very sparingly, fixed on the plodding, down trodden peasants who forms, however, the bulk of the population, and who, together with the industrious burgesses of the few towns, brings forth the wealth of the country. Some years ago an able Frenchman, Monsieur Eugene Bonnemaire, published a history of the peasantry of France. In the very beginning of this work he makes the following remark: "Je ne crois pas, qu'il existe a cette heure en France un homme, qui sache, au vrai, quelle fut, depuis le temps des Gaulois jusqu's nos jours la situation du grand nourricier de la patrie." That is to say: "I do not believe that there is anybody in France at the present time, who really knows something about the situation of the great supporter of the country ever since the time of the Gauls." When Laveley wanted to inquire into that curious institution of the Swiss people which goes by the name of Allmende, an institution which determines the welfare and well being of

more than half the Swiss population, he expected to find a whole literature on this subject. But since the Allmende referred not to the pageantry of military spectacles but to the peaceful and as it were sullen distribution of soil and labor, he was unable to hunt up one single satisfactory treatise on the matter. On the other hand, it would be scarcely possible to master half the immense array of books on the legend of William Tell.

Since the last 50—60 years these and similar defects of the historians have been frequently held up to the reproach of the philosopher. They have been denounced a crying evil. Still further back we find a few great men who were fully aware of the deplorable state of history and who devoted a life's study to the reform of this the most interesting and, according to August Comte the highest branch of Science. As in all other Sciences, so likewise here also, an Italian takes the lead, the venerable Giovanni Battista *Vico* having been the first who tried to delineate the real course of history. His book, *La Science Nuova*, had a very poor success. Generations after the time of its first appearance it began to be appreciated and only at present do we look at *Vico* as the founder of scientific history. *Vico* was the first man of science who expressed his utter dissatisfaction with the state of historiography. He did not hesitate to state that our insight into the growth and decay of nations, into the causes which work at the grandeur or at the decline of a people is absolutely unsatisfactory. Amongst others he was the first historian who doubted the trustworthiness of *Livy* and *Dionysius* as far as the early history of Rome is concerned. He said that the stories about *Romulus* and *Numa Pompilius*, *Tullus Hostilius* and *Ancus Marcius* are more or less fabulous. He expressed it in clear terms, that the course of historical events does not depend on mighty over-towering individuals, but that on the contrary historical events are produced by general causes

and that the part played by those celebrated persons, whose names we are taught to admire and to adore, is a rather insignificant one. You remember that Thomas Carlyle held exactly the opposite doctrine. In his view we owe everything to a few gifted persons who by dint of their genius prepared our way and led to the goal. The hero worship of Carlyle and the doctrine of Vico form the two extremes of historical conceptions. The one is poetical, interesting, reads like a novel and fills the heart of the reader with images of glory and love. The other is sober and dry, but scientific and true.

A further step in the right direction was taken by Herder, one of the German classics. The German classics have one singular feature in common. Poets and dreamy nature though they be, they at the same time were all great scholars. Lessing had unbounded resources of learning, Wieland was deeply read in ancient and mediæval literature, Schiller was a searching historian, Goethe a first class naturalist, Rueckert, a celebrated Orientalist, and Herder had read and reread the choicest books of the literature of all nations. As all German classics he knew over six languages and it is this wide range of studies which gave to his views that peculiar broadness and comprehensiveness which still forms our chief admirations whenever we delight in a chapter of his work, on "*Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*"; "*Ideas concerning the history of mankind.*"

It would be simply impossible to mention and characterize all or even part of those modern historians who discarded the old method of writing military annals and began to re-write all history from the point of view of Vico and Herder. I must restrict myself to a few leading names. Foremost in this splendid array of lofty spirits stands the name of Auguste Comte. He was a Frenchman and of noble descent. His parents who lived in the North of France, were faithful adherents to the Catholic

religion, did their very best to educate their beloved son in the same spirit and make him one of the bulwarks of their church. But Auguste had too much of that spirit of apostasy, which seems to be the common heritage of genius. Genius always remonstrates. The social institutions, the geological strata of society as it were, have not been arranged with regard to the extraordinary, to the unwonted, to the unexpected, but with regard to what happens in the usual course of life, every forenoon and afternoon, indoors and outdoors. Auguste Comte, therefore, left his paternal home and went to the center of France, or to France itself, as the saying is, to Paris. Paris then (in the years 1820-30) was the spiritual center not only of France but of all Europe. Scientists and poets, artists and musicians, authors and business men—all rushed to Paris, all tried to find their Mecca in the many different associations of congenial people in which at that time Paris abounded. Amongst others there was one highly-gifted person by the name of St. Simon, whose wonderful sway over the human soul made him the founder of a new school. His imposing personal appearance, his rich voice, his transporting oratorical power allured the masses; his profound thoughts on the constitution of our social life won him the admiration and the partisanship of many of the strongest minds of France. St. Simon's object was to remodel mankind. Such gigantic schemes were perfectly adapted to the vainglorious, ambitious mind of the Frenchmen.

It is no wonder that a young man, in whom fancy prevailed over cool judgment, should fall victim to the fascinating magic power of a man like St. Simon. August Comte, hence became one of St. Simon's most ardent adherents. He adopted his views, he embraced his tenets with the power of a disciple, and with the argumentative force of a thinker. Besides being his disciple, Auguste

accepted also a position as private secretary to St. Simon, and thus their mutual relations were strengthened by both theoretical and practical bonds. But this connection did not last very long. A genius like Comte wants to assert his own views, his own conceptions. The views and conceptions of others, be they ever so profound, ever so sage and vast, have one serious fault, they are the thought of others, they do not bear the stamp of one's own cherished ideas. And Auguste's mind was fierce and impetuous. He broke off his relation to St. Simon and became professor of Mathematics at the l'Ecole Polytechnique. There is a general belief that the study of mathematics dries up all the tenderer emotions of the soul and that it has a tendency to give to the mind a jejune, unpoetical, prosaic turn of thinking. This assumption, however, does not hold good with regard to mathematicians of the higher order. They all display an unusual power of fancy, and some of the greatest mathematicians have been noted for their fine poetry. Even Leonhard Euler, a man who spent all his life with figures and numbers, was extremely fond of poetry, and not a bad poet himself. Comte was a very excellent mathematician and he left us some extremely interesting works on this noble science. His lectures enjoyed a very great reputation for being lucid, perspicuous and comprehensive. He had scarcely commenced his lectures when he did what only few philosophers ever dared to do—he married. It is difficult to avoid misapprehension in such a delicate subject, but we have to state the fact, that a great many of the most celebrated thinkers never married. Hobbes, Pascal, Giordano Bruno, Cartesius, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Schopenhauer—all died unmarried. On the other hand, we must concede that those few women who devoted themselves to the study of philosophy or science remained single as well. Maria Agnesi and Sophie Germain were both excellent mathe-

maticians and both unmarried. Auguste Comte deviated from the common routine of philosophers and married a lady of great attainments. It is very sad to be compelled to say that this marriage served only to prove how very wise Hobbes, Pascal, Kant and Leibnitz have been. Comte had a very unhappy matrimonial life. He loved his wife, and, no doubt, she loved him. But love alone is not sufficient. Something more than love is requisite, and that is mutual indulgence. But this rare flower never bloomed in the heart of Comte. His was that implacable, unbending sort of temper which is perfectly appropriate for the founder of a new creed, for the organizer of a new land—but absolutely inadequate for a husband. This unfortunate, gloomy temper made his position at the Ecole more and more untenable. At last he was discharged, and so he had to look out for some new means of existence. He announced a series of lectures on his new philosophy, and so wide spread had his reputation become meanwhile, that men of the highest standing in science, men like Biot, Boulainville and A. Humboldt, flocked to his lectures. But his domestic troubles, together with an over-excitement of unremitting study and profound thinking, engendered a dismal state of his brain, and in one of his terrific fits the great thinker, outraged by care, maltreatment and despair, drowned himself in the Seine. Happily he was saved, and a better treatment restored the equilibrium of his magnificent spirit. He continued his lectures and began to publish them in six volumes under the title of “Cours de philosophie positive.” The fine term, “philosophie positive,” (positive philosophy) is Comte’s own invention. He was extremely happy in inventing new terms, and the correct choice of terms does in no small degree contribute to the promotion of a new philosophy. Comte called his philosophy the positive philosophy, Positivism, and his adherents are known by

the name of Positivists. The most celebrated of his adherents is the lamented E. Littré.

Let me now try to give you an outline of that part of Comte's philosophy which bears on our present subject, on history. If you take up the six stout volumes of Comte's principal work you will scarcely find a heading named history. Comte seldom speaks of history, his term is *physique sociale*. That is another of his happily suggested terms. He, and not Quetelet, the Belgian statistician, was the first author to use the word *physique sociale* to denote the new science of history. What is the meaning of *physique sociale*? Comte started with the undoubted fact that our positive knowledge of physics, chemistry and physiology, in other words, that our knowledge of external nature is by far superior to our knowledge of human affairs. His various arguments he compresses into this one main proposition, "*Savoir c'est predire.*" To know means to predict. Where our capability of predicting events is small, there our positive knowledge must needs be very small too. For instance, we are able to predict many events on the skies, and hence we may safely infer that our knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies is a pretty fair one. But we are scarcely able to predict anything as to the movements of political parties, and hence our knowledge of politics and political affairs is no scientific one. If we should go still lower and try to predict anything as to what any single man might or might not do in the next hour, we would have to confess our perfect ignorance, and hence we may justly say that our *scientific* knowledge of individuals or individual life is next to nothing. But history does not treat of the movements of single persons. On the contrary, its main and principal object is the movement of masses, of large aggregates of people, of nations. Since the movement of larger bodies must necessarily be simpler and less whimsical or

vagrant, being less subject to the influence of every imaginable cause, this movement must also be easier amenable to a scientific treatment. Regarding now whole groups of people, joined together under several names, as *e. g.* people, nation, race, tribe, as one enormous body, or as Th. Hobbes puts it, as one gigantic Leviathan, we may ask for the physical qualities, for the laws of this body, for its physiology, very much in the same way as we ask for the laws and for the physiology of any other physical body. Thus we begin to look at a nation and its movements exactly from the same point of view which generally serves as the commanding standpoint of the naturalist. He studies the geological strata and their mutual relations, and his main object is to discover the general law of these relations. He wants to know in what succession and order the different layers follow each other; why and how the upper Silurian Era succeeded to the lower Silurian Era; why, again, in the upper Silurian Era the Niagara group succeeded to the Clinton group, etc. Nations are likewise built up by different strata, by different layers, and their movements are governed and controlled by the mutual correlation of these strata. The divergence and discrepancy of these strata, when compared with the strata of other nations, constitutes the differences among nations. Take *e. g.* England's population in the time of Queen Elizabeth and compare it with the population of Germany in the same time. In England the different strata of the population were the following ones: villeins, yeomanry, burgesses, squires, clergy, noblemen. Scarcely any of these strata will be found in the cotemporary German Empire. The German Empire of Maximilian and Rudolf had some kind of dependent people (or as the Germans say Hoerige), but they had a totally different position from that of the English villains. Again, the German burgess, the buerger was absolutely different from the Eng-

lish townsman. His political rights, his social standing, his independence are as many essential points of discrepancy. England, therefore, had altogether different strata, and it is no wonder that her course of development, that the whole character of her civilization deviated from the course of civilization in Germany.

It is scarcely necessary to remind you that these sketches are the bare outlines, in fact, very faint contours of those leading principles which at present constitute the groundwork and foundation of history. I mention them simply for the sake of illustrating Comte's term, *physique sociale*. The great work of Auguste Comte treats apparently of the whole range of science, but its principal object is the establishment and elaboration of what Comte conceived to be the real science of history, to-wit, *physique sociale*. It is a well known fact that Comte, though he frequently states the mere preliminary nature of his book, propounded one general law of history which in his opinion covers all ages and nations, and which, therefore, ought to be taken as the first and most important principle of history. I shall not call your attention to this fundamental law. It is to the present day an unsettled question whether this supposed law is really a law of history or only a law of Comte's. And in this whole course of lectures I shall try to give you mostly well ascertained facts, and I shall avoid to the best of my ability to burden your memories with fanciful theories. The immortal merit of Auguste Comte, as far as history is concerned, consists in the clear and precise conception of that *physique sociale*, the discussion of which forms the fourth, fifth and sixth volumes of his *Cours de philosophie positive*.

Next to this illustrious Frenchman stands an Englishman. I allude to H. Th. Buckle. Twenty-four years have elapsed since the death of this most indefatigable scholar, and the judgment of his coevals has not yet come

to a fair conclusion. You may frequently hear of Buckle as of one of those mental giants who surpassed all his predecessors, by whose labors more real knowledge did accrue to the stock of what we know than by the labor of any other single man. What he himself said of the celebrated book of Adam Smith, namely, that it is the most useful book which has ever been written by a single man—such and similar adulatory praises have been frequently bestowed on the author of a “History of Civilization in England.” His fame is perhaps still greater in non-English speaking countries. I can state it as an absolute fact of my personal experience, that in Germany, Austria and Hungary it is in cultivated circles considered a perfect shame not to have read Buckle. He is constantly quoted in all kinds of books and newspapers, and his book has been translated into all languages of Eastern Europe, into Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Servian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, and part of it into Turkish.

Any man who is able to rouse the entire interest of so many different people must have certainly hit the right keynote, and no doubt Buckle’s book is one of the gems of English literature. Written in a style of unparalleled beauty, a style which is both flowry and precise, blooming and vigorous, profound and clear, Buckle’s book is the outcome of a rich, perhaps excessively rich mind, which, setting out with a view to embrace the whole universe, landed on the isle of premature death. He was only 40 years of age when he died. He was the son of a rich London merchant, and when still a boy he inherited by the death of his father a considerable fortune. Endowed with great oratorical faculties and with an unusually acute mind of various talents (amongst others he was a famous chessplayer), he could have speedily reached a prominent place in English public life. But instead of yielding to the allurements of public life, he locked himself up in his study, and with the

exception of occasional trips to the Continent of Europe, he continued the life of a solitary scholar during 20 consecutive years. He acquired a sufficient knowledge of over nine languages, he devoured whole libraries, he amassed an amazing amount of facts and theories—nothing seemed to be alien from his course of studies—and we see him study heraldry and the art of blazonry with almost the same care as Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that, pathology and therapeutics, together with Chinese institutions and the customs of Polyneesian savage tribes. And all these studies he pursued with one single object steadily kept in his mind. They all were like as many rays converging toward one common focus. This focus was the history of the civilization of mankind. A gigantic scheme—a scheme which does not enter the mind of an ordinary scholar, a scheme which seems and in reality does surpass the capacity of a whole academy of scholars. To construe the history of civilization in a scientific way, to build up the whole fabric of human progress by pointing out those innumerable inventions and contrivances, both mental and mechanical, by which the human mind succeeded in evolving a higher state of culture out of the barren state of savagery or barbarism—that was the dream of Buckle's life. His preparations were careful, his meditations profound, and the temporary success of his book perfectly immense. When he offered his manuscript to Longman & Co., in London, the shrewd publishers of so many celebrated books refused to accept it. They did not consider it a profitable job at all. Buckle, hence, had his book published at his own expense. The first volume of the book was scarcely out when Buckle became the center of admiration and flattery of the London society. Invitations to dinners and parties poured in by the hundred, ladies of the very highest rank left their cards at his home—in one word, he was wellnigh the victim to one of the usual lionizing crazes of London society. But the

author of a History of Civilization in England calmly and coolly obviated the sad fate of those unfortunate celebrities who, like Mrs. Beecher Stowe, believe in the genuine and lasting character of London enthusiasm. Buckle simply refused all invitations and went on in his usual course of hard study. A second volume appeared. But this second volume fell short of the brilliancy and suggestiveness of the first volume. It was the usual display of unbounded learning and reading, occasionally enlivened by sparkling flashes of an exuberant mind; but the audacious, grasping spirit of the first volume is missing. No more promises of carrying the torch of truth into the dark caverns of human ignorance, none of those sweeping assertions and world-embracing suggestions of the first volume. Sullen, crest-fallen, cramped—that is the appearance of the author in his second volume. He was compelled to confess that the task surpassed his force—and he did not hesitate to do penance and declare solemnly that he can not redeem his pledge. It is one of the most interesting passages of his work, and I will give it in his own words:

“Once, when I first caught sight of the whole field of knowledge, and seemed, however dimly, to discern its various parts and the relation they bore to each other, I was so entranced with its surpassing beauty, that the judgment was beguiled, and I deemed myself able, not only to cover the surface, but also to master the details. Little did I know how the horizon enlarges as well as recedes, and how vainly we grasp at the fleeting forms, which melt away and elude us in the distance. Of all that I had hoped to do, I now find but too surely how small a part I shall accomplish. In those early aspirations there was much that was fanciful; perhaps there was much that was foolish. Perhaps, too, they contained a moral defect, and savoured of an arrogance which belongs

to a strength that refuses to recognize its own weakness. Still, even now that they are defeated and brought to nought, I cannot repent having indulged in them, but, on the contrary, I would willingly recall them, if I could. For, such hopes belong to that joyous and sanguine period of life, when alone we are really happy; when the emotions are more active than the judgment; when experience has not yet hardened our nature; when the affections are not yet blighted and nipped to the core; and when the bitterness of disappointment not having yet been felt, difficulties are unheeded, obstacles are unseen, ambition is a pleasure instead of a pang, and the blood coursing swiftly through the veins, the pulse beats high, while the heart throbs at the prospect of the future. Those are glorious days; but they go from us, and nothing can compensate their absence. To me they now seem more like the visions of a disordered fancy, than the sober realities of things that were, and are not. It is painful to make this confession; but I owe it the reader, because I would not have him to suppose that either in this, or in the future volumes of my History, I shall be able to redeem my pledge, and to perform all that I promised. Something, I hope to achieve, which will interest the thinkers of this age; and something perhaps, on which posterity may build. It will, however, only be a fragment of my original design."

Buckle did not live to finish his work, and thus the two volumes he left us are but the introduction to his plan, a valuable torso. It is a peculiar fate that seems to be the common lot of great authors, that they but very seldom can carry out their original design. There is not very much exaggeration in saying that the most splendid library could be arranged by selecting the most celebrated of unfinished books.

Until very recently it was almost generally believed that

Buckle succeeded in laying the foundation of scientific history, and that we may safely consider him the model historian, the great and successful reformer of that branch of science. Buckle's book is one of the most fascinating books that have ever been written. Its literary merit stands very high. He speaks of so many and different topics, of almost every science and art, of poetry, of inventions and travels, that the most fastidious reader is likely to find something which will interest him. But as to the mere scientific value of the books our judgment must be a very different one. We are forced to say, with his own words, that Buckle's book contains something which will interest the thinkers of this age, but nothing more. If you read the first five chapters of the first volume, you have read all Buckle; the rest consists of very interesting suggestive notes, scholarly excursions into all departments of science, but they do not enrich the main principles laid down in the first five chapters. But perhaps some of you have no time to go over these chapters, and therefore I shall give you the summary of them in Buckle's own words:

"In the preceding volumes, I have endeavored to establish four leading propositions, which, according to my view, are to be deemed the basis of the history of civilization. They are: 1st, That the progress of mankind depends on the success with which the laws of phenomena are investigated, and on the extent to which a knowledge of those laws is diffused. 2nd, That before such investigation can begin, a spirit of scepticism must arise, which, at first aiding the investigation, is afterwards aided by it. 3rd, That the discoveries thus made increase the influence of intellectual truths, and diminish—relatively, not absolutely—the influence of moral truths; moral truths being more stationary than intellectual truths, and receiving fewer additions. 4th. That the great enemy of this move-

ment, and therefore the great enemy of civilization, is the protective spirit; by which I mean the notion that society cannot prosper unless the affairs of life are watched over and protected at nearly every turn by the state and the church; the state teaching men what they are to do, and the church teaching them what they are to believe. Such are the propositions which I hold to be the most essential for a right understanding of history, and which I have defended in the only two ways any proposition can be defended; namely, inductively and deductively."

You will ask me now whether these four propositions are still considered the basis of the history of civilization. If we should go by the judgment of the most competent authorities, both in Europe and America, we have to say that at present these propositions are not considered the basis of the history of civilization. H. Spencer and Stanley Jevons, in England; E. Littré, in France; Sybel, Peschel, in Germany, are among the many great authorities who refused to accept Buckle's four propositions as leading principles. Accordingly, I advise you to read Buckle, you will most certainly enjoy his book very much, but please don't look at it as you would at a scientific book, as you would at Sir I. Newton's "Principles," or at J. St. Mills' Logic. Read it as you would read the Essays of Montaigne or Charles Lamb, but don't let your historical conceptions be biased by those brilliant sallies of the first volume, which, though suggestive of some truth, are very far from containing truth itself.

More real service has been done by the quiet and unostentatious labors of an American scholar, Mr. Lewis Morgan. Mr. Morgan took a fancy to the aboriginal Indians of this country, and made for many years a special study of their habits and customs. Although paying attention to the institutions of all the known tribes of the United States, as well as to the different Pueblos of Mex-

ico and the numberless tribes of Central and South America, his studies were chiefly concerned with the highly-interesting community of the Iroquois. He acquired a thorough knowledge of their language, he penetrated into all the mysteries of their usages, both military and civil, and summed up his studies in a most valuable work on this Indian tribe. He noticed that the Iroquois are still in the same state of beginning civilization in which the civilized part of the world has been 2,000 or 3,000 years ago. He consequently assumed that a study of the institutions of the Iroquois and similar tribes will help us to a great extent in the study of ancient society, of society as it most probably has been some 2,000 or 3,000 years ago. Continuing this line of argument and comparison, he extended his studies to almost every known savage and half-savage tribe. Aided by the United States Government, he sent circulars to every Consul of the United States and to all the different missionaries all over the world, asking them, under several headings, a series of questions as to the system of kingship, tribal government and civil rights of those savage tribes. The circulars were faithfully answered and sent back to Washington. Mr. Morgan thus collected an inestimable mass of well-arranged facts covering the whole globe. The systematic elaboration of these facts he published under the title of "Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family." This great work made him the first ethnologist of the country. It was highly praised in England and France, and the celebrated Sir J. Lubbock did not hesitate to declare that Mr. Morgan's book is one of the most valuable contributions to the science of sociology which has of late appeared. Morgan continued his studies, gathering facts from all quarters, and at last came out with his principal work, the title of which is, "Ancient Society, or, Researches in the Lines of Human


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Progress From Savagery Through Barbarism Into Civilization." In accordance with his view of evolution, Mr. Morgan has treated the history of mankind as a growth, and his book is divided into four parts, headed respectively: (1) Growth of Intelligence Through Inventions and Discoveries; (2) Growth of the Idea of Government; (3) Growth of the Idea of Family; (4) Growth of the Idea of Property. He acknowledges three classes succeeding each other, viz.: Society based upon difference of sex, society based upon kin and political society, and upon territory and property.

The theories of Mr. Morgan have been vehemently assailed, especially in England. The late McClennan was one of his most resolute opponents. The strife is still going on, and many of the issues involved in it have not yet been settled by an unanimous vote of science. But there is one part at least of Mr. Morgan's studies which has almost universally been accepted as a reliable doctrine borne out by all kinds of well ascertained facts. I am referring to Mr. Morgan's inquiries into the origin of the family. Up to the time of Mr. Morgan's book, it was generally believed that the family, consisting of husband and wife, has been the original social unit, out of which every other aggregate of people developed. The general doctrine was, that a tribe or a clan originated from a family. Whereas, in reality the family makes its appearance much later than the tribe, and in fact almost every people had a tribal system long before it ever thought to found a family. This one proposition is of the very highest importance. Many of the most essential doctrines of politics and law start with the assumption that the family was the original unit of society. It is therefore, more or less of primary importance to understand this principal result of Mr. Morgan's labors. He has not given us a history of the whole course of human civiliza-

tion ; but at any rate, we are indebted to him more than to any one else for an insight into one of the foundations of our society.

Ladies and Gentlemen :—By what I had to say of Vico and Herder, Comte, Buckle and Morgan, you will easily see that the scientific history of civilization has not yet reached the state of maturity enjoyed by other sciences. In the course of my lectures, I will be frequently compelled to confess the insufficiency of my authorities. Great and lasting results have, however, been achieved, and I trust that with your kind assistance, we shall be able to traverse the ocean of our science in a safe and pleasant way.



PRELIMINARY LECTURES.

II.

References:—*Bachofen*, Mutterrecht. *McLennan*, Primit. Marr. *L. Morgan*, Anc. Soc. *Salverte*, Hist. of Names. *Lalor*, Pol. Cycl. *Laveleye*, Prim. Property. *Sullivan*, Brehon Laws. *Sir I. Phear*, Aryan household. *Marquardt*, Roem. Staatsrecht.

In my first lecture, I tried to give you the outlines of the modern conception of historiography. We came to the conclusion, that a right understanding of historical events does not depend on a minute and painful study of military annals, nor does history, and especially the history of civilization pay much attention to single persons of alleged great influence. Whoever has a real and serious desire to understand the course of development of humanity, must simply discard the old and obsolete way of looking at events, and endeavor to grasp those ideas and conceptions which have of late been recognized as the true principles of historical science. Within the extremely narrow limits of this course of lectures, I have, very much against my will, to restrict myself to a few salient points, and although expressing my deep regret that I can not here discuss these questions at full length, I shall nevertheless, aspire to throw the brightest possible light on those main points and leading principles which alone can be the subject of this synoptical course.

Assuming now the question as little removed from its outset as possible, I begin with asking, what is the real, the proper, the scientific subject of a history of civilization? My answer to this paramount question is extremely brief, in fact, it consists only of one single word, but this word is big with meaning, abundant with ideas, and far reaching in its purport. The real, proper subject-matter of a scientific history of civilization consists of

INSTITUTIONS.

The word "Institution" is a very usual word, a hackney expression used and applied in the wear and tear of every day's talk. If you hear that some nations greet each other by mutually rubbing their noses, or that in many countries a person who sneezes is being congratulated by his present friends on account of that memorable event in the function of his nose, or that on the continent of Europe the gentleman has invariably to extend his right arm to the lady and never his left arm,—such and a score of similar manners are frequently called social institutions. Now I am far from belittling the study of such national habits. I heartily agree with the fervor of those painstaking and diligent scholars and travellers who collect all they can about those usages of daily life with different nations. But on the other hand, those usages can not be called institutions in the strict scientific sense of the term. For—and that is my chief object at present,—for the term institutions is a scientific term with a strict, limited sense of its own. You remember that all scientific terms have that peculiarity of being limited, strictly limited in their sense. The term increment in the calculus does not mean any increment of whatever size, and of a discrete or a continuous quantity, but it means strictly, the infinitesimal increase of a variable quantity. The same way in all other sciences. That is the very blessing of real and genuine science that it always uses words in one and the same strict sense. The meanings of these words never shift, they have a clear, candid look about them, they never eye you a-slant, they never squint. This, then, being the first condition we must first circumscribe the precise meaning of our term "Institution;" the more so because this whole course of lectures shall treat of nothing else but institutions.

In order to get at a precise, exact definition of this our chief and most substantial term in the shortest and most efficacious way, I shall analyze it and at the same time compare it with an almost absolutely identical term in anatomy. We heard in our first lecture that in treating history as a science we have to look at a people, or a nation as forming one huge common body, or as Th. Hobbes put it, as a Leviathan, and that we may safely ask for the laws, the physical and physiological qualities of this body. In the science of organic bodies, our progress being by far the greater one, we may feel assured that much, very much, may be learned from an attentive observation of those methods which have proved successful in anatomy and physiology. Anatomy teaches us that the solid parts of our body consist of tissues. All solid parts are composed of tissues. It was the celebrated Bichat, a Frenchman, who founded this remarkable doctrine. He established the highly important fact that the solid parts of our body are composed of twenty one tissues, not more nor less. These twenty-one tissues, though similar to each other in some way or another, have at the same time marked differences in structure and chemical quality. None of them are absolutely alike, and, on the other hand, all tissues of the human body belong to one of the twenty-one classes, or, as it were, species of tissues. This doctrine of Bichat's has so far not been overruled, though more than eighty-four years have elapsed since Bichat's death. But Schwann and Schleiden and Virchow have shown that every simple tissue, vegetable as well as animal, consists in ultimate analysis of organic cells. But this new doctrine served only to specify the statements of Bichat. To the present day it is taught that all solid organs of the human body are composed of tissues, and that there are twenty-one different classes of these tissues in existence.

Returning now to our Leviathan, could we not suppose that such an organic body is similarly composed of such elements as the tissues of the human body? Take, for the sake of closer explanation of the matter, the human hand. From the standpoint of the anatomist, the hand is an organ composed of so and so many tissues of different kinds, fitted to work as levers, and thereby perform all sorts of manual labor. For the anatomist the shape of the hand, the number and varying size of the fingers, the tenderness of the skin, does not make the slightest difference. In fact, the hands are for him nothing but a more refined repetition of the foot. He simply looks at the constitutive elements of the hand, viz., at the tissues. He does the same thing with regard to all the solid organs of the human body; he tries to find out their different tissues and the way they influence each other. Can we now really hope to find such tissues, as it were, which in their aggregate form the elements of our body politic, of our leviathan? To be sure we can. And these tissues of our Leviathan are the institutions of a nation. We may accordingly define this leading term of our science in a rather descriptive way, that institutions are the tissues of a people. You will remark that I am using a term of anatomy in order to define a conception of history. But let us beware of all kinds of childish, misplaced application of other sciences. The enormous progress of the science of organic nature has misled a good many of the most gifted inquirers to use, or rather to abuse, the terminology of natural science. It seems to be the special fate of Charles Darwin's remarkable works to serve as labels to all kinds of mixed drinks. We frequently hear of Darwinism in history, Darwinism in æsthetics, Darwinism in ethics, Darwinism in politics, and Darwinism everywhere. These vain and puerile aspirations must be utterly and absolutely disregarded. Let me venture to give you an ad-

vice : Try to be as diligent, as conscientious, as cautious as Charles Darwin, but don't try to apply his words to matters not directly connected with his subject.

While I therefore use the word tissues in defining our term, "institutions," I am far from thinking that this anatomical term will be of any immediate use for me ; I am far from doing what a good many German writers on sociology, especially Prof. Schaeffle, do, that is to say, of blending my historical subject with all kinds of far-fetched analogies from natural science. The word tissue I use simply to illustrate the proper definition of institutions. For the proper and direct definition of this term is this : Institutions are the elements of the body politic.

A few moments ago I spoke of Schwann and Schleiden and their discovery of those ultimate constituents of an organic body, of the cells. There is an analogous thing in the body politic. The cells of the body politic are the individual persons. But there is this great difference. If one-half of the population of the State of Ohio would suddenly emigrate, the State of Ohio would nevertheless remain unaltered ; the existence of this State does not depend on Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones ; the State of Ohio has an existence of its own. But if the legislative power of the State of Ohio ; if the Legislature in Ohio would, by any power whatsoever, be annihilated, the State of Ohio would not only be altered, but it would finally cease to exist. Consequently, the Legislature of Ohio is one of its institutions, one of its elements. To recur once more to our previous example : When the textile tissues in the human body, or its fibrous tissues, would of a sudden be annihilated, the human body would cease to exist as such. The human body can exist without a head, or without an eye, but it can not exist in the form of a human body without the textile or fibrous tissues. For these tissues are the institutions of the body, whereas a

hand or an eye is only an organ, an implement of the body.

I must beg your pardon for dwelling, perhaps, too much on this one term. But my apology lies in the circumstance, that this one term rules our whole science. There is no fair, or even approximative understanding of our science, unless we have found a clear and precise idea of Institutions. Let me cite a few illustrations. You all enjoy or suffer from the general habit of treating in this country. Now, we are perfectly entitled to ask, as a matter of our science, whether treating is an institution of the United States? In scarcely any other country will you find the same custom. Without discussing all the beery and winy details of this question, I feel confident in stating that treating is not an institution of the United States, but an outcome of an institution. Another example. It is a very general custom of the United States, to write your name in three divisions. I mean that in America the custom prevails to write one's name that way: John E. Smith, the first name John in full, then one letter E., and then the family name in full, John E. Smith.

It seems to be very easy to account for that. One would think, that this way of giving your name is due to the necessity of making your name easily distinguishable from any other name. But if this reason would account for it, it would be incomprehensible why persons in other countries do not use the same contrivance.

Take Berlin, there are some 4,000 Schmidt and some 10,000 Mueller in the city of Berlin. Every single bearer of this name has two or three Christian names; but, when it comes to signing his name he invariably signs it E. Schultze, F. Mueller, G. Schmidt, never using the American pattern of Henry F. Schultze. Perhaps, you might think that these are very trifling things and not worth the attention of the scientist. But a moment's consideration

will make you hesitate. The manner of naming persons is a faithful mirror of the institutions of a people. Look at the ancient Greeks. In ancient Greece every person had only one name. We hear of Aristotle, of Thucydides, of Cimon, of Sokrates, but we never hear of another name annexed to this one. The father of Cimon was named Miltiades, the father of Thucydides was named Oloros, the father of Aristotle was named Nikomacho. At present it would seem to be ludicrous beyond any limit to ask for the family name of the father, after having learned the family name of the son. But in ancient Greece it was utterly impossible to guess at the name of the father by the name of the son. The Roman system differed entirely. Every Roman, as a rule, had three names; the nomen, praenomen and cognomen. It is a surprising coincidence that the ancient Romans followed almost to an iota, the American way of signing names. They signed, Marcus T. Cicero or M. Tullius Cicero, M. Antistius Labeo, C. Sempronius Grachus; in other words, they wrote one first name in full, one with the initial letter, and one again in full. Christianity introduced an entirely new way of signing. To the present day, Emperors and Kings in Europe have no family names. The full name of the Queen of England is Victoria, nothing else; the full name of the German Emperor is William, nothing else. This most interesting topic, by the way, is most elaborately and profusely discussed in a work of an excellent French philosopher, by the name of Salverte in his excellent work: History of names. Returning now to our question, is the American habit of signing names an institution of America, of the United States? Can't it be called an institution? I again answer: This custom is an outcome of an institution, but not an institution itself.

By these few illustrations, you will see that it is not an easy task to denote the institutions of a country. In fact, it is one of the most difficult investigations.

Bichat succeeded in an enumeration of the institutions of the human body ; he fixed the very number of these institutions, you remember his statement of the twenty-one tissues of our body. Our science has not yet come to a similar successful enumeration of the institutions of the body politic. I can not specify in number or quality all the different institutions of society, civil and politic. So far we are only able to establish a few of the undoubted institutions of our Leviathan, and par excellence the institutions of Family, Tribe and State. It is these three institutions that I am going to discuss now at some length. First, the general institution of family. I say general, for we have to distinguish between general and special institutions. Some institutions will be met with almost every people, some other institutions are the specific product of a single country. You will be astonished, perhaps, to understand that the city governments of the United States are in politics as novel an invention as is the telephone in physics. Never before did a people possess a similar institution. The Supreme Court of the United States has in a good many of its decisions declared that the meaning of the word city, when conveying the American institution, is absolutely different from both Continental or English cities, and that an analogy can scarcely be found. You may look for an excellent article in Lalor's Political Cyclopaedia, article city, where you will find the said decisions. I shall have the pleasure of enlarging on the special institutions of this great republic in the last lectures of this course. At present we are concerned with general institutions, common to all nations, or almost to all, and in the first place with the institution of Family.

In our first lecture I mentioned that our view of the

history of family has of late been entirely altered. We owe our better insight into this most important question to the extensive labors of a distinguished American scholar, Mr. Lewis Morgan, of Rochester, N. Y. Up to his time the general theory of the origin of society was to the effect that society originally started from the family. The family was the social unit, the protoplasm of society. And accordingly it was believed that originally the father was the absolute master of his wife, of his children, and the goods of the little community. In other words, it was taught that society began with the family, and that the family was ruled by paternal power, by the power of the father. But this disparagement of the power of women is neither gallant nor consistent with truth. On the contrary, it is now a well established fact that society started with the absolute governing and domineering power of women. Four or five thousand years ago, as well as at present, women were bossing and running society. Fathers were not heeded; in fact, nobody knew his father. For there was no monogamic family, no family at all. It was the rude state of natural freedom. The only fact that everybody was really aware of was the personality of his mother. And consequently the mother alone owned the child, the mother alone protected the child. All kindred went through women, the kin of the father was totally ignored. The father was no relative to his son, nor was the father's brother, or the father's father; the father would not be heir to his son, nor the son to his father, he was not named after his father, but after his mother. And this seemingly very curious state of things is not only a feature of archaic antiquity; we find it still among numberless nations at the present time. Kindred through women is recognized in Australia, in the Marianne Islands, in Fiji, Tonga, and in the Caroline Islands. The natives of the Chinese province Keangse,

the Nairs of Malabar, the Zaporogue Cossacks, and the red men of the United States maintain this odd custom. Besides very many African tribes, with the Basques (that quaint people in the southwest corner of France), women inherited property to the exclusion of males as late as the eighteenth century. In some of the bilingual inscriptions of Etruria, written in Etruscan and Latin, the Etruscan text gives only the name of the mother of the dead, while the Latin text gives that of the father. Herodotus teaches us that daughters in Egypt were compelled by law to maintain their parents, while sons were free to do as they pleased. This has been curiously confirmed by the legal documents of certain private Egyptian families, lately deciphered by Mr. Revillout. The custom of marrying one or several women is of a comparatively recent origin. All peoples have a peculiar tradition as to the origin of this solemnity, and it is an astounding fact that in all these traditions snakes and serpents play the leading part. Greek mythology attributes the origin of marriage to the serpent, so do the sacred books of the Hebrews, and tribes of Australia ascribe it to the lizard, Hindoos, on the other hand, to Svetakatu, a divine being, Egyptians to Menes, Chinese to Fohi.

This very irregular state of female rules, which lasted for many, many centuries, until it was supplanted by the establishment of male power, has been first elucidated by Mr. Bachofen and Mr. McLennan. Bachofen introduced the term *Mutterrecht* (mother-right). He said in the beginning, there was nothing but *Mutterrecht*. McLennan, who had never learned of the existence of Bachofen's book, wrote an exquisite treatise on "Primitive Marriage," in which he propounded the same doctrine with Bachofen, adducing, however, a more satisfactory apparatus of evidence and proof. Bachofen's book is the most unwieldy piece of literary performance that you can possi-

bly come across. The german writers have a peculiar talent of making simple things intricate, and intricate things perfect enigmas. McLennan's book "Primitive Marriage" is, though slovenly in style, one of the most attractive books of recent english literature.

I stated just now, that in very, very ancient times, there was no family at all, neither polygamous, nor polyandrous, nor monogamous. What, then, took the place of it? How did men at that remote time contrive to find a common interest which was strong enough to unite them together, to keep up a union between them? The answer is very simple: Men at that time were kept together by the bonds of their tribe. We shall now occupy ourselves with that primary institution. In order to come rapidly to a comprehensive and exhaustive view of our subject, I shall contrast the old and the new theory of the tribe. The old, and still more or less prevalent theory of the origin of the tribe goes as follows: The beginning of the tribe is the family. After the death of the father, who is considered the absolute ruler of the family, his oldest son succeeds him, and in course of time this association of kindred, by natural increase and by adoption develops into the clan, or as the Romans called it, gens, or as the Greeks named it genos. As generations multiply, the more distinct relations split off into other classes, relieving, however, the sense of primitive kinship. They unite into tribes. These, again, as civilization advances, acknowledge themselves to be subjects of a King, in whose veins the blood of the original family runs purest. Before entering the converse theory, let me apologize for using some terms, the explanation of which I shall give below. The converse theory, then, runs thus: The totem kindred of savages grow up through exogamy and female kinship; this change is effected by the superinducement of male kinship, by the substitution

of the name of a fictitious ancestor for that of the sacred plant, animal or natural object. In accordance with the principle laid down in the beginning of this lecture, I shall try now to attain a precise definition of the terms of these two theories contrasted. We heard the terms tribe and totem. Very few terms of ethnology have been subject to such a careless treatment on the part of travelers and scientists as the term tribe. They call tribe, what in reality is a clan, or a common household, or a military division, or a religious corporation. And thus, we have to be extremely careful in accepting their relations of tribal systems. More than one-half of the immense literature on Indian tribes in the United States, on the pueblos in Mexico, on the numberless tribes in Central and South America, and still in a higher degree the literature on the races of Africa is stained with that ugly blot. We must draw clear and broad lines of demarcation between a common household, as the one we find in India, or the gens of the ancient Romans, the *genos* of the ancient Greeks, the tribes of the ancient Hebrews, the mark of the Germans, the clans of the Scotch, the village communities of the Hindoo, Irish, and the Bosnian, Bulgarian, Russian (*mir*) and many other people, and the totem kindred of the red Indians. All these different and self-existent institutions have been promiscuously called tribe, or gens, or clan. The meaning attached to these words continually overlaps their proper sense, and thus a cheerless confusion has arisen, the disentanglement of which is one of the heaviest burdens on our science. A tribe is not a gens. I use the word gens because Mr. Morgan's introduction of this Roman term has met with the approval of great authorities. Once more, a tribe is not a gens. A tribe is a coalition of gentes, a union of several gentes. We have now to inquire, what is a gens? Here we may abide by the brief and precise defi-

nition of Mr. Morgan. The gens is a body of consanguinei descended from the same common ancestor, distinguished by a gentile name, and bound together by affinities of blood. It includes, however, a moiety only of such descendants. In the earliest times this ancestor was supposed to be a female; therefore, descent was in the female line, later it changed to the male line. When the primitive ancestor was supposed to have been a woman, all the kin through the father and his natural relatives were excluded; and vice versa, when the original ancestor was supposed to have been a male person, all kin through women was excluded. This system was the case with the Romans. In Rome, and not only in ancient times, but down to the times of the Emperors, the mother of a Roman was in law only his sister and her husband's daughter. This was a matter of absolute necessity, because kin through women being precluded, a Roman's wife, after the death of her husband, would have been divested of every legal claim on the heritage of her husband. The different rights and privileges of the member of a gens are of course far too numerous to admit of a satisfactory statement. But to illustrate this institution with an example, let me give you the rights of the Iroquois gentiles as communicated by Mr. Morgan. These rights are ten in number. 1.—The right of electing its sachem and chiefs. 2.—The right of deposing its sachem and chiefs. 3.—The obligation not to marry into the gens. 4.—Mutual rights of inheritance to the property of deceased members. 5.—Reciprocal obligations of help, defense and redress of injuries. 6.—The right of bestowing names upon its members. 7.—The right of adopting strangers into the gens. 8.—Common religious rites. 9.—A common burial place. 10.—A council of the gens.

That is the gens. We can state it now as an undoubted

fact of science that the original unit of ancient society was not the family, but the gens. Before leaving this most attractive institution, we have yet to treat of our other term, of totem. This odd institution is founded on a most general belief among uncivilized people that they descend from animals, plants, or stones. Surprising as this may seem to you, it is nevertheless a usage of almost universal acceptance. A gens in Australia, *e. g.*, has a firm belief in its descent from the kangaroo, and consequently no member of this gens will ever dare to slay or eat this animal. The tribe of the Senecas is composed of sets of persons, called by the names of Wolf, Bear, Turtle, Beaver, Deer, Snipe, Heron, Hawk. They all firmly believe to descend respectively from a wolf, a deer, a turtle, etc. Accordingly a wolf, a deer, a turtle, a beaver, is their totem. No member of the wolf association will ever dare to slay or eat a wolf, and no male member of the same association will ever marry a woman of another association; another gens, if this other gens happen to bear the same name of Wolf, Turtle, Hawk, etc. There is a curious coincidence of this half-savage custom and the heraldic systems of European nobility. The coats of arms of a European Count generally display an animal—a lion, a deer, a lamb, a dog. This animal is, as it were, the totem of the Count's family, and to remove it would be equivalent of depriving him of his nobility.

I must regret that I can not follow up this very interesting topic into all its details. It will be sufficient at present to remark that totem kindred preceded family kindred. Savages were first united by totem kindred, *i. e.*, by a belief that they all descend from a common animal, or plant, or stone. Then this changed, and they began to believe in a descent from a common female person, and lastly in a descent from a common male person, always retaining, meanwhile, a good many of the features of totem kindred.

When men first began to think of marrying women, they had in the majority of the known gentes or tribes a general rule forbidding a man to take his wife from among the daughters of his own tribe. The reason of this singular rule it is rather difficult to make out. This rule goes by the scientific name of exogamy. Exogamy means a prohibition to marry in one's own tribe. Consequently our ancestors had to look out for their fiancées in other and foreign tribes. But these foreign tribes, again, were generally hostile towards them, and so the bride had to be simply kidnapped. She had to be captured. This custom of capturing the bride (a subject which you will find completely handled in Mr. McLennan's book, *Primitive Marriage*,) has been observed with the Tunguzians, Khonds, Fuegians, the Welsh, the Arabs, the Irish, and others. It is highly curious to remark the survivals of this queer custom in some usages of very civilized people. It is customary in some parts of England that the parents of the bride should stay at home while the marriage ceremony is being performed in the church. This vestige of an aboriginal custom connects the present age with extremely remote ages of the past. For in the past the parents of the bride were most certainly not present at the marriage ceremony of their kidnapped daughters. You all remember the interesting story about the rape of the Sabine women.

The question of marriage brings us back to the institution of family. When the family did arise was it monogamous or polygamous? The best ascertained results of the combined labors of Bachofen, McLennan and Morgan tend to prove that the monogamous family is of a very late date. Originally, all nations, or rather tribes, lived in polygamy or polyandry. By polyandry we mean the institution of several husbands married to one wife. We must carefully beware of disdaining or absolutely abhorring people with whom this institution obtained. At the

present time more than 30,000 millions of respectable and civilized people (I mean the population of Thibet) consider polyandry as the rule of their life. Some of the keenest observers, as Mr. Wilson, in his book, "Abode of Snow," can not but express his respect for the uprightness, soberness and peaceful industry of the polyandrous Thibetans.

As to polygamy, it is a well known fact, that by far the majority of human beings live in polygamy. Polygamy obtained with the Chinese, Indian, Burmese, Javanese, Arabs, Persians, etc., all of them civilized people, with an elaborate literature and great achievements in science and art. It is not our business to judge the ethical or moral value of these institutions. We have simply and exclusively to state facts. The fact is, that the polygamous and polyandrous family preceded the monogamous family, that our monogamous family is of very recent origin.

As to the different stages of this development, we have not yet come to a definite result, and hence, I shall not quote what Morgan called his five successive forms of the family. The only reliable result of science at present is this, that polygamy and polyandry are not wilful departures from the supposed rule of monogamy, on the contrary, the reverse appears now to answer the real history of the family.

We have so far, come to a fair definition of the gens and of the tribe, and we cleared the way to a proper understanding of the institution of the family. It is now incumbent on us to examine the third great Institution, that of the State. It is very easy to ask, what is a State?—but it is more than difficult to give a correct answer. Not that we would complain of a lack of ready-made definitions. More than 200 different definitions of a State have been launched from the time of Aristotle, who

first wrote on politics, down to the present year. You can find this dazzling array of words in Bluntschli's history of political science. But I am sorry to say, that the authors of these longwinded definitions, who all pretend to be on the best of terms with the spirit and philosophy of politics, although they may do justice to themselves, fail entirely to do justice to the State. I think this a very convenient opportunity to mention the renowned book of Sir Henry Sumner Maine. You all know his book, the title of which is "Ancient Law." The book was, at the time of its first apparition, quite a sensation. It was considered a real revelation, and people began to look with pity on those unfortunate writers whose lamentable misfortune it has been to die before the publication of Sir Henry's book. The waves of admiration, however, began to subside, and at present "Ancient Law," viz: Sir Henry's book is on a level with 100 other books of ordinary merit.

With all requisite deference to this worthy gentleman, I am obliged to state, that especially those portions of his book which treat of the Roman State (and they form the moiety of the work)—are void of all scientific value. He reminds you of that exquisite passage in Goethe's Faust, where the immortal German speaks of the writers of history. This passage may serve as a motto to the historians, who, instead of giving you the spirit and tendency of events, give only the spirit of their own poor mind. I shall read the passage both in German and English. The English translation of Faust, the best of all translations of this gem of gems, has been written by the celebrated American poet, Bayard Taylor. The passage I refer to is part of the scene between Faust and Wagner, his assistant. Faust representing the pure, ideal genius, craving for genuine truth, and Wagner the pedantic scholar, who delights in heaps of withered manuscripts.

WAGNER.

Verzeiht! es ist ein gross Ergetzen,
 Sich in den Geist der Zeiten zu versetzen
 Zu schauen, wie vor uns ein weiser Mann gedacht,
 Und wie wir's dann zuletzt so herrlich weit gebracht.

FAUST.

O ja, bis an die Sterne weit!
 Mein Freund die Zeiten der Vergangenheit.
 Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln;
 Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst
 Das ist im Grund der Herren eigener Geist,
 In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.
 Da ist's denn wahrlich oft ein Jammer
 Man laeuft euch bei dem ersten Blick davon
 Ein Kerichtfass und eine Rumpelkammer,
 Und hoechstens eine Haupt-und Staats action,
 Mit trefflichen pragmatischen Maximen
 Wie sie den Puppen wol im Munde ziemen!

WAGNER.

Pardon! a great delight is granted
 When, in the spirit of the ages planted,
 We mark how, ere our time, a sage has thought,
 And then, how far his work, and grandly, we have brought.

FAUST.

O, yes, up to the stars at last!
 Listen, my friend, the ages that are past
 Are now a book with seven seals protected,
 What you the spirit of the Ages call
 Is nothing but the spirit of you all
 Wherein the ages are reflected,
 So, oftentimes, you miserably mar it!
 At the first glance who sees it, runs away.
 An offal-barrel and a lumber garret,
 Or, at the best, a Punch-and-Judy play,
 With maxims most pragmatistical and hitting,
 As in the mouths of puppets are befitting.

Perhaps, some of you are astonished that neither in my first nor in my second lecture have I availed myself of the works of Herbert Spencer. H. Spencer's work, that is, taking some of the products of his prolific pen, cover the very ground that I am speaking of. But, neither in this nor in any of my future lectures, shall I devote much time

to Spencer's writings. It is a well known tenet of his philosophy that all knowledge refers either to the knowable or to the unknowable. But this apparently very modest classification of knowledge applies only to other persons. For H. Spencer himself seems or pretends, at least, to know everything, and thus the unknowable does not exist for him.


Reading his book on social institutions, you will easily find his long declamation on the State, on the nature, and on the origin of the State. If I were to follow him, I could, with the greatest complacency, give you the solution of the many, many riddles connected with the State. But I do not believe in his doctrines, and I am not going to deceive you with a show of false learning. If you should ask me: Can you tell me how the idea of State did arise, how it developed, and how it decays?—I would not hesitate for a moment to express my ignorance. In fact, I am proud of this confession. I know most positively, that we have no scientific knowledge of the development of the State. I don't feel ashamed of this rather poor state of my science, for sciences very much older than mine have to confess their insufficiency with regard to the most ordinary occurrences of every day's life. Let me cite a very striking example. The science of mechanics is now 200, and some 40 to 50 years old; it dates from the time of Galilei. Do you think that the science of mechanics is able to give a full explanation of that very common phenomenon, the kite? No, it is not able.

Sir W. Thompson, the greatest living physicist, said but a year ago, that he can not account in a physico-mathematical way for the movements of a kite. But, at the same time, I have to remind you that such a confession of ignorance is, with regard to our present subject, with regard to the development of the State, the exception

and not the rule. For as I remarked a few minutes ago, the majority of writers on the State assume the attitude of perfect knowledge. But after a careful study of their works, I came to the conclusion that their results do not stand the test of scientific arguments.

All we know about the development of the State comes to this: The State is one of the elements, one of the institutions, or, to use Bichat's word—one of the tissues of the body politic. It assumes various forms, and its functions are of a diversified character. It is, sometimes, vested in a plurality of persons, sometimes in no person at all, as in the case of the old Hebrews, sometimes again in a few individuals.

Ladies and Gentlemen: These are the leading principles as to the institutions of the family, the tribe and the State. Castes will more conveniently be discussed in our next lecture on China and India.





COLLOSSAL STATUE OF BUDDHA.

(From a Photograph.)

CHINA AND INDIA.

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

In our first two lectures we came to a definite and precise result as to the real and proper subject-matter of a scientific History of Civilization. We circumscribed it as a discussion of the Institutions of different ages. Institutions are the very soul of our society, and accordingly, I shall treat of China and India, and exclusively with a view to the institutions of these countries. You can not, therefore, expect a list of all the emperors of China, or an enumeration of all the numberless Indian rajahs and Mohammedan kings and mogul despots who in succession have ruled the gorgeous island of India. Kings and their courts, battles, wars, although of unequivocal influence on the destinies of a nation, are by principle excluded from our course of studies. Any one may easily satisfy his curiosity with regard to these topics by reading the numerous books on the political history of either China or India. The most recommendable of these books are Mills' History of India and Guetzlaff's History of China. I shall treat first of China.

It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the vast importance of China for a student of sociology. You know that the Chinese people form exactly the third part of all humanity. Now, how can we expect to get at a right understanding of the development of the human race if we should neglect the study of an entire third part of humanity? Humanity is one gigantic, transcendental unity, and to neglect the third part of it would amount, and in fact does amount, to a dreary garbling of our knowledge.

I had abundant opportunity in my first and second lectures to illustrate the great advancement of knowledge and increase of light that accrued from the study of half-savage people. Our better insight into the origin and development of the Family is due to a careful investigation into the manners and customs of half-savage people. Is it, then, not a mere matter of trivial truth that our obligations to China, provided we study her institutions in the proper way, would be, as they partially are, still greater and more momentous?

Undoubtedly. It is perfectly hopeless and puerile to speak of China in a smiling, half-pitying way, as of a quaint set of semi-profligate heathens. The Chinese are a great people, with a wonderful civilization, with perfectly marvellous achievements in science and art, with a richness of domestic happiness and peaceful enjoyment of innocent pleasures which frequently roused the envy of the most enlightened European and American travelers. They have, in some arts at least, outstripped the most advanced minds in Europe, and at a time when the rest of the world was plunged in the most abject slavery, the Chinese had already succeeded in evolving a high stage of civilization and refinement. We must, therefore, approach China with the devout earnestness of a pupil, and not with the haughty, condescending sneer of a superior being.

You know that in all scientific investigations the very first duty incumbent on us is to inquire into the reliability and truthfulness of our sources. It is not sufficient to take up any book with a title like "Travels in China," or "Domestic Life in China," or "The Chinese People," and read it. Ninety per cent. of the itinerant scholars who traveled in China and inflicted their relations on humanity are of no value whatever. You must be first satisfied as to (1) whether the man could speak Chinese, (2) how long he stayed in China, (3) where he sojourned, whether only in

the treaty-ports, with their half-European finish, or in the genuine cities of the interior; (4) was the man really prepared for his task, had he acquired that rare quality of observing things? It is a truism that more than eyes are required to see anything. The eyes don't see any more than the foot. It is the mind that sees, and the mind has to be carefully prepared and disciplined. If you now put the bulk of writers on China to the fourfold test of the questions just mentioned, you will be astonished at the fearful shortcomings of these authors. Exceedingly few ever grasped the elements of the Chinese language, and consequently their works are absolutely of no account whatever. Just think of a man who would undertake to write a book on America after a sojourn of ten months in this country and without the least knowledge of English. Is that not absurd?

More than 8,000 books have been written on China, but only one per cent. of this huge mass may be safely taken as a real guide. Among these very few genuine sources we have to count those relations that have been published by Catholic missionaries from the thirteenth century upwards. The Catholic Church sent her missionaries, chiefly Franciscan monks, as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century. At a time when no European power ever dreamed of the existence of China, the Pontiff in Rome not only knew of this great empire, but also took very energetic measures to conquer it in a spiritual way by converting it to Christianity. The venerable name of Plan Carpini looms up in the far distance of the fifteenth century as the great missionary and teacher of China. Next to him stands the celebrated Venetian, Marco Polo. The travels of Polo are of the most fascinating and most trustworthy books on foreign countries that has ever been written. For Plan Carpini and Marco Polo the name China does not yet exist; they speak of Katay, and in mediæval times no other

name was known. The third great authorities on China are the Jesuit missionaries. It is a well known fact that the works of this Catholic order on the different tribes in America and Asia are now considered as the greatest treasury of information.

You are aware of the fact, that one of the best books on the red Indians of America has been written by the Jesuit Lafiteau in the beginning of the eighteenth century. The most prominent of the Jesuit missionaries in China towards the end of the sixteenth century was Peter Ricci, or as the Chinese call him, Lee-ma-tu. Numerous English, Dutch, French and Portuguese travellers have since visited the heavenly Kingdom, and left us at least some remarkable books on China. From personal study, I must express my great admiration for the works of Staunton, Guetzlaff, Julien, Legge, Huc, and Sir J. F. Davis.

Of late, the study of the Chinese language and literature has in Europe been taken up with considerable interest, and Remusat, Julien, Legge, are among the most efficient scholars of this miraculous language. They have published a long series of translations from Chinese literature, and very important contributions have been thus made to our knowledge of China.

Let me try now to characterize the general value of these our sources. Do we so far, really possess satisfactory sources as to the institutions of China? My answer to this is, that we do possess satisfactory sources of information with regard to a few of the leading institutions of China, but only with regard to a few. Hence, we can pass no definite and final judgment on China, we have still to bide our time and suspend our criticism.

Before reviewing the institutions of China, I shall first cast a glance at the Empire itself, at its size and population. China consists of China proper and her dependencies, Mandshuria, Mongolia, and Thibet. China is one-

third larger than the United States, and her population is certainly above 400,000,000. China proper is divided into nineteen provinces. Each of the provinces collects its own taxes, pays its own expenses, and has its own army and navy. Every province is divided into districts, and every district into sub-districts, and these again comprise other sub-divisions. I don't mention the titles of the different officers, mandarins as they are called, who stand at the head of these provinces, districts and sub-districts, because I am more than likely to pronounce those Chinese titles in an altogether wrong way, and I don't want to burden your memories with false terms. It is so extremely difficult to find the right pronunciation of a Chinese word. I shall speak of that later on when treating of the Chinese language.

In English books on China, you will, nevertheless, find the English term for Chinese officials. They continually speak of sheriffs, and coroners, and auditors, and probate judges in China, as though the English common law would have of time immemorial been the law of the Chinese. But that is sheer nonsense. I defy anybody to translate the word sheriff into German or French. There is no such word in German or French, for neither the Germans nor the Frenchmen ever had the English institution of a sheriff, nor had the Chinese either. And consequently, we know very little, next to nothing, of the internal regime of the provinces. It is true, all travellers relate us that mandarins are of nine grades, with different buttons on the top of their caps. But this interesting statement does not help us any to a better understanding of a Chinese administration.

More to the point is the statement, that a mandarin keeps office only for three years. But I must confess, that my authorities do not agree with respect to this most important point. To the present day there is no nobility

of birth in China, and the tenure of office supplies the only distinguishing rank in the Empire.

China is the great country of civil service reform and examination. No matter how old an official is, how many offices he might have been in, whenever he wants to ascend still higher, he must first pass a scholarly examination. These numberless examinations are the chief topic of conversation in Chinese private life. Everybody is interested in the result of the examination, the haphazard of which plays the part of exciting elections in other countries. But great is also the number of victorious candidates without an office, and that accounts for the amazing number of literary proletarians in China.

The government of China is, at present, a patriarchal despotism. But this was not always the case. For over 1,500 years (from 1,700—200 B. C.) China was divided into many realms of the feudal pattern, and only the Emperors of the then dynasty succeeded in subjecting all the feudal States into one large Empire. Twenty-two different dynasties have reigned in China, and the present dynasty is of Mandshu origin, and Mandshus take a prominent part in the government of the country. Submissive as they are, the Chinese maintain, nevertheless, the doctrine of Confucius and his disciple Mencius, that a wicked ruler has forfeited his right, that he may be dethroned and put to death. The same doctrine obtained with the Arabs with regard to their seemingly omnipotent chalifs, as is expressly stated in Maverdi's great system of Arabian constitutional law. That may show you that the Chinese system can not be called a despotism *pur et simple*. It has a fair sprinkling of democratic ideas, fully borne out by the frequent rebellions and revolutions of the Chinese people. The whole theory of Chinese government is the embodiment of parental and filial piety. As the people are the children of the

Emperor, so he is the Teen-tse, or the son of Heaven. He performs the national sacrifice, or State observances, the greatest of which is the sacrifice at the winter solstice, before sunrise, on the morning of the twenty-first of December, at the altar of Heaven.

His nominally boundless power is circumscribed by ceremonial laws and hampered by precedents, so that his whole life is one continual round of ceremonial observations. His privy council consists of nine Mandshu and seven Chinamen, besides there are six administrative boards for the whole empire.

In China polygamy is an admitted institution. It will be interesting to hear the marriage and divorce laws of the Chinese in the authentic translation of Sir Staunton.

“When a marriage is intended to be contracted, it shall be, in the first instance, reciprocally explained to, and clearly understood by, the families interested, whether the parties, who design to marry, are or are not diseased, infirm, aged, or under age, and whether they are the children of their parents by blood, or only by adoption. If either of the contracting families then object, the proceedings shall be carried no further; if they still approve, they shall then in conjunction with the negotiators of the marriage, if such there be, draw up the marriage articles, and determine the amount of the marriage-presents. If, after the woman is thus regularly affianced by the recognition of the marriage articles, or by a personal interview and agreement between the families, the family of the intended bride should repent having entered into the contract, and refuse to execute it, the person amongst them who had authority to give her away shall be punished with fifty blows, and the marriage shall be completed agreeably to the original contract; although the marriage-articles should not have been drawn up in writing, the acceptance of the marriage-presents shall be sufficient evidence of the agreement between the parties.”

The remaining clauses of this section provide, in every possibly way, against the infraction of a marriage-contract, whether on the part of the man or woman affianced, or of their respective relations. Lending a wife on hire is punishable with eighty blows; lending a daughter with sixty; those who receive the wives or daughters on hire for a limited time, are to participate equally in the aforesaid punishment, and the parties are to be separated; the pecuniary consideration for such loan to be forfeited to government.

“Moreover, although one of the seven justifying causes of divorce should be chargeable upon the wife, namely: 1. Barrenness; 2. Lasciviousness; 3. Disregard of her husband’s parents; 4. Talkativeness, 5. Thievish propensities; 6. Envious and suspicious temper; 7. Inveterate infirmity; yet, if any of the three reasons against a divorce should exist, namely: 1. The wife’s having mourned three years for her husband’s parents; 2. the family’s having become rich after having been poor previous to, and at the time of marriage; 3. The wife’s having no parents living to receive her back again. In these cases none of the seven aforementioned causes will justify a divorce, and the husband who puts away his wife upon such grounds, shall suffer punishment two degrees less than that last stated, and be obliged to receive her again.”

The bamboo plays a prominent part in this tender affair of loving hearts, but that is more a theoretical rule than a practical contrivance. For all travelers agree that the bamboo is used very sparingly. Some of the laws of China have been translated into English, but so far our knowledge, especially of the civil law of the Chinese, is very insignificant. We know very little about their jurisdiction, or courts of law, or attachments, or law of inheritance, etc.

There is, amongst others, a professor in Munich, Prof. Plath, who writes year in and year out big treatises on China

and her laws. But I suppose a person is more likely to make out some sense by looking at the mysterious hieroglyphs of original Chinese books than by studying the uncouth German products of Prof. Plath. At least I never succeeded.

By far greater are our attainments as to another of the institutions of China, I mean the language of that country. You will be surprised, perhaps, to hear of the language of a country as of one of its institutions. But a language is one of the most powerful institutions of a country, acting and reacting on every single individual, shaping the thoughts, coloring the sentiments, directing the feelings. It is true, a language, in many respects, is but a symptom, a result of institutions, but in course of time it becomes an institution itself, and the language of a people is so intimately connected with the institutions of that people as is the family, the mode of government and the religion.

Together with the decline of the institutions of Rome, we notice a similar decay of the language of Rome, and new institutions elicited a new language, the modern idiom of Italy. The rise of the Italian language coincides with the decay of Roman institutions. The rise of the English language, some 300 years before Shakspeare, coincides with the decay of Norman, and the rise of specific English institutions.

A closer study of a language always and unmistakably reveals the connection between language and other institutions. Take, *e. g.*, the English word thou. Since two centuries the custom of *thouing* persons has disappeared from usual English conversation, and accordingly all affixes and suffixes of nouns and verbs governed by "thou" have been dropped. In the beginning of the eighteenth century a good many persons were still clinging to the old custom of *thouing* persons of an inferior standing. Rich-

ard Bentley, the great English critic, kept up this way of address till his death. But his contemporaries considered it as an obsolete, effete custom. And why did the English drop this innocent word, "thou"? Because it commenced to clash with the spreading democratic spirit of the English society, by dint of which nobody liked to be considered inferior, and everybody wanted to be addressed by "you."

In German, in Hungarian, in Russian, on the other hand, there are three to four ways of addressing different people, but since 30 to 40 years one of them (the address by "er") has given way to the pressure of more democratic institutions. The Chinese language is one of the great institutions of China. It is a marvelous language. It consists exclusively of monosyllabic words. No Chinese word has more than one syllable; several of the letters of our alphabet are entirely unknown to the Chinese, o, f, C, r, z; no word begins with an a. The most marvellous thing, however, is that the whole Chinese language has only 500 sounds, viz. : all the words of their language are represented to the ear by only 500 sounds, and consequently one sound often conveys as many as 100 different meanings.

The art of writing the Chinese language is, beyond any doubt, one of the most curious inventions of mankind. In the majority of languages ideas are expressed by a combination of letters, representing, not the ideas themselves, but certain particular sounds with which those ideas, either by accident or by convention, have become identified. It is exclusively in the Chinese language that the seemingly visionary scheme of a philosophical character, immediately expressive of ideas and conceptions themselves, under an entire disregard of the sounds employed to give them utterance, has ever been generally adopted, a plan of which it may justly be said that the practice is no less

inconvenient and perplexing than the theory is beautiful and ingenious. (Compare Leibnitz's *Characteristics*).

The signs of the Chinese language being entirely independent of the sounds of the words they suggest, the Japanese have until recently used Chinese characters, Chinese word pictures to express the totally different Japanese word, so that the same line of words could at the same time be read by A in Chinese and by B in Japanese. The 60,000 characters, or rather word pictures, of the Chinese are compounds of exactly 214 elementary signs. The great dictionary of the Chinese language consists of 200 volumes, each as large as our Webster. This miraculous language is the vehicle of an extremely sober, unphantastic, jejune people, who believe in earthly wellbeing, and don't care very much for spiritual, transcendental objects. This language stifled all idealistic tendencies, all abstract philosophic aspirations in their very germ, for a language which never abandons the root of a word, never forms derivatives, must necessarily predispose to very clear but prosaic thinking.

It is accordingly in the abstract sciences that we find the Chinese most deficient. They know how to figure out the length of one side of the rightangled triangle by means of the two other sides, but they never generalized this rule, and never expressed the well-known rule of the hypotenuse in the abstract terms of Pythagoras. They have built magnificent bridges and wonderful buildings with all hidden intricacies of the arch and pillar, but they never abstracted the theoretical rule of vaulting an edifice or of curbing a bridge. The character of their language occasioned that peculiar tone of Chinese learning, which sticks to the word and sacrifices the sense. This incapacity of soaring into the region of the abstract prevented them from ever inventing a satisfactory system of arithmetic. They have never quit the threshold of the system of numbers; as this is little

known, and at the same time of the very greatest interest, I shall devote a few minutes to Chinese arithmetic.

For centuries the "*Livre de Mutations*" as the French missionaries used to call it was a perfect enigma to Chinese scholars.

This celebrated table consisted of sixty-four groups of six lines each, some of these lines being unbroken dashes, some of them broken into two parts. It was indicated in the table that one group denoted the number 20, another group 31, a third group 54; but nobody could account for the reason of this peculiar, mysterious way of writing numbers. The most renowned Chinese scholars failed in their efforts to solve the riddle. At last a copy of the table came into the possession of the celebrated German philosopher, Leibnitz, and he at once solved it. He said that in this table the first place is occupied by the unit, as in our decimal system; the next place, however, is occupied not by 10, but by 2; the third place by the square of 2; the fourth place by the cube of 2, etc.

In other words, in that mysterious table the number two was the fundamental number, and not the number 10, it was not our decimal system, but the binarian system. This then was the remotest boundary of Chinese theoretical arithmetic. But although more than deficient in abstract sciences, the Chinese have amassed an astounding amount of empirical knowledge concerning arts and industries and technical handicrafts. The most competent judges agree in unbounded admiration of the usefulness of Chinese books on empirical sciences. There is a general cyclopaedia written by one Mr. Twan Lin on which book Remusat and Wells Williams have bestowed a perfect shower of praise. They simply say that it is worth while to learn Chinese in order to enjoy this most wonderful book of Mr. Twan Lin's. Similar admiration has been expressed with regard to that gigantic Chinese encyclopedia of 6,109 vol-

umes, in comparison with which our most extensive encyclopedias are dwarfed into insignificance.

Of late the Chinese have established a scientific bureau in the Kiangnan arsenal, under the superintendence of Mr. John Fryar, and several 100 of the best scientific books of Europe and America have been translated into Chinese.

Our judgment on the literature of China rests chiefly on a restricted number of translated novels, lyrical poems and dramas. The most celebrated of these novels goes by the name "The Two Fairy Cousins." You will find a very amusing translation of this renowned Chinese novel in Fraser's Magazine for 1874. Two girls fall in love with the hero of the novel, and the good natured fellow is perfectly at a loss what to do. At last he disposes of the supernumerary heroine by marrying both.

The Chinese have no epos and their drama is very poorly developed. They are, however, passionate lovers of stage performances, and have, curious enough, the same rule with the Greeks, that no more than two persons can be on the stage at one and the same time. Women don't play on the stage.

A few moments ago I mentioned the sober, jejune mind of the average Chinese. The bulk of the nation never indulge in spirits, in fact they have no wine, no beer, no whiskey; opium is their only intoxicating drug. In accordance with this prosaic turn of mind is an almost entire absence of religious fervor. In fact the Chinese have no national religion. You will generally read of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism as being the chief religions of China. But this is incorrect, Confucianism and Taoism are no religions whatever. Taoism is an abstract philosophy, founded by Laotse, and Confucianism refers almost exclusively to the art of political government and private morals.

Confucius, or rather Kung (for fu tse simply means the wise, the sage) was a contemporary of Pythagoras, 550 B. C., and descended from noble ancestors. He held great offices and spent the greater part of his life in evolving a system of government which was mainly taken from old usage and a wise consideration of the most characteristic features of the Chinese.

Society, Confucius said, is an ordinance of Heaven, and is made up of five relations: viz.: ruler and subject, husband and wife, father and son, elder brother and younger brother and friends. When these five relations are appropriately established, nothing remains to be desired for. The celebrated five books of Kings are ascribed to Confucius, but more recent inquiries have proved that these sacred books, containing hymns, lyrical poems and mythological stories are of a different origin. The doctrine of Confucius, taught by his disciple Mencius, reads very much like the moralist treatises of Benjamin Franklin. They never sought to be evangiles of a religion, and Confucius himself never wanted to pass for a seer or prophet, or inspired writer. He hated to speak of spiritual things, and never gave an answer to transcendental questions. Consequently we cannot speak of Confucianism as a religion.

The only religious system widely spread among the Chinese is the Buddhism, or as it is called in China the Foism. I shall treat of this religion in connection with India. Confucius is considered the greatest sage of the Chinese people, his living lineal descendants in the 75th generation still hold large imperial estates.

I have not yet mentioned one of the most momentous institutions of China, an institution which has been frequently neglected by writers who pretend to treat their subject in a thoroughly scientific way. I allude to the Chinese cue.

The cue in China is an institution of the very greatest importance, and it shows only how very few people are

able to trace things up to their real source, that this remarkable institution has not yet met with an apt treatment. It is easy to make fun of the cue, to ridicule it. But science does not intend to deride or pity. Science wants simply to understand things. The Chinese have no national religion, no common Sabbath, no common prayer in temples; everyone prays for himself at home, and thus the bonds and ties of internal common interests are more or less missing. In lieu of *internal* bonds people always contrive to settle on some *external* badge or sign, as tattooing, or the rite of the semitic races, or a peculiar costume. The cue of the Chinese is his badge, his tattoo his nationality typified, and you all know how impossible it is to persuade Sam Lee in America to clip his cue. And in fact by clipping his cue he would clip his very nationality.

I can not conclude this synoptical view of the heavenly empire without saying a few words of the alleged perpetuity and unchangeableness of Chinese civilization. Numberless articles have been written on the supposedly immovable, petrified stage of China, and ingenious writers have essayed to account for that. I am sorry to say these writers have undertaken a very barren and hopeless task.

In the first place it is far from positive whether China has really not gone through a whole series of changes and reforms.

Our knowledge of China is too unsatisfactory as to admit of such a peremptory statement. We have still to bide our time and wait for fuller information. Our present knowledge of them does not entitle us to give a definite and fixed judgment on this great country.

INDIA.

India, or Hindoostan, is as large as all Europe less Russia, and has at present a population of 240,000,000. In a physical way India represents all climates, all zones, all kinds of soil, from affluent tropic scenery down to bar-

ren, sterile deserts, swamps and jungles. The snow-covered peaks of the Himalaya in the north, the sea in the east, south and west.

At the very outset of our study of India we have to be extremely careful not to see a unity where in reality there is a most complicated diversity and plurality. The one word India covers 1000 different things. India is a common name to 100 different nations, 100 different sets and castes, to 100 stages of civilization. There is no such thing as one uniform Hindoo people, and there never has been such a uniform Hindoo people. Germany, *e. g.*, is inhabited by the Germans, France by the French, Italy by the Italians. But India is not inhabited by a uniform Hindoo population; not at present, and not 2000, 3000 or 4000 years ago. When we speak of Hindoo religion, Hindoo law, Hindoo science, we mean the science of only one single, limited class of the people of India, we speak of the Brahmans. All religion, all science, all law, all codified law, at least, has originated with the Brahmans, viz.: with one of the many castes and classes in India. For there are many castes in India. You will frequently hear of the *four castes* of India. You could just as well speak of only four cities of America, of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The so-called four castes in India—I shall treat of them later on—are only one of the many divisions of people in India. There are over 300 castes in India.

India displays all stages of civilization. We find, especially in the central provinces of India and in the Anamalai hills in Southern Madras, aboriginal colored tribes who have lived there ever since the arrival of the fair-skinned Aryans, viz.: ever since 4000 years. They still use agate knives and rough flint instruments. They have no knowledge of bronze or iron. Such are the Puliars, the Mundavars, who possess no dwellings, and continually

wander over the hills; the Nairs, of whose polyandrous institutions I was speaking in my second lecture. The wild tribe of the Mari fly on the approach of a stranger. Once a year a messenger comes to them from the local rajah to take their tribute of jungle products. He does not enter their hamlets, but beats a drum outside, and then hides himself. The sly Mari creep forth, place what they have to give in an appointed spot, and run back again into their retreats. So have the Juangs only flint weapons, and thus form a remnant to our own day of the stone age. On the other hand, we have the highly developed, beautiful Aryans and the descendants of the Arabians.

Roughly speaking, we have three different sets of people in India. (I) The descendants of the aboriginal tribes, displaying the Negro and Malayan tribe. The number of these tribes is quite bewildering. Their languages are divided into three great classes, (1) the Tibeto Burmese class, with twenty-one principal and some more or less distinct dialects; (2) the Kolarian languages (nine principal dialects), and (3) the Dravidian languages, spoken by 46 millions of people (twelve principal dialects). These are the non-Aryan people. Then comes the second (II) great division or the descendants of the Aryan people, with a score of different languages, and (III) the Arabian, Persian, Afghan and Chinese population. The Mohammedan people of India exceed 40,000,000. We know now that India is a compound of a great many elements, and we have accordingly to restrict ourselves to its most prominent element, the Aryan descendants, disregarding all the non-Aryan tribes. In speaking, therefore, of India, I shall speak exclusively of the Aryans of India. Our knowledge of the non-Aryan people of India, who live mostly under their own rajahs, although tributary to the British, is such a scanty one, that it is scarcely worth while to dwell on them any longer. All that

we really do know about India refers to the Aryan tribes, and especially to the Brahmans. When speaking of China I called your attention to the paramount necessity of first sifting our sources before we proceed any further. The sources of our knowledge of India (of course I mean of Aryan India) are by far more ample and richer than our sources for China. You all know that the Aryan Indians are our next kin; Americans as well as Europeans, with but few exceptions, belong to one large class of fair-skinned people, known under the name of *Indo-Germans*. In other words, Indians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, (Italians), Spaniards, Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, Danes, Swedes and Norwegians, Icelanders, Poles, Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotchmen and all emigrant Americans, with the exception of the Chinese, were originally one and the same tribe of Aryans, who lived in Central Asia, speaking the same language, having the same institutions, and adoring the same deity. Four or five thousand years ago this original Indo-German tribe split off into many classes and divisions, some going west, establishing the ever memorable empires of Greece and Rome and Gaul and Britain; some going east, establishing the kingdoms of India. To the present day there is a palpable similarity between all the languages of these nations, so that whole Persian sentences read perfectly German, or some propositions of three to four English words read perfectly Slavonian or Russian. The fact that there is an affinity of blood between ourselves and the Aryan Indians contributed very much to a closer study of Indian civilization. In studying their ancient books we studied, as it were, the history of our own ancestors. We owe the discovery of our relation to the Aryan Indians and Persians to the powerful, suggestive mind of W. Schlegel, one of the German classics. It is more than astonishing that the English, who govern India since

1765, and who had great Sanskrit scholars long before the Germans ever thought of studying this sacred language, I say it is highly astonishing that no Englishman ever noticed this wonderful correlation between Aryan Indians and Europeans. Sir W. Jones, the celebrated Orientalist, himself a great Sanskrit scholar and translator of many Sanskrit books, and the indefatigable Colebrooke, who spent all his life with Sanskrit writings, both failed to see what the German poet distinctly perceived. Shortly after the publication of this discovery a host of scholars took to the study of Sanskrit, hunting manuscripts, publishing, translating works, dictionaries, grammars. At present the literature of the Aryan Indians, in other words, the Sanskrit literature, covers an immense field. We have most elaborate treatises on the history, archæology, antiquity, religion, science and law of the Indians. Let me mention a few of these celebrated scholars. Eugen Burnouf, Lassen, Benfey, Max Mueller, Jolly, Baillie, Boethlingk, and Prof. Whitney, in Yale College. Our statements, consequently, admit of great precision.

We have now to inquire into the institutions of the Aryan Indians. Among their institutions there are chiefly two which form the groundwork of Indian society. I mean their *castes* and their *religion*. I shall speak first of their religion, for their castes are of a later date. Originally, and even down to the eighth century B. C., the Indians had no caste. There is no mention of the castes in that marvelous poem Rigveda, which forms the greatest literary memorial of the early Aryan settlements in the Punjab. But their religion dates back to a very remote antiquity.

In the course of 5,000 years the Indians evolved four different religions. The first is the old Vedic religion, the

second is Brahmanism, the third is Buddhism, the fourth is modern Hindooism.

The old Vedic religion is laid down chiefly in the Rig-veda, but also in the other Vedas, in the Samaveda, in the Yayurveda and in the Atharvaveda. These Vedas have all been translated. Of late they appeared in the precious series of volumes edited by Mr. Mueller, of Oxford, under the title "Sacred Books of the East."

The Rigveda consists of 1017 short lyrical poems written by a family of inspired psalmists, some 1000 years B. C. It teaches to adore Dyaushpitar (the Diespiter, Jupiter of the Romans and Greeks), the Varuna (Uranos of the Greek), Agni (Ignis), Ushas (Eos of the Greek, the dawn), in all about thirty-three gods, who are eleven in heaven, eleven on earth and eleven dwelling in mid-air.

The terrible blood-drinking deities of later Brahmanism are scarcely known in the Vedas. The Aryans of that age were a noble people, who held women in high esteem; the widow was under no obligation to burn herself. The dead were buried on funeral piles, similar to the Greek and Roman custom.

You noticed the identity of the old Vedic gods with some of the Greek and Roman deities, and to this day the Deity is adored by names derived from the same old Aryan root by Brahmans in Calcutta, by Protestant clergymen at Westminster, and by Catholic priests in Peru. But this pure and poetic religion of the old Vedas which was merely an adoration of the forces and elements of Nature gave way to Brahmanism.

The word Brahma has different meanings. It denotes a prayer to the Deity, but it denotes also the Deity himself. Brahma is the Deity as a creator, Vishnu as a conservator, and Siwa as a destroyer, these three together forming the Brahma Trimurti, or sacred Trinity. But the excessive fancy of the Indians was not satisfied with these three per-

sonifications of Brahma, and there are 100 of such personifications, the most celebrated of which are Krishna, and the terrible Durga or Kali.

“Siva is represented to the Indian mind as a hideous being, encircled by a girdle of snakes, with a human skull in his hand, and wearing a necklace composed of human bones. He has three eyes; the ferocity of his temper is marked by his being clothed in a tiger’s skin; he is represented as wandering about like a madman, and over his left shoulder the deadly cobra di capella rears its head. This monstrous creation of an awe-struck fancy has a wife, Doorga, called sometimes Kali, and sometimes by other names. She has a body of dark blue, while the palms of her hands are red, to indicate her insatiate appetite for blood. She has four arms, with which she carries the skull of a giant; her tongue protrudes, and hangs lollingly from her mouth; round her waist are the hands of her victims; and her neck is adorned with human heads strung together in a ghastly row.”

A civilized people as the Indians, 500-600 years B. C. undoubtedly were, could not endure such blasphemous polytheism, and in the sixth century previous to the beginning of our era a reaction began, initiated by Gautama Buddha. Buddha, for that is the familiar name of this great man, although Buddha is no surname, but an attribute meaning the sage, the wise, Buddha was the son of a king, and spent the first thirty years of his life in all the luxury of oriental princes. But a mysterious craving for an unknown something, for a higher, superior world overtook him, and leaving the palace of his father and his own beautiful young wife, he withdrew to a thick forest and lived for many years the gloomy life of a recluse, meditating on the courses of Life and Death, of joy and sorrow, of pain and bliss. At last he thought himself purified and freed from all earthly desire and he came forth as the reformer of man-

kind, preaching his evangile in all cities, villages and hamlets of his country. I must abstain from telling you all the details of the life of this extraordinary man, but I can not help asking you to read his biography which in itself is of the greatest interest.

It is the common fate of some of the very greatest men that modern critics have tried to doubt the very existence of these men. You know that the personal existence of Homer has been doubted and actually denied. You know that the authorship of Shakespeare has been exposed to a very severe criticism. And as to our Buddha, so late as 1854, Prof. Wilson of Oxford, England, has published an elaborate treatise to the effect, that Gautama Buddha never existed. But this conjecture has proved altogether futile and we have at present the most irrefragable evidence of the personal existence of Gautama. Of course the many miraculous stories connected with his biography are mere legends, but he undoubtedly existed. His religion can scarcely be called a religion, because it does not acknowledge a Deity, nor does it teach to believe in a creator; it is an atheistical religion.

Nevertheless, the creed has gained more disciples than any other, being professed by 500,000,000 of people, or more than one-third of the human race. Our scientific insight into Buddhism, we owe chiefly to the labors of one Hungarian and two French scholars, to Korosi Csoma Sandor, and to E. Burnouf and Barthelemy St. Hilaire. It is of course next to impossible to give you a satisfactory outline of Buddha's system within the narrow compass of a few minutes, but we shall try to delineate the salient point at least of this well-nigh universal institution.

Buddha taught that all truth may be reduced to four main tenets:

1. That misery always accompanies existence.

2. That all modes of existence of men or animals result from passion or desire.

3. That there is no escape from existence except by destruction of desire.

4. That this may be accomplished by following the way to Nirvana.

Nirvana is that perfectly happy state of bliss when we have grown indifferent to all earthly desires, when absolute composure of mind and soul prevails in our whole being, when we have finally abandoned the relations of society and are totally wrapped up in the contemplation of eternity. The point, however, above purity, above justice, above even faith is, according to Buddha, universal charity.

You can not fail to remark the close identity between this scheme of intellectual transcendentalism and the superhuman efforts of some of the Christian monastic orders. And it is but a matter of natural consequence, that this doctrine of Buddha's led to the institution of monasteries, a thing which was entirely alien to Brahmanism.

It seems to be utterly incomprehensible how such a gloomy, austere and unsocial doctrine could ever gain the ascendancy over the pompous, bright and imposing Brahman creed. But, some 300 years after Buddha's death, the Emperor Asoka forced the Buddhistic religion on all India; he may be justly considered the Constantin of Buddhism.

The two systems co-existed as popular religions during more than 1,000 years (244 B. C.—800 A. D.) But at last, Sankara-acharya overthrew Buddhism in the eighth century of our era, and since that time Buddhism was on the wane, so that at present there is no Buddhism in India; Buddhism being the religion of Thibet, China, Burma, Java, Celebes, Borneo, etc. The impression,

however, that Buddhism made on the profound mind of the people of India was too deep and never disappeared.

The fourth, the present religion of the Hindoos is a mixture of Brahmanism and Buddhism, they maintain the doctrine of the Trimurti, but in the same time believe in Nirvana. Let me mention in passing, that Buddhism is a favorite topic with modern philosophers, and that especially the German philosopher Schopenhauer extolled it to the skies.

We have now to treat of the second great institution of the Aryan-Hindoos, of the Caste-system. I said, that there are over 300 castes in India; but this applies to all India and to all the tribes, Aryan and non-Aryan of India. The four castes, familiarly known as the four castes of India, refer only to Brahman-Hindooism.

The shortest and most efficacious way to understand an institution is to follow up its development. I shall give you now what may be considered the acknowledged theory of the origin of the caste. This theory has been propounded and affirmed by Lassen, Bohlen, Rhode and M. Mueller. They say, that the families who learned the all-important prayers, the brahmas, by heart, won great influence over the balance of the population. By degrees, a vast array of ministrants grew up around each of the greater sacrifices, and the families who understood all the requisite ceremonies and were well versed in the interpretation of the Vedas, began to be considered as teachers and mental guardians of the nation. That will account for the origin of the first caste, the Brahmins.

The second caste, the Ksatriya, the soldiers recruited from among the more fortunate and richer warriors, who were freed from the labor of husbandry and defended the country against its enemies. The modern Rajput is the representation of this old caste.

The third caste, the Vaisyas, are the husbandmen, the farmers, as we call them.

The fourth caste, Sudras or Pariahs, are remnants of some aboriginal tribes kept in abject bondage. They were not permitted to be present at the national sacrifice.

You will easily see that the theory just mentioned, does in no way; whatever, account for the origin of a caste. For, and that is my principal point—a caste is not a class. All people had and have classes, all nations brought forth priests and warriors and farmers. But the distinguishing mark of a caste is this, that the members of the different castes are unequal, not only as to political rights, but as to social intercourse.

The main characteristic feature of Hindoo-castes is the prohibition of intermarriage and social intercourse. No Brahman is allowed to marry a Ksatria girl, and no Ksatria is allowed to marry a Vaisya girl, and nobody but a Sudra is allowed to marry a Sudra girl. At present, this sacred law has frequently been infringed upon—but in older times it was considered almost a law of nature.

That being then the peculiar character of a caste, we can not subscribe to the theory of Bohlen and Rhode, for this theory does not account for the prohibition of intermarriage and social intercourse.

The nobility in Europe has for many centuries, been a real caste and to the present day it is, if not legally at least socially, a perfect caste. The great reformer of the history of German law, Prof. Eichhorn, tried to account for the origin of the German nobility as a caste, but he did not succeed in that, and frankly confessed, that we can give no satisfactory reason for the rise of this set of prerogatives. It is, as yet, impossible to account for the curious fact, that some nations have only classes and some have castes. The Greeks, the Romans had distinct classes, and so have the Chinese, but none of them ever

had a caste. Neither Brahmanism nor Buddhism, in spite of its levelling tendencies, could do away with the caste system. There can be no doubt that Hindoos do not feel, and perhaps, never felt their caste restriction as being in any way burdensome, or still less a disgrace to them.

To wind up this part of our inquiry: We know that the Hindoos and the Egyptian possessed the institution, not of classes and ranks, but of castes; but we do not know what circumstances have necessitated this institution.

The Hindoos belonging to the first three castes are a noble people. They have the firm belief, that they are twice born beings, their second birth dating from the initiation into the doctrines of the sacred Vedas and the investiture with the sacred cord ordinarily worn over the left shoulder and under the right arm. Veda means knowledge; the German, wissen. The Sudras are only once born people; compare the German "wohlgeboren", the Slavonic "panyi urozena".

The Brahman, that is to say, the members of the first class, are splendid specimens of our species. Mr. Sherring, in his book, *Hindoo Tribes and Castes*, (a very instructive and amusing book) says of the Brahmans:

"The Brahman occupies the highest rank among Hindus for at least three reasons: The first is his assumed sanctity. By the people generally he is regarded as a pure, stainless, twice-born being, divine as well as human, worthy of unbounded admiration and worship. He is the priest of the Hindu religion, directing the ceremonies performed at the temples, sacred wells, sacred tanks, sacred rivers, and at all hallowed places throughout the land. He is present to sanction, and give effect to the great social festivals of his countrymen held at marriages, at births of sons and at deaths. He casts the horoscope, tells the lucky

days, gives spiritual counsel whispers *mantras* or mysterious words, executes magical incantations and charms, and is at once household god, family priest, and general preceptor and guide in behalf of the many millions of Hindus residing in the vast country lying between the Himalayas and Cape Comorin.


“The second reason of the Brnhman’s superiority is that for many ages, perhaps from the outset of his career, when with other Ayrans he first entered the plains of India, he has been intellectually in advance of the rest of the Hindu race.

“The third reason is a consequent of the second. The Brahmin is not only a thinking man, but also a reading man. He possesses and, and perhaps, reads the holy canon – Vedas, Shastras and Puranus. He has been the author of Hindu literature.

“Light of complexion, his forehead ample, his countenance of striking significance, his lips thin and mouth expressive, his eyes quick and sharp, his fingers long, his carriage noble and almost sublime, the true Brahmin, uncontaminated by European influence and manners, with his intense self-consciousness, with the proud conviction of superiority depicted in every muscle of his face, and manifest in every movement of his body, is a wonderful specimen of humanity walking on God’s earth. Yet the Brahman has lived his day. His prestige is rapidly on the decline, and is only maintained at its ancient pitch in remote villages and in the fastnesses of superstition in great cities. Here, as of old, it envelops him like a glory. But the further he moves from such places, the more dim becomes the glory, until it fades away altogether. Education and other influences are treating the Brahman roughly. Yet the fault is his own. He has had a better start by reason of his great natural endowments than any Hindu of the other castes below him, but he has neglected his op-

portunities. I fear he has been too proud, too self-satisfied to avail himself of them."

All Indian literature, all science, and all law originated with and is possessed by the Brahmans. This literature has since the last seventy years, formed a never ceasing subject of admiration and study. It displays the most wonderful epic poems, as the Mahabharata and Ramejana, the daintiest, sweetest lyrical drama Sakuntala, etc., the gravest works on mathematics, philosophy, astronomy and other sciences. In fact, we need not be ashamed of our ancestors.



CHAPTER ON THE VIRTUE OF OBEDIENCE.

Fac-simile of the oldest literary production, composed during the times of the old empire, written in hieratic characters; the authors of which name themselves: For one part Prince Ptahhotep, city governor and strategyst under King Asa (5 Dyn., 4 Thousand B. C.) and for the other part Kakemna, who, according to the last lines of page 2 of the Papyrus occupied the same honors under King Snofru, who succeeded Huni (3 Dyn.)

The fragment contains hieroglyphic text, likely from a papyrus scroll. The text is arranged in approximately 12 horizontal lines. The top half of the fragment contains black ink, while the bottom half contains red ink. The hieroglyphs are arranged in a regular, grid-like pattern, typical of ancient Egyptian writing. The fragment is rectangular with irregular, torn edges.

CHAPTER ON THE VIRTUE OF OBEDIENCE.

From the writings of Prince Pahhotep, city governor and strategist under Asa, King of Egypt (5 Dyn 4 Thousand B. C.)
 (The tinted letters are written in red in the original.)

EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

References:—*Bunsen*, Egypt's place. *Maspero*, Histoire anc. *De Rouge*, Six prem. dyn. *Chabas*, Melanges. *Sir G. Wilkinson*, Manners. *Lepsius*, Koenigsbuch. *Mariette*, Musée Boulaq; "Records of the past." *Brugsch*, History of Egypt. *Champollion*, Oeuvres.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next great topic is Egypt. In fact, I would have taken Egypt as the very first of all my topics, for our knowledge of ancient and even archaic Egypt is by far the greatest when compared with our information on the antiquities of other countries of the same time. Since the beginning of this century and even previous to it, numberless monuments, inscriptions, tombs, documents, and in fact, remains of all sorts have been collected, which, in their aggregate form a perfectly bewildering mass of reference. The study of China or India or Persia has been left to private industry, and to the efforts and means of private scholars. With Egypt it is entirely different. Three great empires of Europe have spontaneously offered their most efficacious help and almost unlimited financial means in order to collect a satisfactory apparatus for the study of this marvelous country.

The French government, under the personal superintendence of Napoleon I, the German government under the guidance of the celebrated Lepsius, and the Italian government under Rosellini have sent whole commissions to Egypt with strict injunction to do everything in their power toward an effectual collection of facts. Accordingly we now have three great publications, edited by the governments of these three countries respectively, which cover the whole ground of Egyptian antiquity.

These official explorers assisted by the most celebrated scholars extended their inquiries to the most imposing as

well as the most trifling feature of Egyptian life. They deciphered the enigmatic hieroglyphic inscriptions on the tombs of kings and princes, they copied faithfully the garments, houses, utensils and animals. They investigated the daily customs and usages and occupations of the laborer, of the peasant, of the farmer, of the soldier, of the priest, of the official, of the king, of women of all classes.

At last a body of such comprehensive information has been gathered that we can fairly state the fact, that at present we really know more about every detail of old Egyptian life, 5000 years ago, than about similar details of old Roman life, 2000 years ago.

Say *e. g.*, we read in the Latin classics about the different carriages, cabs, etc. of the Romans; we read the word *cisium*, or *essedum*, or *esseda*, but in spite of all the efforts of the most learned scholars, in spite of Gruter and Grævius and Maffei and Marquardsen and a score of other savants, we do not know what kind of carriage was meant by *cisium*, and what kind by *esseda*.

Or, to give another example, everybody heard of the wonderful pottery works of the Romans made of *murrha*, but nobody can tell what particular mineral is meant by *murrha*. Such a curious lack of information is a rare thing with Egyptian archæology. We can by a careful study of the many works and sources on Egypt, form a most adequate idea of the life in ancient Egypt. If you have no time to go over the erudite books, some of which I shall presently mention, you may get a very fair and positive knowledge of ancient Egyptian life by reading the novels of Ebers. Ebers is a scholar who made Egyptian antiquities his specialty, but in the same time he commands a great power of poetic fancy, and that enabled him to write novels which are, as it were, the poetic embodiment of his scientific studies. Based on a very comprehensive study of facts they are a more satisfactory

picture of ancient Egypt than *e. g.* Bulwer's "Last Days of Pompei" are of ancient Rome. There are of course excellent English translations of these novels. As to the scientific books on Egypt, it is chiefly in French and German books where we can find the most trustworthy information. Englishmen have, with few exceptions, so far not published any other but second hand books, and this applies especially to the well-known book of Rawlinson on Ancient Egypt. This book, as all his books, has been widely read, and is perhaps better known than any other book on Egypt. But is only a second hand book, a compilation, and not a faithful compilation after all.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me risk an advice. People, I mean intelligent people, are very apt to form what is usually called strong opinions. They read something in a paper, in a book which was accidentally slipped into their hands, and without any further consideration, they immediately form an opinion, a strong, a firm opinion, a stubborn opinion, the more stubborn, the less real foundation it rests upon. It is an undoubted fact that profound thinkers were rather timid in expressing a strong opinion. You remember the very modest title used by David Hume. The unrivalled book of this profound thinker bears the simple title, "An Essay on Human Understanding." Only an essay, only an attempt to know something, not a peremptory decision. Adam Smith said, "An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations," only an inquiry. Darwin said, "*On* the Origin of Species—as it were meditation on the Origin of Species and not dictation. But that is not the way of talking with the ordinary intelligent lady or gentleman. They are never timid, they never essay, they never attempt, they are far beyond that. And why are they courageous, when David Hume and Adam Smith were timid. Because they generally read second hand books, I mean books, the authors of which got their in-

formation at second hand. You remember, in our lecture on China we excluded all writers who lacked a thorough knowledge of the Chinese language. We have now to exclude all writers that lack a thorough knowledge of the language of ancient Egypt, and consequently, Mr. Rawlinson's book on Egypt has to be excluded. Be extremely careful in selecting your books, and if you should not be able to read sources at first hand, please suspend your judgment; be aware of the fact that your knowledge is only of a dilettantic nature.

Perhaps you will think, that only a selected few have the requisite time and patience to read the original sources. I am glad to say, that this rather true remark does not apply to history. Take Egypt, the greatest authorities on ancient Egypt, after having published works of an exclusively scientific character adapted to the scholarly taste of the professional student, were very anxious to propagate their results in a more popular way, by editing books of a less scientific and severe turn. Thus, among others, we have the interesting work of Brugsch-Bey, a first-class authority, written in an amiable, and still highly reliable style. Then the scientific and poetic works of Ebers, and the fascinating volumes of Mariette. The works of the Count de Rouge at present, together with the late Lepsius, the chief authority on Egypt, of Chabas, of Sharpe, of Bunsen and Maspero, are scientific investigators.

In my statement of facts and partially, at least, in my judgments, I shall follow de Rouge and Chabas in preference to the rest of the scholars just mentioned, because a careful study of their works convinced me of their superiority. These, then, are our sources on Egypt.

Ancient Egypt was divided into Upper and Lower Egypt. Upper Egypt was divided into twenty two nomes, Lower Egypt into twenty nomes. You know that Egypt is mainly the fertile land along the river Nile, this deified

river being not only the fertilizer but simply the creator of the country. The history of Egypt goes back to a very remote antiquity. We have proper and undoubted information about Egyptian pharaohs living 4,000 B. C. In that remote age, Egypt displayed already the culture, and abundance of a highly civilized people. They had, at that time, numerous large cities, populous districts, a great army, numberless temples, a refined literature and a considerable science.

Our authorities as to these facts are perfectly irreproachable, they are still existent, they are not handed down by spurious traditions, they do not require an implicit belief, they may be tested every day anew—and they will stand all cross-examinations. These pure and unadulterated authorities are the pyramids and their contents. Some of those original architectural wonders have been erected 3,800 or 4,000 years B. C., and their inscriptions, the documents found in them, tell the story of their originators.

At present there are only some 20 or 30 pyramids in Egypt, but originally there were over 70. Destruction by natural forces or by the still ruder treatment of human barbarity was the common lot of the majority of the pyramids. They were gazed upon as weird, uncouth remnants of a dark, benighted and superstitious age. So early as the fifth century B. C., the Egyptians themselves looked with horror and awe at the huge, ghastly buildings, the purport and meaning of which they scarcely understood. Only recent discoveries have pulled off the mysterious veil, and we know now what the pyramids were meant for.

I must abstain from giving you a minute description of the pyramids, my time being too limited, but you will find the details in Wilson's Egypt, or in the first volume of Brugsch's book. The pyramids were enormous granite-stone buildings in the shape of pyramids, from 200-450

English feet high, the breadth at the base being 380-746 English feet, respectively. Each of them was perfectly adjusted to the cardinal points of the horizon, to north, east, south and west, and with the exception of a few corridors and galleries, the whole gigantic work was all solid.

If we take into consideration that the ancient Egyptians never used iron tools in their masonry, iron being considered as of an evil omen, in other words, that the ancient Egyptian had no other tools but bronze tools—it is to the present day perfectly unintelligible how they ever succeeded in erecting those fearful blocks of granite and granite marble to such an enormous height. Modern architecture despairs of an explanation of this enigma. No bronze tool of modern make can be used as a hammer or chisel in granite work. Of course the labor consumed on these mammoth buildigs is beyond all comprehension. Hundred thousands of workmen had for 30 or 40 years to devote all their physical strength and all their skill to the erection of one of those pyramids. The great pyramid of Khufu necessitated such an immense array of laborers, that the mere value of the requisite eatables, chiefly radishes, onions and garlic amounted to \$1,000,000.

Interesting as these details are, there is still a more interesting and more substantial question to be answered. You know that in the whole course of these lectures our chief and principal attention is directed to a fair understanding of institutions. The pyramids, undoubtedly the expression, or rather the representative of one of the broadest institutions of ancient Egypt—I say the pyramids may serve as a perfectly adequate clue to a better insight into the institutions of Egypt

Facts, although the very first condition, facts are only the material of science, not science itself. It is not enough to accumulate facts—the meaning of these facts,

that is our chief interest. You may easily acquire an unusual amount of detail in the pyramids; nevertheless, you may be totally deficient in a right understanding of the pyramids. Are the pyramids the product of mere folly on the part of the Pharaohs who had them erected, and of mere submissive stupidity on the part of the people who silently assented to the fearful drudgery of such work? Are they the outcome of haughtiness, of religious zeal, of philosophic doctrines? All these and a host of other questions have been raised with regard to the pyramids. The oddest explanation seemed to be the most natural. There are scholars (and I understand that there is one in this city) who consider a pyramid a kind of scientific apparatus, used for the perpetuation of measures. There are other scholars holding similar far-fetched opinions. It is scarcely necessary to tell you that these theories do not account for the erection of pyramids. It is very easy to speak of the folly of others, but if we represent to ourselves the great and early development of the Egyptians, it must appear absolutely ridiculous to suppose that the civilized Egyptians performed these architectural wonders out of mere silliness. They were always alike sensible and wise. Take 1000 persons of ancient Egypt and 1000 persons of modern Europe and America, and as to mere natural talent and ability there is, on the average, no difference whatever. There must have been a plain cause why the Egyptians assented to spend such enormous labor to the erection of pyramids. This cause, being of a lasting and general nature, must be referable to a lasting and general feature in the human constitution. Extreme folly is only an occasional phenomenon of the human mind, but there never has been a time, and never will be a time, when folly, pure, unadulterated folly, formed a lasting and general feature of people's character. I know one frequently refers to some apparently

very foolish and nonsensical phenomena of history, say to the belief in witchcraft, to the superstitious horrors of the Spanish inquisition, and similar things, all of them of a lasting and general character. But there is less folly in that than you might imagine. In my lectures on the middle ages I shall take particular care to combat some of the widespread prejudices on the supposed folly and benighted spirit of those times. At present I want only to warn you against a false view of ancient Egyptian institutions. If we want to understand the pyramids, we have to gain, first, a clear view of the Egyptian people, their relation to their ruler, the state of their classes, of their priests, and the state of their religion. The rulers in Egypt, known by the name of Pharaohs, were absolute monarchs. They appointed every official, every judge, every provincial governor, according to their pleasure, and did likewise discharge him at will. All the taxes of the country were the Pharaoh's property, and he disposed of them absolutely. His title was "His Holiness," and people prostrated themselves at sight of him. There were, however, several checks to the power of the Pharaoh. Egypt, at least during the reign of some dynasties, possessed an hereditary nobility, the members of which held many offices as their hereditary stations, possessing, at the same time, large landed estates and numerous vassals and husbandmen. The other great check of the Pharaoh's power were the priests. They were the depositories of all the secret wisdom and ancient lore of Egypt. At a time when the treasures of Egypt were not yet unearthed, when our knowledge of this marvellous country rested chiefly on the comparatively few scattered passages in Herodotus, Strabo and Diodorus, there was a general belief that the priests in Egypt possessed a profound knowledge of things divine and mundane, and that a rediscovery of this ancient lore would prove a mag-

nificent aggrandisement of our own knowledge. Since the discovery of all those books, inscriptions and documents which now serve as the firm basis of our study of Egypt, this general belief and expectation has been almost fully justified. The priests in ancient Egypt were really great thinkers, they had succeeded to utilize many of the most efficient sources of nature, they were well skilled in astronomy, in geometry ; they had deeply meditated on metaphysics and the origin of the human mind. We have deciphered some of their scientific treatises on medicine, and we have to acknowledge their remarkable knowledge of the human frame as well as of curative herbs and liquids. These priests, however, were not the sole recipients of religious tenets. I shall speak of that later on, when treating of the religion of ancient Egypt. There was another class of people, the warriors. It is not quite manifest as yet whether this class had separate rights of their own or whether its members only recruited from among the other classes.

In contrast to the opulent classes stood the bulk of the people—a large mass of simple, easy minded, poor beings who were perfectly at a loss how to pass their time. It seems to be rather ridiculous, but it is borne out by all varieties of fact that the general people in Egypt had scarcely anything to do all day long. Their dress was extremely simple—common laborers wearing no dress at all. The food chiefly dates and durrha, was so cheap that to bring up a child to manhood cost only three dollars in American money. Consequently Egyptians were extremely prone to indulge in all kinds of amusements, and accordingly in the numberless wall-paintings and inscriptions we find an interminable display of all sorts of merry-making. Dance, music, festivities, drinking and etching were the essential parts of their life. If you now try to imagine that peculiar state of things in Egypt: At the head

an omnipotent monarch, and a mysterious priesthood, at the bottom a careless, lazy mob; what can be more natural than that the rulers were constantly searching some occupation for these masses of lazy people? Rulers, especially absolute rulers dread nothing as intensely as quiet peaceful times. They know that the unoccupied minds of their downtrodden subjects if not kept busy with something or another, must necessarily awake to criticism and ultimately to revolution.

The absolute czars of Russia, although already sovereign of immense territories are continually looking out for some conquest. But the fact is that they don't want to conquer foreign territories, but the minds of their own subjects. The Pharaohs had to be on the alert, for the impressive minds of the Egyptian low classes was very much liable to any kind of seduction and uproarious tendencies. To keep them busy, to prevent an outbreak of their rebellious instincts, to turn their minds into more peaceful channels, the Pharaohs struck out an ingenious contrivance. Before I proceed any further, I must again call your attention to the peculiar state of the Egyptian lower classes. They were poor, and so were the low classes of all ages. But the poverty of the Egyptians had a characteristic feature of its own. A poor man in other countries has, just in consequence of his poverty to work hard for his daily bread. One idle day, and he had to face the hideous features of dreary hunger. Not so with the poor man in Egypt. Though poor, he was under no necessity to go to work. The little wants of his physique (Egypt being a very warm country, and consequently needs much less nourishment) were easily satisfied by the date-palm tree, two hundred of which could easily be raised on one single acre. The poor classes of Egypt were not only poor but lazy; not only lazy but also without any urgency to give up their laziness. Can there

be a more dangerous class of people? People who can lose nothing and gain everything? It is part of the A, B, C in politics to turn the mind of the people into those channels where they will act in the least perilous way. The Pharaohs, therefore, took advantage of a general, prevailing idea of Egyptians, and ——— but I must first treat of this curious idea of the Egyptians. Of all peoples of antiquity the Egyptians dwelt most on the future life, and made the most earnest efforts to represent to themselves the anatomy of the immortal part of men. When they were yet in the bloom of their life, they began to build their tombs, and even the poorest Egyptian enshrined all his petty treasures in his future abode. He decorated it with the utmost care and delicacy, we frequently find the most exquisite paintings and drawings on tombs of very ordinary people; and sometimes in the midst of his labors death cut him off, leaving his tomb in an unfinished state of artistic wormanship.

At their festivities the image of death was present and all their best cherished desires were concentrated in the hope to attain beatitude, to be saved, to reach the kingdom of eternal life. The Pharaohs availed themselves of this universal idea, and from the time they mounted their throne they commenced to erect their tombs, but not within the moderate limit of a private person, but in measures grand and colossal as fitting a monarch of Egypt. The pyramids were all tombs of Pharaohs, and it was the erection of these costly, gigantic buildings which served as a means to occupy the minds and the time of the lazy populace of Egypt. The pyramids of Egypt hence were in the first place a political measure of the grandest scale, they served as one of the firmest foundation of the empire of the Pharaohs. All the religious ceremonies and rituals connected with the pyramids were most momentous things, but they were only instrumental to the chief and leading idea underlying the whole institution.

Every pyramid had its own priest, and of course the coffin containing the mummy of the dead Pharaoh was inclosed deep in the center of the huge building, protected by immense rocks and locked up with all the artifices of ancient technics. Nowhere else do we find similar things, and nowhere else do we meet with that peculiar state of the people which I have just been trying to delineate. In Rome the people of the republic had a prominent share in the administration of the state, they had to look after their daily earnings, and consequently there was no necessity to occupy them with the erection of useless buildings, temple of Tarus. Besides, they were constantly engaged in wars. But when the power of Rome came to be united more or less in the hands of one single man, of the Cæsars, it became a measure of the highest political wisdom to entertain the large populace of Rome, and accordingly enormous amphitheaters began to be built up, and gorgeous games were established. The pyramids of Egypt are symbolical representations of that eternal truth, that the lazy man is the wicked man, and that labor is the only real permanent blessing of mankind.

Antiquity has a peculiar charm for everybody, and I hope to gratify a just curiosity by telling a few words on the details of ancient Egyptian life. The great authority for this part of our inquiry is the work of Sir Gardner Wilkinson on the manners and customs of the ancient Egyptians. The Egyptians called their country Kem, viz.: the black land. They were more related to the Caucassian than to the negro type. Most of the modern inhabitants have preserved many of the characteristics of their ancient predecessors. Oval heads, long noses, with a slight bridge, chin small, hair long, full, crisp and black. Very few Egyptians were blondes. The men of all classes had shaven heads, with skull caps, or wore their own

hair, or wigs, very full, and in numerous plaits or curls, falling to the shoulders. Soldiers, however, did not shave their heads. Except kings and great persons, every one shaved the hair of the face. The Pharaoh was distinguished from his subjects by the richness of his apparel, the figure of an asp, the emblem of royalty is often tied just above his forehead. The ordinary costume of men of the upper and middle classes was the same as that of the king, the short kilt, with sometimes the long shirt or skirt of fine linen above it, tied in various forms. They generally went barefoot, but sometimes used sandals. The priest was occasionally clad in a leopard skin, the fore legs forming sleeves. The royal princes were distinguished by a side-lock apparently curiously plaited. The men of the lower classes wore the kilt and girdle alone, or especially when engaged in laborious work, went, as I said before, altogether naked. The dress of the queen consisted of a tight skirt, descending to the ankles, supported by shoulder-straps and bound at the waist by a girdle with long ends falling in front. Over this was usually worn a full shirt of fine linen, with wide sleeves reaching below the elbows and having a broad skirt falling to the ground. It much resembles the upper dress of the king. The queen was distinguished by her head dress, which was in the form of a vulture with outspread wings, the bird's head projecting over the forehead and the wings falling on either side, while the tail extended behind. The queen also wore sandals. The dress of ladies was the same as that of the queen, without the distinguishing ornaments, but they frequently appeared in the under garment or skirt alone. I mentioned already the extreme care every Egyptian took with regard to the future state of his soul. The greatest ceremony of each man's life was his funeral. The period of mourning began at the time of death, and lasted seventy-two days or a shorter time. During this

time the body was embalmed and swathed in many linen bandages, the outermost of which was covered with a kind of paste-board, which represented the deceased. It was the chief ambition of the very poorest Egyptian to be declared worthy of a blessed life in the world to come and consequently to be insured of a future resurrection in the shape of a human being. This declaration was given by priests after a careful investigation of the actions of the deceased. This extra investigation, however, cost money, and since the ancient Egyptians had no particular inkling towards wasting their money in vain, it was invariably understood on both sides that the deceased shall be declared an Osiris, viz.: a saved soul. Osiris, though ordinarily the name of one of the chief gods, was also the name of every deceased person after having been declared saved. This brings us to a contemplation of the religion of the ancient Egyptians. When speaking of the manners and customs of daily life in ancient Egypt, I had to state the great affluence of our sources. With regard to the religion of this great people, I could not complain of a lack of sources either; the only considerable drawback, however, prevails that these sources are not properly digested and systematized. We know very many little and great things of the Egyptian deities. We know the names and images of almost all the different deities of the different homes and towns, for every home as well as every town in ancient Egypt had its separate deity, its own god. We know quite an amount of interesting facts on the different cycles of deities, as they have been called, we know of Ra, the Sun-god, and his cycle of gods, and of Osiris and Isis and of Mentu, and Shu and Thot, or reason. I shall presently tell you more particulars about these deities. But before all I am very anxious to come to a point of very great importance with regard to Egyptian religion. All inquirers, whether absolutely unpreju-

diced, as the Count de Rouge, or whether biased to a certain extent, as Brugsch or Rawlinson, all inquirers, I say, agree as to the remarkable fact that the ancient Egyptians, at least the priests, had a clear and pure idea of One God, self-existent, self-producing, the creator of heaven and earth. The Prisse papyrus (it has this name because a French gentleman, a Mr. Prisse, who had bought it from a poor fellah in Egypt, donated it to the National Library in Paris) this Papyrus is, undoubtedly, the oldest book in the world, written by Prince Ptah-hotep some 2500 years B. C. In it the Prince speaks constantly of One God. There is another extremely old papyrus, known under the name of the "Ritual," 4000 years old, which contains the pure doctrine of monotheism, but is occasionally alloyed with gross superstition. You may see by that that monotheism was the original religious doctrine of the Egyptians, and permit me to remark again, that all inquirers without one single exception, agree on this one point. None of them denies that the ancient Egyptians propounded the belief in One God. Such a sublime belief, however, did not suit the less spiritual minds of the people, and consequently a whole series of divinities were created, and the fancy of religious zeal indulged in numberless mythological stories. I mentioned before that there were two cycles of divinities. Ra, the sun, is usually represented as a hawk-headed man, occasionally as a man, in both cases bearing on his head the solar disk, round which the uraeus, symbolic of royal power, is sometimes coiled. Ra had the most general worship of any Egyptian divinity except Osiris. Ra is purely solar, Osiris participates more of the human nature. Osiris is essentially the good principle, hence his name, Unnefer, the good being. Like Ra, he is the creator, and, like him, in perpetual warfare with evil. His brother or son Typhon or Seth is his opponent. They

represent respectively light and darkness, physical good and evil, the Nile and the desert. In the perpetual combat Osiris at last is vanquished. He is cut in pieces and submerged in the water. Watched by his sister Isis, his consort, he revives. Horus, his son, avenges him, and with the aid of Thoth, or reason, he destroys the power of Seth, but does not annihilate him. The myth is a picture of the daily life of the sun and of the struggles of men. Osiris is usually represented as a mummy wearing the royal cap of Upper Egypt. Mentu and Shu and a score of other deities are all so many variations of these principal forms. But I can not help remarking that so far we have not yet attained a perfectly satisfactory insight into Egyptian mythology. The most opposite doctrines have been defended by renowned scholars, but it is merely a question of time, the materials being so abundant, that a clear result must necessarily be expected. A little over two years ago the Archduke Rainer of Austria donated a colossal heap of papyri to the museum in Vienna, and on proper investigation these papyri, though none of them were very old, proved to be an inestimable contribution to our knowledge of Egypt. Austrian scholars promised to publish the contents of this great collection in the course of the next ten years. In our second lecture I spoke of that curious institution of peoples, the animal worship. The ancient Egyptians were great animal-worshippers. The three most famous of those sacred animals which were worshiped as individuals, not as a class, were the bulls Apis and Mnevis and the Mendesian goat; but there were also many other sacred animals, as the ichneumon. The religious service took place in the small inner chambers, the outer courts, and still more the great inclosures containing the whole group of temple-buildings.

The ancient Egyptians as well as the modern Mussulmans had no separate headquarters as it were for their business transactions. In every Christian town there is a market-place, a forum, as the Romans called it, that is to say a place entirely severed and separated from all church-ceremonies, and devoted exclusively to business and eventually to law. But the mosque in oriental countries as well as the old Egyptian temple was the general gathering place of the people, their chief public resort for business and pleasure.

This one remarkable circumstance may show you the vast difference between our religious conception and the conception of Oriental people. In fact, in ancient Egypt there were no other public buildings or market-places. They had no public theatres, or public city halls, or public bath halls, or public lecture halls. The temple was everything, and secular and religious affairs had one and the same centre.

The Egyptian religion had 42 commandments, and the most important of these commandments run thus:—Pray to the Gods; to honor the dead; to give bread to the hungry; water to the thirsty; clothing to the naked. I believe it will be highly interesting to read an extract of that oldest of existing books, that I mentioned before. In this most ancient relic of literature, Prince Ptah-Hotep writes among others as follows:

“If thou art become great after thou hast been humble, and if thou hast amassed riches after poverty, being, because of that the first in the town, if thou art known for thy wealth and art become a great lord, let not thy heart become proud because of thy riches, for it is God who is the author of them for thee. Despise not another who is as thou wast; be to him as toward thy equal. Let thy face be cheerful as long as thou livest: has any one come out of the coffin after having once entered it?”

When speaking of China, I enlarged to a considerable extent on the marvellous language of that people, I called it one of the institutions of China, inasmuch as the spirit of this nation manifests itself in clear and unmistakable traits in the character of their language. This holds good with the ancient language of the Egyptians also. And accordingly, I shall treat now of the language and of the hieroglyphics of the ancient Egyptians. In the first place I am going to call your attention to the wellnigh incredible amount of sagacity on the part of those men who first succeeded in reading the hieroglyphics. Just fancy yourself into their position. Imagine you stand in front of an inscription on one of the pyramids or tombs in Egypt. You notice all kinds of mysterious signs, dashes, pictures, dots, lines, etc. You have not the faintest idea whatever as to the meaning of any of these signs. No grammar, no book can guide you. In fact, you do not know even in what language these signs are written. More than that, after having guessed that the language of these signs is most probably the language of the ancient Egyptians, you have to face a still more unsurmountable obstacle. For you have not the slightest idea of the ancient Egyptian language. You don't know one single word of this language. And in the face of all these apparently unconquerable bars, a few, or to put it exactly, one English and one French scholar succeeded in deciphering and understanding the signs and language of the hieroglyphics, so that at present, we can read hieroglyphics just as easily as Latin or German type. Is that not a perfect marvel? Marvellous as the hieroglyphics are, their deciphering is still more marvellous.

The name of the Englishman is Thomas Young. You all know Thomas Young. If you study mathematics you meet his name: if you study optics, acoustics, chemistry,

medicine—you invariably meet his immortal name, for numberless inventions and discoveries in all these sciences are attached to his name. Thomas Young had a curious principle. He said, anybody can do anything. Nothing is impossible—everything must yield to the indomitable force of human perseverance and toil. In his time (in the beginning of this century) the hieroglyphs were still an unsolved riddle and the solution had been given up as perfectly hopeless. The more infeasible it looked, the more attraction it had for Thomas Young—and he made up his mind to solve the riddle by any means—and he solved it, at least, he opened a new vein of successful inquiry. In his time a curious looking rock was found in the vicinity of Rosette, and therefore, usually called the Rosette stone. On that stone there were engraved two sets of inscriptions, one in hieroglyphics and one in Greek. Several individual names occurred in both, and by a sagacious comparison of these names, or rather of the letters and signs of these names, Young succeeded in finding the meaning of several of the hieroglyphic signs. On the other hand, he proved that the modern Coptic, viz.: the language of the modern Copts in Abyssinia and Upper Egypt, is a more or less pure remnant of ancient Egyptian. Thus he pointed out a new track of investigation. He did not live to finish his great work, which was completed by the celebrated Frenchman, Champollion. Champollion detected that the ancient Egyptians had three different ways of writing. He called them the hieroglyphic proper, the hieratic and the demotic respectively. The hieroglyphic proper, has exactly the same character as the Chinese word picture, *e. g.* ○ means the sea; * means a star, * means a star under the vault of Heaven, means the night, etc., etc. Hieroglyphics are written either in horizontal lines or vertical columns, and are ordinarily read from the right to the left.

It is a curious fact, that some people write from the right to the left and some from the left to the right, as we do. I shall give the explanation of this fact in another lecture, when treating of oriental nations. The head of animals and the like show from which direction to begin reading. Hieroglyphics proper are only a lapidary system—we find it only on stone-inscriptions. The second way of writing was the hieratic. This system contained by far less pictures and approached to a certain degree to our system of alphabetical writing.

The third system, the demotic, is almost a pure alphabetic system, every sound has its sign.


Now let us compare these systems of writing with the Chinese manner of fixing ideas. The Chinese never left their original manner of word-painting, they stopped at the hieroglyphic stage, and never even essayed to come to the hieratic or demotic stage. Don't we see therein the clear, unmistakeable influence of institutions? The progressive spirit of the Egyptians wanted a more fluent, current way of representing ideas—the Chinese never thought of that. I do not venture to decide as I said in my lecture, whether the mind of the Chinese is in any way progressive or not, but their means of writing, of representing thoughts is undoubtedly retrogressive and stationary. The civilization of the ancient Egyptians resembled ours very much, and it is only a natural consequence that their way of writing was at last exactly similar to our own system. They counted twenty-four hours in a day, thirty days in a month, and twelve months in a year.

Our information about the thirty dynasties who have ruled Egypt from 4000 B. C. till 340 B. C. is very extensive. If you read e. g. the two thick volumes of Brugsch, you will find delightful details about a king or a Pharaoh, who reigned 4000, or of another who reigned 5000 years ago. Our chief sources are the Turin papyrus,

which gives a list of all the Pharaohs, then Manetho and the monuments. There is much strife among scholars as to the date of the first dynasty of Egypt. Mariette goes back to 5004 B. C., Lepsius only to 3892 B. C. There is an abundance of monuments of the fourth dynasty some 3500 years B. C. Chabas proposes 4000 years before the first dynasty as sufficient for the development of the civilization which had already attained maturity in the time of the fourth dynasty. So that according to Chabas the antiquity of Egypt counts 11000 years.

The historical founder of Egypt, and also the first Pharaoh of the first dynasty was Menes. Let us cast a rapid glance over the history of Egypt, this wonderful history, from the great pyramid building fourth dynasty on through the unification of the country from the Delta to Elephantine under the kings of the southern sixth dynasty, the culmination of the civilization and its subsequent decline; the disintegration of the monarchy which lasted till the eleventh dynasty, the rise of a new centre at Thebes, the prosperous twelfth dynasty which instead of pyramids produced beneficent works, like the artificial Lake Mœris and opened new avenues of commerce and new fields of industry; then through the following decline of vigor and the middle kingdom of the Hyksos or Shepherds, to the rise of the new empire under Aahmes, the founder of the 18th dynasty, when the pure solar religion was introduced; the brilliant career of Thotmes III, who led his victorious armies as far as the Euphrates on the north, and to the further extremity of Nubia on the south, while his fleets commanded the whole eastern shore of the Mediterranean; the exploits of the Ramessides of the nineteenth dynasties, the great Sesostris, the greatest period of Egyptian history (about 1400-1280 B. C.); the house of Rames is succeeded by a priest dynasty (the twenty-first); then a line of Ethiopian


princes govern the country, the twenty-fifth dynasty and finally out of the disintegration comes the revival under Psametith and the twenty-sixth dynasty when the old heroic spirit flashes up for an instant to expire forever under the heels of Cambyses (527 B. C.) and the Persian dynasty.



MOSES.

MICHAEL ANGELO BUONAROTTI.

The structure of which it occupies the center, was meant to form one of the sides of the four-fronted tomb, which Pope Julius II. promised himself in the middle of the nave of St. Peter's; the scattered materials of this vast design contribute to the adornment of the Pallazzo Vecchio at Florence, of San Lorenzo, and even of the Louvre. After the Medici, Paul III. reduced this work to a fourth, and sent this fragment to San Pietro in Vincoli.



MOSES.

MICHAEL ANGELO BUONAROTTI.

ISRAEL, BIBLE, MONOTHEISM, THEOCRACY.

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next great topic is Israel, the Bible, Monotheism, and Theocracy. Before entering on our subject I shall take the utmost care as to a precise circumscription of my standpoint, of my point of view. I say the utmost care, for anything short of an absolute precision is likely to blight my prospects. You know what my prospects, my expectations are. I did not promise to preach sermons, nor did I ever say that I shall in any of my lectures discuss the metaphysical difficulties of first principles with regard to religion or philosophy. More than that, I do not feel under any obligation on my part to cater to the tastes of either the orthodox believer or the heterodox unbeliever. I am independent of both. My way leads to nothing, but to a scientific study of questions which at present are amenable to scientific investigation. For not every question is amenable to science, at least to science in its present state. It is the general fault of men to insist on an immediate answer. They want to be answered at once, on the spot, without any further delay. But did science ever pretend to answer every reasonable question? Did science ever boast of being a satisfactory solution of all riddles and of every single enigma? Never; on the con-

trary, science, by its most advanced advocates and representatives perpetually insists on the premature nature of some questions.

Where did man come from? Why has the human shape developed that way and not in any other way? Why do the eyebrows consist of little hair and the mustache of long ones? How did language arise, how thinking, and how faith? To all these little and great questions, science gives one and the same answer: Can you not wait; can you not wait for a few hundred years? Are you in such a haste? Do you think that truth, scientific truth can be turned over to you in "spot cash" money? Truth as a rule is drawn on long, very long notes, but when due it is invariably paid off. If, therefore, you should expect me to satisfy your religious as well as your scientific desires, if you should expect me to treat of our present subject, of the Bible, of monotheism, and of the theocracy of the ancient Hebrews in the way of a priestly scholar, or a scholarly priest, then, ladies and gentlemen, I am sorry to say we would thoroughly misunderstand each other. I have nothing to do with the subjects so far as their religious, their confessional purport is concerned. Whether the Bible or any part of it (of course, at present, I only speak of the Old Testament) well then, whether the Bible is to be considered a canon, a dogmatic sacred book or not, whether God Almighty, himself has revealed in it His infinite wisdom, and whether He has selected the people of Israel as His chosen people; these are questions entirely alien to my subject. You remember how frequently I had to complain of the lack of sufficient sources regarding the actions and institutions of men, but our sources regarding the actions and institutions of God are infinitely more deficient.

Revelation is divine, but the report of revelation is human, and it is perfectly congruous to our feeling as well

as to our understanding that we doubt human actions and human reports, although we never can think of doubting divine influences. When I had to treat of China or India, or Egypt, I could discuss, and you most probably accepted my subject in perfectly calm composure of mind. China, although highly interesting, India, although immensely attractive, and Egypt, although profoundly fascinating, are still more or less foreign countries, none of their institutions, none of their sacred books forms part of our own sacred creed, their ideas and opinions don't come home to us as it were. It is altogether different with Israel. The moment you speak of the Old Testament, of monotheism, you instantly become to a certain extent personal. The Old Testament is part not only of the Jewish church, but of all Christian creeds too. Its study forms one of the occupations of our childhood, many of our dearest impressions are forever connected with the persons and tales of the Old Testament, and the most objective discussion of this venerable document has a tendency to stir up the feelings of the hearer. On the other hand there is no worse thing for science than feeling. Science is absolute indifference. Science does not sneer, nor does it laugh, nor does it despise: it treats of human affairs, as one of the masters said, "*ac si questio esset de punctis lineis et planis*," as if the question would be of geometrical points and lines and planes. One of the most excellent assertions of A. Comte, points to the great influence on the progress of astronomy exercised by our indifference to these remote bodies. No earthly interest, no feeling whatever, comes into play whenever we try to study the movements of stars, and thus our thinking faculties can act untrammelled and unbiased with their full force. In our study of the Old Testament, however, all kinds of feeling come into play, and it is, therefore, only a matter of course that our scientific knowledge of astronomy is so much older than our scientific knowledge of ancient Israel

When in my third lecture I spoke of the five sacred Books of King of the Chinese, generally attributed to Confucius, stating that Confucius was not the author of these books, I do not suppose that any of you felt his interest roused in the question. You heard it, accepted it in a passive way, and turned your attention to something else. Suppose, however, just for the sake of argument, I would say that the five Books of Moses have not been written by Moses, a whole series of feelings would suddenly occupy your soul, and instead of passively listening to me, you would, within yourself at least very actively remonstrate. You would look upon the whole question as on a matter of a half-personal hue, as on an interest of your own mental household.

This, then, being the case with our present subject, I shall circumscribe my proper region with all possible precision. In the whole course of these lectures I shall always lay, as I so far always laid, particular stress on the sources of our knowledge. I desire you to understand that I do not take anything at all at second hand. First, hand, original sources or no study at all, that has to be our motto. Accordingly, I shall now treat, first, of our original sources of the institutions of Israel, in other words, of the Bible, and a few Egyptian and Assyrian inscriptions, these three together being our only positive and direct authorities. Next to this I shall treat of monotheism and theocracy as an institution, disregarding entirely its religious or dogmatic aspect. Again and again I have to ask you not to expect any theological or religious discussion. Exactly in the way I treated of the institutions of China, or India, or Egypt, in the very identical way shall I treat of the known institutions of the ancient Hebrews. First, then, the sources, the Bible, the Old Testament. We may fairly divide the Old Testament into four parts: (1) The Pentateuch, (2) the his-

torical writings (Joshua, Kings, Samuel, Chronicles, Judges); (3) Prophets (the three greater and the twelve lesser), and (4) diverse writings (Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon). It is almost unnecessary to say that our chief attention will be directed to the Pentateuch, this being considered the oldest and most sacred, and in fact the fullest authority of our knowledge of ancient Israel. The Pentateuch consists of five books, the authorship of which is attributed to Moses. It is a very comprehensive work, divided into 187 chapters, and comprises the theology, the law and the history of the ancient Hebrews. Since over two centuries many a learned and sagacious theologian has spent all his life in reconciling the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions of these five books when contrasted with each other. In spite of all religious piety, they could not help remarking that the Pentateuch is not a homogenous, uniform work of one man or of one age, that the discrepancies in language, law and religious tenets are so clashing, that we are forced to the assumption of a multifarious origin of the Pentateuch. Astruc, a zealous French Catholic physician and theologian in the beginning of the last century, was led by his studies to the statement that we have to recognize two main sources in Genesis, between which the whole materials of this first book of the Pentateuch have to be divided. These sources he distinguished by the mark that the one used for God the name Elohim and the others the name Jehovah. Astruc's hypothesis, fortified by the observation of other linguistic differences which regularly corresponded with the variations in the name of God was accepted by the great Eichhorn, one of the founders of modern scientific theology, and proved the fruitful and just point of departure for all further inquiry. It is at the present a scientific fact, placed beyond the reach of any reasonable doubt, that those passages in

Genesis that use the word Elohim for God must be traced back to a different time and a different author than the passages in which the word Jehovah is used for God. After the idea of a plurality of authors of the Pentateuch had once taken a firm hold, it was a more natural consequence that the minutest and most laborious inquiries were instituted in order to find the different parts and layers of the work. It became more and more evident that the Pentateuch is a composite work, consisting of several layers, one older, one again of a more recent and even very recent origin. These inquiries were led on by theologians; each of them entertaining the highest possible degree of piety and devotion for revealed religion. I must call your particular attention to this very remarkable fact, for it is of very great importance whether the students and critics of the Pentateuch have been hostile unbelievers who start with a wish to detract from the value of the document as much as they can, or whether these inquirers have been pious theologians who could not help stating what pure, irrefragable evidence proved to be a clear fact. All my statements on the origin and constitution of the Pentateuch are taken from pious theologians, and chiefly from Eichhorn, De Wette, H. Graf, Reuss and Bishop Colenso. These scholars have nothing whatever to do with rationalism, with that hyper-philosophical movement peculiar to Germany, where it originated. They are all faithful believers, and consequently the results of their labors may be accepted, and in fact have been accepted by both sides, by the downright orthodox part on account of their having been propounded by orthodox theologians, and by the non-orthodox part on account of their dispassionate, forcible and ample evidence. I can scarcely refrain from showing you step by step the slow development of these results, from describing the various, sometimes marvellous efforts that have

been taken by a host of the most indefatigable scholars in order to distinguish older layers of the Pentateuch from more recent ones. Thousands of manuscripts have been collected, and all the related languages (Syrian, Aramaic, Assyrian, old Arabian, Phœnician, etc.), have been brought to bear upon the question. But I can only state the mere final results of these studies as far as they have been acknowledged as achievements of a scientific character. These results, then, are as follows :

(1) We can not speak of a Pentateuch, *pente* being the Greek word for five. We have to speak of a Hexateuch, *hex* being the Greek word for six. I say the denomination Pentateuch conveys an altogether wrong idea. It suggests the assumption of one, uniform book, written by one author and forming a separate division of the Old Testament. But there is no such separate division with regard to the so-called five Books of Moses. The Book of Joshua has been written by the same authors that wrote part of the five Books of Moses, and consequently these five books and Joshua are of one and the same stock and must be taken as one part of the Old Testament. Consequently, we have to speak of a Hexateuch and not of a Pentateuch. This has been universally accepted among scholars of all shades, and it is a great pity that the usual class of reference books and popular treatises do not show a trace of this incontestible and far-reaching fact. But the establishment of a Hexateuch is only the basis of the whole edifice. We have now to inquire into the different parts of this Hexateuch.

You all know that we divide the Hexateuch into Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy and Joshua. But this division is barely conventional. It does not show the real and original sequel of the parts. According to this division we would think, and the majority of the people still think, that Deuteronomy, or as it is usually called

the Fifth Book of Moses, is by far the latest of the five. There is, however, scarcely any fact better established than this, that Deuteronomy is one of the oldest parts of the whole Bible. I do not mean by that, that every single chapter or line in Deuteronomy is of an earlier origin than the chapters of Genesis, I only mean that those parts of this book that treat of laws are one of the oldest parts of the whole Bible; they were originally, most probably only oral traditions.

There is, however, a still older part of the Hexateuch. This part is not an element of the other books, but part of all the books, and has been termed the Jehovist part of the Hexateuch. In other words the ancient Hebrews originally possessed a book in which God was named Jehovah, and which has now to be considered the oldest layer of the whole Hexateuch. After this came the book which now is called Deuteronomy, and many centuries after this came the Priestly Code, or Leviticus, part of Numbers and the rest of the Hexateuch. There are hence three main layers of the Hexateuch.

First the Jehovistic history book distinguished by the fact that it is essentially narrative and not law, and by the pleasure it takes in bringing out details of the historical traditions, so that individual points of the story receive full justice and are not sacrificed to the interests of the general plan.

The patriarchal history belongs almost entirely to this document, and forms the most characteristic part of it; here that history forms no mere epitomized introduction to more important matter as in the Priestly Code, but it is treated in all fullness as a subject of first rate importance. Legislative elements are incorporated in the Jehovistic narrative only at one point, where they naturally fall into the historical context, viz.: in connection with the law given on Sinai (Exodus 20-23).

The second part is Deuteronomy, which embraces precepts for civil life, and must be limited to chapters 12-26.

The third part is the work of the Elohist, which we shall call the Priestly Code. This too, like Deuteronomy is a law-book, but it has an historical setting. Its main stock is Leviticus, with the cognate part of the adjacent books, Exodus 25-40, with a few exceptions, and Numbers 1-10, 15-19, 25-36, with some inconsiderable exceptions. This law book, however, does not embrace precepts for civil life, but is confined to affairs of worship, and mainly to the esoteric aspect of public worship, that is to such points as belonged to the functions of the priests as distinguished from the worshipping people. The legal contents of the Code are supported on a scaffolding of history, which, however, belongs to the literary form rather than to the substance of the work. It is only where some point of legal interest is involved that the narrative acquires any fullness, as it does in the book of Genesis in connection with the three preparatory stages of the Mosaic covenant attached to the names of Adam, Noah and Abraham. Generally speaking, the historical thread is very thin, and often becomes a mere genealogical line, on which is hung a continuous chronology, carried on from the creation to the exodus.

The Priestly Code is characterized by a marked predilection for numbers and measures, for arrangement and formality of scheme, by poverty and inflexibility of language. Thus its distinguishing marks are very pronounced and can always be recognized without difficulty. This Priestly Code is by no means a perfectly incomposite structure. On the one hand some older elements have been incorporated on its main stock, while on the other hand there have been engrafted on it quite a number of later novelties. Thus we see that the Hexateuch consists principally of three layers, of three strata as it were, and that

these strata are the products of different ages. In its present form we frequently meet all the three strata in one and the same chapter, and very frequently in two consecutive chapters of Genesis or Exodus. As to the dates of the formation of these strata it is almost universally accepted that the composition of the second part or Deuteronomy has taken place in the time of King Josiah (641 B. C.) The similarity of language and the resemblance of ideas refer the first layer or the Jehovist part to the golden age of Hebrew literature, the same which has given us the Books of Judges, Samuel, Kings and the oldest extant prophetic writings—the age of the Kings and Prophets, before the dissolution of the sister states of Israel and Judah.

The date of the Priestly Code is disputed. The greatest probability seems to point to the year 444 B. C., when the Babylonian priest and scribe Esra published this code. At any rate, nothing can outweigh the decisive arguments that support the view that the Priestly Code originated in or after the exile. That the Hexateuch in its known form is of a comparatively very recent origin, is fully borne out by the fact that the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries B. C. know nothing of a Mosaic code. Jeremiah is the first prophet who has reference to a code, and his quotations are taken from Deuteronomy. These well ascertained facts may serve now as a firm basis for a fair valuation of the Bible as an historical source. The greatest part of the Hexateuch, that is to say, the Priestly Code, is the work of ambitious priests, who shaped all law, all ceremonies, to their own purposes. A genuine and unadulterated source of legal commandments of the ancient Hebrews must and can be found in the second part, that is to say, in chapters 12–26 of Deuteronomy, while the Jehovist part is mere naive tradition. You will easily see now the vast difference between one great layer

of the Hexateuch and another. While Deuteronomy may be looked upon as the genuine and original statement of the laws of ancient Israel, the Priestly Code is of very little value for times previous to the fifth or sixth century B. C. Therefore, whenever you have a quotation from the Hexateuch seemingly corroborating or refuting a certain statement, it is not sufficient to know that such a quotation is really part of the text of the Hexateuch. It must moreover be stated whether the quotation is part of the first, or second or third layer of the Hexateuch. For else the quotation, although perhaps of great efficiency for the eighth, seventh or sixth century B. C., may be of no value whatever for the eighteenth, seventeenth or sixteenth century B. C. None of us ever thinks of mixing up the laws of Alfred with the laws of Queen Victoria, or the history of Henry I. with that of George III. But the difference between these two reigns is no more marked than the difference of the ancient Israelites 1,600 and 600 years B. C. This must never be lost sight of. It is really ridiculous to use Bible texts as so many passages of one homeogenous work, as if all parts of the Hexateuch would have been written at the same time and under and with reference to the same circumstances and institutions. In the time of King Josiah a great and immense change took place and altered the whole system of the ancient Hebrews. I shall speak of that later on. At present I want only to come to a clear and precise statement of our real and reliable sources. I have therefore to exclude all sources that have been composed or published centuries after the events recorded in them had taken place and with a palpable design to make these records subservient to a special purpose. And hence, to conclude all this, we have for our study of the ancient Hebrews to exclude the whole of the Priestly Code. So that our chief sources are chapters 12-26 of Deuteronomy and the little histori-

cal data in the Jehovist layer. When the treasures of Egypt were being excavated and collected, there was for a time a perfectly feverish curiosity to find some inscription or papyrus or any document with regard to the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt. But in spite of all the efforts of Brugsch and others, not the faintest trace could be found so far. There is, however, a very ancient inscription on the pylones of the temple of Karnak, on which Thotmes III., in the beginning of the sixteenth century B. C., has handed down an account of his military expedition to Western Asia. In this account we find the names of many towns in Palestine dating from before the Hebrew immigration. There is also a historic papyrus of the fourteenth century B. C., which contains a description of a carriage journey through Syria, made by an Egyptian officer, possibly for the collection of tribute. In this papyrus we similarly find a list of some places in Palestine. But neither of these documents gives us any details about the state of affairs. We have thus come to a precise statement of our sources, and we can now commence to inquire into the institutions of the ancient Hebrews. By ancient Hebrews I mean the population of Palestine from the fourteenth century down to the eighth century. The geographical boundaries of their country are far from being definite. All our information in the Old Testament does not enable us to assign correctly the north, south and west boundaries of the Israelitic country. The eastern boundary consisted of the desert. The ancient Hebrews were entirely shut out from the sea coast. Their country is mountainous and favors the growth of tropic and sub-tropic vegetation.

It is needless to dwell on the details of the geography of Palestine. Of all historical subjects, this perhaps is the most familiar one, and the principal regions of the country are well-known to everybody. Still I must remark in passing, that we are very far from identifying all places in the

Bible. Enormous money has been spent by the Palestine Exploration Fund raised in England a few years ago, and a gigantic map has been published of the Holy Land with the pretension of a faithful picture of Palestine. But the greatest authorities of continental Europe have declared against the accuracy of this map, and in short, to the present day we have no authentic map of ancient Palestine. The Hexateuch informs us of the twelve tribes of Israelites who successively occupied the Holy Land. But the report of the twelve tribes is scattered over the three layers of the Hexateuch, and consequently we have to use the utmost care in applying our texts to the present geographical denomination.

It is impossible with the present material to determine the ancient tribal limits. These tribes settled down some 1500 years B. C. and established a government of the most curious character. I am going to enlarge on the government of the ancient Hebrews to a considerable extent, because it is there where we find the root, the germ of all their institutions. To try to understand their religion, their ritualism, their theocracy, and even their oddities and crude ways, without a thorough understanding of their government is the most hopeless thing that we could do.

You can read in the works of the celebrated Renan, e. g. that the monotheism of the ancient Hebrews is due to a racial cause, that it is a race quality of the Semitic people, or to use his own words: "*à une disposition innée à la race, . . . propre à la famille semitique.*" It is scarcely possible to beat this specimen of scholarly uncouthness. In the first place we heard in our last lecture that we possess undoubted evidence to the effect that a people like the ancient Egyptians, who were by no means a Semitic people, had then propounded the clear idea of one God. You remember that oldest book of Prince Ptah-Hotep, an extract of which I read to you. The mummified prince speaks of the one God

in express terms, long before any of the three layers of the Hexateuch were composed. We have the huge volumes of Cudworth, in which it is proved beyond any reasonable doubt, that many, great many of the thinkers and philosophers of the Hellenic times had a clear and pure idea of one God. But even if we were compelled to grant that none but the ancient Hebrews had the doctrine of one God, that none but the Israelites ever embraced monotheism, could we possibly ascribe such a fact to mere racial qualities? Could we really think that racial qualities are in such connection with religious doctrines? That blood and bones and flesh and certain propensities of the mind predispose to certain theological tenets or make averse to others? That is perfectly ludicrous. Race, racial qualities—these peculiar words are the conjurer's wand used by all, whenever they are at a loss how to explain institutions. Every thing is race. We speak of the quiet, cold-minded calmness of the Englishmen as of his race-quality; we speak of the hot-blooded, rash temper of the Frenchman as of one of his racial qualities; yea we speak of the absolute government of the Russians as the consequence of the slavish submissive national and race character of the Russians. But this is all puerile. You could just as well say that my shoes are an outcome of the racial qualities of the calf, because my shoemaker has used calf-leather in manufacturing my shoes.

Renan is decried as an unbeliever. I am not concerned with this question. But I dare say that he has handled the subject of Hebrew monotheism in a highly unscientific way, that whether believer or unbeliever, his treatment of the matter is utterly useless. The monotheism of the ancient Hebrews has nothing to do with their racial qualities. It is an outcome of their institutions, and happily we can trace its origin and development very clearly, but to achieve this I have first to return to my

point of departure, to the state and government of the ancient Hebrews.

If I were to deliver my lectures in Germany or Austria, I would scarcely expect any of my hearers, the very learned ones excepted, to understand the statements that I am about to tell. But happily I am in a country where everybody is sufficiently acquainted with politics, with the ways of government, of administration, of legislature, or judicature. Hence, I hope that I will be readily understood, and so easily attain my object. In this country more than in any other everybody becomes daily aware of the elementary fact that cooperation, mutual help and assistance is the primary bond of society. Whenever a nation settles down in a foreign country they try to find out some arrangement which shall enable them to live together without troubling each other too much. They all agree on the necessity of some general measures which are instrumental to mutual safety, and, which, though curtailing as it were, the original natural right of the individual, bring out in the end a higher state of general well-being.

It is doubtless that the squatters and huntsmen of the western territories of this country were, individually taken, by far freer and less hampered in their doings when still in no connection with the other States of the Union than after it. But they knew that a sacrifice of this aboriginal freedom to more regulated customs and ways will ultimately be productive of a greater amount of welfare. And so they joined the Union, freely submitting to the regulations and ordinances of their self-created magistracies. But of course they, as well as the original thirteen States of the Union, were very much on their guard with respect to the amount of power they were going to vest their magistracies with. It was, and to the present day it is, a general principle with the people of this republic that the less rul-

ing power there is distributed among officials the better it is. Consequently very little power is vested with any of the officials, one (the President) excepted. Take, *e. g.*, the State legislature in America. To be sure, the State legislature in America has the power of passing laws, but is a law thus passed really a law, an unquestionable law? By no means. It can be put to a test of constitutionality and repealed: we frequently see such cases. That, however, is not the case with less republican States. Say, *e. g.*, in Germany, whatever the Reichstag together with the Emperor chance to pass as a law, that is an ultimate commandment, and no judge and no tribunal can change it. If, *e. g.*, the Reichstag in Germany would pass a law that only every fifth man is allowed to marry, none but the fifth man would be permitted to marry, and no other help would there be against such an absurd law but an application to the Reichstag itself. Because the power of legislation is absolutely and without any restraint vested in the Reichstag and Emperor.

The United States, on the other hand, have the general principle that all power is vested with the people, *i. e.*, in the constitution and amendments of constitution, and hence no legislature of a single State can ever go beyond the boundaries of the constitution. But the American people, although averse to all great centers of power, have nevertheless admitted that there should be quite a considerable number of officials, a Governor, a Secretary, a Mayor, a Sheriff, an Auditor, a police, etc., etc. They still cling to the idea that some checks and restraints there must be, some preventive power there must exist, else people would not live in perfect security.

The ancient Hebrews, when they settled down in Palestine, were similarly aware of the great necessity of having some arrangements made as to the order and government of their community. They could not help seeing that

something had to be done in the line of ruling these many different tribes and families. But when it came to deciding on the particular means that should be taken, they felt an unconquerable aversion toward being interfered with too much by officials and rulers. They were afraid of changes. They thought, this country is overflowing with all that is necessary for us and our children. Not only we can comfortably live here, but there is no reason why even our latest descendants should not enjoy the same land, the same exuberant soil, the same prolific vegetation, and the same mild climate. Why should we not arrange affairs in such a way that nothing should be changed? Why, *e. g.*, should a man's landed property ever be taken away from him? The few acres he needs for his vineyard, for his olive trees, for his wheat and rye, why should he be ever deprived of them? Perhaps because he had contracted debts? Because he was once in financial embarrassment, and because his brother or his friend happened to dispose of the little money he at that time lacked? What a trifling reason to deprive a man and all his numberless descendants of the invaluable benefit of possessing his own landed estate, of procuring his living by laboring on his own acres! No, that shall not be the case. Just as things were in the beginning, when each of us possessed his own land, and kept up his family with the fruits of his own acres—just in the same way shall this prosperous state continue for all the time to come. There shall be no change. There shall never be a power vested with any individual of our people, or with any class of our people, and not even in the whole people assembled, mark the enormity of this principle—not even in the whole people assembled—that shall be entitled to pass new laws, or any laws whatever. We herewith transfer all rights and powers of legislation unto God; and consequently, God being unchanging, God being unable to commit an error, God being under no necessity to change

a commandment because of its insufficiency, God being the eternal wisdom, the One, the True, the Unflinching—consequently there is no further necessity of a human legislature, of a human administration, no necessity for a sheriff, or an auditor, or a treasurer, or a police force. God is our legislature, our administration, our sheriff, our auditor, our police, our protection. The ancient Hebrews had no legislature at all, no officials at all, no police, no separate army, nothing of the kind. They carried the republican feeling to the extreme, they desired to be absolutely independent, they did not want to be interfered with by any human being at all; they wanted to assert and to maintain the aboriginal, natural freedom of the individual, and abhorred the idea of a beadle, of a tax collector, of a police, of a superior official. Accordingly, they vested all power in Him who never changes, whose laws can not be repealed, who is not subject to flattery, or liable to threatenings, who is the One, the Eternal, the Almighty.

Thus they were left in the possession of that freedom of the natural state, when men are not yet connected and pinioned together by the bonds of the State and its commandments. But the ancient Hebrews could not help noticing the great risk they ran by granting to everybody the full scope of his natural freedom. The beastly, fierce, unwieldy part of human nature is far too strong not to require some checks, some iron bonds of a palpable, concrete, actual nature—bonds that will come home to the understanding and feeling of the silliest and poorest, as well as the wisest and richest. But where shall these bonds, checks and restraints be found? To empower a certain class of people, say e. g., the priest with the right of superintending, watching or punishing the actions of men, that is the very thing that the ancient Hebrews abhorred most. They detested the idea of having men—human beings—stand above them. To elect annually new

and new officials—that went against their grain as well. No person shall ever interfere with another person. Hence there was only one way left, and it was a really ingenious way. Instead of having the people watched over and superintended by certain officials or certain classes, they contrived to concoct the most marvelous system of self-superintendence and self-watching ever invented. Every action, the meanest and the most sublime one, every hour almost of the day, every occupation, every amusement, was once forever regulated by divine precept. The husbandman could not go to the plough, he could not sow or reap, he could not trim the vines or pluck the olives, or do any kind of husbandry-work, when it pleased him. There was a day prescribed for one kind of work, and another day for another kind of work. No reason whatever could be an apology for doing the work on any other but the prescribed day. The baker, the carpenter, the tailor, the teacher—none of them could perform their handicrafts or professions according to their own taste. Every single part of the work was prescribed; nothing was omitted; nothing could be changed. A man could not take a bath at a time when he liked it; he had to take it at a time prescribed by divine regulation. A person could not eat or drink whatever he liked; he had to eat and to drink those eatables that were permitted by divine law, and had to abstain from those eatables that were prohibited by divine law. Even the things he was permitted to eat could not be eaten in any sequel or order whatever. The thing A., e. g., could be eaten before B., but not the thing B. before A. A person could not enjoy himself at the time it pleased him. He had to laugh and to dance and to sing at a strictly set time; and he had to weep and cry and mourn at another set time. A person could not marry the girl his heart longed for, but one of the girls that were among the permitted ones. If any

person trespassed upon any of those rules, he was handed over to the severest and most unrelenting of all judges—to the stings of a frightened conscience, to the fear of having offended the most powerful Creator of heaven and earth. It was this grotesque, gigantic system of self-watching that the ancient Hebrews invented in order to make up for the total lack of any official power in the shape of a police, or army, or Church; for the ancient Hebrews had no Church.

It is the greatest possible mistake to speak of a Church, of a priest-class, of a priestly hierarchy, in ancient Israel. Nothing of the kind existed. I know you will easily point to numberless passages in the Hexateuch which seem to, and in fact do speak of a Church or a priestly hierarchy; but in which part of the Hexateuch do you find these passages? Are they part of the first layer, are they part of the second layer, or part of the third layer? They are invariably taken from the third part; that is to say, from the Priestly Code, composed and published long after the decline of the original ancient republic, and at a time when the priests tried to gain the ascendancy and established a Hierarchy, a priest government, on the ruins of the ancient Theocracy, or God-government. In ancient times the priests were one of the tribes—not more. They had no greater rights than any other tribe. They were neither the judges, nor the lawgivers, nor the preachers, nor the teachers of the people. They were not the judges, I say: for John Selden has proved it, to any amount of certainty, that the judges in ancient Israel could be selected from among the general class of people, just as well as we at present select our jurors, and the fact of being a Levite was not the least reason why to be a judge. They were not the lawgivers, because the ancient Hebrews had no lawgiver, no legislature at all. They were not the teachers, because the study of the law was a gen-

eral occupation of the people. They were not the preachers or chief depositaries of the sacred religion, because in ancient Israel every tribe, almost every family, had its own altar for the worship of their ruler, for the adoration of the One, the Eternal, the Almighty. The worship of God was not yet centralized in Jerusalem. It was only in the time of King Isaiah that the centralization of the culture in Jerusalem took place. Till then there were in Judah, as there had been before in Samaria, a multitude of local sanctuaries, the legitimacy of which no one dreamt of disputing. If Hezekiah made an attempt to abolish those local shrines, as we are told in the second book of Kings, it is yet plain that this attempt was not very serious, as it had been quite forgotten less than one hundred years later. Josiah's reforms were the first that went deep enough to leave a mark on history. Not, indeed, that the high places fell at one blow; they rose again after the King's death, and the attachment to them finally disappeared only when the Babylonian exile tore the nation from its ancestral soil and forcibly interrupted its traditional customs. The returning exiles were thoroughly imbued with the ideas of Josiah's reform; it cost them no sacrifice of their feelings to leave the ruined high places unbuilt. From this date all Hebrews understood, as a matter of course, that the One God had only one sanctuary. That was in the sixth century.

Thus we have three distinct historical periods :

1. The period before Josiah.
2. The transition period introduced by Josiah's reform.
3. The period after the exile.

But at present I do not treat of any other but of the first period, of the time before Josiah. This is the time of ancient Israel; this is the time when the Levites had no special and higher standing of their own, when the sacred gifts were not paid to the priests at all, but to Je-

hovah, when they were not taxes, but public offerings to God, when the three great feasts of the people, the Feast of the Tabernacles, the Easter Feast, and the Harvest Feast, or Pentecost, were only thanksgivings for the fruits of the ground, and when the significance of these feasts was not yet toned down to mere rituals by the expressions of the Priestly Code.

At this time the vigorous republican spirit of the ancient Hebrews was still in full force. They were firmly resolved not to give up the least particle of what they possessed, and, as I said before, nothing could change the original state of their property. They had no state, no county, no city officials, and their regulations with regard to the preservation of family property were perfectly unique. They did not permit that a man should lose his property; in fact, they precluded all possibility of selling property by the rule of the seventh year and the year of jubilee. As this is generally little known, I shall read to you the original text of the Bible, (Lev. 25):

"8. And thou shalt number seven Sabbaths of years unto thee, seven times seven years; and the space of the seven Sabbaths of years shall be unto thee forty and nine years.

"9. Then shalt thou cause the trumpet of the jubilee to sound on the tenth day of the seventh month, in the day of atonement shall ye make the trumpet sound throughout all your land.

"10. And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto you, and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family.

"11. A jubilee shall that fiftieth year be unto you; ye shall not sow, neither reap that which groweth of itself in it, nor gather the grapes in it of thy vine undressed.

"14. And if thou sell ought unto thy neighbour, or buyest ought of thy neighbour's hand, ye shall not oppress one another.

"15. According to the number of years after the jubilee thou shalt buy of thy neighbour, and according unto the number of years of the fruits he shall sell unto thee.

"16. According to the multitude of years thou shalt increase the price thereof, and according to the fewness of years thou shalt diminish the price of it; for according to the number of the years of the fruits doth he sell unto thee.

"17. Ye shall not therefore oppress one another: but thou shalt fear thy God: for I am the LORD your God.

"18. Wherefore ye shall do my statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them: and ye shall dwell in the land in safety.

"19. And the land shall yield her fruit, and ye shall eat your fill, and dwell therein in safety.

"23. The land shall not be sold forever; for the land is mine; for ye are strangers and sojourners with me.

"24. And in all the land of your possession ye shall grant a redemption for the land.

"25. If thy brother be waxen poor, and hath sold away some of his possession, and if any of his kin come to redeem it, then shall he redeem that which his brother sold.

"26. And if the man have none to redeem it and himself be able to redeem it.

"27. Then let him count the years of the sale thereof, and restore the overplus unto the man to whom he sold it; that he may return unto his possession.

"28. But if he be not able to restore it to him, then that which is sold shall remain in the hand of him that hath bought it until the year of jubilee; and in the jubilee it shall go out, and he shall return unto his possession.

"29. And if a man sell a dwelling house in a walled city, then he may redeem it within a whole year after it is sold; within a full year may he redeem it.

"39. And if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant.

"40. But as an hired servant, and as a sojourner, he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee.

"41. And then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers shall he return.

"42. For they are my servants which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bondsmen.

"47. And if a sojourner or stranger wax rich by thee, and thy brother that dwelleth by him waxeth poor, and sell himself unto the stranger or sojourner by thee, or to the stock of the stranger's family.

"48. After that he is sold he may be redeemed again; one of his brethren may redeem him:

"49. Either his uncle or his uncle's son, may redeem him, or any that is nigh of kin unto him of his family may redeem him; or if he be able, he may redeem himself.

"50. And he shall reckon with him that bought him from the year that he was sold to him unto the year of jubilee; and the price of his sale shall be according unto the number of years, according to the time of an hired servant shall it be with him.

"51. If there be yet many years behind, according unto them he shall give again the price of his redemption out of the money that he was bought for.

"52. And if there remain but few years unto the year of jubilee, then he shall count with him, and according unto his years shall he give him again the price of his redemption.

"53. And as a yearly hired servant shall he be with him; and the other shall not rule with rigour over him in thy sight.

"54. And if he be not redeemed in these years, then he shall go out in the year of jubilee, both he and his children with him.

"55. For unto me the children of Israel are servants; they are my servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; I am the LORD your God."

This was in perfect accordance with their original principle of absolute non-interference. They extended this principle not only to all departments of politics, they did not only prohibit, once forever, a pressure on or an alteration of the political right, of the political independence, of every individual. They went far beyond that. They prohibited any pressure on or any alteration of the civil, financial independence of the individual by declaring all contracts, sales, purchases to the contrary, viz.: to a transfer of property, void of effect. It is quite natural that, in reality, there were all kinds of business transactions, turning over property from one party to another. But in point of law, such things were next to impossible.

This highly remarkable tendency to preclude the deleterious influence of any kind of interference manifests itself very strikingly in two of the phenomena of ancient Hebrew institutions. I mean in the prophets and in the parts played by women. When reading the writings of the prophets, we cannot help being astonished at the great liberty these men took in censuring and exhorting the King, the priests, the people—everybody. We know that the Romans had a magistrate, the censor, who was permitted to put his mark of blame, his censure, to the name of a Roman citizen, and thereby exclude him from the senate. But these censors had been previously elected by the people, and thus the people had consented to these censures and criticisms. We now hear preachers and clergymen address their audiences sometimes in a very reprobatory way. But these men have likewise been

elected; they have been, as it were, hired for blaming; they have been vested with the power of public conscience. But the prophets in ancient Israel were altogether private men—men without any official call or vocation—men of neither a higher nor a more dignified standing in life. And still they almost appointed and deposed the nominal kings; they threatened them; they menaced them; they issued their commandments to the people. But if you meditate over the curious nature of the ancient Hebrew state, of its utterly amorphous and disintegrated character, you will easily see that none but private men could exercise any such influence; for there were no public officers commanding a great, an imposing power. In Rome there was no need for the rise of private men, of private inspiration or genius; their officers, the Consul, the Prætor, the Dictator, the Censor, had been given power and influence enough. All the great Romans were official persons—I mean persons in some high office. You cannot mention one single Roman who spent his life in a private way, and in the meantime exercised great influence on the course of events. All of them invariably were Consuls, Censors, Prætors, Pontifices, Imperatores; all of them were in office, because there were such offices. But where the number of great and powerful offices is very limited, as *e. g.*, in this great Republic, it frequently happens that men of a comparatively private character, at least not the incumbents of a great office exercise great influence, as *e. g.* Daniel Webster, or those men who are only private persons and travelling round the country censure the behavior, and criticize the actions of men, as the Evangelists in America.

In the ancient Hebrew republic there were no great public offices at all, and consequently the persons who were ambitious to exercise decisive influence over the course of events had to trust everything to their own per-


sonal ability. And, as a matter of course, the greater orators they were, the more inspired they seemed to be, the more genuine interest for the welfare of the people seemed to pervade their speeches, the more they took the people. And hence we find in some of their writings perfect marvels of transporting oratory. Not being able to found their rights of addressing and supervising the people on some records of the past, or on the institutions of the present, they founded them on the events of the future, stating that they can see, they can prophesy the things to come, and hence, they felt obliged and entitled to warn the people, to guide the people, to lead the people. But, as I said before, the peculiar, most extraordinary constitution of the ancient Hebrew republic brought forth another phenomenon of rare interest: women in high political positions. There being no officers at all, and everything in the line of political influence being left entirely to the efforts of the private people, it was only a natural consequence that women who are certainly the equals of men as far as ability is concerned, I say that women tried to gain great influence, and sometimes even acted, as in the case of Deborah, as commander-in-chief. Where men have distributed all political offices among themselves, and among a few public offices, there is no room left for either a private man or a private woman, and thus we see that in the whole history of the Republic of Rome, we never meet with a woman in a high imposing position.

But this unique constitution belonged only and exclusively to the time of the ancient Republic of the Hebrews, a republic which sometimes, very much like England at the present day, had a king at the head, but which in reality always was a republic.

After the return from exile, in the sixth century, however, the Hebrews were conquered by a series of ancient monarchs, and the priests succeeded in subjecting the

minds of the Hebrews to their doctrines and tenets. Ever since that time, with the exception of the Maccabees, the priestly hierarchy was the prevailing and domineering element.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the true and objective picture of the state and of the institution of the ancient Hebrews. With this we have to leave the immense continents of Asia and Africa, and repair to the peninsula of Asia, to Europe, and in the first place to Greece.



SOCIAL LIFE IN GREECE.

References :—*Homer*, *Iliad*, *Odyssey*. *Sophocles*, *Antigone*, *Electra*. *Aristophanes*, *Lysistrata*. *Aristotle*, *Politics*. *Isaeus*, *Cleonymus*, *Nicostratus*, *Ciron*. *Isocrates*, *Aegineticus*. *Plato*, *Leges*. *Plutarch*, *Vitae Parali*. *Corn. Nepos*. *P. van Limburg Brouwer*, *Hist. de la civilis. morale et religieuse des Grecs* (II part, ch. VIII, IX, X). *Gladstone*, *Homeric studies*, vol. II. *Lasaulx*, *Zur Geschichte u. Phil. der the bei den Griechen*. *Welcker*, *Kleine Schriften* 'on Sappho'. *Van den Es*, *De jure Familiarum apud Athenienses*. *Maehly*, *Die Frauen des Griechischen Alterthums*. *Becker*, *Charikles*. *Corsini*, *Dissertationes Agonicæ* (on the Olymp. games). *Meier*, *Olymp Spiele* in "Ersch and Gruber." *F. W. Jacobs*, *Verm. Schriften* 'on Greek Hetairai and Greek meals'. *Smith*, *Dicty of Greek and Rom. Antiquities*.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next topic is : Social Life in Greece. I shall speak of the religion and mythology of the ancient Greeks in connection with their political institutions in my next lecture. At present I shall inquire into the domestic, private, and, as it were, purely human features of Greek life, into the very features which in the majority of books on history are so sadly neglected. Of course, while treating of the private life of the ancient Greeks it is nevertheless impossible to leave their political institutions entirely out of consideration. The Greeks as well as the Latins were a pre-eminently political nation. The political frame, the political foundation of their State was in the same time the frame and the foundation of their private life, of their domestic customs too. At the present time, in spite of all the great, and even vast divergencies between the institutions of modern civilized people, there is a prevailing uniform cast of manners and forms, which in their aggregate constitute what we call a lady or gentleman. In fact, the manners of a lady or of a gentleman, and to a great extent their views and ways are alike all over the civilized world. There is little difference, as far as manners, carriage, and habits of politeness and courtesy are concerned, between a gentleman of Russia,



Alcibiades.

Agathon.

Socrates.

BANQUET OF AGATHON.

of France, of Ohio, or of Brazil. Still less difference will be found in the real ladies of those different countries. But that was not the case in ancient Greece or Rome. The divergencies of these countries were so marked, their political institutions were so widely deviating from one another, that even their private customs and social doings showed scarcely any resemblance whatever. A Roman of the time of Cornelius Scipio Africanus, spent his day in an utterly different way from a Spartan of the time of King Agesilaos or an Athenian of the time of Cimon. A Roman lady had absolutely different views, different opinions, an altogether different turn of mind from a lady of Athens, or of Thebæ, or of Corinth. What the one considered a perfect shame, was taken simply as a matter of course by the other. What the one never dared to do the other never thought of avoiding. These profound discrepancies are amenable in the first place to a discrepancy, to a divergence in political institutions, and hence a few appropriate words about these political foundations of ancient Greek life can not be dispensed with. But before entering on our present topic in such a direct and immediate way, let us pause a moment or two to ponder over the greatness, the grandeur, the imperishable splendor of our subject. Greece!! What an infinite display of things immortal and divine does this one word convey to us! A matchless literature, a peerless science, a profound philosophy, a charming religion, and an interminable treasure of beauty! Beauty in all her aspects, in all her manifestations! Beauty of style and beauty of thought, beauty of objects and beauty of heart, beauty represented by all implements of the workman and all products of the artist, model, pure, chaste beauty! And if we think that all these numberless treasures have been brought forth by a handful of men, by the inhabitants of a few towns, by a country which, even if we add to it all Greek cities of

Sicily, Asia Minor and Egypt, is considerably smaller than Ohio, we must feel almost bewildered and utterly at a loss how to account for it. These few men have given us standard models of style, of sculpture, of elocution, of metaphysics, of geometry, of historiography and of dramas. Two thousand years have elapsed, and numberless efforts have been made by the most ingenious thinkers, poets and artists to rival, to equal the works of the Greeks. There has been a time when great scholars have tried to deny the merits of the Greeks. The spiritual exponent of the movement was Chas. Perrault, the celebrated French author, in his book, "*Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes.*" A whole literature arose on this question; the civilized world was divided into two hostile parties, the one desirous to supersede the acquirements of Greek thinkers and poets, the other upholding the glory of Greece. The modernists declared that our modern authors and artists have gone beyond the ancients, that the rhetoric and logic of Aristotle is inferior to the rhetoric and logic of Port Royal and Ramus, that the poetics of the Stagirite is of no use to our modern high-toned scholars; that Herodotus is a dotard and Thucydides a dry statesman, and even Scaliger asserted boldly that Homer is far inferior to Vergil. But when the waves of hot, personal strife began to subside, it became a perfect truism that the ancient Greeks have been model writers and poets and artists, not only for one time but for all times. Then it was declared by the greatest critic that ever lived (I use Macaulay's word), by Lessing, that every line in Aristotle's Poetics has to be considered an immaculate evangile, and Grotefend, Layard, Rawlinson and Bunsen declared that Herodotus is next to absolutely reliable, and all historians agreed in awarding the praise of historiography to Thucydides, and George Boole and Stanley Jevons, together with De Morgan, reinstated the logics of the great Greek thinker to its previous high place of honor.

The more we study the scientific writings of the ancient Greeks the more we have to admire them. It was no less a thinker than Leibnitz who said that by reading the ancient Greek writers on science we begin to tone down our admiration for modern inventors. The great physicist Biot could not help stating that Archimedes is still a highly beneficial study for the most advanced mathematicians of the present day, and there can be no doubt that we have not yet attained the elegance and forcibleness of Euclid's master work.

Homer is at present by far the best known and the best loved of all poets; his heroes and heroines are now, over 3000 years after the composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as familiar to us as the names of our own sisters and brothers. The dramas of *Æschiles*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, the comedies of *Aristophanes* are studied in our schools just as they have been studied 2000 years ago, and we can never cease to read them anew, to admire them, to love them. And all these marvels of sagacity, of wisdom, of loveliness—they are the products of a few ages, of one nation, of one language. This striking phenomenon is the central and most important fact of all Greek history. We must try to account for it, we must endeavor to gain some knowledge of the causes, which were working at the rise and development of this unique civilization.

These causes were very many in number, and it would be impossible to discuss them in one lecture. But, happily, I can devote four lectures to Greece, and thus I hope to be able to discuss these causes at considerable length. At present, I am only concerned with the social life of the ancient Greeks, this being one of the great motors of their grand civilization, one of the springs by which the unrivalled grandeur and beauty of Greek civilization was made possible. But as I said in the beginning of our present lecture, we have to cast first a glance on the

political constitution of Greece, thus laying the only proper foundation for a right understanding of their private and social life. Of course of all the political institutions of the ancient Greeks, I shall only select such as really bear on my present subject; and consequently, I shall have to omit a great many of their political institutions, the full discussion of which I shall, in connection with Greek religion and mythology, undertake in my next lecture.

The most momentous political institution of the ancient Greeks with regard to their social life is the Greek city. Ladies and Gentlemen, if I were to talk for one hundred consecutive hours, if I were to hoard all the facts of past ages, and all the references of the best libraries of London and Paris, I would not exhaust the immense significance, the boundless importance of a city, in contradistinction to any other dwelling place. The mode of living together, the manner in which people happened to associate as neighbors, whether they live in the form of a German mark, or of a Scotch parish, or an Anglo-saxon ward, or a Mexican common building, or an Indian village-community, or in a modern hamlet or village, or lastly, whether they live together in a town, in a city, that makes all the difference imaginable, that leaves its mark on the most trifling, as on the most important institutions of such community. The very language of a people, I mean of a people the majority of which lives in cities, is totally different from the language of people that lives in scattered villages. Nomadic nations keep strictly to the root of the word, they add to it, they magnify it, but they never change it, say e. g. in Hungarian, Szeret, love; Szeret-ek, I love; Szeretlek, I love you; Szeret-telek, I have loved you; Szeret-hetnelek, I would love you, etc., because they are afraid of losing the means of intercommunication with each other. City-living nations on the other hand, like to drop the root, to change it; their languages belong to the inflecting class

of idioms, and consequently the languages of such nations are entirely different from the languages of people who descend from nomadic tribes. But not only their language, their very mind, their soul takes an altogether different turn. It is to the present day a notorious experience, that city-life is more energetic, more suggestive of all kinds of thought, more abundant with all descriptions of character and events, more nervous than country-life. And it is one of the chief reasons of the astonishing amount of intelligence possessed by the population of this country, that over a third part of the people of the United States spend their lives in cities, whereas not a tenth part of the population of Europe lives in cities. If we now keep this before our mind we will readily see that the Greeks who lived exclusively in cities, had to partake in a still greater degree in the benefit of city-life. I say exclusively, for the Greeks lived only in cities. A Greek state means a Greek city. When you speak of Attica, you mean the city of Athens with her dependencies in that territory which is called Attica. There was no other state. In modern times we call a state a large territory, which is considered one political being, the head of all the cities and towns in that territory. There was no such thing in ancient Greece, and none in ancient Rome as we shall see later on.

In Greece the boundaries of the cities were also the boundaries of the state. Every city was a state in itself or a dependency of another city. There were no villages or hamlets, or townships or counties, or any other division of the territory. Only a city. Every Greek spent his life in a city, consequently every single Greek was exposed to the working of all those highly civilizing powers and influences which at the present time, just as well as 3000 years ago make up the great intellectual agencies of a city. Men meet more frequently in a city than they do in the country; they hear more, they see more, they are

forced to take interest in many things which would never rouse their sympathy when living in the country; they are forced socially, as well as politically, to contribute something to the stock of useful, amusing and instructive arrangements; they talk more and are being talked to to a greater extent—in short, city people are likely, and in fact are more intelligent, more supple, more inventive, more liberal than country people.

The Ancient Greeks were all city people, they had no living unless they lived in a city; the city was their state, their home, their fatherland. Even now you call a member of a state a citizen, a man of the city. Being continually subject to the stirring agencies of city-life, their intellect grew at rapid strides, they advanced with great fastness, and achieved wonderful things in a short time. Compare with that the middle ages, counting their times from the fifth century A. D. to the end of the fourteenth century—nine centuries. In seven of the centuries there were scarcely any cities in all Germany, very few in the northern half of France, very few in England, and none or only five or six in Holland, Denmark, Hungary, Russia, respectively. Accordingly you find that the intellectual development of these countries is literally nothing when compared with Greek civilization. Thereby you will clearly see that this political institution, that is to say the institution of cities to the exclusion of all other territorial divisions of villages, of parishes, of counties, of townships, etc., wrought its influence deeply into the minds of the Greeks. This circumstance is one of the most important; its working can be traced, as I said before, in the character of the language, in the intellect of a people, and especially in the rapidity with which this intellect develops. But that is not all. We would certainly overdo things by attributing everything to this one cause. Great though the influence of cities and city-life undoubtedly was, there were

still other and equally mighty powers at work. The Greek cities were not only cities, they were *democratic* cities, they were cities, in the government and administration of which every single citizen took part. Every single citizen, I say, and there is again one of the marked differences of Greek cities. The people did not abide by merely exercising their right of suffrage two or three times a year, and thus leaving everything to a few officials and a few boards, as e. g. the Romans did and the Americans do, but almost every single citizen partook daily in the whole administration of the state, of the city. They had several 1000 judges, several 1000 other officials, but I shall treat of that in my next lecture. At present it will suffice to say that a Greek citizen was constantly engaged in the political work of his state; the Greek cities were strictly democratical—*demos* meaning the people. The whole people was running the political machine. If you now take those two things together. 1. A Greek had no other place on earth but his city, no other city in Greece could be a home for him, unless this other city had a special treaty with his native city; he was bound to live and to die in this one city, occasional trips to other places excepted. 2. That the government of this city was carried on daily by almost every citizen. Taking these two things into consideration you may easily see how very important it was for every Greek to be perfectly sure of his citizenship. He must have had most authentic and incontestible evidence of his being a citizen of his city, or else he was excluded from the city; or in other words, since he was excluded from every other town in Greece as well, and since there was no other dwelling place but a town, the unfortunate man was a homeless pariah, a person outside the pale of safety.

Take the modern conception: Suppose you are a citizen of the United States and want to sojourn in France.

Does that interfere with your prolonged sojourn in France? No; you need not partake in the political life of the Frenchmen; thousands and thousands of born Frenchmen don't either. And even in this country it is not necessary to be a citizen of the United States in order to spend comfortably a few years in any of the States. If anyone wants to become a citizen of the United States, he can do so by living here a couple of years. But does he enjoy any direct emoluments by becoming a citizen of the United States? Does he get an annual rent or pay, or any reward whatever? Scarcely any if we except the Homestead Law. But this was altogether different in Greece. In Greece the direct emoluments and benefits of a citizen were so many and so lucrative, that the Greeks had an actual aversion to augmenting the number of citizens. But leaving all this to my next lecture I hasten to my point, to the influence of this political institution on the social life of the Greeks. The Greeks being extremely anxious to have the most positive knowledge of the citizenship of the father and mother of every single citizen, for nobody was considered a citizen unless both his father and mother were citizens; they consequently laid down very strict rules as to the private life of women. They did not trust women in general, they wanted to have the most authentic evidence of the fact of paternity; they wanted to have the legitimacy of the mother and father placed beyond the faintest suspicion of doubt, and consequently they treated their women almost as prisoners.

Greek women lived in upstairs rooms, so that the husband could watch her when she left her house. She had to stay all day at home, with her servants. She never went to the theater, or only then when serious tragedies were played. She never went to the public meeting-places, she did not partake in the symposia, in the soirees and musicales of the gentlemen, and even at family suppers she had

to sit apart. When in the street she was constantly attended by slaves, and nobody ventured to address her or to accompany her. When still very young they were married to a young man or an old man whom they had scarcely seen before, and there was precious little love in the whole affair. We have in one of the Greek dramatists a striking passage, where a young girl shortly describes her youth. She says: "When I was seven years old, I carried the mystic box in procession; then when I was ten I ground the cakes for our patron goddess, and, then, clad in a saffron-colored robe, was the bearer at the Brauronian festival, and I carried the sacred basket when I became a beautiful girl." Such were the great external events in the life of an Athenian maid. Athenian women were always minors, subject to some male. Aristotle always classes women and children together. An unfaithful woman was practically expelled from society and excommunicated. If she appeared in a temple any one could tear her dress off and maltreat her to any extent with impunity, provided he stopped short of killing her. It is in accordance with the spirit of this institution that Greek towns had no treaty as to a permission of intermarriage between their sons and daughters. At least we never read of such treaty between Athens and Sparta or Argos or Corinth, or any other of the famous towns of Greece.

This peculiar and very odd position of Greek ladies had one great exception—the Lakonian ladies, the ladies of Sparta. In Sparta the women were not held under similar restrictions, they could move freely, in fact too freely, even for the emancipated woman of modern times. Spartan women were not only allowed, they were obliged to undergo all physical exercises of the gymnasium together with the young men of the city. They had to prove their physical valor by wrestling and boxing-matches. The statuesque beauty of Spartan women was

renowned all over Greece. When married they were expected to have children, and this main and principal object had to be attained under any circumstances. An old husband had to be supplanted by a young lover, with the consent of public opinion and with the approval of the State. Hence we seldom hear of adultery in Sparta. The State, the preservation of the State, was the first and the last consideration. It is a well known fact, that in Sparta every new born baby had to be submitted to a jury of commissioners, who decided on the vitality of the child. In case of a negative decision the baby was simply flung into the abyss of the Taygetos. For what shall be the use of a weak girl or a weak boy? The State did not want such useless children, and the State was everything.

Before proceeding any further, we have to ask why Spartan women were allowed a freedom that was absolutely refused to the women of other Greek cities. The answer to this question leads us again to the political institutions of Sparta. They had the same idea of citizenship as the Athenians or Corinthians; they were similarly anxious to retain the old number of citizens; they were similarly averse to any augmentation of the stock of citizens, of new citizens, and they were similarly afraid of being doubted as to the legitimacy of their paternity. But the seclusion of women which was thus necessitated in Athens was relatively superfluous in Sparta. For the Spartans had the most inhospitable principle of excluding all strangers from their city. To prevent any afflux of strangers by commerce or traffic, they, or rather Lycurgus, had introduced the clumsiest and most unmanageable money—huge iron bars or rods—so that no foreign people ever felt attracted by the treasures of Sparta. Consequently none but Spartans lived in Sparta, and hence there was no particular risk in granting perfect social freedom to their women. But with the exception of Sparta

and some cities on Creta, the social state of women in Greece was very much alike to the present Mussulman women of the harem. This, however, applies to *one* set of free Greek women only, to the married women. It is only a matter of course that the highly developed Greeks, who had such a keen sense of the beautiful and lovely, whose heart was unceasingly longing for manifestations of harmonious beauty, I say it is only a matter of course that the Greeks could not feel satisfied with the monotonous charms of their simple, not to say silly, undeveloped wives. They had to make up for this lack of social charms, they had to find a deeper, a more passionate show of sympathy, of love. They could not dispense with those tender emotions of the heart that play such a prominent part in the development of our whole soul. And consequently we find in Greece two systems of love, if I may say so, both of them unique, both of them exclusively classical and antique—I mean the love men cherished for men and the love of men for the emancipated women of Greece, for the Hetairai. In treating of these two subjects we must be extremely careful. If you should go by the descriptions and allusions of Aristophanes or other Greek comedians, you would utterly condemn both these systems. You would look upon them as the impure outcome of low passions, as the vile product of heathenish bestiality. But let us beware of such uncritical talk.

The Greeks were unable to find the comfort of their soul in their homes, and consequently they looked for an outside gratification of their desires. This is as simple as the A B C. Men always do the same. That is one of the reasons why club life in England has taken such fearful dimensions. The ancient Greeks, therefore, became attached to male friends with a fervor of feeling, with a depth of passion, that nowadays is de-

voted only to women. In Krete, as well as in Sparta and Thebes, men were passionately attached to men. The famous invincible guard of the 300 Boeotian heroes were all pinioned together by an ideal and enthusiastic love for each other. The venerable Epaminondas never left his male love, and to merely look at him was perfect consolation, as he himself said. Accordingly, we read of the most exalted examples of friendship, of Aristogiton and Harmodius, of Achilles and Patroclos, of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, and of Damon and Phintias, the story of whom has been immortalized by Schiller in his poem, "Die Buergschaft." The treatise on friendship in the Nikomachean ethics of Aristotle is to the present day a model representation of that generous and rare attachment of hearts, of friendship. But men can not be satisfied with the love of men only—they crave for the charm of female suggestiveness, of female tender tact, of intercourse with broad-viewed, refined women. As such women could never arise among the imprisoned class of married women, they had of needs to be sought for among the class of unmarried women—of free, unmarried women. And these women, who were the spiritual companions of the greatest of Greeks, these women, whose charming conversation and graceful manners conquered the most philosophical as well as the most trivial of Greeks, these women were the Hetairai. There is no other word for this peculiar class of women. No other term would exactly convey the proper meaning of Hetairai. They cultivated all the graces of life; they dressed with exquisite taste. They were witty, and their witty sayings were chronicled and turned into verse. Some of them attained the highest social position.

Almost every famous man had one of these lady-companions with whom he discussed the pursuits and soothed the evils of his life. Plato had Archænassa, Aristotle had

Herpyllis, Epicurus had Leontion, Socrates had Melanira, Menander had Glycera. The beauty of some, especially of Phryne, the most beautiful woman that ever lived, attracted the eyes of all Greece; and Appelles painted her, and Praxiteles made her the model for the Cnidian Aphrodite, the most lovely representation of woman that ever came from the sculptor's chisel.

Some were renowned for their musical faculty, some were celebrated painters. Socrates the wisest of men, did not hesitate to say (you can read the passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*) that he considers Aspasia, the most famous of all the Hetairai, his teacher. You will readily see that the Hetairai were a direct outcome of the social state of Greek women. Some of the women in Greece were perfectly conscious of the unworthy state of their social standing, and a movement began with a view to a reformation, to an emancipation of women. The centre of this movement was the poetess Sappho. She of herself would deserve a passing notice in any account of ancient women, for she occupied a position altogether unique. She was the only woman in all antiquity whose productions placed her on the same level as the greatest poets of the other sex. Solon, on hearing one of her songs sung at a banquet, got the singer to teach it to him immediately, saying that he wished to learn it and die. Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle refer to her in terms of profound respect. Plato called her the tenth muse. This woman determined to do her utmost to elevate her sex. The one method of culture open to women at that time was poetry, and accordingly Sappho established a school of Greek poetesses; the most celebrated of which is Erinna.

But this whole emancipation movement was of no use whatever. The social state of Greek women being a consequence of the principal political institutions of Greece, it could never be altered unless a corresponding change

in the political institutions would have taken place. But there was no likelihood of such a change unless brought upon by a foreign power. Political institutions, political life was the domineering, the most essential, and to a certain extent the only life in Greece. We can trace the working of this main current in every part of social life. Say *e. g.* the Greek house.

Both the Homeric and the historic houses have in common the important feature of a courtyard. In both it is surrounded by columns and forms, as it were, the centre around which the other parts of the house are grouped equally, and into which the single rooms open. The historic house, however, was much inferior in size and splendour to that described by Homer, as was natural, seeing that it was inhabited by simple citizens instead of kings and rulers of the people.

Homer never even mentions private dwellings. Moreover, it was, in consequence of the prominence of public, of political life, a natural peculiarity of the Greeks, in their best times to concentrate all their splendour and luxury in the adornment of temples and other public edifices, while their private dwellings were small and modest, not to say mean. The homes of the Greeks were their public places, their Stoas and Agoras; only in the Macedonian period (end of the fourth cen.) when Greek freedom and greatness had vanished, luxurious private houses became the fashion, while at the same time begin the complaints of both religious and civic buildings being more and more neglected. Only in the country were there large houses; in cities houses had generally only one yard. The Greek house agreed in its principal features with the Roman domes, and it will be more convenient to treat of it in our lecture on social life in Rome. Meanwhile, I cannot refrain from remarking that the main idea of a Greek or a Roman dwelling house was a flight of down stair halls,

with as little up-stair room as possible; the up-stair rooms being reserved for women, slaves and servants.

When we think of the great, of the overwhelming influence of political institutions in Greece, we must feel rather astonished at the lack of public schools. In ancient Greece very few people could do without a knowledge of reading and writing, and still they never had a system of public schools, nor had the Romans either. Nevertheless they had very strict laws as to compulsory instruction. Everybody was under a strict obligation to acquire the rudiments of knowledge, but he had to acquire it by the tuition of a private teacher, of the *grammatistes*. The education of the Greek male person was based on very ancient foundation. The most ancient of the teachers was Cheiron, the instructor of Jason and Achilles. The course of studies in the Homeric times embraced the art of hunting, and all the different sorts of weapon-exercises, a herb-lore (*jatricke*), a course of music, a course of prophesying (*mantike*) and a course of law.

This course of studies together with a study of the poets and dramatists was the main stock of a Greeks knowledge. Every single boy had to learn the laws of the country by heart, and there were few Greeks without a thorough knowledge of Homer's epical poems, of Hesiod or of Pindar. At their public games the most celebrated authors read their works to the people, as *e. g.* Herodotus, who read part of his unrivalled history to the people of Greece assembled in Olympia. The Spartans had no public schools either. Spartan boys were taught by the dramatists—but they never aimed at great learning. On the contrary, they were inclined to think that ample knowledge has a tendency to effeminate brave soldiers, and only the war songs of Tyrtæos were a favorite song and poem with the Spartans.

This intellectual training made them extremely quick at sharp repartee, and at present we denote such epigrammatic short answers with the word Laconic answers. They hated all long-winded discussions, and when once the sophist Kephisophon wanted to enter their city, a man who boasted to be able to discuss any topic whatever the whole day long, they simply turned him out of the precincts of their city. Spartan boys from their seventh year belonged to the State, they were divided into divisions and subdivisions, every division being headed by a boy of maturer age. They were constantly under the close superintendence of the more aged persons of the community, and were trained to the endurance of any kind of physical hardship, of hunger, of thirst, of cold and heat, of moral anguish of all kinds, until they became perfectly obdurate and callous to any other sensation but the love and enthusiasm of their own country. No Spartan ever took his meals at home. They enjoyed their meals in common, in a public place, in the *syssitia*, or, as the Cretans called it, *andreia*, because no women were admitted to them. Fifteen persons sat at one table, each of them having contributed his share of victuals and a little cash money to the common stock. The chief dish was the well-known Spartan black soup. But the Greeks of the other cities took their meals at home. Since the oldest times every Greek (I speak of the non-Spartan Greeks) took three meals a day, (1) *ariston* (breakfast), (2) *deipnon* (dinner), and (3) *dorpon* (supper). The supper was the chief meal. In Homer's poems the Heroes sat upright at the table as we do; but later on it was the general custom to lie down at table, viz., the left arm was propped on a cushion and the body was stretched out on a sofa, the back of which leaned against the table. The Romans had the same custom. Boys were always sitting. The order of sitting at the table was identical with the Roman

Triclinium, with this exception, that generally only two seats were on each side. The Greeks had no tablecloth, no napkins, no knife, no fork. They ate with their fingers, and children were taught very early to use their fingers in a decent way. They used spoons, however. Instead of a napkin they used the crumbs of bread or a specially prepared piece of dough, that every single guest usually brought with him. In Homeric times the Greeks ate nothing but meat (ox, goat, deer, hog and venison) and bread. But in later times they began to eat madza, a kind of polenta or macaroni, the Greek national dish, besides many vegetables and sausages. But one of the most favorite dishes of the historic Greeks is fish, and especially sardines. The Greeks down to the time of the Macedonian invasion had no male cook, the cooking being done by the ladies of the house together with her maids. Greeks never drank between meals, but when the supper was over—and it was a very poor supper, with very few courses, the Persians made very scornful remarks on the poverty of Greek meals—but after the supper was over, I say, the symposion began, in other words, the Greeks sat down to hard drinking. Drinking was the principal part of a supper. The first goblet was solemnly dedicated, that is to say, emptied, to the gods. Flute music accompanied this solemn act, and not a drop of water was mixed with the wine. But with the exception of this first goblet none but watered wine was used. To mix it half and half was considered rude; the proportion generally was 3:1, 2:1, 3:2. Drunkenness was not considered a shame, and even Plato apologizes for it. The Spartans and the Cretans, however, were strictly temperance. Every Greek symposion had a president, who dictated the number of goblets to be drank by every guest. The Greeks had a peculiar custom of drinking the health of their friends. They drank as many goblets as there were letters in the name of the friend. Thus,

Alcibiades drank to the health of Socrates by emptying eight kotyle, and Socrates responded by a still greater number of kotyle, the name of Alcibiades having ten letters. When drinking, the Greeks used to eat all kinds of deserts and fruits. But these symposions were not only wassailing excesses. On the contrary, all that Athens, or Corinth, or Argos could display of refined, cultured, witty people—all these choice minds used to meet at these symposions, and the most charming discussions, the most attractive conversations, social games, enigmas and formal speeches were carried on. All the bloom of the subtle Grecian spirit budded out at these occasions, and in Plato's writings we still find the immortal report of these unique soirées. Music was one of the most essential part of their entertainments, as it was, together with dancing, one of the most essential parts of their education. Every Greek was well trained in singing, playing the cythara, or one of the many different flutes and clarionets they had, and in dancing. They had the most elaborate systems of music, and we still possess a whole Greek literature on this subject. Their instruments (by the way, they had no string instrument, I mean, no violin or violincello), their instruments were tuned according to the single tones of the scale, but they had no idea of modern harmonics. They accompanied their melodies with the fifth or the octave, but there was no polyphonic harmonization in it.

The great music teachers of Greece enjoyed such a wide-spread reputation that their names are always carefully mentioned in the biographies of prominent Greek persons. Even the Latin author Cornelius Nepo seldom forgets to mention the music teachers of his Greek heroes, and we know the name of the musical instructor of Epamiondas, or Lysander or Alcibiades. It was the same case with dancing, orchesis, as the Greeks called it. The dance

was considered as the mimics of the whole body, the highest expression of the Greek feeling for beauty. The dancer used to sing his own song. Men and women never danced together; it was considered far beneath the dignity of a man to do so; or rather to account for it in the correct way, Greek men did not want to elevate women to the right of enjoying free social intercourse; they had a powerful reason why to down them, why to keep them severed from all social liberty. The Romans, these personified examples of skilled dignity had a very different view of dancing. Cicero said: *nemo vero saltat sobrius, nisi forte insanit, neque in solitudine neque in convivio moderato atque honesto*. But there were also religious dances especially in the Isle of Delos, called respectively the dionysiac, bachantic and corybantic dances.

The stern Spartans had only one kind of dances—war-dances; but all Greek writers agree in the praise of the wonderful military grace of these dances. The Greeks, at least the Athenians, had a kind of a ballet in the form of a chorus in the theatre.

The theatres of the Greeks usually had three great divisions: 1. The place for the spectators; 2. The orchestra; 3. The stage. These three places correspond to our modern theatre, with this exception, that the place of their orchestra was much larger, a perfect circle and was occupied by the chorus, this most essential part of ancient tragedies. On the stage the actors were playing, all of them wearing characteristic masks.

It seems to us rather inappropriate that an actor should have one and the same mask all the play through. But you must think of the immense dimensions of a Greek theatre when the more distant spectators were unlikely to see the features of the actors if not artificially enlarged. These masks were, therefore, a means to make up for our

modern opera glasses. I say the Greek theatres were immense buildings, and that is very natural, because every single citizen could enjoy the pleasures of the stage, for instead of paying an entrance fee to the state, who owned the theatre, he was paid by the state to frequent the theatres. That applies of course only to the poorer classes, and therefore to the majority of the people. It is almost certain that the seats of men and women were apart from each other.

Any account of the social life of the ancient Greeks would be utterly deficient without a mention of their national athletic games, and in the first place, of the Olympian games in Elis. The three other games, the istmaean, the pythian, the nemean games are of considerable importance.

In the beginning of every fifth year, the bloom of Greek youth flocked to the banks of the river Alpheus, near the sacred city of Olympia, suspending all warfare, all quarrels, all jealousies, and trying with a holy fervor to win the inestimable prizes of the Olympian games. Exercises of a Spartan type, testing endurance and strength with an especial view to war, had almost exclusively formed the earlier programme. But as early as the twenty-fifth Olympiad the four-horse chariot race was added. Horse-races were added later. Besides the foot-race in which the course was traversed once only, there were now the diaulos or double course, and the long foot-race (*dolichos*). Wrestling and boxing were combined in the Pancration. Leaping, quoit-throwing, javelin-throwing, running and wrestling were combined in the Pantatlon. While the details of the scene and of the festivals were the subjects of endless modifications and change, Olympia remained a central expression of the Greek idea that the body of a man has a glory as well as his intellect and spirit; that body and mind should alike be disciplined, and that it is

by the harmonious discipline of both, that men best honour Zeus. The significance of Olympia was larger and higher than the political fortunes of the Greeks who met there, and it survived the overthrow of Greek independence.

In the Macedonian and Roman ages the temples and contents of Olympia still interpret the ideal at which free Greece had aimed. Philip of Macedon and Nero, are among those whose names have a record in the Aetis. The Olympian festival ceased to be held after 393 A. D., the first year of the 293d Olympiad.

The list of Olympian victors which begins in 776 B. C. with Corœbos of Elis closes with the name of a Romanized Armenian Varestad, who is said to have belonged to the race of the Arsacidæ. In the fifth century the desolation of Olympia had set in. The chryselephantine statue of the Olympian Zeus, by Phidias was carried to Constantinople and perished in a great fire 476 A. D. The Olympian temple is said to have been destroyed by the Goths in the reign of Theodorus 402-450 A. D.—German excavations began under Dr. Pren in 1875. We can form now a vivid idea of the location of Pindars' Odes, of the gymnasium, a large open place, inclosed on two sides by doric colonades, the Palestra for wrestlers, the bouleterion (council-hall.)

Let us now cast a general glance over the whole of Grecian life, and we have to bow before this astonishing display of mental activity and beauty.


Beauty in all its ramifications was the prevailing character of Greek life. Not every victor at the Olympian games could reach immortality by being portrayed in the hall of glory in Olympia, only a few were selected among the victors, and usually the most beautiful ones. The very language of Greece is luxuriant with the most extraordinary refinements of style, and no other people have

ever reached the divine grace and rythmical beauty of Greek classics. It may fairly be said that never a people enjoyed life more than the Greeks. There was more amusement, more entertainment, or, to use a familiar word, more fun in one day of a Greek's life than in one hundred days of a Roman's or an Englishman's existence. Numberless were the chances to hear great poets recite their poems in the street, to listen to great orators, as Isaius, Isocrates and Demosthenes, in the courts, to be present at the discussions of the finest and noblest questions of politics, to enjoy the oral instructions of men like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Xenokrates, Euclid of Megara, Parmenides, Zeno and Pythagoras. Sorrow, care, was more or less unknown, the State had to take charge of the necessities of the people, and the State was immensely rich.

The Greeks had an excellent money; I mean their coins (the Spartan iron money excepted) were pure in metal and exact in weight, its real corresponding to its nominal value. The chief reason is that it was municipal money. Every city had its own mint, and the officers of this mint were under the close superintendence of every single citizen of the city. Then a free people never has bad money, for no despot can defraud them. When the evil of false and depreciated money was rife throughout Europe in the middle ages, it was the merchant republics like Venice and Florence that had the surest guarantees against it. Athens, in whose public offices all the citizens took part, had excellent money. We can judge that by the numerous coins of Greek cities to be found in the numismatical collections of London, Rome or Paris. But all these enviable achievements, this liberty, this beauty, this amusing life was purchased at a very heavy price. You know that everything has to be paid for. The ledgers and account books of the divine power are accurate and precise

to an iota—nothing can be had, no fortune can be enjoyed, no amusement, no freedom, no satisfaction—nothing can be attained unless you pay for it. And the greater the boon the heavier you have to pay it. It is only just and fair—to admire the Greeks, to speak of their marvellous attainments, of their immortal works, of their grace and wisdom, but did you ever think of the price that had to be paid for all these enchanting things? Did you ever think of the numberless slaves of Greece, of the nominal slaves, the men and women in bondage, and the real slaves, their so-called free men and women? Never would have the Greeks been able to perform a thousandth part of what they really did but for the institution of this two-fold slavery.

Their slaves and their women freed them from all prosaic toil, from all the drudgery of human life, leaving them full scope to culture the more elevated part of the mind.




POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS IN-STITUTIONS OF GREECE.

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next topic is the political and religious institutions of Greece. Questions of politics are as a rule of very little interest to the general student. They are considered dry and monotonous, they occupy an inferior place in literature, they partake more of the character of a profession than of a liberal art. The dislike of politics is to be met with even among scholars, whose duty it would be to pay the closest possible attention to all political matters. You know that numberless books have been written on the literature, art, science and history of ancient Greece. But comparatively speaking, very few books have been written on the political institutions of ancient Greece. There is no exaggeration in saying that a whole library has been written on the different grammatical character of any of the Greek particles, say *e. g.* *an*, *kata*, etc., and there is scarcely a line in all Greek literature, and we possess, according to *F. A. Wolff's* statement, 1200 Greek literary works, I say there is scarcely a line in all these numerous, sometimes very voluminous writings that has not been subjected to unceasing and unterminable comment and eluci-



THE ACROPOLIS (ATHENS).

Restoration.)

The Cella.

The House of the Statue.

The Parthenon.

The Erechtheium.

The Hall of the Maidens.

dation of a grammatical and literary character. The comments and lucubrations on the *political* purport of these writings, however, although one of the most essential parts of our study of antiquity, has so far been, if not neglected, yet at any rate poorly treated of.

With regard to some leading questions on the political structure of Grecian cities we have still to refer to the labors of the savants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; to Sigonius, to Meursius, to Gruter and Reinesius. In modern times a few highly valuable books have appeared but they do not cover the whole ground. This scarcity of inquiries is the more astonishing the more we have to acknowledge that political institutions are among all institutions of a people, the most important ones. I say of all the institutions of a people the political institutions are by far the most influential, the most essential ones.

By influential I mean an influence which extends to the most ordinary affairs of everyday life just as well as to the loftiest state-affairs. Very few people, and especially very few women, are aware of the enormous influence of political institutions on the actions, on the manners, on the dwellings, on the mode of dressing, eating, drinking, dancing, etc.

You remember in our last lecture I stated that no Grecian—the Spartans excepted—ever danced with a girl, and I hope you remember the explanation of this curious fact, an explanation that showed the intimate connection between this fact and the political structure of a Grecian city. Of course no man, no woman ever feels the pressure of political institutions in a direct and immediate way. When you want to select a bonnet, or buy a sealskin, or rent a flat, you go apparently only by the dictations of your own taste. It never occurs to you that your taste has in turn been determined by something which is absolutely removed from your control. The purchase of a sealskin

is not only a mere business transaction, it is not only a question of money on the part of the purchaser, for there are thousands and thousands of people in Europe who could very easily dispose of the requisite money, and who, nevertheless, will never buy a sealskin. It is against the character of their class to wear such costly garments; and the character of the class is determined by the amount of political power vested in that class. Hence you will see that the selection of garments is not a matter of mere taste and fashion. In the times when wigs and pig-tails were the custom, and this time stretched over almost two centuries, these wigs and pigtails were not the mere funny outcome of whimsical fashion, they were not the product of quaint undeveloped civilization, but they stood, incredible as it may seem to you, in the closest connection with the peculiar political organization of those times. I shall trace this connection in another of my lectures, at present I want only to point to the vast influence of political institutions in general; an influence which is not restricted to the making of laws and the administration of justice, but which reaches everybody in his own home, in his domestic doings, in the formation of friendships, and in the whole arrangement of his life. Take *e. g.* the way of greeting, the salutations of the different peoples. They are the clear and unmistakeable reflexes of the political organization of a people. In Austria friends greet each other by saying "servus." Servus means in Latin slave, and this is the humorous statement of what originally was a very serious acknowledgement of the inferiority of the person greeting. If you meet a person of higher standing you say: "I have the honor," and in fact, you have to feel honored by the salutation of your superior.

Wherever political power is unequally distributed, there the salutations of people are expressive of those differences in rank and class; and accordingly where political power

is more equally distributed, there people greet each other by general remarks on the weather, or on the state of their health, anxiously avoiding all allusions to honor or superiority or the like. Hence, Americans, viz.: the members of a free people, meet you with: Hello, how do you do? The ancient Greeks said, *chaire*, as the Viennese say, "*viel vergnuegen*," and the Romans kissed each other. Even the cleanliness and personal appearance of individuals stands in the very closest connection with the political structure of a people. In democratic states where everybody is the equal of every other person, people watch each other more closely, and everybody is exposed to a greater number of persons watching him, taking notice of his doings, than in countries where, in consequence of an unequal distribution of political power, the one class scarcely cares for the other at all. No member of the higher class will feel annoyed, or can pay much attention to the neat appearance of some one of the lower class; on the contrary, perhaps he will be glad to see him degraded by uncleanness. But in democratic states, where my butcher of to-day may be my juror or my trustee of to-morrow, everybody has a distinct feeling of the necessity of dressing nicely and of cultivating his personal appearance, and hence, the more absolutistic a country, say Russia, the less clean will the people be, and the more democratic a country, the more attention will people devote to the tidy and clean appearance of their own selves, as the ancient Greeks, the modern Greeks who are in spite of their king, a highly democratic people, and the Americans of the United States. Vast as the influence of political institutions on the legislature, on the administration, and on the social life of a people may be, it bears more powerfully still on the *religion* of a people.

The religion of a people invariably shows the marks of the political institutions of this people. In other words

there is a fixed and intelligible relation between the political and religious institutions of a people. Two peoples of wholly different political structure cannot have the same religion. In the whole course of history there is no example of two peoples having the same religious institutions unless they had the same political structure. Look *e. g.* at Europe at the present time : all Europe with the exception of Turkey confesses Christian creeds, but what a diversity of creeds, what a diversity of religious institutions ! Russia being altogether different in political structure, has also a different creed—the Greek church. Austria and Germany is divided between two churches only, the Catholic and the Protestant, the Lutheran. In England on the other hand, there are no less than 122 religious denominations : amongst others, twelve different kinds of Baptists, and thirteen different kinds of Wesleyan Methodists. But England differs wholly from the rest of Europe as far as political institutions are concerned. And this is not a mere casual coincidence. It is not a sheer chance, that a divergence in political institutions tallies with a similar divergence in religious creeds and churches. There is a deeply rooted connection between these two main sources of our life, a connection which I am sorry to say is being ignored by some of the best students of the history of civilization.

In this coadjustment of politics and religion there is nothing derogatory to religion, nothing to abate one particle of the divine dignity of the subject. Both are the fountains of our life, and we could just as well think of bereaving ourselves of our daily food as of abandoning our religious institutions. But when I speak of religion and religious institutions, I do not mean to treat of the dogma, of the creed, properly so called, of different nations. The dogma, the creed proper, is comparatively speaking a very modern thing. The classical Ancients and even the ancient Hebrews had no dogma.

In Christian or Mohammedan countries you can be a convert to the Christian or Mohammedan religion without at the same time being a member of this or that country; *e. g.* you are a convert of the Catholic religion, but that does not necessarily imply that you are a Frenchman, or a Spaniard. On the contrary, your being a convert of the Catholic church does not interfere in the least with a change of citizenship; you can become a naturalized Frenchman after having been a Spaniard without any further effect on your creed. But that was not the case in ancient times. To be admitted to the worship of the Jupiter Capitolinus of Rome, or to the Athenian Minerva presupposed a previous naturalization as a citizen of Rome or Athens.

The ancient Hebrews had converts, but these converts were at the same time citizens of Judaea. The mere belief in one God without a corresponding admission into one of the tribes of Israel was a mere theoretical affair, and such a believer was as much of a pagan as any other heathen. It was the political part of the whole matter that was considered the main part of it. Being a citizen of this community, said the ancient Hebrews, you necessarily participate of the pure belief in one God. When no citizen, you are, as it were, non-existent, and your belief does not help you any. It was only at or a little before the beginning of our present era that the belief, the mere belief in a certain dogma began to be considered the more important of the two, until it lead to what recent historians, and especially Thiele, call the universal religion, as the Christian, Mohammedan and the Buddhistic religion, that do not insist on a particular citizenship, but which inculcate the belief in certain dogmatical creeds.

I must confess, ladies and gentlemen, there is scarcely another point of equal importance in the study of classical antiquity, and especially of Greece and Rome. If you

approach Greece with a confused idea about the mutual relation of politics and religion, if you are inclined to mix up our modern idea of religion with what Grecians or Romans called religion, then all your endeavors, and be they ever so elaborate, ever so learned, ever so careful, will be in vain. You mark distinctly the point under discussion: We have to know first what were the politics, what were the political institutions and then what was the religion of Greece. I say first, because I hope that even the short sketch with which I introduced my present lecture will have convinced you that in a study of ancient Greece, politics is the more important factor of the two. The religion of the Greeks was subordinate to their political institutions. In fact, there is no understanding of the polytheism of ancient Greece unless we deduce it from the political institutions.

Polytheism is the assumption of many gods and goddesses—of Jupiter and Juno, Apollo and Venus, Vulcan and Minerva, Neptun and Ceres, and all the other numerous deities, semi-deities, deified heroes, etc., etc. How will you account for such an assumption, for such a belief? Have you the courage to state that the Greeks, the most enlightened and most civilized of all peoples; that the Greeks, who are masters of all that is beautiful, and temperate, and wise, and profound, and lovely—that this bright and ingenuous warm-hearted people clung to a belief in non-existent deities out of mere silliness? That they, so clear-sighted in all other departments of human thought, were so miserably deficient in this one respect as to believe in self-created phantasms, in creations of their own fancy? Is that possible? Can you really think that Polytheism, that the religion of the Grecians was nothing else than the creation of an undeveloped inferior mind? I must confess I can not muster up so much courage; I can not blind myself to what undeniable facts force me to see. I

can not say in one and the same breath: The wisest people was, at the same time, the most foolish people; the noblest of men were, at the same time, wretched fetich-worshippers. Rather than say that I will begin to doubt my information about the matter; I will try to occupy another, a new standpoint, a new way of looking at the question. I will say to myself: You are the fool; you are the worshipper of a fetich, viz: of a miserable prejudice, of a wretched and lame idea of superiority—and thus prepared I shall approach my subject in a more appropriate way and very probably find the real history of the religion of Greece. I can not leave this, the introductory part of my present lecture, without trying, at least, to circumscribe my views of the whole subject as precisely as I possibly can. In order to do that in the most efficacious way I shall contrast my view with that of a celebrated Frenchman, whose book has been widely read in England as well as in the United States. I mean Fustel de Coulanges and his book, "The Ancient City." In the passage which I am about to quote there are two propositions which contain the very germ of these prevailing ideas on Greece and Rome—both those propositions I shall combat. I was an adherent of the one of those propositions for over fifteen years, and I believed in the other until recently. But a more consummate study of institutions has convinced me to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt, that both those propositions, glaring and flattering though they be, are equally false. Before reading the first of these propositions I shall read a few preceding lines. Coulanges says in the introduction to his work.

"Why are the conditions of human government no longer the same as in earlier times? The great changes which appear from time to time in the constitution of society can be the effect neither of chance nor of force alone.

“The cause which produces them must be powerful, and must be found in man himself. If the laws of human association are no longer the same as in antiquity, it is because there has been a change in man. There is, in fact, a part of our being which is modified from age to age; this is our intelligence. It is always in movement; almost always progressing; and on this account, our institutions and our laws are subject to change. Man has not in our day the way of thinking that he had twenty-five centuries ago; and this is why he is no longer governed as he was governed then.”

“Man has not in our day the way of thinking that he had twenty-five centuries ago; and this is why he is no longer governed as he was governed then.” This is what I called the first proposition: this is the germ, the motto, the credo of almost all modern writers on ancient history. They say, and pre-eminently Buckle says, men 2000, 3000 years ago were not as advanced, not as intelligent, not as enlightened as they are now, and consequently they were governed in a different way, and consequently they had different beliefs, and consequently they had different opinions, different ways of thinking. This is the first proposition—and this is the great falsehood, the great lie, the great—oh, excuse me—the great humbug of our age. We constantly speak of our enormous progress, of our incredible advancements, of the marvellous change in our intelligence, in our way of thinking and feeling.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have at present no time to discuss this great question at any length whatever. I can barely touch it, but although I have no time to discuss this proposition, I shall take time to deny, peremptorily deny the truth of this proposition, and I ask you, I entreat you, I beseech you not to believe it. I do not hesitate to say that the one proposition that underlies all that I have said, and all that I am still going to say is the direct reverse

of this first proposition of Coulanges. I most profoundly do believe that the ways of thinking and feeling of men 2000-3000 years ago were exactly the same as they are at present, that there is not the slightest imaginable trace of an advancement in our way of thinking and feeling, although innumerable new products may enrich the store-houses of our mental and physical activity.

You see the difference: I do not deny a change in the products, but I do deny a change in the faculty, in the originator of the products. Of course it is very easy, and in fact it reduces all the task of the historian to a mere toy, when we assume that the way of thinking was different with men 2000 or 3000 years ago from what it is now. For whenever we cannot really explain an institution of a people, we simply refer to their inferior development of intelligence. Then we say, oh! the ancient Spartans had those crude institutions, because they were still inferior, you know; they were not as civilized as we are, you know, they had not yet reached the sublime height of our present civilization you know. For as Coulanges says: Man has not the way of thinking that he had twenty centuries ago. That much with regard to the first proposition.

Coulanges proceeds to his second proposition. He says:

“Examine the institutions of the ancients without thinking of their religious notions, and you will find them obscure, whimsical and inexplicable. Why were there patricians and plebeians, patrons and clients, eupatrids and thetes; and whence came the native and inefaceable differences which we find between these classes? What was the meaning of those Lacedæmonian institutions which appear to us so contrary to nature? How are we to explain those unjust caprices of ancient private law; at Corinth and at Thebes the sale of land prohibited; at Athens and at Rome an inequality in the succession between brother and sister? What did the jurists understand

by *agnation* and by *gens*? Why those revolutions in the laws, those political revolutions? What was that singular patriotism which sometimes effaced every natural sentiment? What did they understand by that liberty of which they were always talking? How did it happen that institutions so very different from anything of which we have an idea to-day, could become established and reign for so long a time? What is the superior principle which gave them authority over the minds of men?"

"But by the side of these institutions and laws place the religious ideas of those times, and the facts at once become clear, and their explanation is no longer doubtful. If, on going back to the first ages of this race—that is to say, to the time when its institutions were founded—we observe the idea which it had of human existence, of life, of death, of a second life, of the divine principle, we perceive a close relation between these opinions and ancient rules of private law; between the rights which spring from these opinions and their political institutions."

Coulanges hence, does not satisfy himself with the statement of a relation, a close relation between the religious opinions of the Grecians and their political institutions. He goes beyond that. He asserts that in this relation the religion plays the part of the superior principle, or to put it in plain language, that the relation between religion and political institutions in Greece was a relation of cause and effect, and that the religion was the cause and that the political institutions were the effect. That is the second proposition of Coulanges, his main vehicle for an explanation of Grecian civilization. From this I deviate absolutely, in fact I do assert the very reverse of it. A very careful study of Grecian civilization has led me to the positive conviction, that the relation between religion and political institutions in Greece was a relation between effect and cause; in other words, that the political institutions were the supe-

rior principle, that they were the cause of Grecian religion and not vice versa. No more opposed views could possibly be embraced, and by advising you to read the book of Coulanges, a very interesting book after all, and by asking you to honor me with a very close attention I leave the decision as to the correctness of either view to your own judgment. It will now be sufficiently clear that in treating of the political and religious institutions of Greece I shall treat first of the political institutions of this classical country, and I shall do so intentionally, prompted by the best of reasons, by mere logical necessity, for we must treat first of the cause and then of the effect.

The connection between cause and effect in this case, I mean the relation between politics and religion in Greece is not a palpable one, it is indeed frequently very far from manifest, else everybody would have noticed it. But while it is not always manifest and tangible, it can always be proved, and with very satisfactory proofs too. But in order to effectuate these proofs we must abandon all ludicrous ideas about an assumed inferiority of men in ancient times. We must steadily keep to the sober view, that men always were, in the main, what they are at present. The chief characteristic sign of our species is the love of pleasure, the dislike of work, the greediness for wealth and power, and a faculty of thinking and combining individual strength into gregarious units of force. These characteristic signs are common to the types of the most ancient Chinese or Indian literature as well as to the heroes of Homer. Does Odysseus not talk to us in tones of a very familiar ring? Could Nausikaa, the sweet daughter of Alkinoos, not serve as a type of a modern girl of sweet sixteen? Is Penelope less of a worthy, prudent matron than any of our own mothers? Has any of us surpassed Aristotle in sagacity, Plato in dignity and profoundness, Demosthenes in grace and power of speech, Thucydides in political wisdom, Soc-

rates in human feeling, Euclid and Hipparchos in scientific method, or Alexander in military genius? All of us will heartily give a negative answer. And thus we will accost Grecian civilization with the sympathy of brothers, with the congenial feeling of fellow-workmen at the dome of humanity, and not with the supercilious air of superior beings. I shall proceed now to a delineation of the political institutions of Greece.

You remember from our last lecture that Greece was not a uniform country, one homogeneous territory like France or England. It consisted of very many self-governed cities, each of which formed a state of its own. The city of Korinth was a state, the city of Argos was a state, and so was the city of Thebes, the city of Athens, Sycion, Plataea, Megara, etc., etc. Each of these city-states had its own government, its own income, its own army and navy, its own games and religious festivals, and of course its own constitution.

Unhappily, the work of Aristotle which described over 150 constitutions of Greek and other city-states, is lost, and thus our information about the different constitutions of the Greek cities is not as full as desirable. But on the other hand it would be next to impossible for me to give you a satisfactory statement of all these manifold constitutions, and consequently I have to restrict myself to the two prominent types of all Grecian cities, to the Ionian city-state of Athens, and to the Dorian city-state of Sparta, or to Attica and Laconia respectively.

These two city-states may serve as fair specimens of all the other Grecian states, each of which being more or less after the pattern of either Athens or Sparta. This is at least the view of German scholars. O. Mueller in his elaborate work on the Dorians puts forth the state of Sparta as the model type of all Dorian cities, whether in Greece proper or in Asia Minor or Crete or Italy. This view has

been vehemently combated by the celebrated English historian Grote, who is of the opinion that Sparta was not the model type of a Dorian city-state, and that Athens was the general pattern of Grecian cities.

This vexed question has not as yet been settled, but it will be advisable to study both Athens and Sparta on account of the overwhelming importance of these two cities for all Greece and all classical antiquity.

Athens was the head of Attica, of the territory of Attica. The institutions which are found existing in Attica in the seventh century B. C., may be regarded as dating from the age which tradition called that of Theseus, the age in which the loose canton system of Attica was bound together into a single state. The inhabitants of Attica at that time formed three classes, the eupatridæ or nobles, the geomori or free husbandmen, and the demiurgi or handicraftsmen. The government was wholly in the hands of the eupatridæ, who alone were citizens in the proper sense. The Eupatrid order was divided into four tribes, called after the son of Jon—Geleon, Hoples, Aegicoreus, Argadeus. Each tribe possessed three phratræ or clans, and each clan thirty gene or houses. The members of each clan were united by the worship of an heroic ancestor and all the clans were bound together by the common worship of Zeus Herkeios and Appollo Patrous. When Attica first comes into the view of history, it already forms a single state of which Athens is the capital. The kingly period is over. The transition from monarchy to oligarchy was, however, more gradual at Athens than it seems to have been elsewhere in Greece.

First, the priestly office of the king was taken away, and as the old name basileus implied religious as well as civil authority, he was henceforth called simply the ruler, archon. But the office of archon was still held for life, and was hereditary.

The second step was to appoint the archon for ten years.

The third and last step was to divide the old regal power among nine archons appointed annually, 683 B. C.

The first archon called Eponymos, because his name marked the date of official documents, had a general supervision of affairs, and in particular was the guardian of orphans and minors; the second archon was high-priest (basileus); the third was commander-in-chief (polemarch); the remaining six were the custodians of law (thesmotetæ). After this Solon and Cleisthenes laid the foundation of the Athenian state. Solon abolished the distinctions of eupatridæ (nobles by birth), geomori (agriculturists) and demiurgi (artizans) of which I spoke before, and introduced his property qualifications of which I shall speak presently. Cleisthenes, the leader of the democratic reform, whose institutions continued to be in force, with some few exceptions until the overthrow of Athenian independence, created ten new tribes; first dividing the whole territory of Attica into one hundred parts, which he called demoi, or townships, at least the word township or as they say in New England, town, is the nearest word for it in English institutional terms, and assigning ten of them to each tribe; not, however, ten continuous ones, but so that each tribe might be composed of townships locally separate. The object of this arrangement was, that by the breaking up of the old associations a perfect revolution might be effected in the habits and feelings, as well as in the political organization of the people. But we must beware of looking at these corporations as at political creations similar, *c. g.* to the American townships. The demoi (townships) of Attica rendered mostly one political service, namely, the preservation by means of their register, of a genuine list of Attic citizens. For every Athenian was obliged to be a member of some

township; and no man could be admitted to exercise any civic rights, until his name was entered upon the roll. Our knowledge on this subject is derived mostly from the oration of Demosthenes against Eubulides, but we can see from the expressions of Demosthenes, that the Athenian demos was by no means anything identical with a modern county or township; for as I said in my last lecture the Grecians had no other political centre but a city. Even the demoi of Athens, the country cantons or townships, or whatever you might call them, held their most important meetings in Athens.

In this city, filled with the most gorgeous public buildings, all citizens of Attica convened, Athens was the center, the soul of the state, the state itself. But the ancient Grecians could not help seeing, that when every citizen has the same and equal right of determining the course of government, interminable trouble will be the necessary result. Everybody in this country is aware of the precarious state of city government in the United States. The founders of this great Republic and the originators of state institutions in America tried their utmost to save cities from the dangerous general right of suffrage and to shift the governing power of cities from the population of the city itself to the legislature of the state.

You all know how little responsible power, how little legislative or executive power is being vested in any of the officials of the city of Cincinnati! How insignificant is the power of the mayor of Cincinnati when compared to the power of any of the archons of Athens! How very small is the power of the councilmen or aldermen of an American town—I mean, of course, their legitimate power—when compared to the power of the Athenian or Roman Senate! And that has been done so for very sound reasons. If cities in America would be vested

with a great power, say *e. g.*, if the city of Cincinnati would possess the power of abolishing, by means of an election, any of the boards, the board of public affairs, or the board of education, or any other city office—the worst class of the voters in Cincinnati would soon be in the ascendancy. Go a step further and suppose that the city of Cincinnati should be empowered to pass laws, and that every citizen in Cincinnati would be entitled to a vote. What would be the next consequence? The poorer class of voters, forming, of course, the majority, would pass a law abolishing all debts, or releasing them from any other kind of obligations.

To preclude such monstrous consequences different nations have devised different schemes. In America, where no one dared to abolish the general right of suffrage, the state legislature alone has the right of abolishing city boards or passing laws, and the state legislature again is subject to the supreme court, that serves as a check on the illegitimate encroachments of the state legislature. In Athens and Rome they applied a different contrivance. They declared, once for ever, that although no one shall be deprived of his civic right of voting, still only the wealthy, and consequently more reliable part of the citizens, shall enjoy the privilege of being eligible to the offices of the state. Accordingly Solon divided and classed the citizens by their rated property, as first Pentakosio medimnoi, that is to say, those citizens who had an income of at least 500 drachmae (\$100); second Hippieis, or the equestrian order, with an income of at least 300 drachmae (\$60); third the Zeugitae, with an income of 150 drachmae (\$30); and fourth the Thetae, or those people whose annual income was less than \$30. These sums seem to be very small, but the value of money at different times differs quite enormously; \$100 in classical Athens was very much money, perhaps several times as much as in America.

Kritobulos was worth \$10,000, and he was considered a rich man. The father of the orator Demosthenes left his son \$17,000. Konon was worth \$50,000. The celebrated banker Pasion amassed a fortune of 80 talents, about \$100,000. The wife of Alcibiades got a dowry of \$12,000, and that was supposed the amplest dowry ever bestowed on an Athenian husband. Alcibiades himself was worth \$120,000. The property of all Athenian citizens amounted to 20,000 talents according to Boeckh's estimation, that is to say, all Athens was worth \$23,000,000 in rough estimation.

But as I said, we can never go by the mere number of dollars, for the market value, the purchasing-power of money varies enormously. The point is, that Solon, although granting the right of suffrage to every citizen of Athens, whether he was classed among the *thete* or among the *Pentakosimedimnoi*, did not admit any but the wealthier ones to the offices of the State. His reforms hence consisted in doing away with the clannish, aristocratic classes of the older regime, where no wealth whatever could enable a citizen to be appointed archon or councilman unless he was born into one of the higher classes, and in keeping the poorer and less reliable part of the population outside the possibility of ruling. The first of Solon's classes alone could hold the archonship; the fourth had no political privilege except that of voting in the Assembly. But Solon made the Assembly (*ekklesia*) what it had never been before, a real power. The will of the sovereign people of Athens was expressed in the *Ecclesia*. Here were brought before them all matters which, as the supreme power of the State, they had to order or dispose of—questions of war and peace, treaties and alliances, levying of troops, raising of supplies, religious ordinances, bestowing of citizenship; likewise the election of a great variety of magistrates, ambassadors,

commissioners, etc. Anciently the people used to assemble once only in each Pritany, or ten times a year. After the democracy had grown stronger they met every week. These were called the ordinary or regular assemblies. On what days they were held is not known; the Athenians avoided meeting on holidays or unlucky days. The Assembly used anciently to be held in the market-place. Afterward it was transferred to the theatre of Bacchus. But it might be held anywhere, either in the city or the Piræus, or elsewhere. The assemblies were usually convened by the presidents of the council (I shall speak of the council later on) who published notice four days before, specifying the day of meeting and the business to be transacted. All citizens of the age of twenty, who had been duly registered, were entitled to attend and vote. Before the business of the day commenced, a sacrifice of purification was offered. The lustral victims were young pigs, whose blood was carried around and sprinkled on the seats, while at the same time incense was burned in a censer. The crier then pronounced a form of prayer and commination, imploring the gods to bless and prosper the consultations of the people, and imprecating a curse on all enemies and traitors. The chairman then opened the business of the day. If any bill had been prepared by the council, it was read by the crier or usher, and the people were asked if it met their approbation. If there was no opposition, it passed. Any citizen, however, might oppose it, or move an amendment. Every member of the Assembly was at liberty to speak, but only once in a debate. According to the institution of Solon, those who were above fifty years old were first called upon, and afterward the younger men. But this custom fell into disuse. Although all citizens had the right of speaking, the privilege was, of course, exercised by a few only, who felt themselves competent to the task; it was not very easy to get up after a speech of Lysias,

Isaeos, Isocrates, or Demosthenes and address the Assembly in a befitting way. Whoever rose to speak, put on a wreath of myrtle, as a token that he was performing a public duty, and entitled, on that account, to respect. It was a breach of decorum to interrupt the speaker. When the debate was ended the chairman put the question to the vote. The method of voting was either by show of hands (*cheirotomia*) or by ballot. Show of hands was the most common. When all the business was concluded, the crier, by command of the president, dismissed the assembly. A decree having been carried by the votes of the people, was copied on a tablet, and deposited by the secretary among other public records in the temple of Cybele.

The great power of the Assembly and of the people was held in control by the Areopagos. This council, so called from the Hill of Mars (*Ares*), where it held its sittings near the Acropolis, was a judicial and deliberative body greatly esteemed at Athens. It was from time immemorial established as a court of criminal jurisdiction, to try cases of murder, maiming and arson. It sat in the open air, to escape the pollution of being under the same roof with the guilty. In its proceedings the utmost solemnity was observed. Both parties were sworn to speak the truth, and the facts alone were inquired into, without regard to the feelings or oratorical display. The Areopagos used to be taken from the noble families of Attica. But Solon introduced a new law, that the Archons, whose official conduct had been approved, should be members of this council for life. At the same time he enlarged the power of the council, attaching to it political and censorial duties, in order that with the council of 500, the senate, it might act as a check upon the democracy. In their censorial character the Areopagos kept watch over the religion and morals of the city, maintained

order and decency, looked to the education of the young, enquired how the people got their living, and checked riotous excesses and debauchery. We read of their entering houses on feast days to see that the guests were not too numerous. A party in Athens consisted of three persons, according to the number of the graces, or of nine, according to the number of the nine muses. Anything above that was considered excessive. Had not the Areopagos maintained a high character for justice, prudence and moderation it would have been impossible for such inquisitorial and summary powers to have been tolerated in a free state like Athens. In later times the power of the Areopagos, however, was considerably curtailed.

The second check on the power of the democratical assembly was the senate, Boule, or as it was called, the council of the 500. This was an executive and deliberative body, appointed to manage various departments of the public business, more especially that which related to the popular assembly. They were annually chosen by lot, in Solon's time, from the three first classes only, but afterwards from the body of the whole people—with no other restriction than that they must be genuine citizens on both the father's and the mother's side, and of the age of thirty. At the expiration of their year of office they had, like all other functionaries, to render an account of their official conduct to the auditor. For the more convenient despatch of business, the tribes apportioned the year among them and took the duties in rotation. The council was thus divided into ten bodies of fifty men, who were called Prytanes, or Presidents, and who for the time represented the whole council. Their term of office was called a Prytany. As the lunar year consisted of 354 days, it was so arranged that there were six Prytanies of 35 days each, and four of 36. The turns were determined by lot. The council was to be according to Solon's design, a sort of

directorial committee, to assist the people in their deliberations and to guide and control their acts in assembly. It was their duty to discuss beforehand and also to prepare, and in proper form, the measures that were to be submitted to the people. Besides preparing questions for the assembly, the council had a right to issue ordinances of their own, which, if not set aside by the people, remained in force for the year.

The executive duties of the council were very numerous. The whole financial department of the administration was under their control. The income of the Athenian state was between 1,200-1,500 talents (\$2,000,000), outside the tribute of dependent states. Taxes were paid, but not regularly. Neither the Athenians nor the Romans had an idea that the first duty of a law-abiding citizen is to pay taxes. On the contrary, taxes were very irregular and in case of a successful war, as *e. g.*, after the great Macedonian war of the Romans, where an enormous booty had been made, no taxes were paid at all for 150 years. The census in Athens (where it was called *Timema*), or in Rome was instituted not with a direct object of levying so and so many drachmae, or Roman asses annually on the property of the citizens. For in some years no taxes whatever were levied. It was instituted simply to know who was the wealthy and who was the poor citizen; for the wealthy citizen had more power, more privileges than the poor.

These are the contours of the Athenian state. We see an assembly of all citizens, which meets almost twice every week, and apparently determines and rules everything by a majority of votes. But there were mighty checks on the activity of the assembly. On the one hand the *Areopagos*, on the other hand the senate—the council of the 500—they both controlled the actions of the *ecclesia*, of the assembly. In fact the ultimate law-giver in Athens

was not to be found in the ecclesia. For any law, or as it was called, any psephisma, passed in the assembly could be rejected by a board of six law-revisors, called nomothetæ, in this respect similar to the supreme courts of a state in the Union. A bill, a psephisma acquired the full vigor of law, became a nomos, a real law, only after having been approved of by the nomothetæ. Even this short sketch of Athenian politics will enable you to see that the Athenian commonwealth consisted of a most refined and intricate system of checks and balancing powers. Even an ordinary lawsuit required quite an apparatus of officials. No less than several hundred jurors were acting as judges of both fact and law in an Athenian lawsuit.

The Athenian would have been afraid of such a small number of jurors, namely, twelve, as are impaneled in this country. They thought the more jurors, that is to say the more judges, for the judge proper was of little account in an Athenian lawsuit, and there was no cross-examination, the less chance there was for bribery. And consequently there were 6000 judges in Athens elected annually to serve as jurors in civic and criminal cases they were called Heliastæ.

Now represent to yourself the immense amount of labor and attention which every single citizen in Athens was expected to do for public affairs. He had to go twice a week at least to the ecclesia; he could not absent himself; in the beginning heavy fines, later on considerable rewards—up to three obols were paid to every voter on entering the assembly hall. But entering the hall was nothing, he had to stay there, and listen patiently to all the orations, else he could not vote. On days when there was no meeting of the assembly, he had most probably to be one of the many hundred jurors in a civil or criminal case; or he had to attend to the business of

phratria or his demos, or he was engaged in one of the numberless wars, continental and naval, of his state.

What was the next and most immediate consequence of all this? The average Athenian never came to be conscious of his own self, of his private individuality, he was nothing but a member of the state; he was as Aristotle said, a *zoon politikon*, a political animal, a mere tool in the hands of the state. This was still more the case with Sparta. Sparta, or rather Laconia was, to describe it shortly, an aristocracy. There were three classes of people :

1. The Spartans proper, who were all soldiers, and considered themselves pure nobles.

2. The *periœkoi*, or commons, that is to say, freeholders, with very little or no right in the administration of the state, although they had to take part in the military expeditions of the Spartans very frequently.

3. The *helotæ*, or what English jurists would call villains, people in bondage, without any political right whatever.

A Spartan, from his very childhood was constantly engaged in state affairs, he was absolutely imbued with the idea of being a mere representative of the state, a person whose duty, whose delight, whose only honor it is to live and to die for his state. In fact to die for the state was the more ordinary lot of a Spartan, for very few died at home. They were fierce, cold, taciturn warriors, engaged in constant warfares. Accordingly their national assemblies were comparatively rare, their kings and ephors had very little to do, their laws were few in number, lawsuits were seldom, and criminal proceedings were settled with rough abruptness. A Spartan down to the time of the Peloponnesian war was no son, no father, no brother, almost no human being, he was a citizen, nothing else. Is such a curious creature likely to possess a strong individuality of its own?

All Sparta had a marked individuality in contradistinction to Corinth, Argos or Athens. But an individual Spartan was nothing but an exact copy of the general type. To this prevailing tendency of mere types there was an exception—those Greek cities that were governed by Greek tyrants. The Greek tyrants had all possible reasons to engage their citizens as little as possible in political affairs, they gave them festivals of all kinds, but they tried to keep them indifferent to all state affairs, and consequently, the citizens of such cities do not show that typical uniformity of other Greek cities. Some of these tyrants were real benefactors, such as Pittacus, of Mythilene, Periander, of Corinth, and Pisistratus, of Athens. But after all, tyranny in ancient Greece was an exceptional thing. The rule was the case of the Athenian citizen, in other words the rule was that a Grecian was the creation of his state, the copy, the abstract, of his state, his state reduced to minimum dimensions. Now then, what kind of religion will possibly suit such people? Mark the chief point: We treat now of a people, where private individuality as apart of political individuality does scarcely exist.

The private man or woman seeks consolation, assistance in religion. He prays to God for help, for comfort, for benign grace, he prays for his brother, his father, his friend. The private man is afraid of trespassing, he dreads his sin, the sin of his family; the private man wants to be saved, he wants to be assured that after this life another life will commence, a better life, a higher life; the private man feels the need of atonement, of purification, of bliss. The private man, therefore, craves for a merciful God, for a God full of divine sympathy for the sufferings of man, for the little and great stings and pangs of private life. But where there is no private man, where there is only a state? What does a state care for sins?

A state as such is no sinner. A state never dies—hence it does not care for the life after death. A state is not tender, not affectionate, not impulsive—and so it does not care for a tender or affectionate Deity. In fact, a state of the Grecian type needs many gods, not one God. A state, whose every single citizen meddles with every detail of the whole administration, needs many Gods of different character, of different shape, of different attraction. The people in a Grecian city had to be kept in control by superhuman agencies because the human powers, just on account of their democratical institutions, were not sufficient. In Athens they had a public religious festival almost every fifth day. Now in honor of Bacchus, and now in honor of Neptune, and now in honor of Athene, and now again in honor of Apollo. And at these festivals every single citizen had a very good time too. They were defrayed out of the public treasury. But, besides having a good time, these citizens got accustomed to unite in worship, and this union is by far the strongest in existence. Either of the one—if there are no saints, a whole variety of saints, as one of the creeds does grant it—there must be polysectism on earth as in England, where as I said before there are at present 122 religious denominations or polytheism in heaven. The Gods and Goddesses of ancient Greece were in the first place magistracies, heavenly magistracies, elected in every city, heavenly boards of public work, idealized by all the artistic refinements of poets, painters and sculptors. They are the complementary part of what was lacking and missing on earth. When the democratic, and consequently jealous and envious citizens of a Greek city could not agree as to a certain measure, they went to Delphi or Dodona, to the oracle, asking Apollo for advice, that is to say, they were too jealous of their right of mutual equality as to grant a power of decision to any of their


fellow citizens, and so they rather left the decision with Apollo—in the same way as they elected many of their magistrates by lot so as to obviate the influence of the more gifted persons. It is altogether a question of power. The less power you grant on the one side, the more power you have to grant to the other side.

The father in Athens had little power, the mother still less; the guardian almost none; the church was not yet existent; the state consisted of ever fluctuating magistracies. By what then shall the people be kept in control? By the mere abstract idea of the Deity? Does or did ever a people consist only of philosophers, of men who are deeply impressed by mere abstract ideas? Never. Hence there was a need, an inextinguishable need for a variety of divine beings, of deities of surpassing beauty, of glorious appearance, of bewildering majesty, one for the first of January, and one for the fifth, and one for the eleventh, and one for the seventeenth, and so forth. There was a need of numberless divine beings because of the dedication of those matchless temples of Greece; for a temple in Greece was not destined for the pious soul to go therein and pray to his God.

They prayed at home—they never went to church as we do—they prayed at home—they had only festivities in their churches—the church was the exclusive home of the God—it was his abode—his place of office as it were—the private man had nothing to do with it. For the God was not the God of man, of an individual, of a private person. He was the God of a state—a bright, sunny, jovial God, loving and beloved, averse to sorrow, enjoying his eternal life as thoroughly as possible. There was no gloom, no sullenness about those Gods—for the state as such is never gloomy—they were all beauty, happiness and splendour. The state needed happy, cheerful citizens, and so he gave them happy, cheerful Gods. The

state created, admitted Gods, or cancelled them, abolished them—just as it was creating or abolishing any other office. In Athens as in Rome the admission of a new deity was formally put to the vote of the people, and was acted upon in the form of a bill. There was no priesthood. One of the archons, a civilian, superintended the religious ceremonies. There was no priesthood, I say, because the state itself was the priest, because the Gods were state officials. The merciful God of the private man, the God of Christianity had not yet been revealed to humanity, and until the peculiar frame of the antique city-state had not given way to new political structures, this revelation could not have taken place. With the downfall of the antique city-governments, with the rise of pure human personality above mere citizenship, with the greater development of the inner man and the less exuberant growth of the political being—there came a profound craving for another divinity, for another heaven, for a father in heaven ; in other words, for the God whom we a'l adore.

Ladies and Gentlemen: This is, so far as my knowledge goes, the true character of the Greek religion and mythology.




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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

In our first two lectures on ancient Greece I treated of the social, the political and the religious institutions of ancient Greece. I tried to show the intimate connection between these three factors of a nation's life, and pre-eminently I endeavored to prove that the political institutions of Greece were the first and richest fountains of all other institutions of this classical country. I proceed now to a discussion of another aspect of Greek life—of the scientific life of the Grecians, of the nature and progress of Grecian science in classical times. For the Grecians were not only the greatest artists the world has ever seen, they have not only developed the most beautiful type of the human physique, they have not only given us the most marvellous example of great statesmanship, of heroic self-sacrifice, of political wisdom and liberty, they have besides given us the first as well as the real pattern of genuine science; they are the first people in point of time as well as in point of quality, who possessed in the highest degree what has to be considered as the most nec-





LAST MOMENTS OF ARCHIMEDES.

From the painting by Nicolo Barabino.

essary ingredient of scientific treatment ; I mean the power of abstraction. To look at things in an abstract way, to part from the immediate and as it were gross impression furnished by the senses, this is the first and most primitive of all requisites for a scientific investigation. Science deals with abstracts, with things that are not really existent in external nature, but with things that have a mental existence only. Take *e. g.* geometry. A geometrical line is a mere mental being, it does not exist, for a geometrical line is supposed to possess no breadth at all, it is supposed to consist of nothing but pure length. But such a line does not exist in reality, it is only in the mind, in the abstraction of the thinker that such a thing exists, and still you know that there is no more practical and useful science than geometry. This power of abstraction is the originating source of science. The Greeks had this power to an extraordinary degree. In fact, although the most realistic people in one sense, they were also the most idealistic nation that ever existed. They created numberless visible objects, as cities, harbors, public buildings, temples, statues, monuments of all sorts, but at the same time, they created also numberless invisible ideas, and to the present times all our terms are, and the whole cast of our speech is saturated with Greek. We speak of energy, but this word is the original term of Aristotle, likewise the word quintessence, which, too, originated with the teacher of Alexander, and one of his erroneous opinions. The very word idea is pure Greek in its purport, and the terms substance, form, matter, theorem, thema, glossa, are either pure Greek or literal translations from the Greek. It is this power of abstraction, of generalization, or as it were of idealization which forms the chief characteristic part of the Grecian mind. This character manifests itself also in the great terseness of Greek works. All the works of Aristotle, the extant ones at least do not exceed a conve-

nient quarto-volume, and some of the most valuable of their writings, as the works of Archimedes or Euclid, are still less extensive. Compare with that the huge prolixity of Chinese writers. You remember when I spoke of Chinese literature I mentioned one of their encyclopedias that consists of 6109 volumes. All their writings are similarly profuse. Not so the Greeks. They use very few words, and it is the abundance of ideas that makes their writings appear so rich. In treating, however, of science in Greece, I shall speak not of general literature but of science proper, to the exclusion of belletristical literature or of philosophy. For as to the first, as to belletristics, I mean the epical, lyrical poets and the drama, they are already being treated of by members of the faculty of this university; and as to philosophy, this will form the subject of my next lecture. So that at present, I shall speak only of the scientific progress par excellence, of mathematics and astronomy, of physics and physiology of the ancient Grecians.

But we can not approach our problem without some further preparation. You all know that our principal object is history, in other words, that we try to get a fair insight into the causes of those manifold events which in their aggregate form the civilization of mankind. Treating, therefore, of the scientific development of the Grecians, I do not intend to give you all the dogmatical details of their science, I do not intend to recite the thirteen books of Euclid, or the books of Archimedes on the lever, or of Hipparchos on the theory of the moon. That is not part of my duty. All that I am going to do will consist in a characterization of these great men and their works chiefly in connection with the scientific development of Greek civilization, of which they form one of the most valuable and important products. And thus I shall approach that question, which for the historian is the most

interesting one, to-wit: why did the Greeks take so profoundly to the cultivation of abstract science? This question lies at the very threshold of our present subject, and we must try to answer it. And it is not an idle question, for there have been numberless other nations, more powerful, more numerous, richer and older than the Grecians, but they all failed to attain that transcendent elevation of thought which seemed to be the very natural abode of all Grecians, for Greek civilization was not restricted to the peninsula that bears their name in modern times. The city of Marseilles, in South France, founded by Greeks, although at a very remote distance from the motherland, was no less a purely Greek city, than Athens or Corinth. Wherever Grecians carried their forms of city-government and their institutions, there science and art budded forth as an invariable result. The great names of Greek science came from all quarters, they are not restricted to Athens. Aristotle was a Macedonian; Thales, a Milesian; Herodotus a Halicarnassean of Asia Minor, Archimedes a Syracusan, Sicily; Hipparchus from Nicaea in Bythinia, etc.

The genius for science is, therefore, an attribute of all Grecian cities and colonies. It stands in marvellous contrast to the Romans. The greatness of the Roman people, the almost incredible influence they had on the course of all civilization is too well-known as to stand in need of any further explanation. To the present almost every single individual has to feel the gigantic power of this people, and the traces of this influence may be noticed in half the languages and institutions of all modern people. In all North and South America the ruling peoples use idioms of a more or less Roman cast, and numberless cities, as *e. g.* the city of Cincinnati, have been named after Roman generals and colonels.

But if we ask, what this great and powerful people has ever done for the promotion of Science, we have to draw

an entirely different picture. The influence of Roman scientists or philosophers is next to nothing; it certainly dwindles into absolute insignificance when compared to the influence of Greek scientists and philosophers. With the exception of one science—I mean, of course, the Science of Law—the Romans have never achieved great or very valuable results in Science. Their mind, otherwise so penetrating and keen, so subtle and shrewd, seemed to become obtuse and blunt as soon as questions of Science had to be handled. Their system of Politics was one of the most sagacious and profound elaborations of the human mind, as we shall see later on. But with all this sagacity they could not, down to the time of the second Punic war, compute the area of a triangle, and their knowledge of astronomy was the most primitive one. At the very same time the Greeks had already the most elaborate system of Geometry and Kinematics, of Astronomy and Physics. Could we not explain this difference? Is there no possibility to account for this remarkable fact? But of course, when I say account for it, I mean account for it not by merely putting one word in the place of another word, but by really explaining it. Most historians will simply say that the Grecians excelled in scientific work, because their race had a special gift for it. But this special race-gift is only a special absurdity. You remember, from earlier lectures, how very much opposed I am to slipping in the race-hobby whenever you don't know how to account for a thing in a really appropriate way. Everything is race. You remember when I had to speak of the monotheism of the ancient Hebrews, I expressed my utmost aversion to Renan's view of this important question. Renan ascribes the monotheism of the ancient Hebrews to a quality of race; to an inward character of all Semitic tribes. Like wise many, yea, the majority of historians ascribe the great achievements of the Greeks in Science to a genius,

to a quality of race. If we should go on in the same way; if we should use this one poor term for an explanation of the chief events in history, then our scientific study of history has come to an end. Then there is no need of any further study; then everything can be settled off-hand by a plain reference to one or another race quality. Then we will know why the Germans are so musical—it is a race quality with them; and why the Romans were such great lawyers—it is, of course, one of their race qualities; or why the Americans are such great inventors—it is, of course, a race quality again. Such explanations, however, have to be absolutely abandoned. They do not explain anything at all; they give a mere word for another word. In fact, there are very satisfactory and clear reasons why the Romans did not achieve any other great scientific works but legal ones, and why the Germans, and not the Englishmen, have produced the greatest musicians; and why the Americans abound in inventions, or to return to our starting-point, why the Greeks made such enormous progress in abstract Science. I say there are satisfactory and clear reasons for this latter fact, and I am about to state these reasons: In my first lecture on Greece I dilated on the exclusive city-life of the Grecians. I tried to describe, as vividly as I could, the great influence of city-life on the rapid development of the intelligence of men. I said that Greeks, whether in southern France or in Asia Minor or in the Crimea (for they had settlements and colonies all over the civilized ancient world), lived exclusively in cities, and I made the inference that this one circumstance was the most powerful agent in the development of their intellectual faculties. The difference between a college-life and a farmer's life, so far as the cultivation of mental faculties is concerned, is perhaps not as vast as is the difference between the life in a village and the one led by the majority of people in India or ancient Ger-

many and city-life as it was carried on in Greece or Rome or in the American Union. The mental resources of people in the city are not only doubled but quadrupled. Hence a greater number of gifted and ambitious persons will arise in cities than in villages. But these gifted persons look for a chance to vent their talents, to be in possession of commanding positions or of riches, of great social influence, etc., etc. Now the question is: Does the community offer these chances? Is there a possibility for such a satisfaction of ambitious talents? Are there sufficient offices in the State or in the church or in the trade or somewhere, where those higher-endowed persons may exert their ability and thus satisfy themselves? This being then the question, let us try to apply it to what we heard of the State and society of Greece in our former lectures. We learned that in Greek cities everybody was almost constantly, daily engaged in the government and administration of the State. Every single citizen was almost daily active as either a juror or a voter in the Assembly, or a commissioner in his clan, in his *phratria*—in one word, every citizen was active in one way or another in a political line. But where so many citizens had to be employed at one and the same time none could be vested with a prominent share of power; every single citizen had a share in the government or administration of the State, but few or none had a large share.

In none of the Greek cities do we find as powerful offices, as imposing political centres, as those of Rome, The power and influence of a Roman consul, or of a Roman dictator, censor, prætor, pontifex maximus, ædilis, tribunus, and even quæstor and the power and influence of the senate was perfectly enormous. There is nothing analogous to it in all Greek history. In Athens the right to move an amendment to a law was granted to every citizen; in Rome it was restricted to the consul, prætors, tri-

bune and dictators, that is to say to four or five persons. In Athens the judges were so many that none of them could leave a mark on civil procedure. In Rome the judge was appointed by the prætor, but he was clothed with almost unlimited power. It would carry me too far if I were to trace the difference into all its ramifications. It will suffice to remark that Rome abounded in single powerful offices, the possession of which could justly form the subject of many a profound ambition. In addition to that came the large conquests of the Romans, which gave rise to the coveted position of a provincial governor. In short all talent and ambition of Rome and Italy found its natural and satisfactory vent in political channels. There is scarcely any Roman of some prominence in literature or law that has not, at the same time, been the incumbent of some great office of the state. Julius Caesar, the model historian, was the general and imperator of the Romans. Cicero was ædilis, quæstor, prætor, consul and proprætor. The historian Sallustius, was prætor and provincial governor; the elder Pliny, the Humboldt of the Romans, as Miss Somersville has characterized him, was general and proprætor; the younger Pliny, the graceful author of classical letters, was in turn the incumbent of almost all offices; the great jurists as Salvius Julianus, Ulpian, Papinian and a host of others were all the incumbents of powerful offices. They were either præfectus prætorio, or proprætor, or in similar great office. But if we compare that to the state of things in Greece—what do we find? The very opposite thing. In Grecian states there was scarcely a place for genius, except the case of a war. In peaceful times the offices were filled with masses of people; there was no room and no need for great men; the part played by the individual man in office was far too insignificant as to be coveted by a man of genius. Aristotle never craved, never ran for an office; nor did Plato; nor Hera-

klit, nor Parmenides, nor Archimedes, Euclid or Hipparchus.

Occasionally it occurred that one city would offer the government of their community to one man of high attainments, as was the case with the people of Mytilene, who asked the philosopher Pittakus to be their ruler. But this was the exception. As a rule a man of genius, if he had no leaning towards military glories, could not find a worthy political place of activity. Nor was there much or any chance in the ecclesiastical line, for the church and its hierarchy was not yet existent. All the abundant surplus of genius, therefore, unable to find an outlet in politics or in any other external way, was thrown back on its own resources, on its inner world, and hence gave himself to a devoted cultivation of ideas, of science. Almost all scientific thinkers of Greece were private men in no great office whatever; men of whose lives, as a rule, we know very little. We know very little about the lives of Aristotle, of Theophrastus, of Conon, of Euclid, of Archimedes, of Eratosthenes. They were more or less secluded scholars, in whose lives little or nothing remarkable happened. All the events of their lives were marked by a few scientific terms, by a diagram, as *e. g.*, with Archimedes. This most extraordinary genius wanted to have the form of a cylinder, containing a pyramid and a sphere, to be engraved on his tombstone, for he considered his formula, by which we determine the ratio of these geometrical bodies, as the greatest and most telling event of his life. He and all other Greek thinkers spent their lives amidst their problems and their scholars. In ancient Greece tuition in science was more or less gratuitous. They had no colleges or universities or any other high-schools, except for oratory and elocution. In Rhodes, in Athens, and in some other cities of Greece, great collegiate schools for oratory were founded early in the second century,

B. C., where tuition was given in the art of addressing an assembly, of persuading masses of people, winning the favor of the voters, and carrying on an elegant conversation. To these schools not only Grecians but even Romans flocked, as among others Cicero, who received his training in the isle of Rhodes. The whole character of the antique civilization tended to a careful cultivation of oratory, and a good talker was considered a person of great significance. As to the art of talking there are no greater masters than the Greeks, and narrators like Homer the poet, or Herodotos the historian, have not lost a particle of their charm in the course of 2,000-3,000 years. This predilection for refined talk and elocution as a national trait of character, is, among all modern nations, to be found only in the United States of America. It will be astonishing perhaps, for some of you, that such things as schools of elocution do not exist in Europe.

Nobody thinks of establishing such a school that was so frequent in ancient Greece and Rome, and is so frequent in the modern United States. Nobody would attend it, nobody would care for it. It is very important to notice such things, because they are indicative of the divergencies in national institutions and discrepancies in the whole structure of a people's organism. The political and social structure of the United States being essentially similar to the political structure of Greek and Roman states—of course making allowance for differences in religion and some customs—it is but very natural that we should very frequently meet with the same phenomena both in Greece and America. But to return to Greek science. At present we are so used to the fact that science has nothing to do with poetry or religion, that it would seem to us perfectly ridiculous were anyone to publish a treatise on geometry, *e. g.*, in metrical and rhymed verse.

Similarly would it appear absolutely inappropriate to treat of good deeds and pure conscience together with a theory of the lever or the circulation of the blood. But utterly incompatible as those things may seem to us, they did not appear so to other nations or at other times. The Brahman Hindoos *e. g.* did not feel any incompatibility between mathematics and poetry.

In fact, if you should happen to read Sir H. Colebrooke's work on the arithmetic and algebra of the Hindoos, you would be quite astonished at that peculiar combination of the tenderest poetry with the severest mathematics. Say *e. g.* Bramagupta or Bhaskara Acharya, or any other of the Brahman mathematicians will begin his problem by first giving you a charming description of a young, beautiful girl who stands before a pond of smooth and unruffled surface. There she stands musing and gazing at a lotos flower whose root is in the bottom of the pond, and whose head sticks out from the surface of the pond waving to and fro in thoughtful meditation, as Liliavathi, the Hindoo book I am referring to says. After a while a soft westwind rises and bends the head of the lotus flower slowly, slowly into the water, until the lotus flower disappears from sight.

When you arrive at this point of the poem, written in most sonorous sanskrit verse, the quaint mathematician will suddenly in the midst of all poetical verses start the question: Can you tell the beautiful girl gazing at the pond how many feet deep the pond is? And in fact, as we all know the data given in the poetical description, if translated into numbers are perfectly sufficient to compute the depth of the pond. To our modern taste, the beautiful young girl, the description of the pond and of the thoughtful lotos flower in a treatise on geometry is quite superfluous. We treat of young girls in poetry, or we improvise on them in music, and of the lotos flower we treat in

botany. But to the Hindoo mind these things did not jar—their mind was too naive to discern the incongruity.

Similarly other nations treated of mathematics or physics in connection with religion or ethical subjects, *e. g.* the Hebrews tried to find the ratio between the circumference of a circle and its diameter by means of a passage in the First Book of Kings, in the 7th chapter, where it is said Solomon built a molten sea ten cubits from the one brim to the other, and a line of thirty cubits did compass it round about. That would give the well-known number of Ludolf, or the ratio between the circumference and the diameter as 3 to 1, a very incorrect ratio. But no Hebrew thinker would have dared to doubt the correctness of the sacred book, and so Ludolf's number had to give in.

Compare with that the way a Grecian treated the matter. He did not recur to a book of religious character, he did not ask for any authority, he simply relied on the strength of his own subtle mind, inquiring into the question irrespective of all other but scientific considerations. Of course I speak of Archimedes, who by his method of exhaustion, as he called it, arrived at the immeasurably more correct result, that the number in question is equal to a number lying between 3 10-71 and 3 10-70.

This truly scientific method of divesting a problem of all irrelevant, incompatible elements and pursuing the course of the real constituent parts of a conception will be still more manifest when we compare the results of the scientific labors of other coeval nations with the labors of the Greeks. You all heard of the great theorem of Pythagoras, the foundation of all mathematics, or as it has been called the *magister matheseos*. Without this one theorem nothing can be done in mathematics, not in lower and not in higher mathematics. It is the groundwork of the whole edifice. It is said that Pythagoras after having discovered his celebrated theorem, felt such profound

gratitude for this boon bestowed upon him by the gods that he made to them a holocaust of 100 oxen. To this, by the way, one of the German writers made the classical remark, that ever since that time all oxen are afraid of the theorem of Pythagoras.

This theorem teaches us how to compute the length of one side of a right-angled triangle, when the two other sides are given.

The Egyptians had to encounter the same difficulty. In their monumental buildings they had frequently to face the question, how to figure out the length of one side of a triangle when the two others are given. But all they ever were able to arrive at was this: They knew that when a log is three feet long, and another four feet long, in that case a log of exactly five feet long will complete a right-angled triangle; that is to say these three logs together will form such a triangle. But what shall be done, if two of the logs were six and seven feet long respectively—they never succeeded in finding out. The formula of Pythagoras on the other hand enables us to meet all possibilities, whether the varying length of the logs is 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or whatever it may be. In short, the formula of Pythagoras is general, it is not a mere empirical observation, it is a generalized law, that covers the whole ground. It is in this particular quality wherein we must find the chief glory of Grecian science. By dint of that extraordinary power of abstraction that I mentioned before they usually struck out not only a narrow, crafty contrivance for a few practical tricks, but the very principle of the thing.

You all remember the interesting story of Archimedes and the golden crown of King Hiero of Syracuse. Hiero, it is said, had set Archimedes to discover whether or not the gold which he had given to an artist to work into a crown for him had been mixed with baser metal. Archimedes was puzzled till one day as he was stepping into a bath

and observed the water running over it occurred to him that the excess of bulk occasioned by the introduction of alloy could be measured by putting the crown and an equal weight of gold separately into a vessel filled with water, and observing the difference of overflow. He was so overjoyed when this happy thought struck him, that he ran home without his clothes, shouting, "eureka, eureka—I have found it, I have found it."

But instead of merely discovering the fraud of the goldsmith, Archimedes penetrated far beyond the immediate problem, and established the fundamental principle still known by his name that a body immersed in a liquid sustains an upward pressure equal to the weight of the liquid displaced. So that a mere practical problem led him to the discovery of the fundamental principle of Hydrostatics. It was the same case with another celebrated problem.

The oracle in Delphi was not averse to donations and gifts. In fact the Grecian gods were fond of jewelry and gold, and those who wanted to consult the Pythian god, had more chance to get a favorable answer when they presented their applications together with some paraphernalia.

During the plague at Athens, which made a dreadful havoc in that city, some persons being sent to Delphos to consult Apollo, the deity promised to put an end to the destructive scourge, when an altar, double to that which had been erected to him, should be constructed. The artists who were immediately dispatched to double the altar, thought they had nothing to do in order to comply with the demand of the oracle, but to double its dimensions.

But here they met with almost insurmountable difficulties. It is very easy to double the length of a line, but it is very difficult to double the size of a cube equally

on all sides. Occasioned by this question of priestly offerings, the Grecian mathematicians, especially Conon, set to work and invented a whole series of curves and theorems by means of which the duplication of a cube can be effected. Those theorems are to the present day extremely valuable, and we learn them in all schools of higher education. But as I said before, I mentioned these problems merely to illustrate the general character, the spirit of Grecian thought that had a constant tendency to soar from the narrow range of the practical, of the immediate into the lofty atmosphere of the abstract principle, thereby viewing a problem from its most comprehensive standpoint. None of the Greek thinkers have left us more perfect specimens of this truly scientific treatment of problems, than the immortal Stagirite: Aristotle. With the exception of those sacred names to which the foundation of religion has been attached, there is no name in the whole history of the human mind that has commanded a similar influence over the thoughts and opinions of men, as Aristotle. His correct and true opinions as well as his most fallacious and erroneous tenets have exercised an incredible sway on the science of twenty-two centuries. He has been extolled to the skies, and it was considered sheer sacrilege to doubt one word of any of his writings; again his works were banished from several universities, and sometimes the Popes threatened him with excommunication, who should dare to lecture on Aristotle publicly, or even read his books.

Until recently, his writings were considered the fountain head of all wisdom by the one, and as absolute over-ridden antiquities by the other.

To write the history of the Aristotelian philosophy, of the fate of his scientific works in different ages is next to impossible, for that would imply a history of the mental development of all civilized nations of Europe, Arabia and

Persia, and other countries. Whether Aristotle really was a great scientific thinker or not—this question has not yet been settled unanimously. It is not many years since that G. H. Lewes, the celebrated author of *Goethe's life*, published a book on *Aristotle's Merits in Science*.

The book shows all the multifarious learning of the friend of George Eliot's, all the solid knowledge of natural science, that is but natural with the author of the "*Seaside Studies*," and the well-known "*Physiology of Common Life*." But although in the conclusion of his book, Lewes is more inclined to do justice to the incomparable greatness of Aristotle; in the course of his book he censures him very severely. He finds fault with almost every part of the scientific writings of Aristotle, he refuses him all titles to anticipated discoveries. Lewes would not advise anybody to devote his his time to a study of Aristotle; on the contrary, he would advise everybody to leave it be, to rather take up the moderns, the Lavoisiers, Bichats, Cullens, Hunters, Virchows and Lewes himself. From this I differ absolutely. I do not mean to say that a study of the *Zoology of Aristotle*, of the "*De Partibus Animalium*," *e. g.*, will benefit you more than a study of Milnes Edward's or Wallace's works on zoology. But I would advise every student to read Aristotle anyhow, under all circumstances, by all means.

If I had to make my choice under the limitation, that my whole library should consist of only one hundred books, I would not hesitate for a moment to let Aristotle's scientific works be one of the one hundred books; and if the limitation would be still more narrowed, if it would be cut down to fifty books, Aristotle would still hold his place: and if I should be allowed to possess no more than ten volumes, Aristotle would continue to be one of the ten. Any real student of Aristotle will readily

understand this high estimation. The suggestiveness, the comprehensiveness of Aristotle is unparalleled. His very errors are of the greatest moment. There is a vast difference between the error of an ordinary mind, and the error of genius.

An error of an ordinary spirit is indicative of nothing but the weak mind of the poor person erring. It is shallow, limited; it is not the fertile source of corrective thought, it is barren, shortlived, stale.

But the error of genius is full of force, of negative force, it is indicative not only of a short-coming, of an ill-directed activity in the mind of the thinker but of a lack of harmony in the subject-matter itself; it is the fruitful source of progressive ideas, it is like the outburst of lava that displays the inner constitution of the deep strata. Certainly, Aristotle errs frequently. The experience of twenty-two centuries has taught us a good many things that he could not have known. But his errors are the stray thoughts of genius, and it can be easily proved that some of the most valuable results of modern science have been directly and immediately suggested by the error of the Stageirite

It is especially by the works of Lord Bacon that a tendency to depreciate, to slight the writings of Aristotle has been inaugurated. The celebrated Chancellor did everything in his power (and his power was very considerable) to impress his age and all coming ages with the idea that Aristotle was a mere child in Science; that he and all the Greeks were no better than mere beginners in the study of Science. Not only that: they were, he said, not only beginners but mistaken beginners; they were men who had gone amiss; who did not pursue the right track of thought; who failed to apply the right method to their studies, and who, consequently, were unable to obtain any really valuable and lasting results. This one sentence of condemnation the Lord Chancellor expressed in different

forms; in the shape of jokes, of sarcasms, of ironical remarks, of erudite refutations. It recurs on almost every page of his numerous writings; it lurks under the most innocent or indifferent note. He was thoroughly imbued with the idea that we must overcome the Greek way of treating Science; that the methods of Aristotle are barren and useless; that new, entirely new methods have to be invented; that all Science has to be directed into new channels of thought, and that our whole mental fabric has to be renewed and repaired and remodeled. Up to his time, he said, people were duped by fallacious guides, by the insane methods of Aristotle, and he (Lord Bacon) has undertaken to rid mankind of that shameful yoke; to clear the way to a real, to a genuine insight into Nature, into Science; and that his means toward this object consist in the inductive method. Inductive method! That is the great word; that is the parole of Bacon and of the followers of Bacon, and of the domineering majority of English scientists. The inductive method is the way to salvation; the only way, the only vehicle by means of which we can ever hope to get at precious knowledge. In opposition to this method, it is said, stands the method of Aristotle—the deductive method, a method that has never led and will never lead to any but phantastical results. The alleged worthlessness of Aristotle's method in Science has so often and by such able writers been asserted, that it is almost a hopeless task to combat this assertion. Among other writers, who will prove to you that Bacon, alone, is the sanctuary of Science and that Aristotle is an author of mere ideal cobwebs, of dreamy gossamers, etc., etc., is also our mutual friend Lord Macaulay. When Thomas Babington was alive it was perfectly useless to try to stop his gushing torrent of talk. He would talk down a whole Parliament; and the wonder of the thing was that in nine cases out of ten he was an amusing talker, too, so that his

hearers, instead of being bored, listened to him with ever-increasing curiosity, with unceasing pleasure. But after all it was a mental steeple-chase, burling and hustling over houses, meadows, spires, ditches; more bewildering than satisfactory. Now Macaulay, in his Essay on Bacon, begins to talk, or rather never ceases to talk, of the superiority of the Baconian method in contradistinction to the methods of the ancients, and, of course, Aristotle's methods. I feel confident in saying that ninety persons out of one hundred have formed their ideas about both Bacon and Aristotle by the opinions of Lord Macaulay on these two men of Science, enunciated in this essay, and, of course, all the ninety have sided with the persuasive Lord, who invariably carried his point, whose talk was invincible, and whose arguments were always so specious and always clothed in such admirable language, that instead of calmly examining them, we simply yield to their charm. But the great historian was too little of a scientist to be able to judge of the value of scientific methods. When Walter Bagehot was once asked to write the history of the Bank of England he refused to do so, saying: "It is nonsense to try to improve on what has been already done by Macaulay." And that was perfectly correct. In matters of this kind Macaulay's judgment was supreme. But when it came to Science, to the methods of Mathematics or Physiology, then Macaulay's judgment was of very little account. Though an indefatigable and insatiable reader, he never read anything else but literary and historical books. Works on Science were foreign to his studies. And consequently his mind was fed by literary and not by scientific arguments. Read his essays as often as you may, especially the gem of all of them (the Essay on Milton), but don't let your judgment in matters of Science be ruled by his opinions, for he was no judge of these things. In fact, in speaking of ancient Science, or what is equivalent to

that, in speaking of the Aristotelean method, both Macaulay and Lewes missed the right point. They seemed to believe that there must be one, uniform, all-important method of Science; that all really-scientific results can be achieved only by means of this one method, and that the originators of this method have been modern thinkers, especially Lord Bacon. This whole conception I deny most peremptorily. There is no such method; no such one, uniform method, whether inductive or deductive; whether idealistic or materialistic, or whatever you may call it. There is no such thing; there never has been such a thing. Of course, in all ages people pined for such a thing; for such a general clue to all mysteries of the universe. For such a uniform method would practically be nothing else but a key to everything. If we had to solve a problem, any problem whatever, we would simply apply our method, and there it is; here we have the solution. Such a method, such a general receipt and prescription for all mental ailments was the ideal of thousands of philosophers—of Albertus Magnus, of Raymond Lullus, of Campanella, Telesius, Cartesius, Spinoza, and of Bacon. Each of these men asserted that he possessed the method, and especially Bacon boasted of having pointed out the only, the unique method, the method of all methods. And inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus and Dioscorides and all the other Greek scientists were yet ignorant of this Baconian method; and since they were only in possession of Aristotle's method, they, consequently, all failed, and ignominiously, too. This, I say, I most peremptorily deny.

If in reality there would exist such a method, and if Bacon, himself, would have been the inventor, the possessor, the propagator of this one method, of this, as the Germans inimitably say, *alleinseligmachend*—method, why did not Bacon, himself, come forth with a lot of new in-

ventions? Why did not he enrich the storehouses of science with one single new tenet or rule or contrivance? Why was it that Bacon, in spite of all his experiments, observations and verifications, in spite of all his glorious inductive method, could not add one particle to the existing stock of knowledge? That he who belittled all the products of the ancients could not enlarge the science of the moderns? That he always talked science, but never enriched science? And on the other hand, how did it come to pass that Aristotle, although ignorant of Bacon's method, although destitute of all the help of the inductive method, still succeeded in furnishing scores of undoubted valuable additions to science, so that even Lewes who is extremely hard on him, says of his treatise on Generation and Development: "And the man who did all these marvellous things in science, could do it in the teeth of his bad method, of his useless, wretched method, as Bacon says."

The immortal contemporary of Bacon, William Harvey, who discovered the circulation of the blood, has never cared much for the method of Bacon. The glory of English science, Sir Isaac Newton, came to his theorems by an absolutely opposite method. Instead of following Bacon's method, he discarded it altogether, and whoever has read one chapter in his "*Principia Philosophiæ Naturalis Mathematica*" will notice the utter divergence from all Baconian precepts. And so we are forced to the conclusion, that

1. There does not exist such a general, uniform and unique method of science, which when obeyed brings about all luck, and which when disobeyed engenders all misfortune.

2. That there does not exist any contrast at all between Aristotle and the moderns.

He failed in many of his investigations just as well as the moderns do, as *e. g.* Lewes, himself did very frequently, who had to revoke in his book, "*Problems of Life and*

Mind," what he had strenuously asserted in his book, "Biographical History of Philosophy." But these failures of Aristotle were not owing to a radical fault, to a fault in his method, it was simply the fault of all of us, to-wit: to be human beings.

The Grecians were doing in science exactly what we are doing. They raised a question and tried to answer it. Now the trouble is that we frequently ask questions which are either entirely out of place, or immature, or in some other way inappropriate. To ask the right question—why that is the greatest difficulty. It is not the answer that is difficult—the answer is the easiest thing in the world. It takes sometimes a few years, say 50-100-150 years to give the answer, but after all it will be answered. But if the question is wrong, no correct, no scientific answer can be given.

Whewell, in his renowned book on the "Inductive Sciences," made the following remarks as to the scientific questions of the Grecians. He said the Grecians painted the handle of a pitcher on the wall, and wanted to hang a real pitcher unto it. Witty as this remark may be it is altogether false.

The ancients failed frequently, because they did not put the right question, and so do we. What does our modern medical science think of the great physicians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of Boerhave or Stahl, or Digby? Very little. What do we think now of many of the most celebrated works of Cuvier? Ask the Darwinians and they will smile. But none of us dares to think that Cuvier's methods were altogether wrong, that his way of thinking was radically false.

Similarly, the ancients failed not because of a radical fault in their scientific method, but simply because they wanted to solve problems that were not then or as yet not ripe for solution. They would ask *e. g.* why is the little

finger smaller than the middle finger? Or, why have women no beards? Or, why do the stars glitter? Or, what governs the changing forms of the clouds? Or, by what is the sex determined? Or, why can we not fly? You will find these and a score of similar questions in Aristotle or Dioskorides, and of course their answers to these questions are not satisfactory.

But read the answers of the moderns. Could Arago explain why the stars do glitter? No; he could not. Could Pettigrew explain why we can't fly? No; he could not. In one word—these questions were not yet fit for a scientific treatment in the times of the ancients, and they are not fit to-day; we have still to bide our time and wait. But when questions were really fit for a scientific inquiry, then the Grecians invariably succeeded. Thus *e. g.*, in geometry, in the elementary part of Dioptrics, in mechanics. The book of Euclid on Arithmetic and Geometry has to the present day not been superseded, in spite of the most energetic efforts of modern scholars.

In all England it is still used as a text-book just as well as 2000 years ago in the schools of Alexandria, in Egypt. The treatise of Apollonius on the conic sections baffled all efforts to improve on it, and it serves as a handbook now as it did 2000 years ago. The work of Pappus reads as scientific as any work of Pascal or Laplace or Gauss. The same is the case with the work of Diophantus. The Grecians had the most consummate astronomers. Pythagoras as well as Philolaus and Nicetas of Syracuse, taught that the earth is a planet revolving round the sun.

Copernicus, himself, to whom the honor of this great doctrine is usually ascribed. I say, Copernicus, himself, in the preface of his work, confesses that his doctrine is nothing but the revived doctrine of the Grecian philosophers. Aristarchos of Samos, who left us a very valuable treatise on the magnitude and distances of the sun, measured the

diameter of the sun, and his result does not differ very much from modern result. Eratosthenes determined the magnitude of the earth by a most ingenious method, and Hipparchus added the most essential discovery of the precession of the equinoxes, one of the fundamental elements in Astronomy. He discovered the eccentricity of the solar orbit. He accounted for the apparent inequality of the sun's motion by supposing that the earth is not placed exactly at the centre of the circular orbit of the sun, and, that consequently, his distance from the earth is subject to variation. When the sun is at his greatest distance, he appears to move more slowly, and when he approaches nearer, his motion becomes more rapid. The attention of Hipparchos was also directed to the motion of the moon, and on this subject his researches were attended with equal success.

From the comparison of a great number of the most circumstantial and accurate observations of eclipses recorded by the Chaldeans, he was enabled to determine the period of the moon's revolution, relatively to the stars, to the sun, to her nodes and to her apogee. These determinations are among the most valuable results of ancient astronomy, inasmuch as they corroborate one of the finest theoretical deductions—the acceleration of the mean lunar motion—and thus furnishes one of the most delicate tests of the truth of Newton's law of gravitation. He likewise approximated to the parallax of the moon. Besides, he drew up a catalogue of stars containing 1080 stars. In the year 130, of our era, Ptolemy (the Prince of Astronomers, as he was called) flourished in Alexandria, a man who did inestimable service to astronomy. Although his system of the universe has been supplanted by the system of Copernicus, his merits nevertheless entitle him to the esteem and admiration of all mankind. His works are a perfect treasury of astronomical dates and theories, and all

civilized nations took their first information on astronomy from the *Almagest* of Ptolemy. If we regard the high development of Grecian mathematics and astronomy, we feel very much astonished at the fact that the Grecians had the clumsiest and most awkward system of figures imaginable. They did not use our present way of denoting numbers, the Arabic numerals, but they used letters, the letters of their alphabet, so that A means 1, B 2, C 3, D 4, and so on; I means 10, K 20, L 30, U 90, etc., and accordingly 300, 400, 500, 600 were all expressed by one letter of the alphabet. In one word we use only nine digits and the cipher, and are able to express any number, whereas the Greeks had over forty different letters and signs. To multiply or divide with Greek numerals is extremely awkward. In this respect the Brahman Indians were far ahead of the Grecians. What we usually call Arabic numerals are in reality Indian numerals; the Brahman philosophers, especially Arhia-Batta, used them long before the Arabians. And accordingly the Brahmans surpassed the Grecians in the science of numbers, or as it is now called, the theory of numbers and in the theory of equations. In fact, the Brahmans surpassed in this one respect not only the ancient mathematicians, but even the most advanced modern thinkers. This astonishing fact has been revealed only a few years ago, and it is again one of the many arguments against the alleged superiority of modern Science.

By what I said so far, I tried to give you a genuine characterization of Grecian Science, of that ideal, purely objective and philosophical Science that cared only for the relation of ideas to each other, and did not query constantly what is the practical use of all these ideas.

Of course, in many departments of Science—not in all—we know at present much more than the Grecians ever did know, and so will our great-grandsons know more


than we do. But there is still one thing left which we, especially we, the children of this age, can never cease to learn from Aristotle, Archimedes, Euclid and Hipparchus and all the rest of Grecian thinkers and scientists—I mean the love, the ardent love for truth, irrespective of any immediate use, of any practical application of the truth. In our so-called practical age we constantly ask for the practical availability of an idea. We are, more or less, prone to deride, to pity a man who spends all his life with what the ordinary run of people will call useless theory, mere ideal speculation. But a little consideration will show us how very narrow and shallow such a judgment is. We all enjoy now the intense benefits of electricity, but when Swamerdam, Lichtenberg and Volta first studied electricity; when they devoted all their lives to numberless experiments and observations on electricity, did these men do all that with a view to invent the telegraph or the telephone? Did they ever think of benefiting, materially benefiting, either themselves or anybody else? Did they think, did they expect to enrich themselves by their experiments and observations? By no means.

We still have the private correspondence and diaries of Swamerdam, of Lichtenberg, and Baron Volta—and we can see clearly, that these men never thought of turning their studies into material use. They just pursued their inquiries because they were filled with that fervent love for truth, that is the only mark of the thinker, of the genuine thinker, the only mark that distinguishes him from the science-monger, from the sham-scholar, who first asks if there is any money in it? Had Volta and Lichtenberg cared more for money than for science—none of us would ever enjoy the blessings of electricity. And is electricity the only unknown force of Nature? Can there not be hundreds, thousands, millions of similar forces, which, when first properly studied, will lead to similar beneficent results?

Most undoubtedly. But if you want to be repaid immediately, if you want to be salaried in cash money, if you want to avoid all the preliminary drudgery of the solitary scholar—then you never were a lover of truth, then you are a mere beau, a mere coquettish dude—and you had better leave all science. The Grecians were true, profound, devoted, fervent lovers of truth and no dudes. They never asked how much money is in it. When Conon got emaciated to a mere skeleton by the unremitting meditation on that curved line, which to the present day bears his noble name, one of his fellow citizens asked him, half-sneeringly, why he wasted so much precious time on a thing so abstract, and so useless? The philosopher looked at the querist with a divine disdain and answered: “I live only while meditating.” Such fellow citizens were very frequent in Greece. They haunted poor Apollonius and Archimedes with their constant questions about the use of their lines and planes and figures.

It cannot be denied that in Archimedes' time the majority of his geometrical theorems proved utterly useless, I mean, nobody was able to turn them to some practical end. But when thirteen centuries later science in Europe began to revive, it became more and more evident, that the most important problems in Science and Art can not be solved without a thorough knowledge of the theorems of Archimedes and Apollonius. Then it became evident that these theorems, instead of being barren, abstract truth, are the great fountains of some of the most useful arts, as the art of manufacturing telescopes, all kinds of surgical and scientific instruments and numberless other manufactures, but especially the great art of Navigation. What would this grand art be without those theorems that Apollonius of Perga, or Archimedes of Syracuse 2,200 years ago gave all the devotion of his genius to? These uninterested Grecian thinkers laid the foundation of this

art, and if we feel surer now at sea than 500 years ago, if we dare to cross the widest oceans, if we are able to tell many events on the skies in advance—all this we owe in the first place to those unpractical thinkers—the scientists of ancient Greece.



PHILOSOPHY IN ANCIENT GREECE.

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next topic is Philosophy in ancient Greece. It is difficult to refrain from exaggeration when speaking of the philosophers of ancient Greece. There is scarcely a problem which they have not broached, scarcely one aspect of the numberless questions of Philosophy which has not been made a subject of close scrutiny by one or another of the Greek philosophers. Take the most modern problems, those philosophical questions which are being agitated at the present day, the question of evolution versus creation, the question of agnosticism versus belief, of Monism versus Dualism—all these queries have been the subject-matters of Grecian philosophy. In ordinary books on the his-

tory of philosophy you will notice the endeavor to treat of Grecian philosophy as the first part, as the overture only of the grand opera of philosophical development. You will be told that Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and so forth have immeasurably improved on the ideas and prospects of Pythagoras, Heraklit, Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. I am sorry to say I don't think so. I am unable to see any essential, fundamental improvement, with the exception of one department of philosophy, of Logic (I shall speak of that later on). Of course you must not abide by my opinion. You can form an opinion of your own. All that I can say consists in the honest statement that I have studied the philosophers just mentioned with the utmost care, in their original works, and repeatedly so, and that I came to the conclusion that even the one modern philosopher who in my opinion is personally superior to all of them, did not go beyond the reach of the ancient Grecians. For as Goethe says, "Alles gescheidte ist schon einmal gedacht worden, man muss nur versuchen es noch einmal zu denken." "All clever thoughts have been said already, but it is advisable to think them over again." For the historian Grecian philosophy has two main features: Grecian philosophy previous to Socrates, that is to say prior to 400 B. C. and Grecian philosophy after this time. But taking philosophy in a strict sense we have to omit the philosophical poets like Orpheus, Museus, Hesiod, Homer, Simonides, etc., and also the gnostic wisdom of the so-called seven sages of Greece, Thales, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobule, Periander, with the exception of Thales, whose tenets were mere practical resumés of a life's experience and no systematic explanation of the Universe or the human soul. I say we have to omit these men and restrict ourselves to those thinkers who attempted to solve the enigma of the

external world, of the macrosmos or those of the inner world, of the microcosmos, in a more abstract, philosophical way. And thus we have to treat first of the time of 600 B. C. to 400 B. C., for it was in the course of these two centuries when the first real philosophers of Greece made their apparition. All of them tried to sift down to the last elements of this world, all of them wanted to know, how this world was called into existence, how animals and men were developed, and how everything is being kept existing. In one word, they wanted to know the origin of things, the arche as they said. (By the way, it is a most striking fact, that almost all peoples of this globe denote the idea of the origin of something, the first, the beginning of something with a word in which "o" and "r," or "a" and "r," "u" and "r" or "i" and "r" form the first syllable. Thus *Ur-sprung* in German, *origo* in latin, *arche* in Greek, *eredet* in Hungarian, similarly in Turkish, Hebrew, etc.) For the explanation of the arche, the origin of the world, these philosophers offered three different explanations, and accordingly we speak of three different schools of philosophy previous to Socrates: 1. the Physiologists, that is to say those philosophers who tried to account for the origin of the world by assuming either a material origin as the Ionic school, or a formal cause as the Pythagorean school. We have, therefore, (2.) those philosophers who explained the universe by pointing to the minor opposition between experience and intelligence, the eleatic school, and (3.) the Atomist school.

We have to treat now of these three schools. In doing so I have to repeat what I have said in my last lecture. I do not treat of the philosophy of ancient Greece in the capacity of a teacher of philosophy, but in the capacity of an historian, and consequently I view my subject from an altogether different stand-point. Although I shall give you the leading propositions of each of the philosophers

mentioned, and with absolutely reliable precision too, my main object as an historian will be to point out the connection between the labors of the Grecians with those of the moderns, proving hereby my chief proposition, to-wit: that civilization is not a direct function of time—in other words that a young country may be as civilized as an old one, or vice versa, that countries in the most ancient times may have been as civilized as any of the modern countries. In accordance with this formula I have to treat first of the Ionic school. The four great names of the Ionic school of physiologists are Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia.

Thales declared that the arche, the origin of all things, is to be found in the water,—water is the primary substance, the *prima materia* of the universe.

Anaximander taught, that the first principle was an endless, unlimited mass, subject neither to old age nor decay and perpetually yielding fresh materials for the series of beings which issued from it. Out of the vague and limitless body there sprung a central mass—this earth of ours, cylindrical in shape. Man himself and the animals had come into being by transmutations. Mankind was supposed by Anaximander to have sprung from other species of animals, probably aquatic. To Anaximenes again it seemed that the air, with all its variety of contents, its universal presence, was what maintained the universe, even as breath which is our life and soul, sustains us. Everything is air at a different degree of density. By a process of condensation, brought forth under the influence of heat and cold, the broad disk of earth was formed, floating like a leaf on the circumambient air. Similar condensations produced the moon and stars.

The fourth of these philosophers, Diogenes of Apollonia, adopted the tenet of Anaximenes respecting air as the origin of things. But he declared that air was not only

Force, Substance, but also Intelligence, that it is endowed with Consciousness and Reason, for without reason he said it would be impossible for all to be arranged duly and proportionately. Perhaps ninety-nine out of a hundred persons who read or hear of these speculations of the Ionic school of Grecian philosophers will smile in a self-complacent way at the immature guess-work of these great men.

But the fact is that the very ideas of these men have served as starting points to modern investigations, more than that, that some of the ablest naturalists of our age have accepted tenets of the Ionic school without any restraint. Thus a Chemist like Dumas said that plants and animals are only condensed air, and the celebrated Liebig in one of his chemical letters expresses the same idea. But in what does that differ from the idea of Anaximenes? In nothing. Or in what does Darwinism differ from the doctrine of transmutation held by Anaximander? Essentially in nothing. Or in what does the celebrated nebular theory of Kant and Laplace differ from the conception of Anaximenes as to condensation being the originating process of stars?

Essentially in nothing. Neither Anaximenes nor Laplace could prove his assumption by irrefragable mathematical evidence.

Thus you will see that the Ionic school of Greek philosophers were not only beginners in philosophy; that the majority of their ideas have stood the test of twenty-four centuries. This much as to the first division of the Physiologists.

I shall treat now of the second division of the Pythagoreans. The central thought of Pythagorean philosophy is the number. Instead of alleging that this or that material substance was the original foundation, the arche of the world, Pythagoras taught that number is

the essence of everything. Thus he accounted for the origin of the universe by placing a formal cause, an ideal conception, the number in the centre of his speculations.

Number, said Philolaos, a Pythagorean, is great and perfect and omnipotent, and the principle and guide of divine and human life. Immediately connected with their central doctrine is the theory of opposites held by the Pythagoreans. Numbers are divided into odd and even, and from the combination of odd and even, all numbers, and therefore, all things seem to result.

The odd number was identified with the limited, the even with the unlimited. Following out the same thought they developed a list of ten fundamental opposites, which roughly resembles the tables of categories framed by later philosophers :

1. Limited and unlimited. 2. The odd and the even. 3. One and the many. 4. Right and the left. 5. Masculine and feminine. 6. Rest and motion. 7. Straight and crooked. 8. Light and darkness. 9. Good and evil. 10. Square and oblong.

The union of opposites in which consists the existence of things is harmony. Hence the whole universe is harmony, and the regular movements of the heavenly bodies produce the famous harmony of the spheres; the seven planets being considered as the seven golden chords of the heavenly heptachord.

The holy number of the Pythagoreans was four, because it is the first square number. The number five signifies marriage because it is the union of the first masculine and the first feminine number, namely, 3 plus 2; one is identified with reason, because it is unchangeable: 2 with opinion, because it is indeterminate.

The most renowned doctrine of Pythagoras, however, is the transmigration of souls—Metempsychosis. The

bodily life of the soul, according to this doctrine, is an imprisonment suffered for sins committed in a former state of existence. At death the soul reaps what it has sown in the present life.

The reward of the best is to enter the cosmos, or the higher and purer regions of the universe, while the direst crimes receive their punishment in Tartarus. But the general lot is to live afresh in a series of human or animal forms.

The Pythagorean societies had in them from the beginning a germ of ascetism and contemplative mysticism. For five years the novice was condemned to silence, various humiliations had to be endured, serious experiments were made of their powers of self-denial, among others **they were forbidden to eat beans.**

Having purged their souls of the baser particles by purifications, sacrifices and initiations, they were admitted to the sanctuary of true knowledge.

Shall we wonder that Pythagoras was venerated by his disciples as a God? The firmest corroboration of an opinion was a simple reference to "he said it," meaning Pythagoras said it. But queer as this doctrine of the numbers, of opposites, of the metempsychosis may partly seem to be—are they not the doctrines of many of our most celebrated modern thinkers? This tendency to enlarge the realm of the number, has it not been manifested by such a sober thinker as W. S. Jevons, when he tried to reduce all political economy to a mathematical formula? Are not books being published almost daily whose authors consider numbers and numerical laws as the height of wisdom? Or, to approach the problem from a different standpoint, has it not been proved that by the aid of this one mathematical formula—($g = \frac{m}{a^2}$) Newton's formula, all celestial and many terrestrial phenomena can be explained satisfactorily? Why then shall we call Pythagoras' philosophy the

infancy of philosophy? It is just as mature as our own, the only difference being this, that ours covers a larger ground, but although a gigantic oak is considerably taller than a blooming rose, it is by no means more mature.

I shall treat now of the second great school of philosophy previous to Socrates, of the Eleatics. Elea was a town in South Italy, and the school of Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno had its headquarters in this town.

Xenophanes recognized no distinction between truth for the many and truth for the initiated few, as Pythagoras did, whose esoteric doctrines were only for the few advanced disciples, and who divulged only his exoteric doctrines to the public. Xenophanes thought and acted likewise, that truth was for all men, and for three-quarters of a century he wandered into many lands uttering the thoughts which were working in him. He combated the prevailing polytheism chiefly on account of the personification of the gods, and his doctrine was that the One was the all; or in other words, his doctrine was pantheism; his God was not a personal God distinct from the universe.

His doctrine was expanded by Parmenides, the most notable of the philosophers of the Eleatic succession. He embodied his tenets in a short poem called *Nature*, which consists chiefly of two parts—of part 1, named *Truth*, and part 2nd, named *Opinion*.

His doctrine is that the entity, the being, "to on" is one, invariable and immutable, and all plurality, variety and mutation belong to the nonent. Whence it follows that all the states and processes which we commonly recognize as generation and destruction, change of place, alteration of color and the like, are no more than empty words.

In "Opinion," he describes the plurality of things, not as they are, for they are not; but as they seem to be. In the phenomenal world then there are two primary ele-

ments, namely: fire, which is gentle, thin, homogeneous, and night (or earth), which is dark, thick, heavy. Of these elements all things consist.

The difference between Parmenides and his predecessors, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, etc., is this: that these latter assumed a corporeal substance as the arche, the primary matter of the universe, *e. g.*, the water, or the air. Parmenides, on the other hand, excluded all corporeal substances as mere phantasms, teaching that, in reality, there is only one Being, one Ent, and all plurality, all single objects are merely passing modes of the one Being. You will easily represent to yourself this abstract idea by the following simile: The city of Rome is a distinct conception from every single Roman, or from a couple of two, or three, or one hundred or one thousand Romans, and even if all the Romans now living in Rome should die, the city of Rome would continue to exist as it has existed to the present, although millions of Romans lived and died in Rome. The city of Rome, therefore, is entirely independent from all single Romans, or all single houses in Rome; it has an existence of its own. Now Parmenides looked upon the numberless objects (stones, plants, animals,) of the world as upon so many inhabitants of the universe, and consequently he declared that the Ent, viz., the Being, is entirely independent of all single objects or persons; it has an existence of its own. This Ent, this universal Being, he studied, and his propositions with regard to the nature of this Ent, he called Truth. Turning then to the semblance of plurality, viz., to Nature, he gave his opinions on the variety and mutation of things, insisting however on the necessary untrustworthiness of these opinions, for it is, with regard to the Ent alone, that we are able to know something. These profound speculations of Parmenides are the foundations of two of the grandest systems of modern philosophy—of

the system of Giordano Bruno and of Spinozism. The third great leader of the Eleats is Zeno. Zeno, born in the beginning of the fifth century B. C., the fellow-townsmen, disciple and adopted son of Parmenides, is famous for his attempts to prove that the notions of time, space, motion, multiplicity, sight, sound, etc., are self-contradictory and unthinkable. His so-called paradoxes were stated with a subtlety which has forced distinguished thinkers, who were opposed to his main position, *e. g.*, Sir W. Hamilton, to admit some of them to be unanswerable. Against motion Zeno directed several arguments, the most celebrated being that of Achilles and the tortoise. The argument is: let Achilles run ten times as fast as a tortoise, yet, if the tortoise has the start Achilles will never overtake him; for, suppose them to be at first separated by an interval of 1000 feet, when Achilles has run these 1000 feet, the tortoise will have run 100, and when Achilles has run those 100 the tortoise will have got on 10, and so on forever; therefore Achilles may run forever without overtaking the tortoise. Or Zeno argued: there is no motion: for any body apparently moving is, in each individual point of space, at rest; the sum total of a number of these states of rest is called motion. Against sound he argued that, as you can not hear a single grain of corn fall, you can not hear the sound of a number of grains falling: the sounds of the falling of the number of grains being made up of the sounds of the falling of each grain. Thus Zeno sought to prove that thought and sense are opposed and that the latter, contradicting itself, proves itself unworthy of the consideration of the philosopher. These speculations of Zeno strike at the very root of our fundamental ideas. They are not fallacies; they are not mere mental tricks. They consequently can not be refuted, and what J. St. Mill adduces in the way of a refutation is only indicative of his narrow view of the question at issue.

Zeno's so-called fallacies and dilemmas help us to prove one of the leading conceptions of real philosophy, to-wit: That the vast majority of our ideas are mere assumptions. Our ideas of motion and space are assumptions, legitimate assumptions, but nevertheless assumptions; they are not absolutely true, their truth has only a relative character, a partial character. When we say, *e. g.*, that the shortest line between two points is the straight line, that is no truism, that is only an assumption—a legitimate assumption from our conception of space, but our conception of space is also an assumption. There are other conceptions of another space, such a one, *e. g.*, as has been described by Sir W. R. Hamilton, by H. Grassman, by Bolyai, by Riemann, all celebrated mathematicians. Now Zeno touched on all these wonderful speculations. He proved that our common notions of space, time, velocity, sound, etc., which are generally considered as unshaken rocks of absolute truth, are mere assumptions. You will see now how inexpressibly ludicrous it is to speak of Zeno in that half-pitiful way in which some historians deign to talk of the Eleatics. Zeno was one of the most profound thinkers that ever lived, and his investigations are as precious to-day as they were 2000 years ago. The third division of presocratic Grecian philosophers begins with the great name of Heraclitus, surnamed the obscure, one of the most subtle metaphysicians that ever lived. It is a strange coincidence that we owe our best information on this profound philosopher to the labors of the celebrated German socialist, Lassalle, his book on Heraclitus being by far the most comprehensive collection and discussion of the writings of Heraclitus. It is one of the many shortcomings in Lewes' History of Philosophy that he evidently did not know of Lassalle's precious book. Heraclitus used to clothe his ideas in extremely obscure language, and this quality occasioned his surname. Socrates used to say: "By what I

do understand of the writings of Heraclitus I infer that those parts which I do not understand must be equally good." His cast of mind was so intensely aristocratic that, filled with contempt for the counsels and capacities of his fellow-citizens, he made over the hereditary office of basileus in favor of his younger brother, and betook himself to a life of solitude and meditation. Heraclitus tried to get rid of the difficulty so prominent in the Eleatic philosophy, of overcoming the contradiction between the one and the phenomenal many by enunciating, as the principle of the universe, the process of Becoming; implying that everything is, and at the same time, and in the same relation is not. His favorite way of expressing this abstruse idea was the tenet: "Everything is flowing, or nobody ever steps twice into the same river," meaning by that that all objects in Nature consist of ever-fluctuating parts, so that every particle is constantly on the verge of non-existence, and that the whole universe is nothing but an eternal progression from non-existence into existence, and from existence into non-existence. Accordingly he selects the fire as the arche, as the most appropriate embodiment of the principle of Becoming, for fire is, as it were, a representation of this curious idea of simultaneous existence and non-existence. Fire is a constant process, a constant progression; no part of it has a settled existence, every spark or flame consists by consuming itself in the same time.

But Heraclitus did not mean to say that Fire in the material sense of the word is the principle of the world. Fire was only an allegorical representation of the idea of becoming. Hence we have these three statements: Parmenides said: 'Only the Ent, the one is really existing; Zeno proved, that the many, the plurality, is not existing and Heraclitus asserted that nothing is existing, but that there is only a general process of becoming, of eternal stepping into existence. This bold speculation has been resusci-

tated in Modern Germany at the hands of the celebrated Hegel. In fact, Hegel is nothing but an expanded Heraclitus. The doctrine of both Heraclitus and Hegel is of the utmost importance in some departments of religion and law, and in one of the leading divisions of history. All these doctrines will seem utterly phantastical and useless, but they lie at the very bottom of the most useful and practical institutions. You remember what I had to say about the seemingly useless value of Grecian scientific researches, especially of their geometrical inquiries. I showed that those investigations seemed to afford no practical advantage whatever; but later on they proved the only foundations of some of the most necessary wants of modern civilization. In the same way the ancient Grecian philosophic doctrines bear powerfully on our modern conceptions. It would be out of place to trace this influence in its details; my chief obligation as an historian is only to point out the connection between these ancient modes of thought and modern notions. Such a connection exists preeminently between the system of Heraclitus on the one and Hegel and even Schopenhauer on the other hand. It is an irreparable loss for philosophy that none of the works of Heraclitus have reached us in a complete form.

The next great presocratic philosopher is Empedocles. He was a native of Agrigentum in Sicily. The details of his life are full of fable and contradictions. The most probable accounts represent him as belonging to an honorable family. To his contemporaries, as to himself, he seemed more than a mere man. The Sicilians honored his august aspect as he moved amongst them with purple robes and golden girdle, with long hair bound by a Delphic garland, and brazen sandals on his feet, and with a retinue of slaves behind him. Extravagant stories were told of his unlimited generosity, and of the almost miracu-

lous restoration to life of a woman who had long lain in a death-like trance. Legends stranger still told of his disappearance from among men. Empedocles, according to one story, was one midnight, after a feast held in his honor, called away in a blaze of glory to the gods; according to another he had only thrown himself into the crater of Etna, in the hope that men finding no traces of his end, would suppose him translated to heaven. He propounded a new doctrine. There are, according to Empedocles, four ultimate kinds of things, four principal divinities, four elements, of which are made all structures in the world,—fire, air, water, earth. These four elements are eternally brought into union, and eternally pass from each other, by two divine powers, love and hatred—an attractive and a repulsive force which the ordinary eye can see working amongst men, but which really pervades the whole world. Flesh and blood are made of equal parts of all four elements, whereas bones are one-half fire, one-fourth earth and one-fourth water. Nothing new comes or can come into being, the only change that can occur is a change in the juxtaposition of element with element. But the most interesting and most matured part of his views dealt with the first origin of plants and animals and with the physiology of men. As the elements entered into combinations, there appeared quaint results, heads without necks, arms without shoulders. Then as these fragmentary structures met, there were seen horned heads on human bodies, bodies of oxen with men's heads, and figures of double sex. But most of these products of natural forces disappeared as they arose; only in those rare cases where the several parts were found adapted to each other, and casual member fitted into casual member, did the complex structures thus formed last. Thus did the organic universe originally spring. Soon various influences reduced the structures of double sex to a male and a female.

Plants as well as animals have sense and understanding; in men, however, and especially in the blood at his heart, mind has its peculiar seat. Knowledge is explained by the principle that the several elements in the things outside us are perceived by the corresponding elements in ourselves. Like is known by like, simile similibus. These are the outlines of the doctrine of Empedocles. Comparing the same to modern philosophy we are struck by the similarity of the two. Though we do not speak any more of four elements, we do speak yet of the three fundamental states of aggregation, namely, the solid, the liquid, and the gaseous state—these three states corresponding to the earth, the water and the air of Empedocles.

As to the Empedoclean doctrine of the origin of animals it is very far from being a mere freak of fancy. It is still the question whether animals developed in full form, or in installments as it were. I mean it has not been settled yet, whether all the organs of an animal were developed from *one* other animal, or from 2, 3, 6, 8 different animals or plants.

I mention all this mainly to carry my point, to-wit: that the ancient Grecian philosophers handled their problems just as thoroughly as we do, and there is no essential difference between our philosophical inquiries and those of the Greek thinkers.

This similarity or rather identity between modern and ancient thought is still more evident when we approach the two other schools of Greek philosophy, the Atomists and the Skeptics. The chief of the former was Demokritos. He was born at Abdera, a Thracian colony, the inhabitants of which were notorious for their stupidity. His intensity of thinking was figured by the ancients in the story that he put out his eyes in order that he might not be diverted from his meditations. His theory of the universe is to the present day the prevailing theory among scientists.

He thought that all that exists is vacuum and atoms. The atoms are the ultimate material of all things, including spirit. They are uncaused, and have existed from eternity, and are in motion. The atomic theory of perception was as follows. From every object eidola or images of the object are continually being given off in all directions, these enter the organs of sense and give rise to sensation. He reduced all sensation to touch, and all qualities of bodies to two main qualities: to extension and resistance. But don't we meet these very same propositions in those celebrated works of the Brothers Weber, in Gottingen; of Bain, in England, and of Claude Bernard, in France?

*To reduce all sensation to touch is a favorite theory of some of the best known physiologists and psychologists of the age; and the atomic theory of Demokritos, is the foundation of all modern physics.

The other great school of Greek philosophers, the Sceptics, or Pyrrhonists, bear a still greater resemblance to modern thought. They came a little after Socrates but it will be advisable to treat of them at present. Pyrrho asked what is the criterion of our opinion? Reason. But what is the criterion of reason, he asked again. And as he could get no answer to that, he simply inferred that all science, all philosophy is groundless, because there is no general criterion of truth.

The questions of Pyrrho have been reiterated numberless times, and the profound works of the German philosopher Kant are chiefly a discussion of this one question. What makes us believe that one sentence is truer than another? Skepticism is a legitimate tendency, and in its way unanswerable, and its foundations have been laid by the Greeks. Thus we see that Grecian philosophy, very far from being the childish attempt at great things, is in itself an imposing system of thoughts, the discussion of which occu-

pies our present age just as intensely as the age of Pericles.

We have arrived now at the second great division of Grecian philosophy—at Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. At the time when the idle sophists were reaping money and renown by protesting against philosophy and teaching the word-jugglery which they called disputation and oratory, there appeared a homely-looking poor man, who wandered about the streets of Athens, and disputed with all who were willing.

In appearance he resembled a Silenus. Yet when this Silenus spoke there was a witchery in his tongue which fascinated those whom his appearance had disgusted; and Alcibiades declared that he was forced to stop his ears and flee away that he might not sit down beside this wise man and grow old in listening to his talk.

This man was Socrates, a man whose death was as glorious as his life, who taught morals without pretending any honor, any reward, without desiring to be considered a higher being, with the humble confession, that he knows nothing at all. When accused of Atheism and consequently condemned to death, he did not evade his lot, but he took the cup of poison, and cheerfully left this world with blessings for all, even for his enemies.

There is in modern times only one similar case of a philosopher, who kept his profound composure of mind in the face of death—I mean of course Giordano Bruno. When sentenced to be burned on the stake, he said to his judges, the inquisitorial tribunal in Rome, "I suspect you pronounce this sentence with more fear than I receive it."

Socrates left no written work, and all his philosophical teachings are embodied in the works of Plato and Xenophon, largely altered of course by the individual opinions of Plato. Hence, we must assign to Socrates a place of the most dignified position in the social and ethical devel-

opment of Greece, discussing his philosophical doctrines together with those of his immediate and mediate pupils, Plato and Aristotle. The speculations of these two men have served as the most universal foundation of all modern philosophers. They comprise every department of philosophy—logic as well as philosophy; metaphysics as well as the philosophy of law.

In the systems of these two thinkers, a radical divergence can be noticed, a divergence which corresponds to the two general preponderent tendencies of the human mind: the one idealistic, the other realistic. It has justly been remarked that every single individual is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian; in other words with a tendency to view the world and its affairs from an idealistic standpoint, or with a leaning toward a realistic criticism. Plato is more profound, but Aristotle is more comprehensive. Plato's writings exhibit the utmost finish of Greek style. Aristotle uses very precise but graceless language. Plato with a strong artistic bent applies the form of a dialogue, thereby gaining the chance of adding dramatic life to his metaphysical inquiries. The persons introduced in these dialogues have distinct characters of their own; they laugh, they smile, they cry, they despise, they wonder, they query, it is all life and agitation. It is like one of the immortal Britain's plays—we see the impetuous Chærephon, the true-hearted old Crito, the beloved disciple Phædo, the incorrigible Alcibiades, Glaucon the irrepressible in politics, in quarrel and in love, the accomplished Agathon, the gay Aristophanes, etc.

Nothing of the kind is to be met with in Aristotle. No dialogues, no dramatic life, no scenery, no picturesque adjustment, nothing but cool and sober disquisition of the questions of philosophy.

Plato has immense resources of his own, his own mind furnishes him interminable subject-matter to meditate upon.

Aristotle dwells with preference on subjects of external nature, on generation and destruction, on life and death, on animals and plants.

Plato is dissatisfied with the real state of things, he creates an ideal commonwealth and writes a large treatise on how such an ideal republic should be instituted.

Aristotle abides by the real, by the then existing forms of government, and deduces his theories from them.

Plato ignores whole departments of Science and Philosophy, and lays extraordinary stress on abstract mathematics, particularly Geometry, excluding every one who has not previously gone through a course of Geometry. Aristotle ignores nothing; he studies everything—Rhetoric as well as Zoology, Ethics as well as the art of breeding cattle; but he does not consider mathematics the entrance gate to knowledge. Plato is full of reverence toward the older philosophers, especially toward Parmenides and Socrates. Aristotle is inclined to slight his predecessors, especially Plato himself. Plato is dignified, like a high-priest; Aristotle is simple, like a modest youth. Both are complementary to each other. As Schiller and Gœthe have been the two representative types of German civilization, so Plato and Aristotle are the representative types of Greek thought. Their influence extended not only to Greece itself, but to the whole civilized world, and down to the present time we can observe ages in which Platonic ideas are prevalent, and other ages again in which Aristotelian ideas are in the ascendancy. We can study them, we can comment on them, we can enlarge them, we can (partly, at least) improve on them, but we can never supersede them. Permit me to call your attention again to my principal point: We dare not look on Plato and Aristotle as obsolete antiquities, as on things that we can easily dispense with. He who thinks so has never acquired the least smattering in the history of philosophy. These

venerable names, the works of those men are to-day as precious, as inestimable as they were 2000 years ago. Let me give you one striking example: For over 300 years it was a kind of mania to speak of the logic of Aristotle, of his "Analytica Prior and Posterior," (this is the title of the book) in the most depreciative way. They were made the butts of scholarly jokes, and it was considered part of the scientific decorum to slight the logical theories of Aristotle. This curious fashion can be traced back to Ramus and Lord Bacon. These otherwise eminent men really thought that, according to Aristotle, men can inquire into Nature without any experiments or observation at all, using only his own intellect. In other words Aristotle was supposed to teach that we can solve all problems by a mere discussion of terms, by a mere elaboration of syllogisms, just as we do in logic itself, or in some parts of mathematics. As a matter of course all modern thinkers who went by the opinion of Lord Bacon joined in the universal condemnation of the Stagirite, and, in fact, there would be nothing as wretched, as absolutely inadequate as the idea that we get at an understanding of Nature by mere speculation alone, discarding all experiments and observations. Accordingly a verdict of guilty was pronounced on the logical works of Aristotle, and the study of those gems became entirely neglected. And do you really think that Aristotle ever asserted such nonsense? That he ever claimed to be able to interpret Nature without instituting all kinds of experiments, and without preparing a whole array of observations? Alexander the Great, his grateful pupil, sent him not only enormous sums of money for the pursuit of his scientific studies, but also collections of plants and animals found in Mesopotamia, Persia, Babylon, Bactria and India. Alexander Humboldt has proved it in the second volume of his *Cosmos*, that some of the propositions of Aristotle pre-

suppose minute experiments. And thus you will easily see that Aristotle was just as anxious to experiment and observe as either Lord Bacon or J. St. Mill. And consequently he could not have ignored the necessity to frame his logic in accordance with this first requisite of all investigations. The truth is that Aristotle expresses it explicitly in the second book of his *Logic*, that all premises must be tested by experience. It was in the Middle Ages that the scholastical philosophers, by a wrong use of Aristotelian terms, spread the belief that knowledge may be attained by mere syllogistic reasoning. (I shall speak of these thinkers in another lecture.) And this scholastic tenet was taken for a tenet of the Stagirite, and naturally enough it was disapproved of. But now, since we know the real meaning of Aristotle, do we still reject it? Do we now join the old verdict? By no means! The great logicians of the age, especially the Englishmen among them, as George Boole, DeMorgan, Stanley Jevons; and among the Germans, H. Riehl, confirm the ancient praise of the logical works of Aristotle; confirm the value of the syllogism within its proper limits; confirm the very terms of the Greek philosopher. It is very easy to scoff at misunderstood propositions of an ancient philosopher; nothing easier than this, especially if you read translations. These works have to be studied in the original or not studied at all. Or if you can not do that, take your instruction from a person who has studied the original, for it is next to impossible to translate these unique specimens of philosophical diction. How, for instance, will you translate the central thought of the Platonic philosophy, the term *idea*? We use the self-same word in English, we say *idea*. But how remote is "*idea*" in English from "*idea*" in Plato's Greek! Plato wanted to designate by that the archetypes of all things, the model, the universal pattern according to which all things have

been called into existence, and according to which all things have to be understood. Unless you know the "idea" of a thing you can not understand it. This peculiar term is partly identical with the notion of generality, of universality. But to cover the whole meaning of the term by one or two English or German words is absolutely impossible. It is only by a thorough study of Plato's dialogues that we can get at the true sense of this term. Then we shall be able also to understand his conception of God. The God of Plato is the primary idea of ideas, the One, the Infinite, the Almighty. For Plato as well as all the rest of the Greek philosophers believed in one God. More than that. No sensible Greek ever doubted that this world is being ruled by God. It is utterly incongruous with the best ascertained facts of history to presume that the Greeks were not up to the sublime idea of one God. They looked upon their Polytheism as people in Catholic countries look upon their saints, or as people in Protestant countries look upon the different sects and religious denominations. Likewise Aristotle believed in one God, he taught it in all his writings, and he never pretended to say anything else, anything that the majority of people did not know. The novelty of his philosophy consisted chiefly in the rejection of Plato's "ideas". He taught that the archetype of things must be gained by experience; by close observation; that we can not form any correct notion about the nature of our own mind, or about the soul, or about feeling, etc., unless we start from real facts. By such a process of analysis he established, among others, the famous theory of the categories. By categories, it has been said, Aristotle meant to give an exhaustive division of all possible kinds or descriptions of thought. They are ten in number, and in mediæval as well as in modern times it has been taught that these ten categories are to be considered the ten divisions into which the whole universe was classified by Aristotle. And here again you may see

the working of an absolute error. To divide the whole universe with all its numberless contents into ten classes, and to assert that these ten classes comprise all and everything is really absurd. Accordingly all philosophers who accepted these ten categories as the genuine opinion of Aristotle, expressed their disapproval of these categories in a very severe manner.

But Aristotle never asserted such nonsense. In one place he speaks of six categories, in another of four, in another of three only, showing thereby that these categories are only provisional contrivances but no lasting principles. It sounds very easy, and the general public is very fond of such reductions of a whole system to a few points. But in Aristotle there is no one central idea—he was like Nature himself, a development of many forces, a growth of many principles. For the historian he as well as Plato are the two of those heroes of thought that can never die. In numberless decisions of the supreme court of Ohio or of any State in the Union have the political ideas of Aristotle been taken as the undoubted foundation of reasoning. In countless criticisms on Shakespere or any other dramatist have Aristotle's ideas on the drama been applied as the standard rule of dramatic effect. We still use his terms, his conceptions, his ways of thinking, we all are his disciples, although it is long since he ceased to walk up and down in the shady avenues of the academia. Such is the power of great men. They are constantly with us, they direct our thoughts, they shape our ideas, they never leave us. There are a few more philosophical schools of ancient Greece, especially the Stoics and the Epicureans. But since the Stoics influenced the Romans still more than the Grecians, and since the Epicureans are the direct contrast of the Stoics, I shall treat of both in connection with the Romans. In passing I may mention still that the Cynics and the Cyrenaics were also two considerable schools of Greek philosophy.



LAOCOON.

RHODOS, 2nd Cent'y, B. C.

Marble group in the Belvedere of the Vatican, Rome.

GREEK ART.

Vitruvius, De Architectura libri x. *Plinius*, Nat. Hist. libb. xxxiii-xxxvii. *Pausanias*, Descriptio Græc. *Lucian*, passim. *Philostratos* Imagines. *O. Benndorf*, De Anthologia Græcæ Epigram. quæ ad artes spectant. *H. Brunn*, Gesch. d. griech. Kuenstler. *Spon*, Recherches curieuses d'Antiquité. Lyon 1683. *Moutfaucou*, Antiquité expliquée, 5 vols. tol. 1724. *Publications of the Society of Dilettanti* 1769, 1797, 1817. *Winckelmann*, Werke (8 vols.). *Count Caylus*, Recueil d'Antiquité (1767-7 vols.). *Lessing* Werke, ed. Lachmann. *Herder* Plastik, and passim. *Goethe*, Propylæen; Kunst und Alterthum. *Zoege*, Works. *Visconti*, Works. *S. Angell*. and *Th. Harris*, Sculptured Metopes of ... *Selinus*. *Cockerell*, The Temples of Jupiter at Aegina, etc. *Newton*, History of Discoveries, etc (on the Mausoleum). *K. O Mueller Handbuch d. Archæologie*. *G Semper*, Der Styl etc. *C. Boetticher*, Die Tektonik der Hellenen. *Hirt*, Gesch. d. griech. Bank. *Schnaase*, Gesch. d. bildend. Kuenste (vol. ii). *Luebke*, Gesch. d. Kunst.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next topic is an historical survey and appreciation of Greek Art. By art I mean especially architecture, sculpture and painting, for it is particularly in these three departments of art that the Greeks have attained the highest degree of perfection. With regard to music our obligation to the Greeks is a, comparatively speaking, small one. Music is the favorite child of Christianity. Incidentally I shall speak also of those nobler handicrafts which, like gem-engraving, approach more or less the atmosphere of pure art; but mosaic, pottery or metal works will be left out of consideration. For it is Art in the noblest sense of the word which was the historical vocation of Greece. Art is nothing but the language of inspiration. By that divine state of elevated feelings the common gait changes to rythmical dance, the common talk to spell-bound verse, the common abode to a gorgeous temple, the common indifference of features to the divine beauty of deities. This inspiration pervaded all Greece, the very meanest of her citizens, everybody. Art and philosophy was their daily food, the interest of their soul, the ambition of their state, the cheering consolation of their gloomy days. It is an absolute misapprehension of

the real course of events when we attribute the works of Phidias to his own genius exclusively. We should rather reverse the statement, and say that not Phidias was the author of the Olympic temple, that it was Athens that enlivened the Parian marble through the instrumentality of Phidias. Thus it is but a matter of course that the highest development of Art in Greece coincided exactly with the highest development of all other institutions of Greece, of philosophy, of science and of politics. Architecture as well as sculpture and painting reached their pinnacle at the time of Pericles and his immediate successors. The very time when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were teaching philosophy, when Aischylos, Sophocles and Euripides were filling the stage with personifications of unrivalled dramatic force, when the victorious armies of Athens were carrying their banners to the far west as well as to the far east. For it is the nation that makes the genius; a little nation will never produce a great genius. Plato, Phidias and Apelles were great men, but Greece was still greater and they owe everything to their country, and not vice versa.

Our ideas on Greek art are thoroughly German. It is in Germany where the best books on Grecian art have been written, and amongst these books the very best ones have been written by the German classics, by Lessing, Herder, and Goethe. Lessing's works refer to Greek sculpture and painting, Herder's to Greek sculpture, and Goethe's to Greek art in general. It is the same case with the history of Greek art. A German, the well-known Winckelman, is the author of the first as well as the best history of Greek art. In my historical appreciation of Greek art those four authors are together with Schnaase, Semper, Hirt and Luebke my chief authorities.

The history of Greek art may fairly be divided into five periods. The first period comes down to the seventh cen-

tury; the second occupies the sixth century; the third the fifth century, the fourth the fourth century, the fifth the following centuries. The oldest remains of workmanship in Greece, if we except the series of stone implements discovered within the last few years in various localities, are the ruined walls of Tirynth and several other ancient citadels, the stupendous masonry of which, together with the primitive manner of construction, by means of unhewn polygonal blocks of immense size, led the later Greeks to believe that they had been the work of a mythical race of giants, Cyclopes, and to designate such masonry as Cyclopic. Instead of the unsatisfactory Cyclopes, the Pelasgians, who succeeded the Greeks in the occupancy of the soil, are now accredited the authors of the primitive plan. The walls of Mycenæ furnish an example of the fine skill which the Greeks afterwards employed in the Pelasgic construction, the blocks of stone being carefully jointed and hewn on the outer surface while the interior of the walls is filled up with mortar and small stones.

Mycenæ claimed to be one of the very oldest towns of Greece, and its walls may be considered as the oldest known monuments of Greek workmanship. A considerable advance of skill is noticeable in the masonry of the so-called treasure houses (*thesauri*), or dome-shaped and partly subterraneous buildings, which occur in several districts of Greece, and of which the treasury of Atreus, at Mycenæ is a typical example.

With the emigration of the Dorian race commenced the development of an independent style of architecture in Greece, the first step apparently being the invention of a house supported by columns as the designs for a temple. With the new movement in architecture a fresh impetus was given to the art of sculpture. A school of sculpture in marble existed in Chius as early as 660 B. C., and there

also Glaucus is said to have discovered the art of welding iron, the substitute of which had previously been nails.

The new phase of art thus entered upon by the Ionians was in the second period taken up vigorously by the Doric sculptors, among whom the first to obtain distinction were Dipœnus and Scyllis, natives of Crete, and members of the ancient guild of sculptors there. Leaving Crete, they settled in Sicyon probably on the invitation of the tyrant Clisthenes, and were there commissioned to execute at the public cost a group of statues of deities. As to the remains of Greek sculpture, which may with more or less certainty be assigned to the period in which these and other noted sculptors were at work, there are the three metopes from the oldest of the temples of the Acropolis of Selinus in Sicily, which up to now have been regarded as furnishing the first authentic, and as yet the clearest glimpse of that early stage of Greek art. There are also some other authentic remains, especially the sculptures from the temple of Athene, at Aegma, now in Munich, and several marble statues.

The general characteristic features of this period of Greek art were the following ones. First, it is to be observed that the earliest important schools of sculpture arose in the islands, particularly the islands of Chius, Crete and Aegina. To what circumstances this was due—whether, *e. g.*, to a more active intercourse with oriental nations, remains unexplained. Next to the islands, the coast of Asia Minor, Magna Greece, Southern Italy and Sicily were productive of artists.

From Crete the new impetus spread to the Peloponnesus, Sicyon, Argus and Corinth.

Secondly, for some reason the sculptors then worked in pairs like lawyers do nowadays.

Thirdly, the various materials, bronze, marble, wood and ivory, and gold and ivory (chryselephantine) were already in use as in later times.

Fourthly; the subjects were: 1. Religious and mythological—the epos of Homer being the main source. 2. Portraits and statues of successful athletes.

Individual artists had at last begun to assert their peculiarities in the conception of the human form. They had begun to give up those general types which bear the same resemblance as does his shadow cast by the sun. In the infancy of art as in the early morning, the shadows are grotesque. As it advances they improve till at noon the shadow is lost in the living figure. If we are to credit the Greeks with having been introduced by the Assyrians to one branch of art more than another, we should say it was the art of gem engraving.

Not that we possess Greek gems which compare in style and antiquity with those of Assyria, but if for no other reason, because we find a technical process of so great difficulty existing at all in Greece at an early period. The only glyptic artist mentioned in this early period is Mnesarchus, of Samos, the father of Pythagoras.

In contrast with the paucity of early gems from Greek soil is the immense number of scarabs yielded by the tombs of Etruria, which at least reflect the style of this period.

The material consists principally of rock-crystal, carnelian, banded agate, and the subject, it is worthy of remark, are mostly taken from the heroic legends of Greece.

Painting, or rather coloring, as it would be more properly described in its earliest phase, in which it was entirely subservient to architecture and ceramography, is said to have been first elevated to an art by Cleanthus, of Corinth, who introduced the drawing of figures in outline, by Telephanes, of Sicyon, who improved on this by indicating the principal details of Anatomy; and Eumarus, of Athens, who is said to have distinguished, in his paintings, men from women, probably by the means adopted in the early

vases, that is, by painting the flesh white in the case of woman. Like their followers down to the time of Apelles these old painters used only the simple colors: white, yellow, red, and bluish-black, in the mixing of which to obtain other shades they seem to have advanced very little, greater attention being directed to the drawing than to the coloring. At present the only examples of early Greek painting which we can adduce are furnished by the vases, a branch of art which the ancients themselves regarded, it appears, with sufficient disrespect. In simple architecture the principles of both the Doric and Ionic orders were already fully established, the latter in Asia Minor and the former in Greece proper. Among the remains of Doric architecture assignable to this period are, amongst others, the two temples of Paestum. Of the Ionic order during this period the principal example was the temple of Diana at Ephesus, the construction of which, begun by Theodorus, of Samos, was carried on by Chersipron, of Crete, and his son Metagenes, and completed by Demetrius and Paeonius about the time of Croesus, one hundred and twenty years having, it is said, from first to last, been consumed on the work. This temple having been burned by Herostratus, was restored under the direction of Alexander's architect, Dinocrates.

We have reached the time of Phidias, and have now done with imperfections in sculpture, so far at least as they originated in want of knowledge, either of the human form or of technical means. Phidias, the son of Charmides, was an Athenian, and must have been born about 500 B. C., or a little before. He began his career as a painter, but then turned to sculpture. When Pericles succeeded to the administration of affairs, and it was determined to erect new temples and other public buildings worthy of the new glory which Athens had acquired in the Persian wars, it was to Phidias that the supervision of all these works was

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intrusted, with an army of artists and skilled workmen under him. By 438 the Pantheon was completed, with its colossal statue, Athena, in gold and ivory, by Phidias himself, and with its vast extent of sculpture in marble, executed at least under his direction and reflecting in most parts his genius. Meantime, the enormous expense of these undertakings had involved Phidias in the public discontent which was growing up around Pericles. The story related by Plutarch is that Menon, a former assistant of Phidias, had brought a charge against him of having appropriated part of the gold and ivory allowed him for the statue of Athena, and that being acquitted of this charge, he was next denounced for introducing portraits of himself and of Pericles on the shield of Athena, and in consequence of this charge died in prison, either a natural death or by poison. But these statements can not be reconciled with other well-ascertained facts. As to the charge of theft, it could never have reached a public trial, because every one acquainted with the management of the public treasures knew that the gold of the Athena was so sculptured that it could be removed annually and weighed by the officials of the treasuries. The other charge is simply incredible.

The two works with which his fame was chiefly associated were in gold and ivory—the colossal statues of Athena for the Parthenon at Athens and of Zeus for the temple of Olympia. After the completion of the former statue, Phidias accepted the invitation of the people of Elis to exert his highest power in fashioning for their temple of Zeus at Olympia a statue worthy of the majesty and grandeur of the supreme god of Greece. His workshop was near the Altis, or sacred grove, where through successive centuries down to the second century of our era it was preserved and pointed out with feelings of reverence. The finished work was over forty feet high, and

represented the god seated on his throne, his right hand holding forward a figure of victory, and his left resting on a sceptre on which the eagle was perched. On his head was a wreath of olive. The drapery was of gold, richly worked with flowers and figures in enamel, in the execution of which he was assisted by his brother or cousin Panaenus. On the footstool was inscribed the verse: "Phidias, the son of Charmides, an Athenian, has made me." The throne was mostly of ebony and ivory, inlaid with precious stones, and richly sculptured with reliefs and in parts painted. Of this, the greatest work of Phidias, nothing but the description of Pausanias now remains. Among the existing examples of Greek sculpture there is only one which claims to be a direct work of Phidias, and that is one of the two colossal marble statues on the Monte Cavallo at Rome, inscribed respectively "*opus Phidiæ*" and "*opus Praxitelis*." Grand as both are the marking of the pupils of the eyes and the treatment of the armor prove them to have been executed in Roman times, probably as copies of celebrated statues. On the other hand we possess in the sculptures of the Parthenon a large series of works in marble at least designed or modelled by Phidias and executed under his immediate care, if not in many cases finished by his own hands. These sculptures consist of figures in the round form, the pediments, the metopes in high relief, and the friese in low flat relief. The statues of the pediments have suffered most, and that mainly from two causes—the antipathies or necessities of the early Christians, who converted the temple into a church; and the fatal explosion produced by the falling of a shell among the powder stored in it during the Venetian bombardment under Morosini, 1687. The extent of the mischief on this occasion is known from the drawings previously made of the temple as it stood, 1674, by Carrey, an artist in the employment of the French

ambassador at the Porte. In 1805 Lord Elgin, the British ambassador at the Porte, removed all the sculptures that could be removed with safety, shipped them to London, where they found a permanent resting-place in the British Museum.

The subject of the eastern pediment was the birth of Athene, of the western, her contest with Poseidon for supremacy over Attica; those of the north side, which survived the explosion, remain in Athens in bad condition; those of the south are now in the Louvre. The subject—a favorite one in the decorations of Greek architecture—was a combat between Centaurs and Lapithæ. Traces of red color were found on the ground of the relief and of green on the draperies. The subject of the friese is a long festal procession, in which, through every variety of movement of horse and foot, of young and old, of men and women, perhaps of gods and goddesses, is introduced, the calm dignity of national pride and the knowledge of national worth reign supreme. Its entire length is 524 feet, its height from the ground forty feet, its relief very low and flat. About two-thirds of it is preserved, nearly the half being in the British Museum. The mantle of Phidias fell on his pupil Alcamenes, an Athenian; the lofty conception in his figures of deities was highly praised, while in point of gracefulness in womanly forms he appears to have excelled his master. His most celebrated work was a statue of Aphrodite for her temple, of which, however, the merit of the last touch was ascribed to Phidias. Her cheeks, hands and fingers were specially admired; but as to the attitude and general effect we have no information and are not justified in accepting the Aphrodite of Milo in the Louvre as a copy of it, much less as the original work. Scarcely less famous was another pupil of Phidias, Agoracritus of Paros, who so far identi-

fied himself with the master's style that two marble statues of deities by him were sometimes ascribed to Phidias.

Next we have Colotes and Thrasymedes and finally Thercosmus of Megara. The difference of temperament between the Athenians and Peloponnesians was strongly marked in the schools of sculpture peculiar to each. Political rivalry had its exact counterpart in artistic rivalry, in which Phidias represented Athens, and Polycletus the Peloponnesus. The works of the latter appear to have been always chastened with an hereditary serenity, to have been attractive by the purity of their style and the finish of execution, but not commanding in respect. In the records of painting during the previous period it was noticeable that painters even then, in what appeared to be one of the earliest stages of the art, were accustomed to execute large compositions, such as battle-scenes. To heighten the interest of the spectator it was usual to write the name beside each of the persons that appeared in a picture, as we see it done on the early vases.

It is not to be supposed that in the early stages of Greek painting individual forms were studied with any other view than that of rendering the characters more intelligible. At this stage appeared Polygnotus, a native of Thasus. Attracted to Athens by the opportunity presented by the new buildings which were then being erected, Polygnotus found favor with Cimon, to whose zeal and taste the new impulse for the improvement of the city was due.

He was employed to execute wall-paintings for the Stoa Poecile, the Theseum, and the Anaceum or temple of the Dioscuri. For his services, and especially for his disinterestedness of his character, Polygnotus received what was then regarded as the highest distinction—the freedom of the city of Athens. From Athens he was called to Delphi to execute a series of paintings for the two long

walls of the Lesche, a building erected there by the people of Cnidus.

On the wall to the right after entering the Lesche were painted scenes illustrative of the old epos of the taking of Troy.

On the left was the visit of Ulysses to the lower world, as described in the eleventh book of the *Odysee*.

As regards the style of Polygnotus, we have the distinction drawn by Aristotle between this and that of Zeuxis—a distinction which he expressed by the words *ethos* and *pathos*. By *ethos* as applied to the paintings of Polygnotus, we understand a dignified bearing in his figures, and a measured movement throughout his compositions, such as the Parthenon frieze presents compared with the pathetic rendering of scenes in the frieze from the temple of Appollo at Phigalia, or in the frieze of the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus.

It was also said that in place of the old severity and rigidity of features, he introduced a great variety of expression, and was the first to paint figures with the lips open, and further he was accredited with great improvements in the rendering of drapery, so as to show the forms underneath. He painted in monochrome on a white ground, so that, in fact, the principal charm of his work must have been in the drawing. Among the younger contemporaries of Polygnotus were Dionysius of Colophon and Pauson, the Cutt of Aristophanes, remarkable for his talent of caricature and animal painting. The works of these painters have entirely perished.

The history of architecture during this period is an unexampled record of great undertakings throughout Greece, but more especially in Athens, which, if it had suffered most from the Persian invasion, had also in the end acquired the most ample means of repairing its ruins and adding fresh lustre to its aspect. The city walls on the

south side of the Acropolis were rebuilt, and a tower erected to command the entrance, which, however, being afterwards rendered useless by the erection of the Propylaea was removed to make way for the temple of Athene Nike.

Among the new temples is the Theseum, which is not only well-preserved still, but is also the oldest existing example of the Attic-Doric order. Under Pericles, as I said before, Phidias had the supervision over all the public works then going on. Apparently at this time was erected the Odeon, a building intended for musical performances, circular in form and brilliantly decorated with a tent-shaped roof of wood.

It was the Acropolis, however, that was reserved for the crowning effect of architecture in this period. Within the space of probably not more than 5-6 years there rose on the site of an old temple of Athene, which had been destroyed by the Persians, the Parthenon, a model for all time of the Doric order, pure and perfect in its architectural forms and proportions. The architect was Ictinus, who was assisted by Callicratidas. The next undertaking was the so-called Propylaea, a building which though practically serving as an entrance to the Acropolis, aspired to a highly decorative character.

Contemporary with the building of the Propylaea, it appears was that of the small temple of Athene Nike, on the Acropolis, which, on the removal of a Turkish structure in 1875, was recovered in almost all its parts, except some slabs of the frieze; it is now in the British Museum. The great temples at Olympia and Delphi, though begun earlier may also be reckoned among the works of the period, to which also belongs a large series of Doric temples in the Greek towns of Sicily and Magna Grecia, particularly those of Syracuse, Agrigentum, Selinus, Egesta and Metapontum.

Since the beginning of the fourth period the political and social circumstances of Greece, suffered a marked change. The nation had lost its unity, and the Peloponnesian war had made havoc of its resources. Aeschylus had given away to Sophocles and Euripides, Phidias to Scopas and Praxiteles.

Poets and Sculptors of the new generation have chosen as their theme, the representation of pathos. Of works directly from the hand of any of the masters of this school there is no example in existence, so far as we know at present.

On the other hand there are many copies of their works from which some idea may be formed of their style. The first of the artists of this school was Scopas, a native of Paros, the son and pupil of Aristandrus. About 380 B. C. he settled in Athens where for nearly thirty years he maintained a reputation for an unparalleled power of rendering the human or divine figure, especially in a state of excited feeling. When considerably advanced in life, Scopas was invited by Artemisia, the queen of Caria, to assist or direct the sculptures for a monument which she was erecting at Halicarnassus in memory of her husband Mausolus. The site of the Mausoleum, one of the seven wonders of antiquity, was discovered and excavated by C. T. Newton in 1856-7, the result being the recovery of an important part of these celebrated sculptures.

That Praxiteles was directly a pupil of Scopas is not proved even by the fact that he worked in the same artistic vein and spirit, with a result which rendered his style undistinguishable from that of the older master. The scene of his labors was usually Athens and the neighboring towns. His model was Phryne. Like Scopas he had little taste for bronze in comparison with marble, with its surface finely sensitive to the most delicate modulation. Unsatisfied with even this, he endeavored to soften the

asperity of the marble in the crude parts by a process of encaustic, in which, or perhaps rather in the coloring of the draperies, he employed in difficult cases the contemporary painter Nicias. That he was peculiar in thus tinting the marble and an exception among other Greek sculptors can not be meant in the face of so many instances of coloring in the remains of Greek sculpture and architecture. The fact, however, of his being mentioned in connection with it may be taken as a proof that the process was an exceedingly refined one, since his favorite subjects were those of youthful or feminine beauty, in which it is to be supposed that the tints corresponding to those in Nature would appear almost evanescent in their delicacy. Of his works, the number of which was unusually large the most celebrated were the following ones: The marble statue of Aphrodite at Cnidus, of which the more or less modified copies, as the Venus of the Capitoline Museum and the Venus de Medici, together with the ancient records, show that the goddess was represented standing nude at the moment when she has left her bath, and being sensitive to the air, presses her left leg against her right and looks toward the drapery which she has already laid hold of with her left hand. Then a statue of Aphrodite at Thespiæ, beside which was placed a statue of Phryne and a statue of Enos in Parian marble. The development of the art of sculpture in the Argive-Sicyonian school, corresponding to that just described in the second Attic school, was begun by the Corinthian Euphranor whose principal study was to suit the changed tastes with which he had probably become impregnated during his long stay in Athens. To this end he introduced a smaller head, and a thinness of the arms and legs, which gave a greater lightness to the figure, and which, under the hand of his follower, Lysippus, became the favorite type of ideal athletic statues. About 1,500 statues and groups in

bronze were counted as having been produced in his workshop, and among them two at least of colossal size—the statue of Jupiter at Tarentum, sixty feet high, and that of Hercules in the same place. There were also some very celebrated silversmiths. Of these we know Mys, who executed the designs on the shield of the bronze Pallas, of Phidias, on the Acropolis of Athens, and more celebrated, Mentor, who worked chiefly on silver bowls and cups, for which fabulous sums were afterward paid by the Roman collectors. In gem engraving during this period the fame of Pyrgoteles is known, but of all the existing gems which bear his name it may be questioned whether one reflects adequately his style. It may be taken as certain that some of them are from his hand. He was the court-engraver of Alexander the Great, whose portrait he made on an emerald. In painting, the transition from the style of Polygnostus to that of the new school was again, as has been said, a transition from ethos to pathos, from character and noble bearing to beauty and effect. The change as elsewhere was in harmony with the spirit of the times, but of the steps by which it was brought about two deserve attention; the first is the exigencies of scene-painting, on which Sophocles, and after his example his older contemporary, Æschylos, laid great value. In this direction the artist of the day was Agatharchus, of Samos. The second step was gradation of light and shade, and of colors, introduced by Apollodorus, who, for this service, is regarded as the founder of the new school. At the door opened by Apollodorus entered Zeuxis.

The story of his having constantly before his eyes five of the most beautiful maidens of the town of Croton while he was painting his figure of Helena, suggests that he must have been a close student of form and perhaps also of color. His figures were of a large mould, as in the earlier school, and for this reason his heads and limbs ap-

peared a little coarse to Roman connoisseurs accustomed to the elegance of a later time. In this direction a great step in advance was made by his contemporary Parrhasius of Ephesus, who like Zeuxis, also lived some time in Athens, enjoying the society of Socrates.

Seneca relates a tale that Parrhasius bought one of the Olynthians whom Philip of Macedonia sold into slavery, and tortured him in order to have a model for his picture of Prometheus, but the story, which is similar to one told of Michael Angelo is chronologically impossible.

Another tale recorded of him describes his contest with Zeuxis. The latter painted some grapes so perfectly that birds came to peck at them. He then called on Parrhasius to draw aside the curtain and show his picture, but finding that his rival's picture was the curtain itself, he acknowledged himself to be surpassed, for Zeuxis had deceived birds, but Parrhasius had deceived Zeuxis.

The arrogance and vanity of Parrhasius are the subject of many other anecdotes. He dressed himself in the purple robe, golden crown, and staff of a king, and boasted his descent from Apollo. A picture of the Demos, the personified People of Athens is famous; according to the story the twelve prominent characteristics of the people, though apparently quite inconsistent with each other were distinctly expressed in this figure. The way in which this was accomplished is an insoluble riddle.

The next great painter was Timanthes. One of his great pictures was the tragic scene of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, in which the expression of sorrow was rendered with a masterly gradation, from the bystanders (Calchas, Ulysses, Ajax and Menelaus) up to Agamemon, in whom the deep grief of a father was expressed by his covering his face and turning it away from the spectator.

There was a celebrated school of painters in Sicyon at that time. But it is Apelles, in whose person were combined, if we

may judge from his reputation, all the best qualities of the hitherto existing schools of painting. It should, however, be remembered that what we know of him comes entirely from Roman and late Greek sources, and represents rather the tastes of these times, than a critical judgment on his works. The execution of subjects for which thoughtful reflection are mainly required as opposed to the poetic and spontaneous executive faculty of a true artist has been urged as detracting from the greatness of Apelles, and to this extent, he was subject to the weakness of his times. Like Correggio with whom he has been compared, he lived at a time when the great creative spirit had passed away. To refine the harmony of his light and tones as well as to protect his paintings from dirt, he employed a peculiar black glass, which broke the sharp contrasts of colors required for such powerful effects as the appearance of Zeus hurling lightning. With regard to his colors little is known. The statement that he used only four, may or may not be correct. Of his mere skill we have an example in the figure of Hercules, afterward in Rome, of which it was said that the face though turned away from the spectator, was suggested almost as vividly as if it had been actually painted. In technical skill Apelles confessed himself equalled by his contemporary Protogenes, the Rhodian, claiming, however, as his own special superiority, that he knew when to stop. The fault of Protogenes was over-elaboration. On one painting he is said to have worked seven or eleven years, finishing it with four separate glazes to protect it from injury.

Though the works of the masters of this period have wholly perished, there remain two sources from which some idea may be gathered of their manner: First, a number of Pompeian paintings, which, though executed in a later age, are still copies of the spirit and manner of the works of this time, and secondly, a large series of painted

vases, which, though the production of inferior workmen, display a wonderful facility of execution, a splendor of glare and an application of colors which show that the example of the great painters had not been neglected. The figures stand out in red from the black ground of the vase; for the accessories, red, yellow, violet, black, blue, green and gilding are employed. With the close of the Periclean period in Athens the public desire for more temples seems to have ceased, so that the architecture of the period now before us is to be traced rather in works of utility, whether public or private. The two principal schools of sculpture of the last period are represented by the sons of the two great masters of each, by the Athenian school, the sons of Praxiteles—Cephisodotus and Timarchus, and by the Sicyonian school, of the sons of Lysippus, of whom the ablest was Euthykrates. A sculptor of the Rhodian school, by the name of Chares, is known mainly as the author of the bronze colossus of Helios, at Rhodes, a statue 105 feet high, which, after standing a marvel to all for fifty-six years, was broken across the knees and thrown to the ground by an earthquake. To this school belonged Apollonius and Tauriscus, the author of a colossal marble group, which has been identified with that in the museum of Naples, known as the Farnese Bull, and representing Amphios and Zethus in the act of binding Dirce to the horns of a bull in presence of their mother. From the instances of subjects in which cruelty and deep emotion were combined, it has been argued that the group of Laocoon, which was the work of three Rhodian artists, Agesander, Athenodorus and Polydorus, may properly be assigned to the Rhodian school of this period. To the famous school of Pergamus belongs the Dying Gaul, in the Capitoline Museum, known as the Dying Gladiator. In this period we find most exquisite examples of cameos, as the large cameo, now in Vienna, representing the sup-

pression of the Pannonian revolt by Tiberius and Germanicus. When stones were too costly, glass was used, as in the famous Portland vase in the British Museum.

This is, in short, a historical survey of the chief periods and leading persons in Greek art. As to the question whether Greek art is of a spontaneous growth, or whether it has been initiated by the genius of other nations, especially by the Egyptians, Phœnicians and Assyrians—it has been now almost universally accepted, that Greek art is thoroughly Greek, that very few or none of the great features of this incomparable product of the human mind has been borrowed from some other nation. So certainly as the Greeks have independently developed the genius of their language from the common basis of the principal stock, so certainly as in their religious ideas, the ideas prevalent in the East, have been transferred to pure actions, just so certainly in their forms of art each characteristic trait is generically Hellenic. Only in certain forms, belonging to Greek antiquity, do we trace the influence of Oriental art, transmitted by the trading Phœnicians. This is the case in the capitals of the columns and in certain ornamental details of the Ionic style, which seem to come from Babylonian-Assyrian models. In our last lecture, when I had to treat of the philosophers of ancient Greece, I compared their speculations with those of the modern in order to prove what, as a rule, has not yet met with a general approval, namely, that the ancient Grecian philosophers were just as thorough, profound thinkers as any of the modern heroes of thought. Such a comparison with regard to Grecian and modern art is entirely superfluous.

In this respect there is no plurality of opinion, there is no difference of criticism. As to Greek art there is only one judgment, one unlimited praise, one acknowledgment. As to these pure, chaste, perfect representations of beauty and of proportion everybody agrees in awarding

the first prize to the classical Greek art. Greek Art, and more especially their architecture and sculpture is the absolute expression of model beauty. Beauty was the supreme law of Greek Art. It is not very easy to realize the far-reaching influence of this one principle. The Grecian sense of beauty was so sensitive that even our most refined artists sometimes fail to appreciate all its delicacy. This sense was the more sensitive because it was shared by every citizen in Greece, even in Sparta. In Thebae they passed a general law forbidding painters to select ugly subjects for their paintings. They did not want to fill their halls and public buildings with distorted or ugly figures. They wanted to surround everybody with representations of beauty, for the sense of beauty was so strong even in the meanest of their citizens that they felt shocked by ugly, disproportioned figures or scenes. And then they passed laws on the beauty of paintings just as we pass laws on the cleanliness of our streets. The whole city was filled with statues and paintings and they considered it their chief duty that these statues and paintings shall be pure representations of ideal beauty. It is not improbable to suppose that the great personal beauty of the Grecian was in some degree due to the exquisite beauty of all their surroundings. This keen sense of beauty may account for it that none of the Greek artists did ever form or paint a fury. None of the existing statues, reliefs or paintings represent a fury. In the catalogue of Grecian works of art of Pliny or of Pausanias there is no mention of a fury. In compliance with this rule fierce anger was toned down to stern seriousness. The poet spoke of the angry Jupiter who hurled the lightning; the artist represented only the grave Jupiter. Extreme grief was changed into sorrow. And where such a change was not to be effected, where it would have been impossible to lower the expression without lowering the artistic value of the work—

what did Thimantes do in such a case? I spoke of his celebrated picture of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, in which he rendered the gradation of sorrow up to the inexpressible grief of the father. To render this grief in a direct way, by representing the disturbed features of a father writhing with the agony of his feelings, would amount to depicting the pathological ugliness of feelings. Desperate grief is no subject for a beautiful picture. Timantes, therefore, simply covered the head of the father, not in despair at painting the features of extreme grief, but in obeying the first principle of his art—beauty. It is the same case with the renowned statue of Laocoon. The father and his two sons are represented in the mortal struggle with the serpents, the coils of these dreadful animals being already twined round the bodies of the victims. But the expression in the faces of father and sons, although it might be expected to be perfectly horrifying, is, comparatively, calm. For the supreme law of Art, Beauty, did not admit of a photographic, realistic representation of all the horrors of Laocoon. In one of the delightful epigrams of the Greek anthologia there is the following line on an ugly person: “Who will ever think of painting your portrait since everybody hates to see you.” In modern times many artists would think this way: you are ugly, that is true, but nevertheless I shall paint your portrait—for if people will not admire your face, they certainly will admire my dexterity in rendering such an ugly face so faithfully. But that was not the way the Grecians thought. They would have despised that whole Dutch school of genre-painters. They would have called them *Rhyparographi*, the dirt-painters, a name given to one Pyreicus, a Greek painter, who delighted in painting barber shops, kitchen scenes and the like. Pauson, whom I mentioned before, who had a special talent for caricaturing, lived in abject poverty.

The Greeks did not care for his ugly figures, for the low scenes of his pictures. Even when the subject to be painted or sculptured did scarcely admit of any change in the expression the Greeks contrived to avoid the full, relentless representation of horror, and mitigated it down to the lines of beauty. For instance, the image of death. Death is the acme of horror, and it seems to be a very natural thing, that all nations represented death by frightful images, and so we do at present.

Our usual image of death is the absence of all beauty, in fact, the mere skeleton of it. Not so the ancient Greeks. Their representation of Death had to obey the general law of beauty just as well as any other of their allegorical figures, and consequently, they represented the dire end of this lovely life by the figure of a blooming youth, leaning on an upset torch, and looking sadly at the disappearing butterfly.

The butterfly is the symbol of the soul, of the Psyche. But this keen sense of beauty was coupled with the most positive consciousness of the limits of their art. To what Goethe says: *In der Beschreibung zeigt sich der Meister*—in this very quality the Greek artists were far superior to the artists of all ages.

A Grecian painter never strove to represent sculptural beauty, nor did a sculptor aspire to fashion picturesque beauty. The perfection of their works manifests itself not only in the masterly execution of an artistic idea, but in the very selection of their subjects.

Nothing is more instructive in this respect than the celebrated picture of Helen, by Zeuxis. The beauty of Helen was proverbial; the whole *Iliad* is, as it were, founded on the beauty of Helena, for it is because of the eyes of this one woman that the war with Troy was begun. But Homer nowhere describes that beauty; he simply says, Helen was of a divine beauty.

No minute description of her eyes, of her nose, of her ears, of her figure—nothing at all. For the great poet was conscious of the impossibility to depict beauty in words. But he had other means to suggest the extraordinary beauty of Helena. He relates that when Helen entered the assembly of the Trojan senate, the very oldest senators were struck with the beauty of the woman, and although Helen was the cause of more calamity in Troy than any other person then living, the gray-haired senators could not help forgiving her everything.

Zeuxis wanted to paint this scene. Do you think he painted all the senators, with the expression of long forgotten passions on their wrinkled faces?

Nothing of the kind. His picture had only one single female figure of bewitching charms, Helen herself, in her full natural beauty, unaided by any other apparel, and under this picture he wrote the corresponding lines of Homer. The scene in Homer, Zeuxis felt, was a scene for a poet—to render it verbally as it were would not be congruous with the limits, with the character of the art of painting. And then he did, what but very few artists would have done, he left out all but the one person, and let this one person of transcendental beauty stand for the whole scene in Homer. And in fact, in looking at a picture of such exquisite beauty we can more readily understand the feelings of the Trojan senators, than by a picture of one hundred portraits of old legislators.

If, according to the ancient division of all our accomplishments, I mean the two—the Beautiful, the Good, we should award different prizes to different nations, we cannot hesitate for a moment to tender the prize of beauty to the ancient Greeks; and as to the brave and good, they were, as I tried to show in my previous lectures in the van of those civilized nations who honored truth and adored God.

ROME—POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.


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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Our next topic is Rome. This one word comprises the history not of one city, of one state, of one commonwealth, but of all the cities, all the states, all the commonwealths ever since the beginning of our era. Rome is the father, the originator of nearly every political and ecclesiastical institution of the civilized Christian world. Rome is the fountainhead of more than a majority of our domestic and social institutions.

Rome is the lawgiver to over 400,000,000 of people of our age. Rome is the source of two-thirds of all languages spoken in modern Christian countries. Rome after having been the military and political centre of all Europe and Asia and Africa, became the spiritual centre of all these vast countries, and to the present day her sway over the minds and destinies of people is enormous.

Such an influence, such an historical position stands unparalleled. There have been large cities, powerful cities, great centers of government, science and art, as Babylon, Nineveh, Peking, Paris, but their influence lasted only for a while, for a few hundred years, and after that time other cities assumed their part. But the city of Rome never had a rival.





Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus.

Temple of Jupiter Tonans.

Tabularium.

Temple of Saturn. Temple of Vespasian.

Temple of Concordia.

Carcer Mamertinus.

Arch of Tiberius.

Milvium Aureum.

Orator's tribune.

Colossal statue of Domitian.

Rostra of the Temple of Caesar.

Temple of the Dioskuri.

Basilica Julia.

FORUM ROMANUM.

All Roman greatness is attached, as it were, riveted upon this one city. In Greece several cities were alternately the great leaders of the current of civilization.

There were great philosophers in Athens, but there were also great philosophers in South Italy. Pythagoras taught in Crotona, Zeno and Xenophane in Elea, Archimedes in Syracuse in Sicily, Heraclitus in Ephesus, in Asia Minor, Zeuxis in Croton, Euclid and Eratosthenes in Egypt, Democritos in Abdera, and so forth. But none of the great Roman writers, philosophers, jurists or statesmen ever thrived elsewhere than in Rome.

There is not one single Roman name of any importance but he was a child of the city of Rome. He might have been born in some other part of the vast empire; he might have been a hispanus, a Spaniard, like the philosopher Seneca, or the epigrammatist Martial, or the poet Lucanus, or the rhetor Quintilian—they were all Spaniards, at least born in Spain, but they had to come to Rome, they had to breathe the classical air of the immortal city, they had to be fostered and nourished by the spiritual elements of the Urbs, before they were enabled to produce some work of literary art, or penetrating thought. Some of the great jurists of Rome were Phœnicians, or *e. g.* Ulpianus, some of them Africans, as Africanus, some Greeks, as *e. g.*, Gajus—but it was in Rome where they acquired that inimitable skill of construing a jural relation.

Accordingly, we find that in Roman literature there is no divergency of dialect—these writers radiated forth from one and the same centre, consequently they used one and the same idiom—unlike the Grecian authors who used several dialects, the Ionic, Attic and Doric dialects. There certainly is great difference between the language of Plautus, Cicero, and Gellius, but it is no difference of dia-

lect, it is merely a difference in style, a difference in workmanship, not in material.

Thus we see that the city of Rome is the absolute centre of politics, literature, language, of the entire life of the vast empire—everything depended on this one city, she was the soul, the brain and heart of all cities, of all petty and large states, of all nations and peoples.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the cardinal point in all Roman history; this is the chief, the main, the leading fact in the whole course of Roman history down to the present day.

That one single city should obtain such an infinite influence over the destinies of millions of people, that the language of this one city, the laws of this city, the very errors and mistakes of this city should continue to be the languages, the laws, the errors and mistakes of hundreds and thousands of other cities and states—this is the historical miracle, this is the wonder and at the same time the spell of Rome. For this spell is imperishable.

There have been great men in every country. There have been great poets and statesmen in every nation, but the charm of Rome reigns supreme. The civilized Christian nations have spent more labor, have given more attention to the minute details of Rome and Roman institutions than to the institutions or great individuals of their own country. In all schools in England ten times as much time is being spent on Cicero as on Shakespeare, and in German public schools twenty times as much care is devoted to Virgil as to Schiller.

This charm, this spell never failed. The most stalwart champions of the Catholic church, the Jesuits, yielded to the charm of the great Roman heathen, and in their schools the best of Latinity was taught. The popes themselves were ardent propagators of the

study of ancient pagan Rome. In all Protestant countries the study of Rome is the foundation of all education. But our intense interest in Rome is of a still more personal cast.

The leading fact of Roman history, namely, that the city of Rome has been the unique centre of an unlimited power and influence ; this miraculous fact is sufficient for the historian, for the investigator. In addition to this the individual meets a more personal feature in Rome. If there is one event in universal history which surpasses both Greece and Rome as to its immense bearing on the destinies of peoples, it is Christianity.

I do not hesitate to state that Christianity, the origin and development of Christianity is *the* event of European history. Nothing can compare with it in point of profound influence on our mind, on our hearts, on our public and private life.

The influence of Mohammedanism on Asiatic nations was by far less significant. Christianity left its mark on sciences, on all arts, on manners, habits, laws, on everything. But we shall never understand the rise and progress of Christianity, unless we previously prepared our way by a thorough, by a precise understanding of Roman institutions. I want you to understand that this is the most important of all historical events. I mean the origin of Christianity can not be understood ; nay, it must of needs be misunderstood, unless we first know the institutions of the Roman empire. My lectures on Rome, therefore, are preparatory to my lectures on the origin of Christianity, and this is one of the reasons why I devote so much time to the discussion of Rome.

I have so far laid down two main principles—the one is the unification of all Roman history in the city of Rome ; the other is the paramount importance of Rome for an understanding of the greatest event of all European and

American history, for the history of Christianity. I shall now proceed to a discussion of Roman institutions. But such a discussion would be utterly useless unless we first come to a fair agreement as to the relative value of our sources. Take up three or four different books on Rome, *e. g.*, Niebuhr, Sir Cornwall Lewis, Mommsen, and Ludwig Lange. Consult these books on, say the Roman Senate or any other Roman institution. You will be astonished to see that these great scholars differ from each other in almost every detail. All of them quote Latin writers; all of them seem to command a satisfactory knowledge of their subject, all of them give you very plausible arguments, and then you are generally left in a real predicament as to the choice of your guide. Shall you follow Niebuhr, or Mommsen, or Lange? But you might think, perhaps, it will be more advisable to study the Roman writers themselves and not the German, English or French comments on those writers. Very well. You will be told that the ancient writers on the regal period, and on the three first centuries of the Republic are chiefly Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. You take Livy and begin to read, but you will have scarcely proceeded as far as the second page when you will commence to see that, in spite of all your Latin, you fail to understand the elegant historian. You will see, *e. g.*, the very simple word “*patres*,”—the fathers. Why, of course, you never doubted that *patres* means the fathers. But unfortunately Livy seems to denote with *patres*, not the fathers in general, but the patricians, the patrician order; again, in other passages it is evident that *patres* can not mean the whole patrician order, that it must mean something else, probably the Senators. But very frequently it makes all the difference in the world whether *patres* shall be the whole patrician order or the Senators. What will you do now? Perhaps Dionysius will be of some use. But Dionysius wrote

in Greek, and he renders Latin words with Greek terms; his text can not always be taken as a decisive proof for one or another opinion. You will find, perhaps, some allusion in Cicero or Tacitus or Polybius. And very frequently you do find—but unhappily Cicero contradicts Tacitus, and Tacitus deviates from Polybius. And so you are forced to take refuge to an hypothesis. An hypothesis is by no means opposed to a fact; I mean hypothesis and facts are not opposites. There is no such thing as noticing a fact without at the same time using an hypothesis. I know in common life we say: that is a fact, in contradistinction to: that is a mere hypothesis. But that is only a habit of talking. In reality, all our thinking goes by hypothesis, and he is the great thinker who strikes the right hypothesis—but none of us can do without a hypothesis. And thus, applying this to our question at issue: In trying to explain a Roman institution I shall frequently, nay, continually use an hypothesis; that is to say, an assumption. Sometimes this assumption will be taken from Niebuhr, at other times from Mommsen, or Huschke, or Rubino; I shall always carefully state my source. Sometimes I shall use an hypothesis of my own. And therefore, you need not wonder that I frequently differ from what is usually being taught in Roman history. For, to say nothing of some other points, one of my most fundamental principles is this: The ancient Romans were neither savages nor barbarians nor a quaint, weird, or odd people. They were just as we are; they felt, they thought, they suffered just as we feel and think and suffer. This very simple remark has been lost sight of by the overwhelming majority of historians. It is incredible what amount of learning is wasted in consequence of the neglect of this simple remark. A man of such extraordinary power of mind as Thomas Buckle spoke of the Romans as a rude, half-barbarian people, because, he said, they were grossly

unjust to women, because they held them under constant tutelage; because women were no more than the slaves of their haughty husbands or fathers. Well, I can not deny that women in Rome, as far as law is concerned, were treated like children, and like naughty children, too.

The Roman jurists have very unkind words for the *imbecillitas sexus*, for the frailty of women as they call it, they place women in the position of wards, of minors. But does that prove that the Romans were barbarians? I know that many persons, more especially many lady historians boldly assert, that the degree of civilization may be measured by the kind treatment and high social position of women. The more women are being respected the higher civilization has developed. But if that would in reality be the case then we must award the prize to the ancient Germans, clad in bear-skins and living in the forest of Thuringia or Hesse, for their people held its women in the very highest esteem. A woman was considered a half-divine being and instead of giving a dowery to her future husband she was the recipient of an ample marriage present. At least such is the record of their virtues in the well-known book of Tacitus *de Moribus Germaniæ*.

On the other hand, American law is extremely severe, if not more, on women. American law seems to follow the exclamation of Hamlet: "Frailty, thy name is woman!" the very word of the Roman jurists. It will be interesting to hear the statements of one of the great jurists of this country.

"But, when a woman marries, we call her condition *coverture*, and speak of her as a *feme covert*. The old writers call the husband *baron*, and sometimes, in plain English, *lord*. In fact, the scene is now entirely changed. The merging of her name in that of her husband is emblematic of the fate of all her legal rights. The theory is

that marriage makes the husband and wife one person, and that person is the husband. He is the substantive and she the adjective. In a word, there is scarcely a legal act of any description which she is competent to perform. The common reason assigned for this legal disfranchisement of the wife is, that there may be an indissoluble union of interests between the parties. In other words, lest the wife might be sometimes tempted to assert rights in opposition to her husband, the law humanely divests her of rights. For the arguments by which this doctrine is vindicated, I must refer you to the books. It is my province to state what the law is, and not to justify it."

Can anything be more degrading, more severe than those legal expressions? Can anything detract more of the dignity and high position of women than these scathing words of the common law of America? Well, then, but do these legal forms interfere any with the real position of women in America? Do not women enjoy all social and domestic privileges, are they not respected and esteemed by everybody? Most assuredly. Here the inference from legal statements to social privileges is imbecile and worthless.

The Roman jurists may have clothed their legal theorems in language ever so repulsive to the ear of a woman—these theorems referred only to law; they had scarcely any bearing on social life. The Roman matrons enjoyed the same social privileges as the American lady. And thus it is simply ludicrous to term the Romans as barbarians because their lawyers use harsh words as to the mere legal standing of women, the very harsh words that you will find in American and English law books.

But to recur to my point. Our sources about Rome are of a very precarious character and the chief reason of this is, that they have all been written many centuries after the foundation of Rome. The oldest extant latin

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inscriptions date from the third century before our era, whereas the foundation of Rome goes back to the eighth century before our era. The great historian of ancient Rome, Livy wrote in the time of Augustus, that is to say 800 years after the foundation of Rome, and Diogenes about the same time. But in spite of this lack of direct sources of coeval writers, we can fairly judge of the first centuries of Rome by what we see and observe in later centuries. For that is one of the most remarkable features of Roman history. It is throughout the whole of its development of one and the same cast, it barely alters its external appearance. In usual books you will find that the history of Rome comprises three great periods: the times of the kings (from 757—510 B. C.), the times of the Republic (510 till August) and the times of the Emperors till the fall of Roman empire. But this division of Roman history is extremely superficial. The so-called kings of Rome were not kings, nor was the so-called Republic a Republic, nor were the emperors anything like modern emperors. It is absolutely wrong to translate *rex*, the latin word for the dignity of Romulus or Tullus Hostilius, with our English king.

Romulus was no king, nor was Tullus Hostilius, nor Servius Tullius either; they were one of the chief magistracies of the Roman commonwealth. I say one, for there were other magistracies and the only difference was this, that they were elected for life-time. In 510 B. C., when the so-called Republic was founded, there was no visible change being introduced—everything remained as it had been before. This can be proved very easily by the decisive fact that the very soul of the Roman constitution, I mean their *comitia centuriata* and *tributa*, their legislature, was not a product of republican, but of regal Rome, it was established by *rex Servius Tullius* and was kept up for eight or nine centuries. You will find in

Livy very elaborate speeches on the difference between regal and republican institutions—but these speeches do not reflect the spirit of the first three or four centuries of Rome, they are the meditations of a Roman of the time of Augustus. In modern times we have the very same thing with France. France is universally called a Republic. But France is no more of a republic than the United States are of a monarchy. In France everything is being disposed of at top head-quarters. The people of France does not elect its judges, nor does it elect its sheriffs or auditors, or county-commissioners, or school-boards, or provincial governors. All these officials have to be appointed and for life-time by the ministers in Paris.

The clergy in France gets its pay from the state treasury—there are no private school congregations, there is no democratic influence whatever. The only right of the people at large is the right of electing the members of the Legislature. So that in reality there is no essential difference whatever between republican France and monarchial Germany, except the name of the head of the country, the head in France being called a President, and in Germany an Emperor. If ever France should reinstate one of the many monarchial pretenders, no great change would have to take place. Only instead of Monsieur le President the head of the old machinery would be addressed *La Majesté l'Empereur*. That may account, by the way, for the remarkable fact that in France changes of government can be so easily effected—in the course of less than 100 years France has been four times a republic, twice an empire, and twice a kingdom.

The ancient Roman Republic had a democratical basis; that is perfectly true, but in point of law, of theory only. In reality it was very far from a democracy, and hence the difference from the regal period was very slight. I shall discuss all the points later on in my other lectures on

Rome. At present I want only to state the historical fact, that there are only two great periods in the development of Roman civilization: (1.) The time previous to the Emperors, and (2), the times of the Emperors. Both of these periods are essentially of the same character, the foundation of all that is great in imperial Rome, having been laid down in the first five or six centuries B. C. I say they are of essentially the same character, and that refers more especially to the morals of the periods. It is one of the best cherished propositions of almost all historians to extol the virtue of Republican Rome, and to decry the vices of Imperial Rome. At the time of the Republic, it is constantly said, everything was glorious; women were chaste, men were gallant, modest, virtuous, self-sacrificing. In the times of the Emperors women were degraded by all descriptions of base debauchery, and men were rakes, profligate sinners, addicted to the meanest vices—to falsehood, to abject greediness—in one word the world at that time was plunged in the pool of heathen immorality. Such is the general opinion; such are the declarations that you will meet in hundreds of celebrated books on the history of Rome; in books of scholars as well as in books of theologians, romancers, politicians and philosophers. Now, ladies and gentlemen, I beg you most fervently, do me this one favor and don't believe their statement. There is no more real basis for these horrible statements than the breadth of a hair. For take, *e. g.*, the well known book of Professor Friedlander, of Königsberg, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Rom's*. This book has been translated into ten different languages, and it is considered one of the leading authorities on the history of Roman civilization. There you will find the most shocking stories about the vicious private life of the Roman ladies and gentlemen of the time of Tiberius, or Nero, or Domitianus. Stories there are that will make your blood curdle.

You never believed that such things were possible. You never believed, and perhaps you never will prevail on yourself to believe, that a whole people (please mark the point—a whole people, not a few outlawed individuals), that a whole people was stained with the ineffaceable blots of such abominable vices. But the Professor quotes his authorities; he seems to proffer adequate evidence for his statements. Under the line there swarm a couple of names of Latin authors. Very well, but who are these authors? Who are these trustworthy authorities? Martial, a professional epigrammatist; Juvenal, a professional satirist; Propertius, a moody, sickly poet; Tacitus, a baffled statesman. Are these the jurors whose verdict shall be sufficient to condemn a whole nation? Can these writers be considered as entirely free from prejudice, as unbiased, as unprepossessed? To write a funny line: to make his reputation as epigrammatist, a humorist will sacrifice his own sister. To give the requisite finish to his powerful satire, a satirist will use colors of the darkest black, and the most stirring sombre. Shall we judge England of the Eighteenth Century by the satires of Alexander Pope or Johnson? Shall we judge Science by humoristic pictures of Mark Twain or by Peck's bad boy? Shall we judge the characters of Republicans by the slander of Democrats, and *vice versa*? Shall an epigram of Martial be sufficient to charge the noble ladies of Rome with all kinds of unutterable aberrations? Nonsense! Martial and Juvenal and Propertius wrote very good poetry, but very bad history. Or to examine another of the professors' arguments:

The Romans had no newspapers. That is to say, newspapers at that time were so poorly developed, that we may fairly say that they scarcely had any at all. Hence the walls of public bridges, tombs, columns and the like were used as a means to give publicity to things that could

not reach the general public in any other way. Consequently the tombs of a city in Italy were covered all over with all kinds of inscriptions. The houses in Pompeii, a majority of which is still extant, show numberless inscriptions of all kinds, *grafitti*, as they have been called by Italian scholars. These *grafitti* and similar inscriptions touch upon every subject of Roman life. They disclose the most intimate record of private life, they speak of love and hatred, of jealousy, of adventures, of noted events, of everything. In short, those inscriptions made up for our newspapers. But this being their real character, will any sensible man build a solid edifice of thought on mere newspaper reports? Is one of those *grafitti* wantonly scrawled by some jubilant lad a sober argument for an historian? Can such sources be used as a foundation for those crushing charges of immorality that have been so lavishly heaped on the classical heads of the imperial Romans? Nonsense.

I say again, the imperial Roman, the Roman of the time of Trajan, Titus and even of Domitian was just as good and as bad as the Roman of the time of Camillus or Regulus. Those exceptional monsters like Nero or Heliogabalus are so exceptional that they only serve to corroborate the rule. I shall enlarge on this main question to a very considerable extent in another of my lectures, for it has a most powerful bearing on a third great question. At present, these observations serve only to illustrate those fundamental principles of Roman history without which there is no real knowledge of this history. You must first take a right view of the whole subject, you must first place yourself in the adequate angle, on the appropriate stand-point, and then you may read Livy or Dionysius or Polybius, or any of the modern scholars. Some of these principles I have so far mentioned. I spoke of the unification of all Roman civilization in one single

city, further on of the general character of the Roman people as to morals and of the uniform cast of all Roman history. But there is still another fundamental principle, or rather one general fact, which has to be carefully defined and discussed before approaching the details of Roman civilization. And a powerful fact it is; a most powerful fact, pervading the whole frame of Rome, its political as well as its social institutions, its military as well as its religious organization. I spoke of this general fact when treating of Greece. I tried to give a graphic description of its far-reaching influence—but such is the enormous weight of this one fact that I must again and again recur to a close discussion of it and delineate the working of it as plastically as possible. I mean the general fact that Rome was a city, and not a land, a country, a far-spread territory. In fact even in those times, when the Roman Empire comprised immense stretches of land, when it consisted of Lusitania and Hispania, Gallia, Britannia, Belgica, Rhetia, Noricum, Italia, Illyria, Achaia, Macedonia, Thracia, Asia Minor, Syria, Assyria, Egypt, Lybia and Mauritania, even at that time there was practically nothing else but the city of Rome. Take *e. g.* the enormous Union of North America. There are large, rich and powerful cities in the United States. But they cannot confer a special citizenship of their own. You cannot be the recipient of the freedom of New York, or Chicago, or Cincinnati. There is only one citizenship in this country, a citizenship that has nothing to do with a city, the citizen in this country being a citizen of the United States, and not a citizen of a city. There is no such thing as state-citizenship in America, much less is there a citizenship. There is only one national citizenship. In Europe, on the other hand, there is a national citizenship and a city-citizenship. In ancient Rome, however, there was only a city-citizenship and no national or

state or citizenship. When a man from Bythinia or Palestine, say *c. g.* when Josephus, the well known historian, was made a citizen of Rome, he was not made a citizen of the Roman Empire, as we speak of a citizen of the United States, but he was made a citizen of Rome, of the city of Rome, a *civis Romanus*, as it were a citizen of New York city, instead of a citizen of the United States. This is a most momentous point. In fact it is THE point in all classical antiquity.

If I should be called upon to point out the difference between Greek and Roman civilization and mediæval or modern civilization within the compass of a few words, I would simply say: The civilization of the Greeks and Romans was the civilization of a people living in cities exclusively; mediæval and modern Europe again is chiefly a civilization of a people living both in cities and in the country, in villages, hamlets, castles, in marks, in septs, etc., etc.

The United States of America display the civilization of a city-people. The number of farmers living in the country does not alter this statement. They are city people, they dress like city people, they live like city people, more than that they think like city people, they are not, like the country population of Europe, essentially different from the population of the cities. And therefore it is that the civilization of the United States has so many features similar to and identical with the classical antiquity of the Greeks and Romans. That is one of the many reasons why a study of these classical peoples offers such intense interest to every citizen of this Republic. A considerable part of those questions that are being agitated in our daily papers have been also the subject-matter of discussion in Rome. They had before them the vexed question of the board system, of responsibility to the people or subordination under a higher official, the selection or

appointment of judges, the question of sumptuary laws, of homestead laws, and so forth.

I shall carefully discuss all these points, constantly comparing them to modern institutions, for it is only by such comparisons that one can be really enabled to understand those institutions. There would be one more point, one more general fact in Roman history that ought to be considered and discussed before entering into the details of our subject. But I am sorry to say that I don't know anything valuable on this remarkable point. This, my ignorance, is due not to my laziness, for I took very great trouble to gather some information on this point. It is due to the ignorance of my authorities. I mean that general fact, the unrivalled superiority of the Roman army. Why it was that the army of this one city was, on the whole, next to invincible, I know not. It could not have been a greater share of personal bravery, because the Samnites or the Marsi or Umbri or Piceni were equally brave. There must be some other reason for this fact, a military ground—but I am sorry to say that nobody, so far, has investigated this very important question, and thus I can only state the startling fact that the Romans, although they have been defeated number of times, have, on the whole, proved invincible. But I can not explain this fact. In my discussions of the institutions of Rome I shall, more or less, proceed chronologically; that is to say, I shall treat first of the more ancient times and then of the more recent times of Roman history. But such a chronological treatment of institutions is by no means a necessity. It is incumbent upon the annalist, or the chronicler to arrange his tales according to the sequel of years. The real historian cares only for the causes of events, and those causes sometimes originate in very different ages. First—The most ancient history of Rome. We read of it in the beau-

tiful poem of Vergil, in the charming description of Livy and in Dionysius. There we hear of Æneas, who, on his escape from Troja and from the love of Dido, reached the shores of Latium and became king of the country. We read the stories about Romulus and Remus, their miraculous nurse, the foundation of Rome, the murder of Remus, the sole reign of Romulus, the rape of the Sabinian women and the sudden death of Romulus. We read of the wise and pious Numa, of the ferocious Tullus Hortilus, of the prudent Ancus Martius. We read of petty feuds with the peoples of the neighboring towns, with the Cæninians, with the Fidenates, with the Albans. All these beautiful, sometimes touching stories, have been handed down century after century to the eager ear of innocent believers, and it was a perfect sensation when some scholars first began to doubt the credibility of those stories. It was Giovanni Battista Vico, an Italian, and Beaufort, a Frenchman, who first expressed some doubts about the trustworthiness of these tales, but it is the immortal merit of Niebuhr, a German scholar, to have furnished irrefutable proof of the purely mythical character of these ancient records. He has proved, and to the present day it has been universally accepted, that the tales about Æneas and his Trojan followers, about Evander and his Arcadians deserve no place in real history. Nor are the first four kings of Rome, that is to say, Romulus, Numa P., Tullus Hostilius and Ancus Martius real historical persons. They may have lived, but for all that we know about them we are not entitled to say that they did live. We have far better information about the three last kings, about Tarquinius Pr., Servius Tullius, and Tarquinius Superbus. They undoubtedly did live; they were reges, or, as we say, kings of Rome, and most probably either Etruscans or of Etruscan origin, for the very name, Tarquin, is pure Etruscan. But although the main pillars of Niebuhr's

structure have outlived all later attacks, there is still one point of considerable importance where he was mistaken. Niebuhr taught that those stories about Æneas, Numitor, Acca Larentia, Romulus and Remus, etc., were derived from popular ballads, orally delivered from one generation to the other. But Sir Cornwall Lewis succeeded in completely refuting that theory. He showed that even in the ninth and tenth centuries B. C. the people in Italy possessed more of a judicial and critical spirit than was surmised by Niebuhr, and the modern discoveries in Italy as well as in Greece have shown it beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the civilization of the different people in Italy is of a very old date. In the times of the mythical Romulus, Latium or the central part of Italy was inhabited by a homogeneous people.

The stories about Rome having been an asylum for outlaws, a refuge for the scum of other cities is devoid of all credibility. This story is on a par with the idea that the latin language is a mongrel language, a compound idiom of Oscan, Sabellian, Etruscan and other languages. But this theory has been absolutely discarded; we know now the language of Latium as well as the people itself were of a uniform cast, of a separate origin.

The origin of the city of Rome, or as Ennius called it, *Roma quadrata*, must have taken place in the ninth century B. C. There are still preserved few remains of the colossal walls of that ancient city and they show their venerable age by the whole character of their workmanship. Livy and Dionysius talk very much of three tribes which are supposed to have been the chief constituent elements of the Roman people. The names of the tribes are: Ramnes, Tities and Luceres. Our information on these tribes is very scanty, but in the works of German scholars you will find interminable discussions on the character, constitution and influence of the three tribes.

Puchta, one of the great luminaries of German book lore, will tell you that the Ramnes were the originators of the *jus civile*, of the common law of Rome, and that the Tities being of Sabine origin, were the originators of what an English jurist would call the law of Equity. Another great scholar, Goettling, will closely follow up the influence of Etruscan, Sabinian or Albanian race-qualities.

Some of the institutions of Rome, say *e. g.*, the *arval fratres*, he will deduce from the Sabinian race-quality; others again say the *jus fetiale*, what at present would be called, the international law, he will promptly deduce from Etruscan race-qualities. But by which authority, by which original inscription, or authentic document he was induced to launch such daring statements, I know not. It suits his taste, and that's all. Very naturally then, Mommsen who happens to differ in taste from Goettling or Puchta, will ascribe to Etruscan race-qualities what Goettling chose to attribute to Sabinian influences.

You will find a similar thing in this country. The fathers of this republic and more especially those great and good men who worded the Constitution of the United States were undoubtedly under the influence of those revolutionary ideas that had been propogated by the French encyclopædists, by Helvetius, Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau and so forth. The truth of this fact can not be doubted. But does this alone suffice to prove that the constitution of this country is mainly French? By no means. The constitution of this country was a growth of this country, its concordance with some idea of French philosophy serves only to prove that both the Americans as well as the Frenchmen had the same ideas. No more. And that is the very same case with the Romans.

No doubt the Romans had some institutions that resembled Etruscan or Sabinian institutions. It is very proba-

ble *e. g.* that the whole mysterious art of the Haruspices, was identical with the corresponding art of Etruscan state wizards. But this fact alone does not prove that the Roman augurs and haruspices borrowed their lore from the Etruscan.

The act of accepting customs of another people is not a mere mechanical act; it is not like the taking of a piece of wood or money. It is an internal taking, an organic acceptance, and if the thing to be taken is not perfectly fit and adapted to the state of the recipient nation, the whole act falls flat, the nation will never assimilate the boon. On the other hand a nation always knows how to provide for its wants; it is under no necessity of asking the advice of another nation. Supposing Jefferson or Madison had never heard of the French encyclopædists, do you think that the constitution of the United States would have turned out the less wise for it? By no means.

The wants of a nation always elicit the fitting vehicles. And thus we must accustom ourselves to look upon Rome as a uniform, original community. The Romans worked out their civilization aided by none, attacked by everybody. There was no race-difference among them. And this applies chiefly to the well-known contrast between the patrician and the plebeji. On this one question: who and what were the plebeji—whole libraries have been written. Ever since the time of Servius Tullius we constantly read of the contests between the patricii and plebeji—the whole inner history of Rome is made up by the record of these contests—contests that have never been bloody, although sometimes the fiercest passions were roused on both sides. But in vain do we look in Livy, or Dionysius, or Polybius for an explicit statement of the nature of these plebeji. Were they foreign immigrants? or peasants in bondage? or freeholders? or commons? or clients? It is incredible how many different theories

have been started to answer these questions. I shall mention the theory of Niebuhr, because it has wide acceptance among historians, and because it will serve best to prove my point. Niebuhr says that the Plebeians were altogether a different race from the patricians and therefore the patricians looked down upon them, refusing them the rights of full citizenship. Here we have it again. How frequently in the course of my lectures had I to complain of that childish endeavor to settle everything by a mere reference to race-qualities. Here is again one of those examples. Being at a loss how to account for the undeniable difference between patrician and plebeians Niebuhr takes recourse to that *deus ex machina* to race-qualities. The Patrician being of a different race must needs be hostile towards the Plebeian. At least this is the theory of Niebuhr. But where is the cogency of this argument? Does one race invariably hate another race? Is there no such thing as amicable intercourse between races? Or, to reverse the argument, have not people been subjected by members of their own race? Is the nobility in Germany different in race from the peasantry in Germany? Or did the lords in England differ in race from the villains of mediæval England? Not in the least. It is, therefore, entirely unnecessary to suppose that enmities between two sets of people require a difference in race. Most certainly there was an enmity between the patricii and plebeji in Rome, and, no doubt, the patricians considered themselves the nobler ones, the better ones—to the present day the word plebeian has a by-taste of something inferior, something mean. But such word-meanings are of no value whatever for the historian. They are only the expression of hatred, and hatred is injudicious. The fact is that in almost all cities of Europe do we find these two sets of people, the commoners, as it were, and the nobles, the Buerger and the Herrenleute

we had the same case in Greece, in Athens the noblemen were called the eupatridæ; in Sparta the plebeians were called the periokoi, likeursi in Sicyn, in Argos. It is very difficult for an American to represent to himself such an artificial difference among citizens of the same state, of the same city. But such a difference is the rule in all history. In all countries, in all states there have been two or three different classes of people—one nobler, more powerful, richer—the other poorer and less influential. The American order of things, I mean the fact that all citizens enjoy the same amount of privileges, the same number of rights, is altogether an exception.

The word "republic" need not deceive us. The ancient republics were thoroughly aristocratic, and so are all European republics. In Switzerland, *e. g.*, there is a powerful clan of patrician burghers, and no trace of the American right of equality. In Rome the patricians were the real representatives of the State, they possessed all power, all influence, and, as we will see later on, the patricians were the real law-givers of the State. There is only one explanation for these two elements of the Roman State. The patricians were the original inhabitants of the city of Rome; a city at that time, as I have proved in my previous lectures, was the only place of refuge. A man had to live in a city, or else he was exposed to the ransacking raids of all neighboring townsmen. But when new-comers wanted to be received into the protecting precincts of the city of Rome they had to be content with a smaller share of political rights. The older inhabitants of Rome were unwilling to divide their rights with strangers, and these strangers again had no other chance for living in peace or under an efficient protection. If the older inhabitants of an American city should claim similar prerogatives, the younger inhabitants would simply leave the city and repair to another place—there is free

elbow-room in this country for millions of people. But that was not the case in ancient Italy. As far as our records reach we always hear of numberless cities and towns. There must have been at least five hundred different towns in Italy as early as the Twelfth Century B. C. This being the state of things, the rise of two or three orders of people in one and the same town, one the superior, the other the inferior, is nothing but a mere matter of course. I know very well that in Germany such an hypothesis will be received with great reluctance. For in Germany there is an established custom to prove everything by explicit statements of Roman or Greek writers.

I mean to say, when somebody tries to explain an historical fact by means of a conjecture or an assumption, German scholars will demand clear and unequivocal passages of Latin or Greek authors, by which the said assumption shall be fully borne out. But such a demand is utterly unjust; more than that, it is absolutely wrong. For the Latin authors did not even think of many a question as to their own history, which will arouse our most intense curiosity.

A people seldom meditates on its own institutions; and even if that should be the case, the members of this people will seldom inquire into the causes of habitual events. Say, *e. g.*, I dare say that no American ever made it a point of his meditations to inquire into the causes of that general habit of Americans—of chewing tobacco. An American will settle the whole question by saying: "That is a habit," perhaps he will add, "a nasty habit," or he will retort by asking, "Why do people smoke?"

On the other hand, a foreigner will be perfectly amazed at the habit; he will try to find the causes of this habit; to account for it in some satisfactory way, but the ordinary explanation of this fact, namely, that it is a mere habit, he

will discard entirely. Now this is exactly the case with a great many questions of Roman institutions. The Romans themselves never inquired into the ultimate causes of their institutions, or if they did so they ascribed them to their own wisdom; to their own genius. That is, of course, the pleasantest way to account for institutions.

Livy continually speaks of the plebeians and patricians, but it never occurs to him to inquire into the causes of these two orders. He takes it for granted that two such things exist; that they form the elements of the Roman State, and that their contests are the main part of the development of the State. He never accounts for the existence of these two orders; he never thought of accounting for it. Nor did Dionysius, Polybius or Tacitus. It is only the foreigner, I mean the modern investigator, who feels reluctant to take all these things for granted; who feels highly astonished at them.

It was Plato who said, that to be astonished is the beginning of knowledge. It will be, therefore, self-evident that no direct and explicit passages of Roman authors can be adduced in support of my hypothesis. But does this detract any from the value of the hypothesis? Not in the least. With respect to such direct and explicit passages a great American author, Mr. Lewis Morgan, holds the same position. I spoke of the late Mr. Morgan in the very first of my lectures. I said that he did very considerable service to real history, that he succeeded in laying down the foundation of the history of our institution of the family.

In connection with this one institution he made very extensive inquiries into the origin of the gens. Gens is a Roman, a Latin word, and originally means a Roman institution. The Roman patrician families were grouped in several gentes, so that one gens comprised 10 to 15, sometimes fifty different families. All the families had a com-

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mon name, the *nomen gentilicium*, thus *e. g.* the *nomen gentilicium* of Cicero was *Tullius*; the *nomen gentilicium* of Cæsar was *Julius*.

The members of a *gens* were held together by bonds of law as well as of blood. They had to pay ransom for each other, they had to join in common worship, they had to give contributions to the dowry of their daughters, they were entitled to some hereditary rights, and to the right of guardians, and to be buried in a common burial-place. The whole *gens* consisted of *agnates* only. This word means kin by male only. No kin by female, say *e. g.*, the maternal uncle, or maternal grandfather or his sons and daughters would be members of the *gens*.

The *gens*, the origin, the purport and decay of the *gens* is one of the most difficult questions of Roman history. In the Roman writers we find little information on this point. It never occurred to them to investigate the causes of this institution, they took it simply for granted that a patrician, and later also, a plebeian besides belonging to his natural family, I mean to his father and to his mother, belonged also to an artificial family, to the *gens*. Cicero speaks of it and so does Gellius and some of the Jurists. But they never think of giving an historical statement of the origin of this institution. To modern inquirers, however, a *gens* is a very miraculous thing. In fact we can scarcely understand why my maternal grandfather should be less of a relative than my paternal grandfather. We fail to understand why I, instead of using the family name of my father, should bear the name of distant relatives; why a remote cousin should possess more rights and privileges than the brother of my own mother.

• Accordingly, modern inquirers attempted to solve the riddle and account for this institution. But these modern inquirers looked for explanatory passages in Roman and

Greek authors; they changed the text, they twisted and distorted the meaning of the words, all in vain. At last, Mr. Morgan found some clue to the riddle. He did not attack this problem in a direct way, he first studied the tribal relations of the American red Indians, and he came to the conclusion that the gens was not a peculiar institution of the Roman or Italian tribes, but that it was in every part of the globe one of the original institutions of mankind. Hence, he said that a study of the Iroquois gens *e. g.* may help us to a better understanding of the Roman gens.

Mr. Morgan enlarged our knowledge of the Roman gens with one remarkable feature: he proved by conclusion and analogies with the gentes of other nations, that the members of the Roman gens were prohibited to intermarry with females of the same gens.

In conclusion I am going to give you the opinion of Mr. Morgan on the origin of this institution.


“Whether the gens originates spontaneously in a given condition of society, and would thus repeat itself in disconnected areas; or whether it had a single origin, and was propagated from an original center, through successive migrations, over the earth’s surface, are fair questions for speculative consideration. The latter hypothesis, with a simple modification, seems to be the better one, for the following reasons: We find that two forms of marriage, and two forms of the family preceded the institution of the gens. It required a peculiar experience to attain to the second form of marriage and of the family, and to supplement this experience by the invention of the gens.

This second form of the family was the final result, through natural selection, of the reduction within narrower limits of a stupendous conjugal system which enfolded savage man and held him with a powerful grasp. His final deliverance was too remarkable and too improbable,

as it would seem, to be repeated many different times, and in widely separated areas.

Groups of consanguinei, united for protection and subsistence, doubtless, existed from the infancy of the human family; but the gens is a very different body of kindred. It takes a part and excludes the remainder; it organized this part on the bond of kin, under a common name, and with common rights and privileges. Intermarriage in the gens was prohibited to secure the benefits of marrying out with unrelated persons. This was a vital principle of the organism as well as one most difficult of establishment. Instead of a natural and obvious conception, the gens was essentially abstruse; and, as such, a product of high intelligence for the times in which it originated. It required long periods of time, after the idea was developed into life, to bring it to maturity with its uses evolved. The Polynesians had this punaluan family, but failed of inventing the gens; the Australians had the same form of the family and possessed the gens. It originates in the punaluan family, and whatever tribes had attained to it possessed the elements out of which the gens was formed. This is the modification of the hypothesis suggested. In the prior organization, on the basis of sex, the germ of the gens existed. When the gens had become fully developed in its archaic form it would propagate itself over immense areas through the superior powers of an improved stock thus created. Its propagation is more easily explained than its institution. These considerations tend to show the improbability of its repeated reproduction in disconnected areas. On the other hand, its beneficial effects in producing a stock of savages superior to any then existing upon the earth must be admitted. When migrations were flights under the law of savage life, or movements in quest of better areas, such a stock would spread in wave after wave until it covered the larger part of the earth's surface. A consideration of the

principal facts now ascertained bearing upon this question seems to favor the hypothesis of a single origin of the organization into gentes, unless we go back of this to the Australian classes, which gave the punaluan family out of which the gens originated, and regard these classes as the original basis of ancient society. In this event wherever the classes were established, the gens existed potentially."



ROME—LEGISLATURE—SENATE— SLAVERY.

Mommsen, and *Marquardt*, Roem. Alterth. *L. Lange*, Roem. Alterth. *Madvig*, Verfassung und Verwaltg b. R. St. *Duruy*, Hist. des Rom. *Genz.* Patric. Rom. *Grotefend*, Imperium Rom. tributim descriptum. *Mommsen*, Forschungen. *Willems*, Le Sénat de la Rép. Rom. *Long*, Decl. and Fall of the Rom. Rep. *Dureau, de la Malle*, Econom. politique des Rom. *Caquéray*, L'esclavage chez les Rom. *Wallon*, Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'Antiquité. *Pignori*, De Servis Rom. *Popma*, de Servis Rom. *Blair*, Inquiry into the State of Slavery among the Romans.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

The subject of our present lecture will be the discussion of three great institutions of the Roman people : the Legislature, the Senate, and Slavery. These three institutions lie at the very bottom of the whole edifice of Roman greatness.

First, as to the Legislature in Rome. It is very easy to give a proper definition of the Roman Legislature ; but I must confess it is rather difficult to understand the definition properly. The Legislature in Rome was the power to pass laws. But law in Rome had a special meaning of its own. I say of its own, and I may add that very few nations ever attained to that peculiar conception of law which forms the characteristic feature of a Roman lex, of a Roman law. Very few nations have law in the sense of the Roman lex, and very few nations ever had an institution similar to the Roman Legislature.

There is a vast difference between the modes of creating or passing laws in Greece, in Israel, in Rome, in modern Germany, England or America. The very inmost soul of a nation's character manifests itself in the form and nature of its legislature. The ancient Hebrew, *e. g.*, as I have tried to show in my lecture on this interesting people, the ancient Hebrews had no human legislature at all. No

municipal corporation, no town, no section of the people, nay, not even the whole people, the assembly of all Hebrews had the power of passing a stringent ordinance, a law—for the laws of the country had been settled and laid down, once forever, by him who never changes, and whose laws stand in no need of alteration or correction. The Greeks had a legislature; every citizen was expected to vote on the bills submitted to the general assembly, to the ecclesia. But the bill thus voted upon was far from being a binding law; it had to be first subjected to the approval of a board of *nomothetæ*, of law-revisors, and thus not the people, not the electors were the real originators of laws, but the board of *nomothetæ*.

In modern Europe the power of legislature is divided between three, in some European countries between four and five different elements, organs of the State. In the United States of America the power of making and un-making laws in the different states is divided between three factors: 1.—The State legislature, that can make a law. 2.—The supreme court of the State, that can un-make it. 3.—The United States supreme court, that can override the decision of the supreme court of the state. Nor is there any such thing as a power of making or un-making laws in any of the Mohammedan countries. The wildest and most cruelly absolutistic emir or sultan in Afghanistan or Beluchistan, or any of the independent rajahs in India, although he frequently slaughters his subjects with impunity and without rousing the rebellious indignation of his submissive people—even the most atrocious tyrant would never dare to pass new laws as to the transfer of property or as to the validity of contracts. A member of a civilized country will heartily accept new laws provided by said new circumstances; the members of what we are pleased to call uncivilized people would most vehemently resent any innovation in their laws, in their customs.

In the most enlightened law-school of Kairo or Bagdad (and the Mahommedans have a wonderfully developed science of law) the teachers have no idea of a legislature. This idea of a legislature is therefore exclusively Roman. The Romans alone carried out the idea that the will of the people shall be law. They alone shaped this idea in a perfectly adequate form. There was no interference whatsoever. No board of law-revisors, no correcting supreme court, no vetoing presidents, no controlling queens or Kaisers—nothing of the kind. The people having been duly convoked, the bill having been duly voted upon—the effect was an absolute, a binding law—and only the people itself could alter it, could repeal it. An ordinance of such a character, of such an origin was called a *lex*. *Lex est, said the Romans, quod populus jubet.* And accordingly all offices, at least the important ones, all regulations, all criminal decisions originated with the legislature. The most republican American will consider it perfectly appropriate that generals, colonels, in short, that military dignitaries should be created by appointment and not by popular election. But the great generals of Rome, the *imperatores exercitus*, had to be elected in the legislature, in the assembly. For the assembly was everything; it was at once the state and the people. For in Rome there was no distinction between the people and the state. The seal of the State of Rome had the inscription, “*Populus Romanus Senatusque,*” and not like the seal of the State of Ohio, or any other state: “The great seal of the State of Ohio” not mentioning the people of Ohio. It was the people that was the state. But this people again was the population of one city, of the city of Rome. In modern times city and state are two different things, and consequently the difficulties of municipal administration do not add to the complications of state government. But in Rome these two organizations were united into one—the city was

the state and the state was the city, or rather the population of the city. It is self-evident that there can scarcely be a more perilous state of affairs. If the population of a city can dispose of laws and regulations uncontrolled by any other check or power, if by a majority of votes any scheme can be carried into ultimate effect, if the poorer voters—always the majority—can by a simple vote undo any arrangement of order, of property, of wealth, then we have reached the worst state of anarchy, then such a city-state is nothing else but the den of outlawed robbers.

The Romans were well aware of this imminent danger. On the one hand they had the principle of *lex est quod populus jubet*—the commandment of the people is law—on the other hand they did not want and in fact could not deprive their citizens of the right of voting, so that practically the poorer classes would have exercised the same influence on the creation of laws as the richer ones, nay, a greater influence, for the poorer classes always are in the majority. To save the principle of general suffrage and to play it out at the same time, that was the great problem, and the Romans solved it most excellently. They said: "Every Roman citizen has the right of voting, most certainly. We would not deprive him of this precious right for anything in the world. He shall have it."

There shall be no difference between the rich members of the community and the poorer ones. With this limitation, however, the richer members shall vote first, then the poorer citizens. But this one limitation practically annulled the right of suffrage of the poorer classes.

But in order to understand the bearing of this one limitation we must first represent to ourselves the inner structure of the Roman Legislature. The Roman name for legislature is *comitia*. This word means convention, the convention of voters.

In Rome there were three *comitia*: the *comitia curiata*,

the comitia centuriata, the comitia tributa. In the centuries previous to Servius Tullius, the comitia curiata were the legislature of Rome; for the next three or four centuries the comitia centuriata were the legislature of Rome, the comitia tributa being simple ward-conventions of the several districts (tribes) of Rome, and finally, the comitia tributa were blended into the comitia centuria, thus forming the legislative factor of Rome.

Of the emperors as lawgivers, I shall speak in my next lecture.

Of the oldest comitia, the comitia curiata, I shall not treat at all; they are of great interest to the professional scholar, but of very little moment for the general intelligent public. It is the comitia centuriata, and then the comitia tributa which I am about to describe.

The Roman people was conceived as an army, and was therefore divided into two parts—the cavalry (equites), and infantry (pedites). They did vote sometimes assembled in arms. The cavalry was divided into eighteen centuries; the infantry was divided into five classes, or as Dionysius has it, into six classes, for he regards the whole body of people, whose property did not come up to the census of the fifth class as a sixth.

The members of the first class had to be the owners of property worth 100,000 asses; those of the second class of 75,000 asses; those of the third class 50,000; those of the fourth class 25,000 asses; those of the fifth 11,000 asses.

By property in this case the Romans meant chiefly landed property and slaves. Cash money was not subject to the census. By landed property again real estate in the neighborhood of Rome was meant. So that practically the few acres around the city of Rome (for a few miles off the territory of other city-states began) were the real census-property. For the purpose of voting in the comitia

each class was subdivided into a number of centuries, hundreds (*centuriæ*), one-half of which consisted of the *seniores*, and the other of the *juniores*.

There were 193 or 194 such centuries. Each century, further, was counted as one vote, so that a class had as many votes as it contained centuries. This is a point of the greatest importance. You will easily understand it when you think of the difference between presidential elections and other elections in this country. In ordinary elections in this country, the vote of every single member counts as one vote, and if there are 10,000 voters in a county, they can give 10,000 votes. But the president of this Republic is elected not by the direct vote of every American citizen, but by the three hundred and odd votes of representative electors, so that in fact, the majority of three hundred and odd votes elect the president of the United States.

Similarly, in Rome, not the direct votes of the voters decided on a bill, but all the voters together, cavalry and infantry had 193 votes, in other words all Roman voters were divided into 193 centuries, hundreds, and each century had one vote.

But that was not all. Of these 193 centuries, the first the wealthiest class had eighty-two centuries; the second, third and fourth had each twenty centuries, respectively, and the fifth class had thirty-four centuries.

Hence, if the first class with their eighty-two centuries, and the cavalry, with their eighteen centuries, who voted first, agreed among themselves, they formed a majority before the poorer classes would be called upon to vote at all. By this strategem, the right of general suffrage was caused to be inoperative and the wealthiest classes alone were the real voters.

As regards the functions of the *comitia centuriata*, they were the following ones:

1.—The election of magistrates. The magistrates that were elected by the centuries are the consuls, the prætors, the military tribunes, with consular power, the censors and the decemvirs.

2.—Legislation. When a proposal was passed by the centuries it became law. But such a proposal, or as we say such a bill could not be proposed by any member of the legislature as, *e. g.*, in American legislatures. It was brought before the centuries by the presiding magistrate; the legislature simply accepted or rejected the measure.

3.—The decision upon war.

4.—The highest judicial power. The comitia centuriata were in the first place the highest court of appeal.

The comitia centuriata could be held only on dies comitiales or fasti, on which it was lawful to transact business with the people, and the number of such days in every year was about 190. The comitia for elections took place once every year. The place where the centuries met was outside the city, the Campus Martius; this large place contained the septa, the inclosures for the voters, a tabernaculum for the president, and the villa publica for the augurs. One of the main duties devolving upon the president, and which he had to perform before holding the comitia, was to consult the auspices. He then opened the business by laying before the people the subject for the decision, upon which they had been convened and concluded his exposition with the words: "velitis jubeatis quirites?" Do you wish it? Do you command it, citizens? Voters could hold speeches in favor of or against the measure. When the subject was sufficiently discussed, the president called upon the people to prepare for voting. If the number of citizens present at the assembly was thought too small the decision might be deferred till another day, but this was rarely done, and a question was usually put to the vote, if each century was but represented by a few citizens. The

votes were given in writing. The rogatores collected the tablets, which were marked either with U, meaning the approval of the voter (*uti rogas*) or with A, meaning *antiquo*, the disapproval of the voter. These tablets were then given to the *diribitores* who classified and counted the votes and then handed them over to the *custodes*, who again checked them off by points marked on a tablet. The measure or candidate that had the most points was the victorious one. That much as to the *comitia centuriata*.

As regards the *comitia tributa* they had originally only a local power. But their influence gradually increased, for the commonalty being more numerous than the patricians and guided by active and energetic tribunes, the internal administration of the tribes gradually assumed the character of an administration of the internal affairs of the republic, while the *comitia* of the centuries were more calculated to represent the state in its relation to foreign countries.

The laws passed in these *comitia* were considered binding upon the whole people as early as the fourth century, B. C. But in course of time both the *comitia centuriata* and *tributa* were combined into one assembly. When and in what manner this change took place, none of the Roman or Greek writers mention, so that we are left to form our opinion from incidental allusions. You will find endless conjectures in Niebuhr, in Mommsen, Goettling and Zumpt; but they all fail to give a clear and satisfactory statement of this combination of the two *comitia*.

For us at present it is perfectly sufficient to notice the salient point of the Roman legislature, namely, the fact that the will of the people was ultimate law and that the wealthier classes had by far the most decisive influence in the creation of laws. So that the legislature of Rome is one more proof of the fact that the so-called Roman Republic was far from being a democratical organization.

The Senate in Rome had a unique position. It would be the very greatest mistake to compare it to or even identify it with the senate of an American state or with the Senate in Washington. The similarity in this case is restricted to the mere name of these two institutions, in everything else they differ entirely. The Senate in Rome possessed by turns all political power. It was a body of legislators, of administrators, of judges. Of course not always, not at all times. There were times when the Senate in Rome had scarcely any power at all. At other times it was the supreme leader of the whole commonwealth. The Senate in Rome did not play the part of the House of Lords in England, for the House of Lords always had a rather negative power, all important measures originating with the Commons. The Senate in Rome on the other hand was the original source of many of the most important state measures. The bills of the House of Commons in England have to be confirmed by the Lords, but the Roman comitia freed themselves very early from the power of the Senate and their bills became law without the consent of the Senate. Hence there is no similar institution in modern times, not the Senate in France, nor that in Italy. Perhaps the senates of Hamburg or Luebeck or Bremen stand nearest to the old Roman institution.

It would be simply a waste of time to speak of the Senate in the time of the kings. Our information on this point is utterly poor. In the time of the so-called Republic we see that the Senate was the rival of the assemblies and toward the end of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century the Senate was the only ruler of Rome. It was the Senate that defeated the noble Grachi, who wanted to resuscitate the antique power of the popular assemblies. But previous to that time, in the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries of Rome the Senate was the second great fundamental institution of the state. The members

of the Senate were elected by the consuls, consular tribunes, and subsequently the censors. But the power of electing senators possessed by these magistrates was by no means an arbitrary power, for the senators were always taken from among those who were equites, or whom the people had previously invested with a magistracy, so that in reality the people themselves always nominated the candidates for the senate. They were appointed for lifetime, but the censors could exclude such as they deemed unworthy. The exclusion was effected by simply passing over the names and not entering them into the lists of senators drawn up at the time of the lustrum.

The Senate gradually became an assembly representing the people, but notwithstanding this apparently popular character of the Senate it was never a popular or democratic assembly, for its members belonged to the *nobiles*, who were as aristocratic as the patricians. The candidates for the Senate were taken from both orders, from the patricians as well as from the plebeians, for all the state officers had in the course of two centuries become accessible to the plebeians. In fact the majority of senators in the second and first centuries, B. C., were plebeians, but noble plebeians, that is they were members of that peculiar nobility of Rome that founded its claim on a more dignified position, on the fact that their ancestors had been the incumbents of curule offices, and consequently possessed the *jus imaginum*, the right of placing the images of their ancestors, embossed in wax, in the porches of their houses.

It is very important to notice this two-fold nobility. The patricians were noblemen by birth, the *nobiles* by tenure of office, and consequently it was within the reach of any ambitious citizen to attain to the dignity of Roman nobility. There was no senatorial census for the members of the senate; at least not in the first seven centuries of Rome. In the times of the emperors, however, a certain wealth was

required. As regards the age at which a person might become a senator we have no express statement for the time of the Republic, although it appears to have been fixed by some custom or law. But we may by induction discover the probable age. We know that according to the *lex annalis* of the tribune Villius the age fixed for the *quæstorship* was thirty-one. Hence we may presume that the earliest age at which a man might become a senator was thirty-two. Augustus at last fixed the senatorial age at twenty-five. No senator was allowed to carry on any mercantile business. It is clear, however, from many passages in Cicero that this prohibition was frequently violated.

Regular meetings of the senate took place during the republic on the calends, nones and ides of every month extraordinary meetings might be convoked on any other day, with the exception of those which were *atri* and those on which *comitia* were held. The right of convoking the senate was during the republic transferred to the *curule magistrates*, and at last to the *tribunes* also.

If a senator did not appear on a day of meeting, he was liable to a fine for which a pledge was taken. The places where the meetings of the senate were held, were always inaugurated by the *augurs*. The most ancient place was the *Curia Hostilia*, in which alone originally a law could be made.

Afterwards, however, several temples were used for this purpose, such as the Temple of *Concordia* and others. When the *rex* or the *consul*, after consulting the pleasure of the Gods by *auspices*, had convoked the senate he opened the session with the words: *Quod bonum, faustum, felix fortunatumque sit populo Romano quiritis*, and then laid before the assembly what he had to propose. The *præsi-*dent then called upon the assembly to discuss the matter, and after the discussion was over, every member gave his vote. The majority of voters always decided a question.

The majority was either by numeratio or by discessio, that is, the president either counted the votes, or the members who were on the same side joined together, and thus separated from those who voted otherwise. This latter method of voting appears in later times to have been the usual one.

The powers of the senate, after both orders were placed upon a perfect equality were the following ones: The senate continued to have the supreme superintendence in all matters of religion, *e. g.*, the senate determined upon the acceptance of a new deity or a new cult; it determined upon the manner in which a war was to be conducted, what legions were to be placed at the disposal of a commander, and whether new ones were to be levied, it decreed into what provinces the consuls and prætors were to be sent. The commissioners who were generally sent out to settle the administration of a newly conquered country were always appointed by the senate. All embassies for the conclusion of peace or treaties with foreign states were sent out by the senate and such ambassadors were generally senators themselves and ten in number. The senate alone, carried on negotiations with foreign ambassadors, and received the complaints of subject or allied nations who always regarded the senate as the common protector. Even in Rome, the judges (*judices*) to whom the prætor referred important cases, both public and private, were taken from among the senators.

When the commonwealth was in danger the senate might confer unlimited power upon the magistrates by the formula *videant consules ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat*, which was equivalent to a declaration of martial law within the city. This general care for the internal and external welfare of the republic included the right to dispose over the finances requisite for these purposes.

Hence, all the revenue and expenditure of the republic

were under the direct administration of the senate, and the censors and questors were only its ministers or agents. All the expenses necessary for the existence of the armies required the sanction of the senate, before anything could be done, and it might even prevent the triumph of a returning general, by refusing to assign the money necessary for it.

How many members were required in order to constitute a quorum is uncertain, though it appears that there existed some regulations on this point. Finally, as to the distinctions and privileges enjoyed by Roman senators :

1. The tunica with a broad purple stripe (*latus clavus*) in front, which was woven in it, and not as is commonly believed sewed upon it.

2. A kind of short boot with the letter C on the front of the boot. The C is supposed to mean *centum* (100), and to refer to the original number of 100 senators.

3. The right of sitting in the orchestra, in the theatres, and amphitheatres.

4. On a certain day in the year a sacrifice was offered to Jupiter in the capital, and on this occasion the senators alone had a feast in the capitol.

I shall first consider the facts of slavery and then the purport, the character and the historical position of this institution.

The most fruitful sources of slavery were the continual wars of the Romans. The number of captives brought home into slavery appears sometimes incredible. The captives were divided with the spoils upon the battle-field, and each soldier provided for the slaves allotted to him. Hence it became common for the slave dealers (*mangones*) to accompany the army for the purpose of purchasing the captives. The prices at such times became very trifling, sometimes as small as four *drachmæ*, about seventy-five cents. According to Josephus 9,700 captives followed the

destruction of Jerusalem. Men of the highest rank in Rome engaged in this honorable calling, and they constituted a powerful organization. The children of slaves always followed the condition of the mother. The breeding of slaves, until the latter days of Rome was encouraged, it being cheaper to rear than to buy. There were great slave markets in Carthage, in Delos and Shios, but the center of the trade was at Rome. Slaves of peculiar beauty and rarity were kept separate and apart, and sold privately. The slaves generally were sold at auction, standing upon a stone, so that they might be closely scrutinized. Newly imported slaves had their feet whitened with chalk. Those from the East had their ears bored. All of them had a scroll (*titulus*) suspended around the neck, giving their ages, birthplace, qualities, health, etc., and the seller was held to warrant the truth of this statement. He was bound to discover all defects, especially as to health, thievishness, disposition to run away, or to commit suicide. If the seller was unwilling to warrant, instead of the *titulus*, he placed a cap (*pileus*) upon the head of the slave. A crown upon the head indicated a captive taken in war. The seller would cause the slave to run, leap or perform some other act of agility. They possessed the art of causing their limbs to look sound and their flesh young and to retard the appearance of age.

The nativity of the slave gave some indication of his qualities. Thus the Phrygian was timid; the African vain; the Cretan mendacious; the Sardinian unruly; the Corsican cruel and rebellious; the Dalmatian ferocious; the Briton stupid; the Syrian strong; the Ionian beautiful; the Alexandrian accomplished and luxurious.

The private slaves of a rich Roman were distinguished into two classes, the rustic and the city slaves: any number of them, owned by the same master, were called *familia*; *familia rustica* and *familia urbana*. These slaves were still

further subdivided, according to their occupations, and from these occupations they derived their names; such as *ordinarii*, *vulgares*, *mediastini*, *litterati*, etc. The number of Roman slaves, at any period, can not be accurately ascertained. That they were very numerous, and more numerous than the free population, is indisputable, and that the numbers increased during the latter days of the republic and under the emperors. The numbers owned by a single individual are almost incredible. *Athæneus* says as many as 20,000. They were chiefly employed in agricultural pursuits, or the mechanical arts. Many, however, were in those days used as personal attendants, it being considered discreditable for a person of rank to be seen without a train of them. From the moment a stranger entered the vestibule of a Roman house through the hall, in the reception-room, at the table, everywhere he was attended by different servants, each taking their names from their particular occupations.

The same system was developed in every part of the household. The female slaves were in like manner so distinguished, every conceivable want being attended by a separate slave. The smallest service had its appropriate slave. Thus the holding of the umbrella (*umbelliferæ*), of the fan (*flabelliferæ*), of the sandal (*sandaligerulæ*), etc., gave names to particular slaves. So the arranging of dress, the setting of the teeth and the painting of the eyebrows required distinct attendants. A prominent Roman always had a *nomenclator*, viz., a slave who told him the names of the passers-by on the street, for it was considered gentlemanlike to address everybody by his name. The wife upon her marriage received always a confidential slave (*dotalis servus*). He belonged to her, the master had no control over him. He frequently had the confidence of the wife more than her own husband. Even the schoolboy was followed by his little slave to bear his satchel to the school.

The old and luxurious were borne in sedans or chairs, by stout Mesian slaves.

The Roman sports were always rough and violent. The combat of the gladiators was more exciting and attractive than the pathos of tragedy, or the wit of the comic muse, Though Terence and Plautus catered to their taste. To rear and prepare slaves for these dangerous and murderous conflicts, as well as for the fighting of wild beasts, became a common practice, especially under the emperors, who encouraged these sports in the people in order to disengage their thoughts from their own bondage. We should not, however, judge them too harshly for this cruelty, as frequently freemen, knights, senators and even emperors Commodus, *e. g.*, descended into the arena and engaged in the fatal encounter. Sometimes even women joined in the conflict.

The price of slaves in Rome varied very much at different times and according to the qualities of the slave. Under the empire immense sums were paid for beautiful slaves and such as attracted the whim of the purchaser. We have accounts of their selling from 100,000 to 200,000 sesterces (\$5,000-\$10,000). In the time of Horace 500 drachmæ (about \$100) was a fair price for an ordinary slave. Clowns, jesters and pretty females brought high prices, although females generally sold for less than males. Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, being burdened with his prisoners, suffered the knights (*equites*) to be ransomed at \$75, the legionary soldier at \$50, the slaves at \$20.

There were certain feasts during which the slaves were abandoned to perfect liberty; of these the most remarkable were the Saturnalia, when such perfect equality existed that the master waited on the slave at the table. This feast was in the latter part of December and lasted seven days. (Horace, in the second book of his satires, gives an amusing account of an interview between himself and one of his

slaves on the occasion of the Saturnalia.) Another was the feasts in honor of Servius Tullius, the sixth king of Rome, he being himself the son of Ocrisia, a captive and a slave.

These lasted from the ides of March, the date of his birth, to the ides of April, the date of his inauguration of the temple of Diana.

The Compitalia, a feast in honor of the Lares or household gods, was also a season of liberty to the slaves.

The punishments inflicted upon slaves for offences were various and some very severe. They necessarily differed from those prescribed for the same offences when committed by freemen. Minor misdemeanors were submitted to the correction of the master.

Cato, the Censor, upon his farm instituted a kind of jury trial among the slaves themselves, and submitted to them the guilt and the punishment. The courts took cognizance only of graver charges. The removal of the urban slave into the *familia rustica* was a mild and yet a much dreaded penalty, for in such cases they worked in chains. The hand-mill was also a place of punishment. Sometimes they were scourged after being suspended with manacles to the hands and weights fastened to the feet. Another mode of punishment was a wooden yoke (*furca*) upon the neck and bound to the arms on either side. Upon every Roman farm was a private prison (*ergastulum*), in which refractory slaves were confined. They were, however, abolished in the time of Hadrian.

Sometimes extraordinary and cruel punishments were resorted to, such as cutting off the hands for thefts and death by the cross. These, however, were very rare. To protect the master the Roman laws were very stringent, and provided that where the master was found murdered in his house, and no discovery of the perpetrator, all the domestic slaves should be put to death.

There is an appalling instance of this cruel justice in the Fourteenth Book of the *Annales* of Tacitus. There was no distinctive dress for slaves. It was once proposed in the senate to give slaves a distinctive costume, but it was rejected, since it was considered dangerous to show them their number. Male slaves were not allowed to wear the toga or bulla, nor females the stola, but otherwise, they were dressed nearly in the same way as poor people, in clothes of a dark color and slippers. The rights of burial, however, were not denied to slaves, for as the Romans regarded slavery as a political institution, death was considered to put an end to the distinction between freemen and slaves.

Amongst the institutions of Roman and in general, all classical antiquity, slavery holds the foremost rank. Classical antiquity without slavery is simply a non-entity.

Slavery, the bondage of the majority of the population was the *conditio sine qua non* of Roman greatness. Their virtues as well their vices suppose the coexistence of slavery. I say their virtues as well as their vices, and I do so with the utmost deliberation.

Perhaps some of you will feel shocked at such a statement. You will think, perhaps, what has virtue to do with vice? Can vice, can abject, abominable slavery be productive of pure virtue? Has any of those ideal Romans, has Mucius, Scaevola, Camillus, Cincinnatus, Regulus, Cato, have they anything to do with Roman slavery? My answer to this is, yes; they have. Slavery in Rome as well as in Greece and in Palestine, Egypt, and in all countries of antiquity was the groundwork of the whole edifice of civilization. To explain the phenomena, the sympathetic as well as the repulsive phenomena of this grand civilization, without at the same time taking slavery into account is a perfectly hopeless undertaking.

Slavery in classical times is just as natural a feature of civilization, as for instance, the standing armies of Europe are at the present time. The standing armies of Europe, amounting to two millions of young, robust more or less intelligent people are mere tools in the hands of their military rulers. They have no will of their own, they have no honor of their own, no domicile of their own, they can be sent from one city to another; when fleeing from the tyranny of their superiors, they are treated like fugitive slaves, they have no opinion, no independence of mind. Still nobody murmurs at this modern tyranny; on the contrary, all parliaments in Europe gladly consent to the severest rules of military slavery.

A Roman would have abhorred such tyranny; he would have thought that the meanest of his slaves is a king in comparison with those unfortunate military slaves. To sacrifice his life for the state—that was but the natural wish of every Roman, but to serve his country in times of peace in strictest bondage, as all European soldiers do, to divest himself of all his civil rights in times of peace, and to submit to an unlimited thralldom, that is a mode of disfranchisement, which would have been considered too cruel even for a Roman slave.

On the other hand, the most charitable of all religions never thought of abolishing classical slavery, neither in the Old or New Testament, nor in any of the writings of the fathers, not in Justinus Martyr, not in Clemens Alexandrinus, Origenes, Tertullianus, Augustinus or Hieronymus, is there a trace of an endeavor to abolish slavery.

On the contrary the sacred writings admonish the slave to be faithful to his lord, and so do all the fathers.

So in our times, with our modern slavery. Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant church in Europe as such combat the deplorable slavery of European standing armies. For everybody feels that these standing armies in Europe

are simply an absolute necessity. And so did all teachers of Christianity feel as to the abolition of slavery in Rome. Slavery was an absolute necessity. The Romans never doubted the unnatural, perverse character of slavery. You can read these very words in their legal books: "*Jure naturali omnes liberi nascuntur.*" By nature all men are born free. Or "*Servitus est constitutio gentium contra naturam.*" Slavery is an institution of nations contrary to nature. They knew that very well, just as well as any of us. Read the treatise of Seneca on "*De Clementia*" and you will convince yourself that the Romans never hesitated to acknowledge that human nature, common to all of us, must also be revered and loved in everybody, whether he be a slave or a freeman. But the force of circumstances was so enormous that such tender consideration could not get the ascendancy. To be a *civis Romanus* was a very precious thing. The mere fact of being a free citizen of the state was almost a guarantee of a sure living, of protection, of honor. War was very profitable; the State was very rich, and consequently the citizens of Rome were not very anxious to divide their advantageous rights with many people.

Hence they, as well as all other nations of antiquity, established the two great divisions of human beings, (1) free men, *liberi*, *cives*, *ingenui*, and (2) slaves, *servi*. They confessed, and frankly, too, that the majority of people must be subdued, kept in bondage, in order to let some few develop their souls to the height of perfection. If all of us are constantly hampered by the petty, stinging toils, by the dull drudgery of common life then we must abdicate all high claims on life, then art and science, inventions and poetry, literature and the sacred culture of gods must necessarily be of a primitive character. If you compare the state of institutions in the middle ages or in modern times with the antique civilization, you will readily see that the

Greek and Roman civilization could not have existed for one single day without the institution of slavery.

In the middle ages, as well as in modern times, but of course more in the former than in the latter, the majority of the inhabitants of European countries lived in a state of semi-freedom. They were not exactly slaves, they were not precisely cattle, like the Roman servi (although up to the fourteenth century there were regular slave-markets in Italy and other countries of Europe), but vassals, villains, Gesinde, Koetter, serfs, or by whatever name they might have been denoted. These semi-freemen—the history of which forms by far the most interesting part of the middle ages—these semi-freemen were country people. I mean, people who lived in the country, in villages, hamlets, marks. The very word villain shows this fact, villa meaning the manor of an esquire in the country. This one fact alone will show you that such half-free people stand in intimate connection with the possibility of living in villages, in hamlets. But in classical times villages, hamlets, country life was an impossibility. Neither in Greece nor in any part of the Roman empire was there anything else than a city population. Villages with half-free populations, the so-called *coloni*, are one of the latest appearances of Roman history.

Savigny has proved that these *coloni*, who resemble the peasants of the middle ages, that is to say, who are a little above the level of absolute slavery, do not make their apparition before the fourth century of our era. On the other hand the *Komoi* or *demoi* of Greece, which have frequently been taken for modern villages, were nothing but a number of summer cottages of city people. This has been placed beyond any doubt by Emil Kuhn. I do not mean to say that in Roman Italy nobody ever lived in the country, or that there were no villages in Italy, or in Sicily. No doubt there were; the Roman name for such

a place is vicus. But the inhabitants of such a place were altogether city people. In other words, the inhabitants of these vici had to go to the city to which they belonged, and had to vote there in the assembly, to act as judges, or in some other official quality—they were only physically living in the vici, politically and morally they were nothing but townspeople. The inhabitant of a European village on the other hand has no right to vote in the neighboring city, he will never act as judge in the city, he will never be a member of the city council—he is altogether, physically and morally, a villicus, a village-man, a peasant.

This then being the case, the Romans had to choose between two possibilities: either to grant full liberty to everybody, or to refuse it absolutely to part of the population. There was no third possibility; there was no possibility of those half-free people of the middle ages, by the creation of which the principle of humanity was saved without essentially injuring the wants of the principle of egotism. And of these two possibilities the Romans, as well as the Greeks, the Hebrews, the Egyptians, etc., selected the latter one, refusing a liberty, the maintenance of which required their constant engagement in warfares. For Roman liberty was a costly thing, it had to be purchased with streams of the most precious blood, with unremitting perseverance in the most arduous and perilous profession of war. The Romans adopted, to its full extent, the doctrine of Aristotle. This incomparable thinker says in the first book of his treatise on politics that slavery is an inevitable necessity. He has therefore been decried as inhuman, as heathenish, as rude, and Heaven knows what else. But such wild reproaches are merely idle talk. If we consider that in Greece, as well as in Rome, there was no place for half-freedom and none for general full freedom either, we are obliged to say with Aristotle, that slavery *at that time* was inevitable. Cicero, as well as Varro, and the elder Pliny, men of the most refined feeling.

I say all these sensible, good and wise men agreed as to the absolute necessity of slavery, and for us who can soberly judge of a nation after a lapse of eighteen hundred years, and after the multifarious experience of hundreds of other nations, it is to-day simply a matter of course that a people like the Romans were forced to institute slavery. But slavery with the Romans was far from being that most abominable, hideous institution that we find it to be in some Mahommedan and in some American countries. Do not let your judgment be led astray by some glaring quotation from Juvenal, or by one of those well-known stories about the relentless cruelty of Roman slaveholders. No doubt, there have been some monstrous Romans, and some unfortunate slaves, *e. g.*, those of a certain Polio, who fed his enormous fish upon the slaughtered bodies of his slaves, or the case of Flaminius, who killed a slave to gratify a guest who had never seen a man killed, but can all such stories outweigh the testimony of hundreds of thousands of inscriptions on the tombs of slaves, wherein their lords express the most tender feelings for their deceased menials? Can they outweigh the numberless facts of slaves being the most devoted friends of their lords, the teachers of their children, the physicians of the house, the managers and bosses of the whole income, the *institores*, *procuratores*, *exercitores domini*?

Read two pages of the *Corpus Juris*, of this true and genuine reflex of Roman life, and line by line you will meet the sympathetic face of the Roman *servus*, of the Roman slave. He is everything. His lord trusts him with the most delicate errands, he places all his money in his hands, he borrows money from him, he is actually the debtor of his own slave, he sends him, in preference to every free man, with a precious cargo from Rome to Alexandria, he lets him perform the most binding contracts, the *stipulatio*. Most frequently he leaves him a considerable legacy, and

still more frequently he makes him the sole heir of his fortune. *Stichus meus heres esto*—my slave Stichus shall be my heir—is one of the most ordinary occurrences of the *Corpus juris*. In other cases the lord wants to be united with his slave in the same tomb. Thousands of such tomb inscriptions have been found.

The slaves in Rome addressed their lords by their *prænomen*, e.g., Marcus (T. Cicero), no trace of a degrading submissiveness in the title of the lord. They were permitted to marry, they had their wives and children, the child of a female slave was not severed from the mother. The *vernae*, or those slaves that were born in the house of their owner, were proverbially insolent, they used and abused the utmost liberty in the treatment of their rulers. And in the comedies of Plautus, in which slaves play a very prominent part, they almost maltreat their own lords. No doubt, if we should go simply by the expressions of the Roman jurists, I mean by the mere verbal sound of their expressions, we would have to draw a different picture.

In point of law a slave was a *cattle*, a *mortuum caput*, no living being at all, he was *res*, a mere *cattle*, unable to possess, to own, to testify, left to the mercy of his master, who could sell him, torture him, slay him, without fear of punishment. But in point of law many things have a totally different aspect from what they are in a social way. In my last lecture I gave one illustration of this remarkable point with regard to the divergence between the legal and social position of women in the United States of America. Here is another highly interesting illustration of the principle in ancient Rome. In Rome the *filius familias*, the son of a Roman citizen, was almost absolutely divested of all his economical and moral (not of his political) rights during the lifetime of his father. No Roman could acquire one cent's worth of property for himself as long as his father was still alive. All his earnings became

the property of his father, no matter whether the son was fifteen, twenty-five, thirty-five or forty-five years of age. Provided his father did not emancipate him, he continued to remain under the power of his father, irrespective of the fact that the father perhaps was only a storekeeper, and the son a senator or consul. But that was not all. The father had absolute power over his son's life. *Jus vitæ ac necis*. In point of law he could kill him, he could sell him, he could send him away without any further restraint.

There is a touching story in Livy about a Roman son, whose father wanted to kill him. Some bystanders tried to withhold the furious father, but his son indignantly exclaimed: "Am I not his son? Can he not dispose of me as he pleases?" In short the position of a Roman *filius familias* was in point of law almost identical with the position of a slave. And accordingly we find that the Roman jurists generally unite both terms, *servus sive filius familias*, suggesting thereby that the rules for the slaves apply also to the house son. But do all these legal theorems affect the social position of the son? Did Roman fathers really and frequently make use of their *jus vitæ et necis*, of their right to sell, to slay their sons? Did they really deprive them of every cent they earned? Were they in reality no more than slaves? By no means. The legal rule had an altogether different purport. I shall treat of this most remarkable point, of the origin of the Roman *patria potestas*, in my lecture on Roman law. At present I want only to state that the expressions of Roman jurists and one of their historians with regard to the low, abject position of slaves is altogether a legal form—it has nothing to do with the other aspects of real life. Law does not cover all parts of our own life. Law is the exponent of one small part of our life only. And hence we must be very careful in taking legal sources for the appreciation of historical events.



THE EMPEROR NERO.

From the marble bust in the Louvre.

ROMAN MAGISTRACIES—THE EMPERORS AND THEIR AL- LEGED PROFLIGACY.

K. D. Huellmann, Roem. Grundverfassung. *K. W. Goettling*, Geschichte der Roemischen Staatsverfassung. *Thue*, Roemische Verfassung. *Lydus*, De Magistratibus populi Romani. *A. Campiani*, de officio et potestate magistratuum Romanorum. *F. D. Gerlach*, Die Verfassung der roemischen Republik. *G. F. Hertzberg*, Geschichte der Roemer im Alterthum. *F. Hofmann*, De aedilibus Romanorum. *L. Lange*, De sacrosanctae potestatis tribun. natura ejusque origine. *Montesquieu*, Grandeur et décadence des Romains. *M. Naudet*, De la noblesse chez les Romains. *Vellejus Paterculus* Hist. Rom. *Valerius Maximus* Factorum et dictorum memorabilium l. ix. *Cornel. Tacitus*, Annales et Historiae, ed. Lips. *C. Suetonius* Tranquillus, Vitae xii Caesarum. *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*. *Ammianus Marcellinus*, Rer. Gest. *Dion Cassius* Hist. Rom. *Gibbon*, H. of the D. and F. *Merivale*, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire. *Gregorovius*, Hadrian. *H. Schiller*, Nero. *Lehmann*, Claudius and Nero. *Tillemont*, Histoire des Empereurs. *Champagny*, Les Césars. *Ranke*, Weltgeschichte, vols. ii, iii, iv.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

The subject of our present discussion will be the magistracies of Rome. The magistracies of Rome were the exponents of the sturdy power of the Roman people; they were invested with an amazing power, with a power that seems to be perfectly at variance with the spirit of either a republic or a monarchy. For a republic has a tendency to diminish the power of its officials in order to save all power for the people, and a monarchy has the same tendency of curtailing the power of officials in order to save all power for the monarchical head.

But as I said in my first lecture on Rome, this unique commonwealth was neither a republic nor a monarchy, it was a city-state, that is to say, state of its own kind, dissimilar to any other modern or Asiatic communities. There were but few magistracies in Rome, in fact there were no more than six or seven. For the petty little boards of two, three, four, five commissioners for some special purposes, or as the Romans called them, the duumviri, triumviri, quatuor, quinqueviri, etc., fell out of the

ordinary line of magistracies, or they were but the creation of an emergency, of a temporary need.

The chief magistracies were the consul, the censor, the prætor, the ædiles, the quaestor and the tribunes. But these officials were the recipients of boundless respect and reverence. Something like a halo seemed to hover round the very person of each of the Roman magistracies, and down to the fifth century of our era, that is to say down to the eleventh century of the Roman state, the honor of the offices was coveted for by the wealthiest and noblest of people. This reverence was due not to a religious or superstitious belief, it was due to the overpowering force of necessity. The people of Rome, of the city of Rome, had but one refuge, but one relief, but one safeguard, the city of Rome itself.

There was no state outside the city, no aristocracy living in the country, as in England or France, which might eventually prove the powerful ally and assistance of the people: no spiritual help like the church in the middle ages; no influential rustic population like the yeomanry in England, or the peasantry in Germany—there was nothing but this one city.

Hence, everybody, the very meanest citizen of Rome was imbued with the idea that the magistracies of his state are at the same time the magistracies of his own private life, the only bulwark of peace, of safety, the only protectors of honor, of property, of family ties. All the power now-a-days divided between the church, the aristocracy, the state proper, the army, the burgesses, the peasantry of Europe—all this was concentrated upon the magistracies of Rome.

They commanded the spiritual power of the church; for the censors *e. g.*, had the power to blame the citizen for his private morals as our ministers or clergymen do; they commanded all military power for every single Roman

magistrate was both a civic and a military magistrate—the Romans never used the distinction so well-known in our times, I mean the distinction between civil and military offices. These two branches were united into one single centralized power. They commanded the power of our aristocratic orders, for the fact of their holding an office made them noblemen. These magistracies, I say, were the emporiums of all power, and no other protection watched over the lives and goods of the Roman citizens. The most powerful protection of the plebeian tribunes, granted to patricians as well as to plebeians, never extended further than one mile beyond the gates of the city. The city was both the ground and the limit of all protection and so, naturally, the magistracies of this city being looked upon as the natural protectors of every citizen, like fathers and senators, they were given the title, *pater patrice*, father of the country.

There is a decided similarity between the Roman magistracies and the idiom of the Roman, the Latin language. In this marvellous language five or six parts of speech carry on the whole traffic of thought. The character and appearance of each of these elements of speech are fixed, equally developed, their architectural beauty is perfect. In modern languages the substantive will frequently be used as a verb, and the verb as an adverb, and the adverb again as a conjunction. In modern languages the termination of terms and modes of declension have been crumbled off, prepositions cease to govern cases, the words of the language bear a sullen indifference to each other, they do not interdetermine, they do not depend on each other, they do not like, they do not hate each other. But in the glorious idiom of Cicero we see, as it were, the reflex of that well-poised state, in which the centripetal, as well as the centrifugal powers, bore a strong, marked and well-defined proportion to each other. Instead of a sullen in-

difference we see the consuls play the part of the august substantive in a Latin sentence, the senate the part of the Latin verbs, the censors the critical role of the moderating adjectives, the tribunes the negative control of the conjunctions. Polybius, one of the greatest historians of antiquity, treating of the nature of the Roman State, is full of admiration for that happy mixture of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, which was the most marked feature of the Roman State. But this happy mixture again was an outcome of the powerful Roman magistracies who, as, *e. g.*, the tribunes were thoroughly democratical, and at the same time highly aristocratical as the senators, and again profoundly monarchical as the consuls.

It was one of the principles of Roman statecraft never to multiply the number of offices, but rather to multiply the number of the incumbents of one and the same office. Take, *e. g.*, the office of one of their chief magistracies, the prætor. A prætor in Rome was the head of several departments of the State. He had to issue an edict, which was a legislative function. He had judiciary functions, for he had to instruct all lawsuits, he had to issue what English jurists would call a writ and what the Romans called a formula, besides taking cognizance of a host of other law matters; he had to preside at the comitia sometimes at the senate, he had to go to war as a leader of the army, he had to superintend quite a number of other public institutions. So that his office comprised legislative, judicial and executive functions.

This seems to be contrary to our modern view of politics. We think that one of the strongest safeguards against a possible encroachment upon the liberty of the country is a perfect separation of those three branches of the nervous system of a state: of the legislative, judicial and executive nerves. But the Romans were totally indifferent to such a separation. These magistracies usually exercised two or

all the three of these functions. In course of time, with the rapid increase of the population, the prætor was unable to do justice to all his duties. But instead of detaching part of his duties and imposing them upon some new magistracies, the Romans took recourse to another method: They simply multiplied the number of prætors, so that the prætura, the office of the prætor, remained unchanged in number as well as in quality, the number of incumbents changing only.

Accordingly we find, as I said before, that there were, comparatively speaking, very few magistracies in Rome. None of them was a salaried position. They were all honorary dignities, the Romans called them honores, suggesting thereby that they were exclusively a matter of honor. Neither the consuls, nor the censors, nor the senators or prætors were permitted to draw a salary. On the contrary, these offices were very costly dignities. For the electioneering, as well as the festivities after the election, were very heavy expenses. A salary was only given to the minor officers, to the scribes, to the lictors, to the beadles. These offices as a rule lasted only for a year, and the shortness of the term was to make up for the intensity of power granted to the magistracies. To this the senators, as I remarked in my last lecture, made an exception. They were appointed for lifetime. It was not very easy to be re-elected to an office more than twice.

In Rome all transactions with the magistracies were carried on orally. There was no trace of that laborious, cumbersome way of transacting all business of the State in writing, which has expanded our archives to perfect mountains of paper. Every single magistrate had his consilium, his council, consisting of experienced men, well versed in the law and constitution of the country. He gave his decision or order according to the advice and judgment of his consilium. The magistrates of Rome were either such

as had the *imperium*, or such as were without the *imperium*. By *imperium* the Roman understood a greater share of judicial and military power. There were some other divisions of Roman magistracies; some of these had the *auspicia maxima*, the highest auspices, as the consuls, prætors and censors, the other had the *minore auspicia*; and, accordingly, the consuls, prætors and censors were called the *majores*, the greater magistrates, and the other magistracies the *minores*. There was also a division into *curule* and *noncurule* magistracies. The *magistratus curules* were the dictator, the consuls, the censor, the prætor and the *curule ædiles*, who were so called because they had the right of sitting on an ivory chair. These chairs were without arms or back.

At present I will treat only of the consuls, censors and tribunes and of the emperors. The prætor will be the subject of part of my next lecture on Roman law, because he stands in the most intimate connection with the development of the law of Rome. As to the dictator, whose term lasted only for six months, and who was appointed in case of urgent necessity, it is needless to dwell upon his office any longer. It was an exceptional office and it affords but a military interest. The *quæstores* and *ædeles* were more or less subordinate offices and it will be enough to say that the *quæstores* were financial and the *ædiles* police functionaries. I proceed to circumscribe the position and character, first, of the Roman consuls.

The consulships, which was established as a republican magistracy at Rome immediately after the abolition of royalty, showed its republican character in the circumstance that its power was divided between two individuals and that it was only for a year's duration. This principle was, on the whole, observed throughout the republican period and the only exceptions are that sometimes a dictator was appointed instead of two consuls, and, that in a few in-

stances, when one of the consuls had died, the other remained in office alone, either because the remaining portion of the year was too short, or from religious scruples, for otherwise the rule was that if either of the consuls died in the year of his office, or abdicated before its expiration, the other was obliged to convene the comitia for the purpose of electing a successor. In the earliest times the title of the chief magistrates was not consules, but prætors; characterizing them as the commanders of the armies of the republic, or as the officers who stand at the head of the State. After the banishment of the last rex, of Tarquinius Superbus, all the powers which had belonged to the king were transferred to the consuls, except that which had constituted the king high priest of the State. As regards the election of the consuls, it invariably took place in the comitia centuriata, under the presidency of a consul or dictator. In general it was observed as a rule that the magistrates should enter upon their offices on the Kalends (first) or ides (thirteenth or fifteenth), unless particular circumstances rendered it impossible; but the months themselves varied at different times, and there are no less than eight or nine months in which the consuls are known to have entered upon their functions, and in many of these cases we know the reason for which the change was made.

Down to the year 366 B. C., the consulships were accessible to none but patricians, but in that year L. Sextius was the first plebeje consul in consequence of the law of C. Licinius. The consulship was throughout the republic regarded as the highest office and the greatest honor that could be conferred upon a man, for the dictatorship, though it had a majus imperium, a greater power, was, as I have said not a regular magistracy, and the censorship, though conferred only upon consulars, was yet far inferior to the consulship in power and in influence. It was not till the end of the republic, and especially in the time of

Julius Cæsar, that the consulship lost its former dignity; for in order to honor his friends, he caused them to be elected, sometimes for a few months, and sometimes even for a few hours. In regard to the nature of the power of the consuls, we must in the outset divide it into two parts, inasmuch as they were the highest civil authority, and at the same time the supreme commanders of the armies. So long as they were in the city of Rome, they were at the head of the government and the administration, and all the other magistrates, with the exception of the tribunes of the people, were subordinate to them.

They convened the senate, and as presidents conducted the business; they had to carry into effect the decrees of the senate, and sometimes in urgent emergencies they might even act on their own authority and responsibility. They were the medium through which foreign affairs were brought before the senate; all despatches and reports were placed in their hands before they were laid before the senate; by them foreign ambassadors were introduced into the senate, and they alone carried on the negotiations between the senate and foreign states. They also convened the assembly of the people and presided in it, and thus conducted the elections, put legislative measures to the vote, and had to carry the decrees of the people into effect. The whole of the internal machinery of the republic was, in fact, under their superintendence, and in order to give an insight into their executive power, they had the right of summoning and arresting the obstreperous (*vocatio* and *prensio*), which was limited only by the right of appeal from their judgment (*provocatio*); this right of appeal corresponds to the right of Habeas Corpus in England or America. Their right of inflicting punishment might be exercised even against inferior magistrates. The outward signs of their power and at the same time the means by which they exercised it, were twelve lictors with the fasces, without whom the con-

sul never appeared in public, and who preceded him in a line, one behind another. In the city, however, the axes did not appear in the fasces. Every person was bound to turn out of their way, dismount, rise up, uncover the head, or show some similar token of respect on passing them. But the power of the consuls was far more extensive in their capacity of supreme commanders of the armies, when they were without the precincts of the city, and were invested with the full imperium.

When the levying of an army was decreed by the senate (for the Romans in the time of the republic had no standing armies—they levied their regiments only in case of necessity) the consuls conducted the levy, and, at first, had the appointment of all the subordinate officers—a right which subsequently they shared with the people, and the soldiers had to take their oath of allegiance to the consuls. They also determined the contingent to be furnished by the allies; and in the province assigned to them they had the unlimited administration, not only of all military affairs, but of everything else, even over life and death, excepting only the conclusion of peace and treaties.

Abuse of the consular power was prevented first of all, by each of the consuls being dependant on his colleague, who was invested with equal rights, for, if we except the provinces abroad, where each was permitted to act with unlimited power, the two consuls could do nothing unless both were unanimous, and against the sentence of one consul an appeal might be brought before his colleague, nay, one consul might of his own accord put his veto on the proceedings of the other. But in order to avoid every unnecessary dispute or rivalry, arrangements had been made from the first that the real functions of the office should be performed only by one of them every alternate month, and the one who was in the actual exercise of the consular power for the month was preceded by the twelve lictors,

whence he is commonly described in Livy by the words *penesquos fasces erant* (who had the fasces). In this case his colleague was then not accompanied by the lictors at all, or he was preceded by a subordinate official (*accensus*) and the lictors followed after him.

In the earliest times it seems to have been the custom for only one of the consuls to march out at the head of the army, and for the other to remain at Rome for the protection of the city. But when Rome had to contend with a formidable enemy, the two consuls marched out together. The forces, however, were equally divided between them in such a manner that each had the command of two legions, and had the supreme command on every alternate day. In the last centuries of the empire it was customary to create honorary consuls, who were chosen by the senate and sanctioned by the emperor. Although the dignity of these honorary consuls was merely nominal, still it was regarded as the highest in the empire, and was sought after by noble and wealthy persons with the greatest eagerness, notwithstanding the great expenses connected with the office on account of the public entertainments I mentioned before. The last consul of Rome was Decimus Theodorus Paulinus 536 A. D.

The next great magistrate is the censor. Censor is the name of two magistrates of high rank in Rome. Their office was called *censura*. After the expulsion of the kings it was taken by the consuls and special magistrates were not appointed for the purpose of taking it till the year 443 B. C. The reason of this alteration was owing to the appointment in the preceding year of military tribunes with consular power in place of consuls; and as these tribunes might be plebeians, the patricians deprived the consuls and consequently their representatives, the tribunes, of the right of taking the census, and entrusted it to two magistrates, called *censores*, who were to be chosen exclusively

from the patricians. The magistracy continued to be a patrician one till 351 B. C. when C. Marius Rutilus was the first plebeian censor. The censors were elected in the comitia centuriata, held under the presidency of a consul. As a general principle the only persons eligible to the office were, as I said before, those who had previously been consuls.

The censorship is distinguished from all other Roman magistracies by the length of time during which it was held. The censors were originally chosen for a whole lustrum, that is, a period of five years; but their office was limited to eighteen months as early as ten years after its institution. The censors also had a very peculiar position with respect to rank and dignity. No imperium was bestowed upon them, and accordingly they had no lictors. But notwithstanding this, the censorship was regarded as one of the highest dignities in the state, it was a sanctus magistratus, to which the deepest reverence was due. The high rank and dignity which the censorship obtained, was owing to the various important duties gradually entrusted to it, and especially to its possessing the regimen morum, or general control over the conduct and private morals of the citizens. In the exercise of this power they were regulated solely by their own views of duty and were not responsible to any power in the state. This regimen morum formed one of the three duties of the censor, the two others being the census or register of the citizens and of their property, of which I have treated shortly in my last lecture, and the administration of the finances of the state, under the superintendence of the senate.

The regimen morum or the control over the private morals of the citizens was the most important branch of the censor's duties and the one which caused their office to be the most revered and the most dreaded in the Roman state. This part of the censors' office invested them with

a peculiar kind of jurisdiction, which in many respects resembled the exercise of public opinion in modern times; for there are innumerable actions which, though acknowledged by everyone to be prejudicial and immoral, still do not come within the reach of the positive laws of a country. Even in cases of real crimes the positive laws frequently punish only the particular offense, while in public opinion the offender, even after he has undergone punishment, is still incapacitated for certain honors and distinctions which are granted only to persons of unblemished character. Hence the Roman censors might brand a man with their rebuke, or as it was called, *nota censoria*, in case he had been convicted of a crime in an ordinary court of justice and had already suffered punishment for it. The consequence of such a *nota* was not infamy, in the technical sense of the Roman expression, *infamia*, for Savigny has proved it beyond doubt, that *infamia* meant the loss of political rights, whereas the censors could not deprive of those rights. Such a *nota* brought upon the citizen only *ignominia*, ignominy. Its effects, however, could be removed by the following censor, or by a *lex*, a law.

A person might be branded with a censorial *nota* in a variety of cases which it would be impossible to specify. The chief offenses are as follows: Such as occurred in the private life of individuals, *e. g.*, living in celibacy at a time when a person ought to be married. But this, of course, referred to male persons only. Further, the dissolution of matrimony or betrothment in an improper way or for insufficient reason. Improper conduct towards one's wife or children, and disobedience of the latter towards their parents. Inordinate and luxurious mode of living, or an extravagant expenditure of money. A great many instances of this kind are recorded. Neglect and carelessness in cultivating one's fields. The carrying on of a dis-

reputable trade or occupation. Then, offenses committed in public life, either in the capacity of a public officer or against magistrates.

The punishments inflicted by the censors generally differed according to the station which a man occupied, though sometimes a person of the highest rank might suffer all the punishments at once, by being degraded to the fifth class of citizens. I have discussed these classes in my last lecture. The most cruel punishments applied by the censors were: *Motio* or *ejectio e senatu*, or the exclusion of a man from the number of senators, of which I treated last Saturday. Then, the *ademptio equi*, or the taking away of the public horse from an *eques*, from a knight. Then, the terrible punishment, the *motio e tribu*, or the exclusion of a person from his tribe, from his ward, which amounted to political death, or rather to an impossibility to exercise one's political rights.

The censorship continued in existence for 421 years, from 443 to 22 B. C. This peculiar magistracy is of the very greatest interest to the historian. It was a meddling office, it interfered with the private feelings, with the thoughts and motives of men and in this respect it had a remarkable similarity to our churches. All other offices of Rome disregarded the motives of actions; this one office went beyond the mere action, the mere palpable fact. It inquired into the inner world and passed stringent judgments on affairs which as a rule are considered removed from the influence of civil magistracies. We may justly ask why did not the pontifices, the high priests, or any other of the *religious* fraternities, the flamines, the augurs, the *fratres aruales*, why were they not invested with such a moral control over the actions of the citizens? Why was it that such a control, so thoroughly ecclesiastical in its very nature, was given to officers of a merely civil character?

My answer to this has already been given in the course of my lectures on Greece and Rome.

Neither of these civilizations ever possessed what, in modern times, we consider the most primitive thing, the most self-evident data. I mean man, natural persons, in contradistinction to state-beings, to citizens. The mere human nature of man as apart from its civic and political features did not exist in those times. The Romans knew that very well. They found a very expressive word for it. They said: Originally there were none but natural beings, *homines naturales*. These *homines naturales* had no slavery, no kings, no state, no politics—they lived in groups like some of the animals, and every member of the group maintained the full sway of his freedom. But with the advance of civilization, the *homo naturalis*, the natural man, became a *homo civilis*, and all his doings and feelings became subject to the dictation of the *civites*, of the state. The previous *homo naturalis* was submerged in the *homo civilis* and he lived henceforth by and through the state. He had to marry according to the dictation of the state, he had to divorce his wife for similar grounds; he had to sacrifice his property, his life, his family to that new moloch, to the state. There was nothing but the state. All powers were vested in the state, and consequently the power of moral control could not be exempted, and thus the censors, mere political officials, were the preachers and confessors of Rome. This is the real purport of this remarkable institution. It is systematic of one of the profoundest characteristics of Rome and I most respectfully call your attention to it, because it has a powerful bearing on that great question, the discussion of which will lead us to a better understanding of the origin of Christianity. That much as to the censors.

Next in order are the tribunes. The purpose for which the tribunes were appointed was only to afford protection

against any abuse on the part of the patrician magistrates, and that they might be able to afford such protection their persons were declared sacred and inviolable and it was agreed that whoever acted against this inviolability should be an outlaw, and that his property should be forfeited to the temple of Ceres. The tribunes were thus enabled to afford protection to anyone who appealed to the assembly of the commonalty, or required any other assistance. They were essentially the representatives and the organs of the plebeian order, and their sphere of action was the *comitia tributa*. With the patricians and their *comitia* they had nothing to do. The tribunes, however, were no judges and could inflict no punishment, but could only propose the imposition of a fine to the commonalty. The tribunes were thus in their origin only a protecting magistracy of the plebs, but in course of time their power increased to such a degree that it surpassed that of all other magistrates, and the tribunes then, as Niebuhr remarks, became a magistracy for the whole Roman people in opposition to the senate and the oligarchical elements in general, although they had nothing to do with the administration or government.

During the latter period of the republic they became true tyrants, like the national convention of France during the first revolution. But notwithstanding the great and numerous abuses which were made of the tribunitian power by individuals, the greatest historians and statesmen confess that the greatness of Rome and its long duration is in a great measure attributable to the institution of this office. There is no similar office in this republic; but the writ of *mandamus* and *quo warranto*—a writ unknown in monarchical countries—exercises the functions of a Roman tribune, so that in the United States every individual citizen may occasionally play the part of a Roman tribune.

As regards the number of the tribunes of the Roman people, all the ancient writers agree that at first they were only two, though the accounts differ as to the names of the first tribunes. Soon afterwards, however, the number of tribunes was increased to five, one being taken from each of the five classes. The time when the tribunes were elected was, according to Dionysius, always on the tenth of December. It is almost superfluous to state that none but plebeians were eligible to the office of tribune; hence when towards the end of the republic patricians united to obtain the office, they were obliged first to renounce their own order and to become plebeians; hence also under the empire it was thought that the prince should not be tribune because he was a patrician. But the influence which belonged to this office was too great for the emperors not to covet it. Hence Augustus received the *tribunitia potestas* for life.

Although nothing appears to be more natural than that the tribunes should originally have been elected by that body of the Roman citizens which they represented, that is to say, by the *comitia tributa*, yet the subject is involved in considerable obscurity. As the tribunes were the public guardians, it was necessary that everyone should have access to them and at any time, hence the doors of their houses were open day and night for all who were in need of help and protection, which they were empowered to afford against anyone, even against the highest magistrates. Their protection consisted in the utterance of the single word, *veto*—which put an end to all action thus vetoed. For the same reason a tribune was not allowed to be absent from the city for a whole day, except during the *Feriæ Latinæ*, when the whole people was assembled on the Alban Mount.

The tribunes had the right to be present at the deliberations of the senate, but they did not sit among the senators

themselves, but upon benches before the open door of the senate-house. They also proposed bills to the comitia tributa. In 374 B. C. a change took place in the internal organization of the college of tribunes, which threatened to paralyze its powers. Before this year everything had been decided by a majority; but about this time, we do not know how, a change was introduced, which made the opposition (*intercessio*) of one tribune sufficient to render a resolution of his colleagues void. In their relation to other magistrates we may observe that the right of *intercessio* was not confined to stopping a magistrate in his proceedings, but they might even command their *viatores* (their beadles) to seize a consul or a censor, imprison him, or to throw him from the Tarpeian Rock.

Tribunes of the people continued to exist down to the fifth century of our era, though their power became naturally much limited, especially in the reign of Nero. They continued, however, to have the right of *intercession* against decrees of the senate and on behalf of injured individuals. The consuls, the censors, prætors and tribunes were the great magistracies of the Romans, but more especially of the Roman Republic.

In the first four centuries of our era the chief magistracy of the Romans were the Emperors. The Emperors, or Imperatores, stood at the head of all affairs, civil, military and religious, and they combined, or at least tried to combine all the powers of the other magistrates. In order to form a just and correct idea of a Roman Emperor we must first discard all our modern ideas about kings or emperors, for these modern ideas do not fit the Roman institution. A great many prerogatives which would never be given up by a modern emperor were easily abandoned by the imperatores of the Romans. On the other hand, the imperatores were extremely anxious to retain some rights which, by modern emperors, are considered valueless. Thus, *e. g.*,

no modern king or even duke would ever think of dismissing his court—the number of courtly officers, of court dignitaries, as the lord chamberlain of the household, or the lord steward of the household, the lord doorkeeper, etc. These courtiers, together with numberless ladies and gentlemen waiting on the king or queen are considered essential parts of a modern court. But none of the Roman emperors ever thought of such dignitaries. Their court, their residence as such did not differ from any of the houses of rich Romans. They had no special court etiquette, the vexed question of precedence never turned up, nothing of the imposing and costly paraphernalia of modern courts could be perceived. They were simply one of the highest, that is to say, most powerful magistracy of the state. They were consuls, censors and prætors at one and the same time. Nay, they shared these offices with any of their subjects, *e. g.*, Tiberius, Vespasian, or Tryan^{us} or any other of the emperors was elected consul for the past year together with some other patrician or plebeian.

He was sitting on the bench as a judge, and we read that Augustus, or Hadrian very frequently acted as judges on ordinary civil lawsuits. Now, mark the difference. In modern Europe all judgments are being passed in the name of the emperor, even in case somebody sues the emperor himself, for damages, for instance, the judgment will begin thus: "In the name of the Emperor." But in imperial Rome justice was administered not in the name, but sometimes by the emperor himself. The first emperors never thought of establishing a hereditary empire; they did not even possess all power; they had to be elected and re-elected. Augustus, *e. g.*, had himself re-elected every tenth year, and although he was sure to meet with the universal vote, still he clung to the old idea. And in fact there was not very much difference between the so-called liberty of the Republic and the alleged tyranny of the Em-

pire. As a rule it is taught that the old staunch liberty of Rome came to an end when the emperors attained to power. But there are but few historical statements less valueless than this. The hackneyed declamations about the decline of liberty, about the loss of virtue, about the prevailing immorality in the times of the emperors is all idle talk. These declamations are founded on a few Roman historians whose very profession it was to decry everything imperial and to puff up everything republican.

Among these historians Tacitus holds the foremost rank. I do not speak at present of the great surpassing merit of his works as literary productions, I do not speak of the great sagacity, of the profound wisdom of some of his remarks. No doubt he was a great writer and a student of literature or of philology and may justly glory in the unparalleled terseness of his style, in the beauty of his artistic arrangement of the subject. But as an historian Tacitus is of a very precarious value. He belonged to that class of patricians who were inconsolable over the loss of that power which they had commanded in the times of the republic. This loss was brought about by the emperors, and hence the heart of Tacitus was filled with black hatred against all emperors, against all imperial institutions. Instead of writing history he wrote party-history, he wrote political pamphlets, and what he bemoaned was not the loss of liberty, but the loss of power. For in fact, the Roman people enjoyed all kinds of liberty under the emperors. The cities had almost perfect self-government; the governors of the provinces were kept under severe control; justice was administered in the most admirable way; there were no obnoxious garrisons, for the Roman legions were garrisoned at the borders of the empire, and not in the cities of the empire. The emperors of Rome, so far from sapping the foundation of the liberty of Rome, undermined rather the foundation of their own power by neglecting to

rear that aristocracy which proved the best, the safest groundwork of modern monarchies.

As I have mentioned already, the Roman emperors had no courts, no courtiers. They omitted to occasion the growth of a separate class of people, like the aristocrats of Europe, whose interest would have been instinctively connected with their own interest, who would have been a powerful check on the rancorous militia and on the uproarious populace. This they omitted to do—and that was their capital, their fatal fault. They failed to found those nice distinctions between a baron, a count, a duke, a prince, a simple citizen, a peasant—distinctions by which the thrones in Europe have gained a firmness which has stood the attacks of eleven centuries. In the times of the Roman emperors there were no such distinctions; no more than in the times of the Roman republic. The commonest citizen addressed his emperor by the plain *thouing tu*, as if he would speak to his slave. The emperors married simple citizen-girls, they had no special insignia, no crowns, no sceptres, no pages, nothing. They were not the tyrants of their people; they were simply the kind of officials which at those times were alone possible.

In every country of a highly developed civilization some of the leading magistracies of the people must be exempt from the chances of election. A people may be ever so democratic, a people may take ever so much pride in the fact that all power rests with the people and that all power has to be subject to the votes of the people—still, there must be some high, some leading officials, who are absolutely free from the vote of the people. Take, *e. g.*, this great republic, the United States. Most assuredly, it is one of the proud principles of this republic that all power rests with the people, that is the people of the United States is the ruling factor. But has not the people of the United States granted an enormous share of power to a few

officials, who are perfectly exempt from the votes of the people? Do not the judges of the United States Supreme Court possess an enormous power? Can they not unmake the laws passed by the Congress assembled? Can they and did they not sometimes reverse the whole legislature? And on the other hand, are these judges of the Supreme Court of the United States not perfectly exempt from the whims of elections? Have they not been granted the colossal privilege of being appointed for lifetime? Now, it was exactly the same case with the emperors of Rome.

In the first century of our era it became more and more evident that the annual, short, ever-changing officers of the republic were no longer adapted to the immense aggrandizement of the State. And hence a need was felt for the establishment of a lasting office, just as the Americans felt a need of making their supreme judges a lasting institution, exempt from all elections. In Rome, instead of instituting supreme judges they instituted supreme consuls, or rather emperors. That is the real fact. And all that childish talk about the decline of liberty amounts to a mere school declamation. The emperors were one of the great blessings of Rome, not only as an institution, but also taking them individually. For with very few exceptions they were upright gentlemen, who did their utmost to fulfill their duties and honor themselves and their position.

I know, numberless stories are afloat about the base profligacy of the emperors. But if you would but once trace these stories to their sources, you would be astonished at the amazing worthlessness of these narratives. I do not mean to defend an idiot like Caligula, or a rake like Helio-gabalus. No doubt there have been some shameful examples. But what do these four or five individual examples prove? Nothing. There have been idiots and rakes in all classes of people. But the majority of the Roman emperors were more or less honest, brave, wise men, and as

this is a rather novel question I am going to select two typical examples, two emperors of Rome, who are generally depicted as abominable tyrants, given to all vices, perpetrators of horrible crimes, instigators of dastardly deeds. I mean Tiberius and Nero. What I am going to tell about Tiberius here goes to prove that neither of them were the monster that he is said to have been.

Tiberius as a rule is described as a brutal and despotic debauchee. In order, however, to examine the truth of this statement we must first inquire into the nature of those historical sources on which the general opinion about Tiberius is founded. These sources are mainly the three historians, Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius. I have spoken already of Tacitus. Suetonius is no more than a collector of scandalous anecdotes, and so is Dio Cassius, who confesses himself to be nothing but a mere narrator. Tiberius had roused the implacable enmity of the powerful order of the equites, of the knights, who as farmers of the public revenue committed peculations and extortions with an habitual impugntiy. When accused they were tried by accomplices and partizans. * But Tiberius put an end to their robberies and the knights, together with many other noblemen, spread the most abominable stories about the life and character of Tiberius. But if we read our sources, poisoned though they be by party enmity, with calm candor we cannot help saying that Tiberius was a sober, upright, earnest, devoted friend to his people. Tacitus himself cannot disguise the fact that the presence of Tiberius usually in a subordinate seat at trials prevented bribery and corruption. But of course Tacitus remarks on that, though justice was thereby furthered, liberty was impaired. This impairing of liberty is the hobby of Tacitus and he perceives it even when no sensible person would be able to notice it.

The chief characteristic of Tiberius was a moral earnestness. The jests of Augustus (not always very seemly) would die upon his lips when Tiberius approached. In the respect he paid to individuals, or the whole body of the senators he went beyond all bounds. Upon his differing with Quintus Haterius in the senate, "Pardon me, sir," he said, "I beseech you, if I shall as a senator speak my mind rather freely in opposition to you." He never entered the senate but unattended and being once brought thither in a litter, because he was indisposed, he dismissed his attendants at the door. All things of a public nature were transacted by the magistrates and in the old republican forms; the authority of the consuls remained so great that some ambassadors from Africa applied to them and complained that they could not have their business dispatched by Tiberius, to whom they had been sent. And no wonder, since it is observed that Tiberius used to rise up as the consuls approached and give them way.

He had such an aversion to flattery that he would never suffer any senator to attend his litter either as a civility or upon business. Being once called "lord" by some person, he desired that he might no more be affronted in that manner. Tiberius tried, not by force, but by precept and example, to inculcate frugality. He was very liberal in money affairs. To Aemilius Rectus, who on one occasion sent him from Egypt, of which he was governor, more than the appointed tribute, he wrote back: "I wish you to shear, not shave my sheep." He had a decided dislike of titles. He was commonly called Cæsar, occasionally Germanicus and even by himself Primate of the Senate. He said that "I am master of my slaves, commander of my soldiers, but primate of the others. Corporal punishments were unknown in his time. Tacitus and Suetonius, unsupported by Dio Cassius, tell us that Tiberius retiring

to the Isle of Caprea, when he was almost three-score years and ten, commenced a round of debauchery so vile that it has to the present day contaminated his very memory. But the whole story originated in a joke. The name of the island, Caprea or Capri, led some one to call Tiberius, Caprineus, which might mean either a resident in Capri, or by a play on words, a grossly dissolute man. This story was then propagated by party malignity. There is not one single historical fact to substantiate these scandalous stories and the image of Tiberius, at least for the unbiassed mind, stands unpolluted by those mean crimes that have been imputed to him by the virulent denunciations of dissatisfied partisans.

The second great monster is said to have been Nero. That Nero was an exemplary son, a loving husband, a sagacious statesman, or a very reputable emperor, I altogether disbelieve; indeed, one cannot resist the impression that he was a vain, dissolute and weak-minded man, not without good qualities, but with many moral shortcomings, and placed in an atmosphere where his vices must have been fearfully fostered. He *may* have been a monster little better than his fame. I do not know that he was, I do not even suspect that he was, but what I do know with all the certainty possible in such a case is that in support of the capital charges against him, charges universally accepted without question, there is not for the rational inquisitor's mind *any evidence whatever*.


Four chief crimes have been imputed to Nero: (1) The murder of Britannicus, his relative; (2) The murder of his mother, Agrippina; (3) The burning of Rome, and (4) the murder of his wife, Poppæa. If it can be shown that the evidence for these four charges are in all respects unworthy of credence, it being sometimes even childish in its absurdity, there will be no need to investigate the minor charges. First, as to the murder of Britannicus. Sueto-

nus relates that Locusta, a professional poisoner, was ordered to prepare a poison. This poison then was administered to Britannicus at a banquet. No sooner had the prince tasted it than he fell lifeless. The guests were alarmed, some rose to fly, but Nero quietly assured them that it was only an attack of the epileptic fits, to which Britannicus was subject, and that it would soon be over. But Britannicus was really dead and was hastily buried the next day. According to Dio Cassius the face of the corpse had become quite black from the poison. This is the story. The first remark which modern science suggests is that the sudden death of Britannicus may very probably have been due to epilepsy, but cannot have been due to poison, since there was no poison known to the ancients capable of such an instantaneous effect. In our own days the only poisons known to take effect in a few seconds are prussic acid, oxalic acid, strychnine, woorara and the venom of certain snakes, and these were not known in Rome. Aconite, which on good grounds is believed to have been a common poison employed in Rome, requires from one to three hours to produce fatal effect, and the majority of mineral poisons require several hours. Secondly, modern science knows of no poison which instantaneously blackens the face of the victim. There are certain mineral poisons which, taken slowly, will slowly discolor the skin, but not one which rapidly betrays its presence by such discoloration.

With regard to the accusation of Nero having murdered his mother, science and common sense are not less unanimously adverse to it. Suetonius assures us that thrice Nero attempted to poison Agrippina, but thrice was foiled by her having had the precaution to prepare against such attempts by taking an antidote. To the mind of the Romans this was eminently credible. To modern science this is eminently ridiculous. Ancient physiology having no dis-

tinct idea of the nature of poisons and how they affect the organism, found no difficulty in believing in the existence of a universal antidote. Modern physiology, however, smiles when an antidote is mentioned, except as a specific remedy under certain specific conditions, and for specific poisons.

Again, there is no reasonable evidence whatever for Nero having set fire to Rome. Tacitus himself tells us that Nero at that time was in Antium; Suetonius cannot adduce any stronger evidence either; and other contemporary writers do not mention Nero as the perpetrator of the enormous crime. Nero, on the very testimony of his accusers, was singularly free from cruelty, saving many whom the senate would have destroyed. We read of no such wholesale slaughter as is recorded of Augustus, who in one day put to death three hundred senators and noblemen. The emperors of Rome had great power, and, very naturally, frequently abused this power. But that is the common experience of all ages. No set of men has ever been in the possession of power without abusing it. That is a fault not of individual members, but of human nature in general. And thus, while we cannot extol the virtue of every single Roman emperor, we must carefully beware of condemning them in sweeping generalities, without being able to adduce one single reliable form of evidence.



FRAGMENT FROM THE PANDECTS OF JUSTINIAN.

This MSS., one of the most precious in the world, contains the Pandects, a considerable portion of the Roman law, compiled from decisions of the older Jurists, by order of Justinian, who ordered its codification. The MSS. contains two vol's, is written on white parchment, bound in the most elegant manner in purple silk, ornamented with clasps and silver locks, and preserved in a magnificent case. The MSS. was written in Constantinople, and got to Amalfi (lower Italy) in unknown times. When in the year 1134, Amalfi got into the possession of Emperor Lothar II., he presented the copy to his confederates, the Pisans. Pisa fell into the power of the Florentines in the year 1406; since which time the MSS. has remained in Florence.

TRANSCRIPTION.

Incipit liber VII.

R(ubrica) De usufructu et quemadmodum quis utatur fruatur. R(ubrica).

Now follows the text of the law:

Paulus libro tertio ad Vitellium: Ususfructus est jus alienis rebus utendi, fruendi, salva rerum substantia.

Celsus 1) libro octavo decimo digestorum: Est enim ususfructus jus in corpore, quo sublato et ipsum tolli necesse est.

Gaius libro secundo rerum cottidianarum vel aureorum: Omnium praediorum jure legati potest constitui ususfructus, ut heres jubeatur dare alicui, usumfructu(m). Dare autem intellegitur, si induxerit in fundum legatarium, eumve patiatur utifruui. Et sine 2) testamento autem si quis velit usumfructum constituere, pactionibus 3) et stipulationibus id efficere potest. Constitit autem ususfructus non tantum in fundo et aedibus, verum etiam in servis et jumentis ceterisque rebus. Ne tamen in universum inutiles essent proprietates semper abscedente 4) usufructu, placuit certis modis extinguere usumfructum et proprietatem reverti. Quibus autem modis ususfructus et constitit et finitur, isdem modis etiam nudus usus solet et constitui et finiri.

1. The names of the cited Jurists are written in red (shown by tinted letters in this reproduction). 2. The copyist wrote u instead of n, and corrected himself. 3. Another correction: The copyist wrote rationibus. 4. After absce crossed out n.

incipit lib. iiii

R DEVS VIRTVTIV ET OMNIUM AD MODVM
OMNIS VITA VIRTVATVR R

Paulus lib. p. o. t. e. p. t. i. o. a. d. u. i. t. e. l. l. i. u. m. u. s. u. s. p. p. u. c. t. u. s. e. s. t. i. u. s. a. l. i. e. n. i. s. p. e. b. u. s. u. t. e. n. d. i. p. p. u. e. n. d. i. s. a. l. u. a. p. e. p. u. m. s. u. b. s. t. a. n. t. i. a.

Celsus lib. p. o. o. c. t. a. u. o. d. e. c. i. m. o. d. i. g. e. s. t. o. p. u. m. e. i. e. n. i. u. s. u. s. p. p. u. c. t. u. s. i. u. s. i. n. c. o. r. p. o. r. e. q. u. o. s. u. b. l. a. t. o. e. t. i. p. s. u. m. t. o. l. l. i. n. e. c. e. s. s. e. e. s. t.

Gaius lib. p. o. s. e. c. u. n. d. o. p. e. p. u. m. c. o. r. t. i. d. i. a. n. a. p. u. m. u. e. l. a. u. p. e. o. p. u. m. o. m. n. i. u. m. p. p. a. e. d. i. o. p. u. m. i. n. u. p. e. l. e. g. a. t. i. p. o. t. e. s. t. c. o. n. s. t. i. t. u. i. u. s. u. s. p. p. u. c. t. u. s. u. t. b. e. p. e. s. i. u. b. e. a. t. u. p. d. a. p. e. a. l. i. c. u. i. u. s. u. m. p. p. u. e. t. u. d. a. p. e. a. u. t. e. m. i. n. t. e. l. l. e. g. i. t. u. p. s. u. i. n. d. u. x. c. p. i. t. i. n. f. u. n. d. u. m. l. e. g. a. t. a. p. i. u. m. e. u. m. u. e. p. t. i. a. t. u. p. u. t. i. p. p. u. i. e. t. s. u. t. e. t. e. s. t. a. m. e. n. t. o. a. u. t. e. m. s. i. g. n. i. s. u. e. l. i. t. u. s. u. m. p. p. u. c. t. u. m. c. o. n. s. t. i. t. u. e. p. e. x. a. t. i. o. n. i. b. u. s. e. t. s. t. i. p. u. l. a. t. i. o. n. i. b. u. s. i. d. e. p. p. i. c. e. p. e. p. o. t. e. s. t. c. o. n. s. t. i. t. u. a. u. t. e. m. u. s. u. s. p. p. u. c. t. u. s. n. o. n. t. a. n. t. u. m. i. n. f. u. d. o. e. t. a. e. d. i. b. u. s. u. e. p. u. m. e. t. i. a. m. i. n. s. e. p. u. i. s. e. t. u. m. e. n. t. i. s. c. e. t. e. p. i. s. q. u. e. p. e. b. u. s. n. e. t. a. m. e. n. i. u. m. u. e. p. s. u. m. i. n. u. t. i. l. e. s. e. s. s. e. n. t. p. p. o. p. p. i. a. e. t. a. t. e. s. i. e. p. e. p. a. b. s. c. e. n. d. e. u. s. u. p. p. u. c. t. u. p. l. a. c. u. i. t. c. e. p. t. i. m. o. d. i. s. e. x. t. i. n. q. u. i. u. s. u. m. p. p. u. c. t. u. m. e. t. p. p. o. p. p. i. a. t. a. t. e. m. p. e. x. e. p. t. i. q. u. i. b. u. s. a. u. t. e. m. m. o. d. i. s. u. s. u. s. p. p. u. c. t. u. s. e. t. c. o. n. s. t. i. t. u. i. t. e. t. p. i. n. i. t. u. p. i. s. d. e. m. m. o. d. i. s. e. t. i. a. m. n. u. d. u. s. u. s. s. o. l. e. t. e. t. c. o. n. s. t. i. t. u. e. t. p. i. n. i. t.

FRAGMENT FROM THE PANDECTS OF JUSTINIAN.

(Fac-simile. 5-7 of original size.)

Manuscript from the VII Century. In the library of the Medici (Laurentiana) at Florence. The tinted letters are written in red ink in the Original.

ROMAN LAW.

Bruns, Pontes Juris Romani. *Huschke*, Jurisprudentia Antejustiniana, (Gajus, Paulus Sententia Recepta, Ulpian's Fragments, "Fragmenta Vaticana", etc.) *Edictum perpetuum*, ed. Lenel. *Theodosianus Codex*, ed. Huetel. "*Institutiones*," "*Digesta*," *Codex repetita lectiois*. "*Novellæ*", ed. Mommsen. *Basilica*, ed. Heimbach. *Cujacius*, Opera, ed. Neapol. 12 vols. *Donellus*, Commentarii de jure civili. *Savigny*, System des heutigen roemischen Rechts, 10 vols. *Puchta*, Institutionen, ed. Krueger. *Puchta*, Pandekten. *Savigny*, Besiz. *Bethman-Hollweg*, Civilprocess. *Keller*, Litiscontestation. *Windscheid*, Pandekten. *Mainz*, Cours de Droit Romain. *Ihering*, Geist des roemischen Rechts. *Zimmern*, Roemische Rechtsgeschichte. *Rudorff*, Roemische Rechtsgeschichte. *Karlowa*, Roemische Rechtsgeschichte. *Geib*, Roemischer Criminalprocess. *Zumpt*, Criminalrecht der roem. Republik.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

Any discussion of Roman civilization would be essentially defective were we to leave out that marvellous product of the Romans which, perhaps more so than all their great military achievements, is destined to immortalize their name and to make them the teachers and the benefactors of the latest posterity. I mean the Law of the Romans, the discussion of which will form the subject of our present lecture. It is of course entirely superfluous to tell you that I cannot even touch upon all principles of this science within the exceedingly narrow limits of my time. Roman law for the historian is not the legal doctrine of the jurist. Its mere dogmatic aspect is of a secondary consideration. I am not concerned with an exposition of the legal lore of the Romans, I am concerned with an exposition of the historical origin and of the historical purport of this science.

When I was treating of Grecian civilization I devoted two separate lectures to the philosophy and art of the Grecians, respectively. I did so because both Grecian philosophy and art are typical products of Grecian civilization. They were innate to the Grecian mind, they could not help evolving it; nobody helped them (because as I said),

neither the Egyptians nor the Assyrians were the teachers of Greek artists. Greek art and philosophy grew and developed with the force of natural necessity, with the force of that fate to which, according to Grecian religion, the gods themselves were subject. But what philosophy and art was in Greece, that was law, the science of law in Rome. It developed by dint of natural forces, unexpected, uncalled for, with an unconquerable force and energy. I say unexpected, uncalled for, and that is one of the many marvels in this marvellous science.

None of the Romans, down to the time of Augustus, ever set his mind on the exclusive cultivation of law. In fact, none of them was a professional jurist before the first century of the town. There were no lawyers. The Romans had no lawyers. I mean the Romans, at least down to the time of Nero, had no separate profession of lawyers, who lived by the exercise of legal profession. The great consulting lawyers of the Republic and of the first two centuries of our era, Scaevola, Sulpicius, Ofilius, Trebatius Testa, Aquilius Gallus, M. Antistius Labeo, and so forth, they never accepted a cent for their consultations. Hundreds of people beleaguered their houses every day to ask them for some legal advice, but they never thought of getting the least recompense for their trouble, for their lore. And hence none of them practiced law as a profession. They were soldiers, statesman, land-owners, who devoted only part of their time to the practice of law. On the other hand, there were no law-schools, at least not till the middle of the eighth century of the town. The great jurists had acquired their instruction by attending the houses of well-known jurists and by careful studies of laws and a few law books. Nor were the judges practiced lawyers. For the prætors, that is to say, those magistrates of Rome who prepared the lawsuit for the judgment, by fixing the legal question at issue in the form of a writ, of a formula, these

prætors were not practiced jurists, as our judges mostly are ; they were ambitious patricians, or plebeians, who happened to be elected to that office, which they occupied but one year, so that all chances to acquire profound legal knowledge and experience were absolutely excluded. It takes more than one year to become a good judge, or a good lawyer.

Now, if we think of all these circumstances, if we recollect that the Romans had no special training-schools for law (of course I speak now of the time previous to Tiberius, the time when the foundation of all Roman law had already been laid down), I say that the Romans had no special law-schools, no professional judges, no professional lawyers, that they were constantly engaged in wars, continental and maritime, that they despised all commerce and industry, these, the most essential elements of law, as utterly unworthy of a free man, as worthy only of a slave—if we take this into consideration, we should naturally expect the Romans to be very poor jurists. For what is better established, what is more of a truism, than that all work must be done thoroughly or it cannot be done well? But the Romans cultivated law with a certain reluctance. It is only in the second century of our era, in the time of Hadrianus, that we hear of real, professional jurists like Salvius, Julianus and Gaius. Previous to this the Romans seldom or never thought of founding a science of law. Or if they did so, they did it in a manner absolutely erroneous.

Cicero, the great orator of Rome, had a very considerable knowledge of law and he has left us a valuable treatise on what he considered to be the art juris, the science of law. In this curious book he simply derides the contemporary Roman jurists, he calls them law-mongers, people who cannot elevate themselves above the level of ordinary, common ideas, who cannot rise up to the clear atmosphere of philosophic science. And consequently he had made up

his mind to write a real scientific treatise on law. But posterity differs very much in its judgment on those law-mongers. Posterity is of opinion that the scientific treatise of Cicero is very good literary production, but very bad law, and that the books of those law-mongers, while they are poor in style, are excellent in point of law. Cicero, who combined all the culture of his time, who stood at the head of the most enlightened minds of an enlightened period, did not even surmise the far-reaching importance of the law of his state. Nor did Julius Cæsar, nor did any of the Romans till late in the second century of our era. All these facts go to prove that the development of the science of law was a spontaneous growth in Rome, nobody fostered it on purpose, nobody cultivated it deliberately, until it assumed forms of such imposing grandeur that one of the greatest mathematicians of our modern civilization, that Gottfried Leibnitz did not hesitate to compare the writings of the Roman jurists to the best works on the noble science of mathematics.

None of the modern countries, although they spend enormous sums of money in the cultivation and tuition of law, none of the modern jurists, although many of them devoted all their life to the study of law, no nation and no individuals ever succeeded in rivalling the Roman jurists. Their books are an inexhaustible treasury of legal knowledge, every line, every word is of the most precious value. When in the beginning of this century, in 1816, a manuscript, or rather a pamphlet was found in Verona and when it was known to be the lost institution of the Roman jurist, Gaius, an intense excitement took hold of the scholars in all Europe and America. The few pages of this book occupied the labors of a host of jurists and the most recent editor of Gaius confesses the sad fact that but little has been done so far towards a satisfactory understanding of Gaius. More than that. Some fifty years ago End-

licher, the botanist, who was at that time librarian of the imperial library of Vienna, discovered a small slip of vellum on the back of an old book. It contained some twenty lines, which proved to be part of the institutes of Ulpian. These twenty lines are considered such a costly acquisition that they form a conspicuous part of our minor sources of Roman law. Such is the incredible riches of this science that even those poor fragments, which have survived the ravages of time, and which of course give but a very inadequate idea of the original extent of Roman law, that even these poor fragments contain an inexhaustible treasury for all ages. For all that we still possess of the writings of the Roman jurists is but the one-thousandth part of what these jurists actually did write.

This one volume (showing the *Corpus Juris*) contains all Roman law. This one volume is the fountain head of hundreds of thousands of books. Every single line, every single word of this one book has been discussed, and examined by the most sagacious minds of more than ten centuries, and the lacerated contents of this one book have sufficed to render justice to numberless individuals, in numberless cases, beginning from the sixth century of our era to our present age. This one book has supplanted the law-books of the Germans, of the Franks, of the Spaniards, of the Portuguese, of numerous other people. At the time when this law-book began to be introduced into Germany, that is to say, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Germans had well-digested codes, like the *Sachsenspiegel*, the *Schwabenspiegel*, their different *Stadtrechte*, as the city-law of Soest, of Magdeburg, of Cologne. But in the struggle between the outlandish Roman law and the national law, the national law was the loser, and the Roman law retained its supremacy down to our own times.

It is one of the most frequent things to hear a judge in Germany quote the decision of a Roman jurist of the first

century of our era. But he not only quotes it, he abides by it. This incredible force, this inconceivable influence of the law of one single city is the great historical significance of the Roman law. For all Roman law originated in the city of Rome. I mentioned this fact in one of my former lectures on Rome, in connection with the absolute centralization of all Roman greatness in the city of Rome. As regards Roman law the fact does not admit of one single exception. All Roman jurists were the mental products of Rome, of the city of Rome. If you think of what I repeatedly mentioned in my lectures on Rome, you will not be astonished at this rather peculiar fact. For in the times of Rome there was no state, no land, no country, there was only one city, the city of Rome.

Take, *e. g.*, England. The law of England has not been developed in the city of London only, it is a growth of many cities, of many countries and regions of England, it is, as we call it, the common law of England, not the common law of London, or Edinburgh. In one of my lectures on Rome I mentioned the fact that it was in Rome, and in Rome only, where the strict, severe conception of a law, of a *lex* can be found. We will best understand this, one of the most important features of Roman law, if we compare the sources of Roman law with the sources of the laws of other nations. Gaius says : “*Constat autem jus civile populi Romani ex legibus, plebeiscitis, senatus consultis constitutionibus principum edictis eorum qui jus edicendi habent, responsis prudentium.*” In other words, Roman law is taken from the *leges* or *plebeiscita*, that is to say, from the decrees of the people, passed in the legislature, and from the ordinances of those magistracies who are invested by the people with a power of legislating.

It will be highly instructive to compare these legal sources of the Romans with the legal sources of the Mohammedan nations of Asia and the northern part of Africa.

The order of authorities to be observed by a Mohammedan judge is (1) the Kooran, (2) the Soonut, or Traditions, (3) the concurrent opinions of the Sahabah, or comparison of the Prophet, (4) the concurrent opinion of the Tabieen, or their immediate successors, (5) opinion of Abu Huneefa, Aboo Yoosuf, and Mohammed, (6) opinion of modern lawyers, (7) Kiyas, or analogical reason (Neil E. Baillie, *Mahommedan Law of Sale*, p. 21). In the order of these authorities there is no mention of a law in the sense of a lex, of a decree of the people. They found everything on their sacred book, the Kooran, and the traditionary comments on this book, and none of the jurists ever thinks of a legislative power of the people itself. In America, again, law is divided into written and unwritten law. By written law we understand constitutions, treaties and statutes. By unwritten law we mean common law and equity. The general distinction between written and unwritten law is that the former is regularly enacted and promulgated by the proper authority; while the latter is made up of judicial decisions without any formal enactment. Such a division is entirely averse to the character of Roman law. There is no such division in Roman law. In America the Constitution is, as it were, the primary law, and all laws have to agree with it. If a law in America, passed by the state legislature or by the National Congress, does not conform to the letter and the spirit of the constitution of this state or to the Constitution of the Union, it will be declared unconstitutional and void of effect. In other words, the constitution of Ohio of 1851 may annihilate any law, passed after 1851, in case that such a later law should be at variance with the spirit and tendency of the said constitution. But this, as far as Roman legal ideas are concerned, is a perfect jural impossibility. According to Roman jurists there is no such essential difference between one law and another law, they are all of the same class, of the

same species, and are all governed by the general principle that *lex posterior derogat priori*, *e. g.*, the law of a later date is derogatory from the law of an earlier date. Since this great principle of Roman law is absolutely inapplicable to the laws of America, you may easily see by this one example that the American conception of law differs entirely from the Roman conception.

There is another enormous divergence between Roman law on the one side and Anglo-American law on the other side. All of you are aware of the fact that precedents, that is to say, cases decided by previous judges play a very prominent part in American law. The library of an American lawyer generally consists of several hundred, sometimes several thousands of volumes of reports, containing numberless decisions of the judges of past centuries, so far back as the thirteenth century. This enormous library is the constant help, the refuge of every lawyer, he appeals to it in almost every single case, he cannot dispense with it. The Romans never thought of that. Precedents with them are of very little value. Instead of collecting the reports of individual decisions they neglected them entirely. This is a very remarkable point. The discussion of this one point will help us very much to a better understanding of the true character of Roman law.

There were no judges in Rome. I mean there were no such judges as we have. The magistrates in Rome, and more especially the prætor, did not pass a judgment, he simply prepared the lawsuit, granting the formula, the writ, in which the whole jural question at issue was properly formulated. The judgment itself was given by the juror, called *judex*, judge, or by the three judges, called *recuperatores*, never by twelve jurors. But these jurors were private men, and their judgments, although final, could not serve as a subject-matter of legal knowledge. The prætors, on the other hand, could not pass decisions,

but they were allowed to pass edicts as to their future treatment of law questions, and these edicts, when corroborated by their successors, formed part of the *edictum perpetuum* of all prætors. This *edictum perpetuum* of the prætors in Rome, in other words, these ordinances of the Roman prætors, by far the most ample source of Roman law, take the place of American precedents.

By what I had to say about the peculiar character of Roman law you will see that this unique law has a character of its own, an individuality of the most definite form. To solve the riddle of this individuality, to render its very soul within the compass of a few words is next to impossible. But I shall nevertheless try to give you what I consider the most salient point of Roman law, the point which distinguishes Roman law from all other law, and which, as far as I am able to see, constitutes its imposing excellency. But before proceeding to the discussion of this point we will first survey the history of this law.

The history of Roman law is usually divided into four periods; this division has been introduced by Edward Gibbon, the historian, and has been accepted by the Romanists of France and Germany. The first period extends to the establishment of the Republic; the second period to the time of Cicero; the third to Severus; the fourth to Justinian. The remains of the first period are very few, they are only fragments of some laws of the regal period. The remains of the second period are not very ample, either. They are chiefly the remains of the celebrated twelve tables, *lex duodecim tabularum*. These tables were the first codified laws of the Romans, comprising political as well as civil law. Down to the last century of Rome these twelve tables were considered the foundation of all Roman law, and Ulpianus or Papinianus, jurists of the third century after Christ, quote the twelve tables as the current law of their time. The

remains of these tables have been collected and put in order by the most sagacious and learned civilians of Germany, and we can now form a rather fair idea about their general contents. Of course it is impossible to dwell upon their contents at present; but there is one point with regard to these twelve tables, the discussion of which I consider one of my duties as an historian.

In the celebrated book of Sir Sumner Maine on ancient law, a book widely read and indiscriminately admired by the majority of its readers, you will find the following remarks on the twelve tables: First, that these tables do exhibit *some* traces of systematic arrangement, but that this must be ascribed to Greek sources of the *tabulæ*; and, furthermore, that these tables were compiled while usage was still wholesome, and a hundred years afterward it might have been too late, and that that much at least is certain, that with their twelve tables the Romans were exempt from the very chance of so unhappy a destiny as the Hindoos had to undergo because of their omitting to concoct a similar code. I must confess that these words are a perfect dime-museum of nonsense. They are not only erroneous; error in itself is not so injurious; they are far worse than that; they are sly, half true, and cover a profound ignorance with the lustre of shining philosophy.

In the first place, it has been proved to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt by Schoell, by Dircksen and by Huschke, that Greek law had nothing to do with Roman law, and to ascribe parts of the *tabulæ*, of the twelve tables to the influence of Greek law amounts to the solemn confession of a total ignorance of both Roman and Greek law. In the second place, there is not only *some* systematic order in those tables, as Sir Sumner condescends to concede, but there is much, there is exceedingly much systematic order in those old tables, by far more order than in the books of the English professor. The tables display the

utmost sagacity of experienced jurists and if you read what Ihering has to say about the systematic order of these tables you will be filled with the highest admiration for the profound wisdom of those ancient Romans who were the authors of this code. Lastly, as to Maine's remark of the Romans being exempt from the chance of the bad destiny of the Hindoos on account of their code having been made at a time when usage was still wholesome. But what does Sir Sumner call a wholesome usage? Is the usage of the Mahommedans, to expect and to accept a dowry, a wholesome usage, and is the usage of Americans, to refuse a dowry, a sickly custom? This attribute "wholesome" is entirely irrelevant to institutions of law. An institution may be ever so unwholesome with regard to one nation, that, however, does not exclude, that with regard to another nation, the very same institution may prove of the most beneficial character.

The Romans, *e. g.*, seldom or never demanded what many modern laws require as the first of all requisites; I mean written contracts. In point of law an oral contract was just as binding, and binding as to any kind of legal transactions, as a written covenant. Was this a wholesome or an unwholesome usage? Who will dare to decide this question? No sober thinker will. The Romans may have had very stringent reasons for this rule of law and our ignorance of these reasons does not entitle us to declare against the rule as such. As to Sir Sumner's opinion regarding the great benefit derived from the fact that the Romans had their usages codified at such an early period, I must confess that this in itself was no benefit whatever. The Germans had their national codes at a very early time, and so had the Franks, and the Burgunds, and the Castilians, and the Arragonians—but they were suffered to fall into perfect oblivion and their place was occupied by the law of Rome. The wonder is not that the Romans

had a code of twelve tables, but that the code never fell into disuse, that it continued to form the basis of all legal science down to the time of Justinian, that is to say, for more than one thousand years.

Towards the end of this, the second period of the history of Roman law, two main sources of this law made their apparition; I mean the edicts of the prætors and the teachings of the jurists. I spoke already of the edicts of the prætors. Every prætor, when entering upon his functions, had to publish his general principles of law, according to which he would decide cases to be brought before him. These sentences, or principles, he published on a white table in the vicinity of the Forum. This table was called *album*. (By the way, this is the origin of our modern albums.) These edicts were, in the time of Hadrian, collected into one great edictum—the edictum perpetuum—and this edictum, together with the writings of the jurists, contains the bulk of Roman jurisprudence. The writings of the Roman jurists were chiefly comments on the edictum. They took up the concise expressions of the edictum and dissected them, enlarged them, contrasted and compared them; and by such a wonderful process of microscopical and chemical analysis they contrived to bring forth endless legal principles, the most subtle distinctions, the most practical advices, the most unequivocal decisions. They used very good Latin. The severest grammarians praised their style; nevertheless, it takes a very moderate knowledge of Latin to be able to read the Roman jurists. They use very plain language; they hate vague, glittering generalities and general definitions. They say: *in jure civili omnis definitio periculosa*; that is to say: in common law definitions are very dangerous. They like to start from a concrete case, from a case of real life. Then they take up the case as an anatomist would take up an organ of the human body. They first divest it of all non-

jural features, of features which they call *res facti*; Say, *e. g.*, in an action for the recovery of a debt, it is perfectly indifferent whether the plaintiff or defendant is a patrician or plebeian, this is a *res facti*; but it is not indifferent whether the plaintiff or defendant is a *civis*, a citizen of Rome, or a *pregrinus*, a foreigner. Having once divested the case of all its non-jural features, they try to find out the jural relation, the jural principle of the question at issue; they try to determine whether the question has or has not reference to one of those *partes juris*, parts of the system of law which had been established by some of the very first Roman jurists. They quote each other very frequently.

Since the days of Capito and Labeo there were two sections or divisions of jurists; the one was called the Sabiniani, the other the Proculejani, after Sabinus and Proculus. These schools or sects differed on many points of the law, but there was no essential divergence between them. The jurists of Rome were both teachers of law and magistrates. I say both, because they taught their disciples by their oral advice as well as by their numerous writings, and at the same time they had the privilege of making law. Their unanimous opinion was equivalent to a real law. The writings of the Roman jurists did not occupy that merely literary position of the works of our jurists. The works of Coke, Selden, Blackstone, Stephen, Story, Kent, Benjamin and so forth are well-known works, held in high esteem, but their opinions are not equivalent to a real law. But the writings of Labeo, of Africanus, of Gaius, of Papinianus, Ulpianus, Paulus and Modestinus were equivalent to a real law. Hence you may easily imagine the enormous importance of these writings.

It is very difficult to say how it was decided that a certain person was a great jurist. For instance, Cicero was not considered a jurist, nor was the younger Pliny, although

both Cicero and Pliny had been prætors and proconsuls, and although both had published edicts and had given numerous decisions on questions of law. Very probably the Romans decided this precarious question in the same way we decide the question as to whether a man is an artist or only an amateur. We do know that Booth is an artist and that Mr. So and So is only a dilettante, an amateur. For in Rome there were no titles or dignities for the jurist. They had no LL. D.'s, no D. C. L.'s no D. J.'s, nothing of the kind. They were simple jurists. Ulpianus, jurisconsultus—Ulpian, the jurist. These great men filled the highest judicial offices of Rome; they were the chief justices, the præfectiurbi, the chief legal advisers of the imperial palace. It is one more proof of the fragility of the accusations raised against many Roman emperors, that some of the least reputable emperors had the best and most magnanimous jurists as their constant legal advisers. So was Papinianus, the greatest of all Roman jurists, a wonderful man in every respect, the legal adviser of Caracalla. All imperial ordinances, or, as the Romans called them, *constitutiones imperatorum*, issued from their pens. They gave those short and precise decisions which carried the clear, penetrating and systematic spirit of the Roman law to the most distant dependencies of the Roman empire; in the mines of Transylvania as well as in the tombs of Portugal; in the mounds of Northern Scotland as well as in the pyramids of Egypt, do we meet the forms, the signs of that cosmopolitan law, do we meet the peculiarly severe and objective style of the Roman jurists.

The last of the Roman great jurists was Modestinus, about the middle of the third century after Christ. From this time down to the time of Justinian, that is to say, during 300 years, there was no great Roman jurist. This sudden extinction of great Roman jurists has not yet been explained. In a work of Troplong (*Sur l'influence du*

Christianisme au droit Romain) you will find many ingenious reasons for this curious discontinuance. But I must confess I do not think that they really account for the fact. Christianity, as such, had a very deleterious influence on Roman law, and very naturally so, for Christianity tried to do away with those relentless distinctions between human beings, which were the foundation of Roman law.

The 4th period contains the reign of Justinian. Justinian directed several of his legal advisers, more especially Tribonianus, to collect all the more important writings of the Roman jurists into one large work which should henceforth serve as the only source of legal knowledge. Accordingly Tribonianus divided the work of 39 Roman jurists, but especially the works of Ulpianus, Papinianus and Paulus, into four great masses, and ordered several experienced jurists to make convenient extracts of the writings of these 39 jurists. This he and his collaborators completed in the course of three years. The extracts were divided into fifty libri (fifty books), every liber into tituli, sometime three, sometime fifteen, twenty tituli, every titulus into smaller sections, called fragmenta or leges, and every fragmentum into paragraphs. The whole contains 150,000 stichoi, or finished sentences, which are the abridgement of 3,000,000 of lines or sentences of the 2,000 original treatises. This work was published on the 16th of December, 529, and its name was Pandectæ or Digesta. Pandektæ is a word meaning a collection of miscellanies. The pandectæ of Justinian are frequently quoted with the sign ff, which is the origin of the German phrase, "etwas aus dem ff wissen," to know something authentically. The pandectæ contain nothing but abstracts from the writings of the Roman jurists. They are a collection of the most valuable portions of the works of these jurists, and this constitutes

the peculiarity of the *pandectæ*. For very few nations attribute such a high value to the writings of their jurists. In fact, there are only two similar, or rather, identical cases. I mean the Jews and the ancient Irish. The law books of the Jews consist chiefly of the opinions of the rabbis; and the laws of the ancient Irish consist chiefly of the opinions of their *brehons*, or jurists. The *pandectæ* form the bulk of the *corpus juris*. The remaining parts are the *Institutiones* composed by Tribonianus and his colleagues, in order to serve as a primer for the students of law, the *Codex repetitæ lectionis*, that is to say, a collection of imperial constitutions from the time of Hadrianus, and the *Novellæ*, or some new laws of Justinian himself. In addition to this we possess some works of a few Roman jurists, the *Institutes* of Gaius, the *Sententiæ Receptæ* of Paulus, the *Fragmenta Vaticana*, discovered by Angelo Mai in the Palimpsests of the Vatican library in Rome, and a few other fragments. This is in short the history of Roman law. You will see that, with the exception of the twelve tables, the Romans till the time of Justinian did not possess a code, a codified law, and that the law was embodied chiefly in the writings of their jurists, just as the law of America is chiefly embodied in the reports of the courts.

We have arrived at the third part of our lecture, at the discussion of the essential character, the historical position of Roman law. In the first place, Roman law refers almost exclusively to civil law as distinguished from criminal. The greatness of Roman jurists shows best in their writings on civil law. They have treated of criminal law to a very considerable extent, but in this field their attainments were rather of an inferior character. Criminal law, in its more perfect state, presupposes the abolition of those rigid bars between man and man, which for Roman civilization seemed to be unavoidable. The murder of a

slave, the abuse of a slave, was, for the Roman, entirely different from the murder or abuse of a Roman. Hence their definition, their conception of a murder or of any other crime was suffered to be accommodated to artificial differences between man and man, and hence they never attained to those pure and consistent definitions of the modern science of criminal law, which is far superior to the criminal law of the Romans. But with regard to civil law, the Romans were the most perfect masters. They have systemized it, arranged it, every part has its appropriate place, the convenience and coherence of the several parts is luminous, and when once understood it is, comparatively speaking, very easy to find the correct decision in a given case.

Their civil law was not influenced by religious tenets. If we compare the law of the Grecians, of the Hebrews, with the law of the Romans, we will be struck with the remarkable fact that religion, religious ideas, had scarcely any influence whatever on the law of the Romans. Take, *e. g.*, our present age. A contract, as the execution of a bond or promissory note, made on Sunday, is void. This is a clear case of the bearing of religious ideas on legal transactions. Such a thing did not exist in Rome. None of their mythological or deistical ideas were permitted to bear on their law. And consequently this law developed unbiassed, freely, according to its own intrinsic nature. Nor did political institutions influence the development of law. Although there was, politically, a great difference between patricians and plebeians, in point of civil law there never existed such difference. The legal conceptions of property, of obligation, of father, of heir, and so forth, were formed and applied independent of all political features. The patrician possessed the enormous power of the Roman *paterfamilias*, and so did the plebeian; the patrician was capable of being a possessor, that is to say,

the presumable owner of an estate, and so was the plebeian; the patrician could fall heir, or be disinherited, and so could the plebeian; the patrician son, the *filius-familias*, was, in point of law, a mere slave of his father (as I have mentioned in my second lecture on Rome), and so was the plebeian son. In short, there was politically no difference as far as civil law was regarded. In Europe, on the other hand, and to some extent even in this country, the influence of political institutions on the form and character of jural relations is very great. In Europe, *e. g.*, merchants, forming a separate political class of their own, have also a separate civil law of their own—the commercial law; soldiers are judged by the military civil law; members of the Catholic Church by the canonic civil law. In England and in America there is to the present day a vast difference between estates and estates. Some are equitable and some are legal estates, a difference which must be ascribed to the influence of mediæval politics. But the Romans never knew of such distinctions. An estate (*a fundus*) was a tract of land, that was all; it was a *res immobilis*, an immovable object, and a dog was a *res mobilis*, a movable object. There was only one institution of civil law which shows the direct influence of political institutions. I mean that curious division of things into *res Mancipi* and *res nec Mancipi*. Slaves, oxen, horses, mules, donkeys and estates and buildings in Italy were *res Mancipi*, all other things were *res nec Mancipi*. This peculiar division was a direct consequence of the Roman system of taking the census, the register of citizens. In the Roman census only *res Mancipi* were taken into consideration, and by this one cunning strategem the patricians precluded the possibility of a plebeian majority. For the estates and agricultural animals in the vicinity of Rome were mostly

in the possession of patricians, but estates and agricultural animals were *res Mancipi*.

Thus we see that Roman law was almost exempt from all interfering religious or political influences. But furthermore Roman law was almost entirely free from all symbolic agencies, which play such a prominent part in the law of other nations. Take, *e. g.*, the law of evidence. It is highly interesting to observe the different ways and manners embraced by different people for the detection of truth. There is a case of debt. The defendant denies the fact of ever having contracted the debt, or he concedes the contraction of the debt but he alleges that he has already paid it. The question now is whether the money has been loaned or given, or, whether the money has been returned. These are questions of fact. To find out the truth in the matter several nations have devised several methods. For instance, the Hindoo, even at the present time, collect a debt by *dharna*, that is to say, they ask a Brahman priest to squat down at the door of the debtor, and to sit there, without any food or drink, until the debtor, afraid of the starvation of the Brahman, feels like paying. Sitting *dharna* in India is preeminently an expedient resorted to by soldiers to obtain arrears of payment. The ancient Irish had the same custom. Numberless people in the middle ages again had another equally queer custom. They discovered the reality, the truth of facts, by ordeals or by duels. The refractory debtor had to walk barefoot over glowing plowshares, generally nine, or to dip the hand in boiling water or oil or melted lead and take out a stone or ring. If his foot or hand remained free from scalds, then the fact was considered proved in his favor. Otherwise he had to sustain the loss of his feet together with the loss of his money.

The duel was one of the most frequent expedients, not only in criminal but also in civil cases. Whenever a

difficulty as to evidence would arise, the trouble was settled by a regular duel of the parties. To us it seems perfectly unnatural that the incontrollable chances of an ordeal or a duel should serve as the proof of a mere fact; we take recourse to the depositions of witnesses, of circumstantial, indirect evidence, and we feel confident that truth can be decided by these vehicles. And so did the Romans. They never used ordeals or duels. Truth was detected by witnesses, by incidental, circumstantial evidence, and there was no symbolical, fictitious form of legal truth.

The whole development of Roman Law was a natural growth, independent of all secondary influences, nourished by its own intrinsic force, or as Pomponius, one of the jurists, puts it, "*rebus ipsis dictantibus.*" It was a growth dictated as it were by the growing organism itself. I am going to illustrate this very important point with the history of one of the most essential institutions of Roman Law; I mean the history of the Roman *patria potestas*.

In my second lecture on Rome I spoke of the peculiar state of a house-son, of a Roman *filius familiaris*. A Roman son, no matter whether he was fifteen or fifty-five years old, was unable to acquire one cent's worth of property as long as his father was still alive. His father was supposed to possess absolute dominion over his son. All earnings of the son belonged to his father, the father could sell the son, he could even slay him. The son was, in point of law, a mere slave. All this I have mentioned already. At present I am going to give you the explanation of this very peculiar law, in order to show, that Roman Law had its internal resources, that it did not depend on legislatures or judges to such an enormous extent as our own laws do. We may justly say of Roman Law what modern Italy used to say of herself: *Italia fara da se*—Italy will do it by herself. Roman law was an outcome of an inevitable necessity, and so was among others the *patria potestas*.

When speaking of the Roman Legislature we came to the conclusion that in Rome the wealthier classes were, in reality, the true managers and ministers of the state. To be enlisted in the higher classes of the census—this was, of course, the most ardent wish of every Roman, because a member of the higher classes was a voter of ten times more influence than a member of the lower classes. A member of the higher classes had twenty times more chances to get one of those profitable offices in the provinces, the incumbents of which were able to amass enormous riches in the course of a few years. The members of the higher classes were twenty times more likely to attain to one of those magistracies the tenure of which conferred the great honor of Roman nobility. In one word to be enlisted among the classes whose census was a higher one, was the most prevalent object of ambition. Hence when a father had several sons, it was to the interest of both the father and his sons, that all their earnings, all their property, should be considered as one man's property. For while neither of them by himself might be passed to the higher or highest classes of the census, all their joint property would have been able to place one member of the family in a high census-class. Because the census of the father was at the same time also the census of the sons, and the sons willingly agreed to a legal disfranchisement, to a legal incapacity of acquiring property for themselves, in order to give their father and thereby also themselves the enormous privilege of a higher class in the census.

This was the internal cause of the *civic part* of the Roman patria protestas, a cause which is absolutely independent of all legislative measures, which grew up by itself, and which helped to shape one of the most interesting institutions of Roman law. It was the same cause which introduced the Roman will. I say *Roman* will, for it has been absolutely proved by Sir Sumner Maine and Professor Maurer, that the will, the

testament is a Roman invention. To the ancient Germans, Hindoos, Hebrews, Franks, Celts the will was entirely unknown. It is a Roman institution. It is one of the institutions of this excellent law. And this one word institution brings me home to the ultimate object of my lecture, to the precise definition of the real value of Roman law. I shall try to give my opinion in very few words. My opinion is this: *The superiority of Roman law consists in its institutional character.*

It is not very easy to convey a correct meaning of these words. They imply all the admirable features of Roman law, its consistency, its regularity, its proportionality, its easy adaptation to the needs of social life, its scientific character. You will remember that in the whole course of my lectures I have mentioned no one word more frequently than the word institution. This one word occurred and reoccurred numberless times, and it seemed to be, as in reality, it is, the very soul of all that I had to say about the civilization of China, India, Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Rome. I have to confess that I have taken this word from the science of Roman law, that this science was my model, my pattern in framing all my conceptions, for it was this science which initiated me into my studies of the history of civilization.


What is an institution? You will remember that in the second lecture of our course I showed the general character and nature of an institution. As regards Roman law it is very easy to enumerate the institutions of this law, but it is rather difficult to define them in a general way. The institutions of the Roman law are as follows: dominium and possessio; potestas and manus; obligatio and pactum; actio and interdictum; hereditas and honorum possessio. These institutes are, as you see, dychotomous, they go by pairs. I cannot translate these expressions, because there is no proper translation of these words. They are the ground-

work of all Roman law, they cover the whole ground of this extensive law, and all minor divisions are nothing but reiterated copies of these primary institutions. If you compare an English law-book with a book of a Roman jurist you will be astonished to see that the headings of the several divisions in an English law-book are like those in the Roman jurist. The headings, the divisions most frequently met with in English, in American law-books are: Corporations, Partnerships, Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward, Master and Servant, etc., etc. And all these different divisions are arranged under the general heading of the Law of Persons.

But for a Roman jurist it would have been utterly ridiculous to class the division of Partnership under the same heading as the division of Parent and Child. For a Roman jurist there is an institutional divergence between the two divisions. Parent and Child belong to the institution *potestas* and *manus*, whereas Partnership belongs to the institution *obligatio*. By thus carefully coordinating the several organs of law, a symmetry is gained which enables us to rely upon our own judgment, to decide the numberless questions of practical life without constant recourse to the opinions and hobbies of others; it gives us a safe clue to the intricate labyrinth of law.

And it is this institutional character which will forever continue to be the immortal pride of Roman law. The law of no other nation has been able to breathe the soul of institutions into the inert mass of its legal rules and customs, and the study of Roman law will be for all time to come the study of all who want to be real jurists. Whenever the wisdom of the chancellors of England, or the parliaments in France, or the Reichstag in Germany were at a loss how to establish law in a new case, they invariably resorted to the treasury of the *corpus juris romani*, and they never were disappointed. For all great

and extraordinary achievements of the human mind there is a set period. There was a period for unexpected discoveries, in the fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries; there was a period for the most exquisite works of painting, in the time of Rafael, Leonardo da Vinci, Alberti, Michael Angelo; there was a short period for music, which is too much above all human beauty as not to be divine, it was the time of Bach, Handel, Mozart, Haydn, Beethoven, and Schumann; and, finally, there were periods when sculpture and architecture on the one hand, and Law on the other reached a pinnacle infinitely superior to all that had been done in the same line in previous times or in later ages. These times are gone and we shall never be able to equal Grecian art or Roman law.



SOCIAL LIFE OF THE ROMANS.

Graevius, Thesaurus antiquitatum romanarum, 12 vols. fol. *Seneca*, Opera, ed. Lips. *Horatius*, Opera, ed. Benti. *Ovidius*, Opera, ed. Burm. *Cicero*, Orationes, ed. Long. *Epistolae*, ed. Schuetz. *Martialis*, Epigrammata, ed. Lemaire. *Plinius*, (Min.), *Epistolae*, ed. Keil and Momms. *Juvenalis*, *Satirae*, ed. Macl. and Long. *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, ed. Mommsen. *Guhl and Kohner*, Das Leben der Griechen und Römer. *Pauly*, Real Encyclopaedie d. Class. Alterthums. *Forbiger*, Hellas und Rom. *Daremberg and Saglio*, Dict. des Ant. Grecs et Romaines (in course of publication). *Wieseler*, Theatergebäude etc. bei den Griechen und Römern. *Becc de Fouquieres*, Les jeux des Anciens. *Becker*, Gallus. *Marquardt and Mommsen*, vols. iv, v, vi. *Dezobry*, Rome au Siècle d'Auguste, 4 vols. *Martha*, Les Moralistes sous l'Empire Romain.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

I am going to give you a faithful, and as much as possible, a complete description of the social life of the ancient Romans. While I shall be extremely anxious to state well-ascertained facts, I shall at the same time also endeavor to place these facts in their proper light. Facts alone are not sufficient. There is no exaggeration in saying that a person may know ever so many facts about the social life of the Romans, yet he may be utterly destitute of a real insight into the nature and character of the peculiar civilization of the Romans. There have been scholars, say *e. g.* Graevius, or Montfaucon, who have collected numberless details about Roman life. The collection of Graevius forms twelve huge folio volumes, closely printed, with innumerable quotations and annotations. But these vast repositories of isolated facts can avail us but very little.

Facts alone do not constitute science; it is by the correct connection and construction of facts that real science arises. And thus I regard it to be my chief duty, not only to enumerate but mainly to characterize the facts of Roman life. These facts are, comparatively speaking, very few in number. For the social life of the Romans,

taken as a whole, was rather poorly developed. Private life in the times of the Roman Republic or the Roman Empire was very far from being what private life has been during the Middle Ages, or in modern times.

In the Middle Ages as well as in modern times the private life of a people is almost entirely apart from their public, from their political or commercial life.

Society is a world for itself. Society has its own laws, its own standards of dignity, its own rewards, its own pleasures, entertainments, rules and customs. Society has classes and distinctions of its own, distinctions of the most subtle nature. Society cares very little for the dictations of the political law-giver, it will rehabilitate where public law did condemn, and will relentlessly condemn where the law proves lenient and mild.

In Europe there are not only several societies, there are countless degrees of society, each of them having their separate universe of rules, customs, entertainments, and diversions. Consequently the private life of modern nations is a growth of many forces, it assumes forms of an imposing grandeur, it displays a variety, a multifarious development of social institutions that is perfectly bewildering.

Side by side with the political, with the commercial, with the scientific life of nations, the social life asserts its own character, its distinct tenor, its individual tendencies. In the times of the Romans, however, social life was altogether different. It differed from modern life in quantity as well as in quality. It was less diversified, less independent of all other factors of their civilization, and it aimed at altogether different objects. I say it was less diversified and this circumstance was chiefly due to the insignificant part played by women in the social life of the Romans.

Before entering upon this very interesting part of our subject, I have to call your attention to the great diver-

gence between the social standing of Greek and that of Roman women. As I have shown in my lecture on the social life of the Greeks, Grecian women, with the exception of the Spartans, were kept in a state of sweetened captivity: they were not permitted to join the symposia, the social gatherings of men, they were excluded from all public places, even from the theaters, and their life was very similar to the monotonous series of days enjoyed by the female inmates of modern Turkish harems.

Women in Rome, on the other hand, enjoyed all possible freedom. They partook of the decent entertainments of men, they could visit the theaters, the amphitheater, they could call on each other, they were socially almost on a par with women of modern times. Still they played but a very insignificant part in society. The fervent devotion to women in the middle ages, the romantic splendor that hovered round the form of a lady of these times were unknown to the Romans. Nor did they ever think of cultivating the graceful gallantry of modern times.

Leaving the explanation of this remarkable fact for another part of our lecture, we will, at present, draw the inference from the fact. In a society where women play but a very insignificant part—where women are not the objects of eager and romantic competition—in a society where poets took their subjects from mythical deities rather than from real ladies—for there are very few Roman poems of that passionate lyrical admiration of women which glows in the works of our poets, of Byron, of Heine, of Longfellow, of Beranger, the poet Catullus being, perhaps, the only Roman example, in a society where there are no calls, no picnics, no general receptions, where women could not join the associations, the clubs of men—such a society must needs be in a lower stage of development. And, accordingly,

we hear but little of those social contrivances which tend to fill the leisure time of society.

So, amongst others, the Romans knew very few private games and plays. True, we read of a kind of chess (they called it *ludus latrunculorum*) that they practiced, and of a few other games, *e. g.* *par impar* (even and odd), *caput and navis* (head or tail), and of dice—but these are primitive plays when compared with our elaborate system of cards, billiards, chess,—games, with the numberless sports of angling, skating, yachting, piano playing, etc., etc., each of which implies a world of entertainment, an inexhaustible source of privately enjoying life with your partners.

The Romans would have invented these or similar games—but they could not use them. A nation always invents what it needs. But the Romans had no use for such thing; for their lives were given to publicity, to the state, to the forum, to the comitia, that is to say, to the court and assemblies, and to the public entertainments. The social life of a people is complementary to its public life. If the public life encroaches on all powers and abilities of citizens, if it charges them with all kind of duties, and allures them with all kinds of reward, these individuals will feel induced to devote the greater part of their lives to the state, and the lesser part to private society.

This general rule holds good with regard to all nations. The more frequently the people of a country will be called upon to take part in the actions and functions of the State, the less intensely will they think of evolving the social relations of life. This one fact throws very much light on the civilization of nations, and more especially of the Romans. Take, *e. g.*, two countries of modern Europe—England and Russia. England, being a politically free country, the people of England, every single individual Englishman, has to respond to the duties

and obligations of a free citizen, he has to elect and to serve as a juror, as a trustee, as a commissioner, as a guardian, as a councilman, etc. The habitual exercise of these weighty offices, the keen feeling of responsibility, and the constant control of his fellow citizens fills his heart with an earnestness more or less solemn, makes him more or less unfit for easy, bantering jokes, for the lighter, for the smiling aspects of life, and gives him a leaning toward a stern and cold view of the world. The Russians, on the other hand, have none of the political burdens of democratical States. In Russia every thing is being arranged from above by the high dignitaries of the country and by their deputies. The people scarcely ever awaken to the responsibility of their life, they never think of the State, of law, of administration, and thus all their feeling and thinking goes to an intense enjoyment of private life. And no doubt there is ten times more fun in Russian than in English private life. In Russia they have the most exquisite national music, charming national dances, private entertainments, balls, masquerades, of the most enviable character. This gaudy and fascinating nature of the social life of monarchical and despotical States is one of the reasons why those people never think of upsetting the government. The Viennese valse was one of the firmest bulwarks of the Austrian emperors. People enjoy their private life so intensely that they never think of causing a change in their political life.

If we now apply these observations to the civilization of the Romans, we will at once strike at the very root of their social life. In Rome the private being, as distinguished from the political being, from the citizen, did barely exist; the former was perfectly submerged in the latter. There were so many public acts and functions, in which every citizen had to take part, that he had scarcely any leisure time at all for his private entertainments.

You remember that the Roman State consisted of the city of Rome. The inhabitants of this one city were constantly engaged in public affairs. In our times games and entertainments are not given by the State, but by private men. Our base-ball games, for instance, are private enterprises, and so are our theaters and concerts. But the games in Rome, or, as the Romans called them, the *ludi*, were public enterprises, given at the expense of the State. There were the *ludi Apollinares*, *ludi compitalicii*, *ludi florales*, *ludi liberales*, *ludi Piscatorii*, etc. And more especially the games and contests of the circus and the amphitheatre, of which I shall speak later on. Besides there were some fifty-two festival days, as many as our Sundays, for public sacrifices, and games of all sorts. Thus the time and the attention of the citizen was taken up almost exclusively by the State and the stately, frequently stilted entertainments given by the State. And hence the mitigating influence of private society was missing. This accounts for the stern, unflinching tone of the Roman character, whose resorts were public squares of his city or the seats of camp life. The Roman had no talent for that inestimable gift of softer minds, for humor. Their jocose writings are rather scathing satires, and in the comedies of Plautus and Terentius the funny parts are represented by slaves, not by free Romans. Their language is pompous, senatorial, full of the pageantry of public life; their music—they possessed trumpets, tubas, and a kind of clarionettes—was rough, grating, uncouth. Music needs the warmth of domestic tenderness; more refined music hates publicity, but in Rome there was little privacy.

The State was the regulator and administrator of nearly the whole life of every citizen. A citizen could not dress as he desired to. He had to dress according to the law of Rome. The chief apparel of a Roman citizen was the

toga and the tunica. The toga was a nearly elliptical piece of cloth, its greatest length being three times the height of the person who wore it, and its greatest breadth equal to at least twice the height of the wearer. The toga was put on this way: The first step was to double back a segment of the elliptical cloth, so that it may nearly resemble a semicircle. With the long straight edge so obtained, and with the smaller segment on the outside, the toga is thrown over the left shoulder, one end hanging down in front and over the left arm to the ground. The long end is then gathered round the back with the right hand, brought under the right arm and across the body, and finally thrown again over the left shoulder so that it may hang down the back some distance. The segment which was doubled back may be drawn over the back of the head like a veil. The Romans used no hats, only workmen and slaves wore hats, pileus, petasus. The toga was a thin woolen stuff, and as to color was always white for the ordinary citizens. A white toga with a purple border (toga prætexta) was worn as a distinction by those holding public offices, entitling them to the curule chair and fasces, by the great college of priests (Flamen Dialis, Pontifices, Augurs and Arvales), but in this case only during the act of performing their offices, and, curious enough, by boys up to their 15th or 16th year, when they assumed the toga virilis, the toga without the purple border. The tribunes and ædiles of the plebs and the quæstors were denied the right to the prætexta.

A purple toga was always the mark of high office, and as such was worn by the magistrates of republican times and by the emperors. The Romans had no shirts; shirts were first generally worn in the eighth century, A. D. The tunica, generally worn under the toga, was usually of linen, just as the toga was of wool, and white. The tunic of the senatorial order had a broad purple stripe

woven into it down the front; that of the knightly order had two narrow purple stripes. The legs were protected by flat bands (*fasciæ*) laced round them up to the knees. The Romans despised trowsers, they looked down upon them as being used only by barbarians. Senators wore shoes of red leather, ornamented with knots of ivory or brass, and with the letter C. The patrician order wore shoes of black leather ornamented with an ivory crescent. for unofficial occasions and for persons not belonging to these orders, there were the sandals.

Till 290 B. C. it was the custom of men to let the hair and beard grow long. From that time shaving and short hair were the fashion until under Hadrian. But all these minute regulations as to color, the shape and material of the dress of different orders had reference to male persons only. There were no such regulations with regard to the stola of women. Stola was the name of the female dress corresponding to the male toga. They would dress as they pleased—for women had little significance in the state of Rome.

Women in Rome never were the wives of their husbands. They occupied a very odd position. A married woman in Rome was either an *uxor in manu*, that is to say, a woman in the power of her husband, or simply an *uxor*, a wife. The *uxor in manu* was considered as being totally divested of all power to dispose of herself or of her money, or of her acquisitions. She was in the *manus*, in the power of her husband. In fact she and her children had the same relation to the parent father. The children were the absolute property of the father, and, as I have stated in my preceding lectures, the children were incapacitated for an independent life. All they earned belonged to the father, they were minors, wards, as long as their fathers were alive. And likewise the husband's wife. In fact she was nothing but one of the husband's children,

and the Romans do not hesitate to declare that the mother is only the sister of her own sons and daughters.

By her husband's judgment or caprice her behavior was approved or censured or chastised ; he exercised the jurisdiction of life and death, and it was allowed, that in the cases of adultery or drunkenness—(but it was enough to have tasted wine, or to have stolen the key of the cellar), the sentence might be properly inflicted. So clearly was woman defined, not as a person, but as a thing, that if the original title were deficient, she might be claimed like other movables, by the use and possession of an entire year. But after the Punic triumphs, the matrons of Rome aspired to the common benefits of a free and opulent republic, and their wishes were gratified by the indulgence of fathers and lovers in the senate and in the assemblies. They declined the solemnities of the old nuptials, and without losing their name or independence (not even their name—so that the wife of Mr. Cyrus Fulvius was not Mrs. Cyrus Fulvius)—subscribed the liberal and definite terms of a marriage contract. Of their private fortunes they communicated the use and secured the property, the estates of a wife could neither be alienated nor mortgaged by a prodigal husband ; the misconduct of either party might afford, under another name, a future subject for an action of theft. To this loose and voluntary compact, religious and civil rites were no longer essential ; and between persons of a similar rank, the apparent community of life was allowed as sufficient evidence of their nuptials. This, by the way, is also the law of the State of New York ; apparent community of life being considered sufficient evidence of legal matrimony.

Such matrimonial contracts led, of course, to pernicious abuse. A contract so loose and of such extravagant latitude of condition was easily set aside. Passion, interest or caprice, suggested daily notices for the dissolution of

marriage ; a word, a sign, a message, a letter, the mandate of a freedman, declared the separation; the most tender of human connections was degraded to a transient society of profit or pleasure. St. Jerome saw at Rome a triumphant husband burying his twenty-first wife who had interred twenty-two of his less sturdy predecessors.

All these undoubted facts go to prove that Roman women never occupied the position of a modern wife. When a woman in manu, in the absolute power of her husband, she was but a child; a helpless infant. When not in manu, she was absolutely free, she did not even accept her husband's name, she was more of an intimate acquaintance of his, one of his guests. Neither of these positions could add much to her social influence, she could not be the reliable perpetuator of rank, of social standing, of class-pride.

Our esteem for women rests chiefly on our belief in their conservatism, in their being the trustworthy conservators of social morals, of family ethics, and in Europe, of purity of class. But the Romans could not nourish such a belief, the experience of every single day went to discredit it, and, therefore, women were of little significance, and the social influence, of course, a small one. This one circumstance is almost sufficient to account for the fact that the social life of the Romans was rather a life of outdoor entertainments. For the charming centre of private social life, *i. e.*, woman, had little or no general influence at all. Hence the people rushed to the theaters, to the circus, and the amphitheater, and it is there where we must look for the social gatherings of the Romans.

But it will be convenient to treat first of their meals, which, as a rule, were done and enjoyed very elaborately. The evening-meal, the supper, was the principal meal of the Romans. The meal with which they sometimes began the day was the jentaculum. Though by no means uncom-

mon, it does not appear to have been usual, except in the case of children, or sick persons or of laboring men. Bread formed the substantial part of this early breakfast, to which cheese or dried fruit, as dates and raisins was sometimes added. Next followed the prandium or luncheon, with persons of simple habits a frugal meal.

The supper or dinner usually consisted of three courses: first. the promulsis or antecoenā, called, also, gustatio (appetizer), made up of all sorts of stimulants to the appetite. Eggs, also, were indispensable to the first course. Macrobius has left an authentic record of a coena pontificum, given by Lentulus on his election to the office of flamen, in which the first course alone was made up of some twenty-two different dishes.

It would far exceed the limits of my time even to mention all the dishes which formed the second course of a Roman dinner. There were birds from Africa, and Asia, fish dressed in the most various fashions, pork was the favorite dish, especially sucking pig. Boar's flesh and venison were also in high repute. Condiments were added to most of these dishes, and truffles and mushrooms of all kinds. It must not be supposed that the artists (the cooks) of Rome were at all behind ourselves in the preparation and arrangement of the table.

In a large household, the functionaries to whom this important part of domestic economy was entrusted, were four: the butler (promus), the cook (archimagirus), the arranger of the dishes (structor), and the carver (carptor). Carving was taught as an art and frequently performed to the sound of music, with appropriate gesticulations. The bellaria or dessert consisted of fruits (which the Romans usually ate uncooked), such as almonds, dried grapes, dates, of sweetmeats and confections.

We will now suppose the table spread and the guests assembled, each with his mappa or napkin, and in his

dinnerdress, usually of a bright color and variegated with flowers. First they took off their shoes for fear of soiling the couch. Next they lay down to eat, the head resting on the left elbow, and supported by cushions. There were usually, but not always, three on the same couch, the middle place being esteemed the most honorable. Around the table stood the servants, clothed in a tunic, and girt with napkins, some removed the dishes, others gave the guests water for their hands, or cooled the room with fans.

The coena in Cicero's day was an evening meal. It was usual to bathe about 2 o'clock and dine at 3. Dinner was set out in a room called coenatio or diaeta, which two words conveyed to a Roman ear nearly the same distinction as our dining-room and parlor. The coenatio, in rich men's houses was fitted up with great magnificence. Suetonius mentions a supper-room in the Golden Palace of Nero, constructed like a theater, with shifting scenes to change with every course.

The Greeks and Romans were accustomed, in later times, to recline at their meals, though this practice could not have been of great antiquity in Greece, since Homer never describes persons as reclining, but always as sitting at their meals. Roman and Greek ladies continued the practice of sitting at table even after the recumbent position had become common with the other sex.

The Romans knew how to churn butter, but they never used it in the preparation of their food; butyrum (butter) was used as medicine. Nor did they ever indulge in beer, although they knew it. The national beverage was wine. The ancients considered old wine not only more grateful to the palate, but also more wholesome and invigorating. Many of the Italian varieties, however, required to be kept for twenty or twenty-five years before they were drinkable. Hence it became a matter of importance to hasten, if possible, the natural process. This was attempted in various

ways, sometimes by elaborate condiments, sometimes by sinking vessels containing the must in the sea, by which an artificial mellowness was induced, but more usually by the application of heat. Thus it was customary to expose the jugs (*amphoræ*) for some years to the full fervor of the sun's rays.

The lowest market price for wine was 10 cents a gallon. The most celebrated wines in classical Rome were the *Setinum*, the *Falernum*, and the *Albanum*. The wine was almost invariably mixed with water, and to drink it unmixed, was considered a characteristic of barbarism. The proportion in which the wine and water were mixed naturally differed on different occasions. To make a mixture of even half and half was considered injurious, and generally there was a much greater quantity of water than of wine. The most common proportion was 3 to 1 or 2 to 1.

The master of the revels was usually chosen to conduct the symposium, the *wassail*, whose commands the whole company had to obey. The proportion in which the wine and the water were mixed was fixed by him, and also how much each of the company was to drink. The cups were always carried from right to left, and the same order was observed in the conversation, and in everything that took place in the entertainment.

Dancing with women was entirely unknown. No Roman ever thought of dancing except in connection with religion. Such is the enormous changeability of opinion, that the very thing which seems to us to be absolutely averse to religion, was performed by the Romans as a proper part of religious devotion!

I have mentioned already that the chief social resorts of the Romans were the theater, the circus, and the amphitheater. The Roman theaters were originally erected upon the sides of hills. This is still clear from the ruins of

very ancient theaters at Tusculum and Fæsulæ. They did not possess a regular stone theater until a very late period, and, although dramatic representations were very popular in earlier times, it appears that a wooden stage was erected when necessary, and was afterwards pulled down again, and the plays of Plautus and Terentius (which we still possess) were performed on such temporary scaffoldings.

The first attempt to build a stone theater was made a short time before the consulship of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. In 55 B. C. Cn. Pompey built the first stone theater at Rome. It was of great beauty, it contained 40,000 spectators. The Roman theater consisted of three parts, the amphitheater and the seats for the spectators, the orchestra, which was a circular level space extending in front of the spectators, and somewhat below the lowest row of benches, and the stage. Seats could not be purchased at pleasure. The first rows belonged to the senators, then came the magistrates, then fourteen rows for the equites, the knights, and the general public. Soldiers were separated from the people, the same was the case with women and boys. This stage arrangement was in perfect harmony with the whole character of these public entertainments. For these entertainments were given by the state, and the state had to honor its own dignitaries.

In nearly all dramatic performances masks were worn by Greek and Roman actors. It may at first seem strange to us that the ancients, with their refined perception of the beautiful in form and expression, should, by the use of masks, have deprived the spectators in their theatres of the possibility of observing the various expressions of which the human face is capable, and which, with us, contribute so much to theatrical illusion. But it must be remembered that in the large theatres of the Romans it would have been impossible for the greater part of the

audience to distinguish the natural features of an actor. In our modern gigantic circuses the clowns have to imitate their Roman colleagues and appear in typical masks. The features of the mask in Roman theatres were, for the same reason, very strong and marked. Again, the persons represented in most of the ancient tragedies were heroes or gods, and their characters were so well known to the spectators that they were perfectly typical. Every one, therefore, knew immediately, on the appearance of such a character on the stage, who it was, and it would have been difficult to a Roman audience to imagine that a god or hero should have had a face like that of an ordinary actor. The use of the cothurnus, or high-soled shoes, also rendered a proportionate enlargement of the countenance absolutely necessary, or else the figure of an actor would have been ridiculously disproportionate. Lastly, the solemn character of ancient tragedy did not admit of such a variety of expressions of the countenance as modern tragedies, the object of which seems to be to exhibit the whole range of human passions in all their wild and self-devouring play. How widely different are the characters of ancient tragedy! It is perfectly possible to imagine, *e. g.*, the Orestes of Æschylos, the Ajax of Sophocles, or the Medea of Euripides, throughout the whole tragedy with the same countenance, though it would be difficult to assert the same of Romeo or Ophelia or Hamlet. But there is no necessity for supposing that the actors appeared throughout a whole piece with the same countenance; for if circumstances required it they might surely change masks during the intervals between the acts of a piece. The masks used in ancient tragedies were thus, for the most part, typical of certain characters, and consequently differed according to the age, sex, rank, and other peculiarities of the beings who were represented. Pollux, one of the ancient writers, enumerates twenty-five

typical or standing masks of tragedy: 6 for old men, 7 for young men, 10 for females, 3 for slaves, and some 45 standing masks of comical pieces. When actors in Rome displeased their audience and were hissed, they were obliged to take off their masks.

The next great social resort of the Romans was the amphitheatre. The amphitheatre was a place for the exhibition of public shows of combatants and wild beasts, entirely surrounded by seats for the spectators, whereas, in ordinary theatres for dramatic performances, the seats were in a semicircle facing the stage, as in our modern theatres. It is, therefore, frequently described as a double theatre, consisting of two such semicircles or halves joined together, the spaces allotted to their orchestras becoming the circus inclosure or area, termed the arena. The form however, of the ancient amphitheatres was not a circle, but invariably an ellipse, although the circular form appears best adapted for the convenience of the spectators. Most of the early amphitheatres were merely temporary and made of wood.

By far the most celebrated of all was the Flavian amphitheater, afterward called the Colosseum, which was begun by Vespasian and finished by his son, Titus, who dedicated it 80, A. D., on which occasion some 8,000 beasts were destroyed. The immense edifice, which is even yet comparatively entire, was capable of containing 87,000 spectators, and originally stood nearly in the center of the city. It covers altogether about five acres of ground, and the transverse or longer diameter of the external ellipse is 615 feet, and the shorter one 510, while those of the interior ellipse, or arena, are 281 and 176 feet respectively: where it is perfect the exterior is 160 feet high, and consists of four orders, viz: Doric, Ionic and Corinthian, in attached three-quarter columns (that is, columns one-fourth of whose circumference appears to be buried in the

wall behind them), and an upper order of Corinthian pilasters. With the exception of the last, each of these tiers consists of eighty columns, and as many arches between them, forming open galleries throughout the whole circumference of the building. The whole building was covered in with a temporary roofing or awning. It is not quite clear whether the arena was no more than the solid ground or whether it had an actual flooring of any kind. That there must have been some substruction beneath the arena is evident, because the whole arena was on particular occasions filled with water and converted into a naumachia, where vessels engaged in mimic sea-fights, or else crocodiles and other amphibious animals were made to attack each other. Nero is said to have frequently entertained the Romans with spectacles and diversions of this kind, which took place immediately after the customary game, and were again succeeded by them, consequently there must have been not only an abundant supply of water, but mechanical apparatus capable of pouring it in and draining it off again very expeditiously.

There were in the amphiaters concealed tubes, from which scented liquids were scattered over the audience, which sometimes issued from statues placed in different parts of the building. In the amphitheatre the celebrated gladiatorial plays were exhibited. They were a form of spectacle which is peculiar to Rome and Roman provinces. The Grecians never indulged in such games. For the games and plays of a nation are intimately connected with the peculiar character and with the institutions of a people, as the constitution or the laws of a people. It has been several times tried to transplant the American baseball game to England or Germany, but neither the people of England nor the Germans did accept it. It is a thoroughly American game, and will never take root in any other country. It was the same case with the Roman

gladiators; they were a thoroughly Roman institution. The national passion for these games, or rather slaughters, was steadily increasing. The Emperor Trajan, in celebration of his victory over Decebalus, exhibited 5,000 pairs of gladiators. Domitian instituted hunting fights by torchlight, and at the Saturnalia of 90 A. D., arranged a battle between dwarfs and women. From Britain to Syria there was not a town of any size that could not boast its arena and public games.

These gladiators consisted either of captives, slaves and condemned malefactors, or of freeborn citizens who fought voluntarily. Of those who were condemned, some were said to be condemned *ad gladium*, in which case they were obliged to be killed at least within a year. When the day came the gladiators were led along the arena in procession, and matched by pairs, and their swords were examined to see whether they were sufficiently sharp. At first there was a kind of sham battle, in which they fought with wooden swords or the like, and afterwards, at the sound of the trumpet, the real battle began. When a gladiator was wounded, the people called out "*habet!*" and the one who was vanquished lowered his arms in token of submission. His fate, however, depended upon the people, who pressed down their thumbs if they wished him to be saved, but turned them up if they wished him to be killed, and ordered him to receive the sword, which gladiators usually did with the greatest firmness. Gladiators were divided into different classes according to their arms and different mode of fighting. The Samnites fought with the national weapon—a large oblong shield, a vizard, a plumed helmet, and a short sword. The Thraces had a small round buckler and a dagger, curved like a scythe; they were generally pitted against the Mirmillones, so-called from the fish (*myrmilos*) which served as the crest of their helmet. In like manner the Retarius was matched with

the Secutor. The Retiarius had nothing on but a short tunic or apron, and sought to entangle his pursuer, who was fully armed, with the cast-net which he carried in his right hand, and if successful he dispatched him with the trident (a spear with three tines), that he carried in his left.

But far more important than all these single facts is the question which presents itself with regard to the moral and historical significance of these gladiatorial games. Numberless writers, I dare say almost all historians, have pointed to these bloody games as a sure proof of the heathenish, cruel and callous character of the Romans. They have built up a whole edifice of accusations against the low and primitive stage of morals in those times; they have adduced these games as triumphant evidence for the defective symyathies, for the inferior civilization of the Romans. I do not deny that there is some truth in these remarks; it cannot be denied that to us, at least to some people of our century, such games would be utterly repulsive; it cannot be denied that a people who indulged in such shows must have lacked some of those tender sentiments which form the pride of our age. But granting all this, I do by no means grant also that these games are full evidence of the low state of Roman morals, or of Roman civilization in general. By no means. I have been induced, not by one or two or three, but by numberless cases of general history, to let my judgment of foreign institutions proceed unbiassed by any feeling whatever. purposely disregard my feeling; I ignore it. I would not listen to it for one single moment. For my feeling is a product of my surroundings, of my friends, my acquaintances, my time, my age. And the past events of history are the products of different surroundings, of different friends, of different acquaintances, of different times and different ages. Hence my feelings and history stand ajar;

they cannot understand each other. Suppose a Roman, say Cicero, or Pliny, or Marcus Aurelius, would leave his eternal resting-place and visit our present world. He would see our institutions, and no doubt some he would greatly admire; but only some. Others, probably the majority, he would deride, others again he would simply despise. That a freeman should be in a store all day long and smilingly wait on every servant-maid—that would be a perfect insult to a Roman; that men should dance with ladies in a public place, and ostentatiously, too—that would be the height of degradation. And that a culprit should be detained in a prison for five, ten or fifteen years—that would appear to him the most infernal cruelty that men ever invented. In Rome the condemned were branded, mutilated, exiled, killed, but to detain a freeman in cold blood for a series of years in a dungeon, that would have been more revolting to the feelings of a Roman than all the horrors of the arena, of the gladiatorial games. And what would this Roman say of bear-baiting in England, prohibited only less than half a century ago? What about the shameful bull-fights in Spain? What about cock-fights? What about our prize-boxers? Would any of us possess the effrontery to parade our Christian civilization in the face of these outrages, as they are justly called?

Ladies and gentlemen, it is perfectly useless, more than that, it is decidedly injurious, to study history with your heart. We have to study history as the naturalist is studying plants or animals. A naturalist would be a laughing-stock to all his colleagues were he to classify the pink as a moral, and the strawberry as an immoral plant. The standard of morality can be applied to individuals only. We can justly speak of this person as a moral, an ethical person, and of another person as being an immoral person. But a nation, an entire people can never be judged by such a narrow standard. There is little or no difference

between the morality of one and the morality of another nation. And if we still do find some shocking traits, some features which are adverse to *our* own feelings, why not rather doubt the legitimacy of our feeling than unhesitatingly condemn the customs of other peoples? Why not perhaps think : perhaps I do not know all about it ; perhaps there are some reasons for these shocking traits, for these strange features in the character of a people. And I take the liberty to assure you that a more elaborate study will invariably convince you that these shocking things were an inevitable outcome of forces, the control of which are in the hands of Him who controls everything, and cannot be attributed to the nation itself. If you will pursue your historical studies in this manner, you will not be in such a rush with despising and loathing the institutions of other nations. Your feelings, of course, will be put to a severe test ; say, *e. g.*, you read that some peoples eat their slain enemies, or that they sacrifice their children to some one god or goddess. But the principle holds good even in such an extreme case. I must confess I do not know why those so-called savages indulge in human flesh, and what makes them think that their gods have a predilection for human blood. But even in this fearful case I would postpone my judgment, although I cannot postpone my horror. Such doctrines are not intended for children ; but history is not meant for children. History, like astronomy, chemistry, or any other science, is meant for mature minds, for strong minds, who can endure the stern glance of truth, who do not shiver at the least little blizzard of truth. And it is in this, in the scientific spirit of history, that I ask you to look upon the gladiatorial games of Rome. The Romans, as I have tried to show in all my lectures on Rome, had scarcely any domestic life whatever. They had a street life, a camp life, a court life, a life by masses, by aggregates of people.

But masses of people have no tender feelings; an individual man standing in a mass of people has lost all those delicate sentiments which he would otherwise cultivate. He may privately be ever so nice and refined—as part of the mass he will soon notice the ascendancy of the rougher elements of his nature. The mere presence of so many people is exciting, it blunts the calmer feelings, and it creates a disposition to enjoy rude, loud, thrilling sights. And if such masses of people occur and reoccur almost every week, and twice in every week, the desire for those sights grows wilder and wilder, until it stops short of blood, or does not stop at all, but puts out the lolling tongue and cries for blood. The desire for the games of the arena, therefore, was virtually but the necessary product of the lack of domestic life. But who could have averted this evil, who could have changed the whole civilization who could have altered the course of all the channels of Roman life, who else but He whose infinite wisdom did not choose to do so?

You will ask me, perhaps, why did the Grecians dislike the bloody games of the arena? Have they not lacked the mitigating charms of domestic life? Undoubtedly. The Greeks did not possess our modern domestic life either. Women, I mean legitimate women, were most insignificant creatures in Greece. But you will remember the great, the vast influence of the Hetairai, of those semi-legal women, who occupied such a prominent place in Greek society. The charms of their houses took, to a great extent, the place of domestic life, as I have shown in my lecture on Greek life. Hence, no power, or virtue, and no reasoning could obviate the existence of the bloody Roman games.

We shall not then be greatly surprised if hardly one of the Roman moralists is found to raise his voice against this amusement, except on the score of extravagance.

Cicero commends the gladiatorial games as the best discipline against the fear of death and suffering that can be presented to the eye. The younger Pliny, who, perhaps, of all Romans, approaches nearest to our ideal of a cultivated gentleman, speaks approvingly of them. Marcus Aurelius though he did much to mitigate their horrors, yet in his writings condemns the monotony rather than the cruelty. Seneca is, indeed, a splendid exception, but he is without a parallel till we come to the writings of the Christian fathers, of Tertullian, Lactantius, Cyprian, and Augustine. In the confessions of the last mentioned there occurs a narrative which is worth quoting as a proof of the strange fascination which the games exercised even on a religious man and a Christian. He tells us how his friend Alippius was dragged against his will to the amphitheater, how he strove to quiet his conscience by closing his eyes, how at some exciting crisis the shouts of the whole assembly aroused his curiosity, how he looked and was lost, grew drunk with the sight of blood, and cheered again and again, knowing his guilt yet unable to abstain.

We have arrived at the concluding part of our review and discussion of Roman civilization. We tried to construe their political life, their chief magistracies, their legislature, their law, and the leading features of what might be called their social life. We have thus learned the characteristic contents of the biography of this nation and we have now to face the last and, perhaps, the most important and most difficult question. The question I mean as to the causes of the downfall of Rome. Why did this mighty Empire decay? Why was it, that a few hords of Germany and Sarmatia were able to shatter the whole magnificent edifice to pieces? Why did the Persian realm survive the storms of 3,000 years, why did the Chinese empire defy the hurricanes of 6,000 years, and

why did Rome succumb under the burden of a little over 1,200 years? This is the question.

In order to get a real insight into this momentous question we must first clear the field of all irrelevant factors. So amongst others: You will frequently hear that the downfall of the Roman Empire must be ascribed to their frequent military failures in the fourth and fifth centuries, A. D., to the many battles in which they were defeated by the sturdy and vigorous barbarians of the north. But such an explanation is perfectly childish.

The Romans, in their palmy days, suffered the most terrific defeats at the hands of the Gallians, of Hannibal, of Pyrrhus, of the Cimbri—defeats which were next to an absolute annihilation. Nor can their internal contests be regarded the real cause of their decay. For exactly at the time when they were at the summit of their power, they also underwent the dreary havoc of intestine wars. But least of all can we ascribe their downfall to the alleged rotten state of their morals. I know very well, that this is the general opinion. I know that generally we are taught to think, that the Romans of the first, second, third, and fourth centuries after Christ were in such a hopeless state of moral decadence, that the whole fabric of their institutions was thoroughly diseased, foul, venomous, unfit to live and unworthy to die.

These are the teachings of our school-books, of our reference-books, of our scholars, of our writers. From this I do deviate absolutely. Despite my most careful studies of the sources, despite all arguments of my opponents, or rather in consequence of this, I am deeply convinced of the utter worthlessness of this opinion. I do not deny the fact of the downfall of Rome; surely, this is an historical fact. But I do most strenuously deny that the downfall of Rome was due to the moral decadence of the Romans.

The Romans of the fourth and fifth centuries after

Christ were, on the whole, just as moral or immoral as the Romans of the fourth and fifth centuries before Christ. It would be the easiest thing in the world to accumulate examples of the most tender charity practiced by these immoral Romans; for instance the charitable institutions of the emperors Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian, which embraced all the orphans and the minor children of the vast empire. Numberless are the cases of the most magnanimous individuals; justice in imperial Rome, in this rotten and diseased Rome was administered in the most perfect way. We seldom or never hear a complaint over the injustice of judges, or the injustice of the imperial chamber.

The liberty of citizens, even the personal safety of slaves, were protected by powerful laws; the taxes were small, and were, comparatively speaking, a rare event. The average Roman gentleman was a firm believer in the pure doctrine of the Stoa, and this system of philosophy is of such a refined morality that one of the great theologians of Germany, Bruno Bauer, considered it to be one of the secondary sources of Christianity. Stoicism teaches self-control, self-respect, mild judgment of others, the immortality of the soul, the transient and ephemereal character of pleasure, and the contemplation of the infinite wisdom of God. These teachings were the confessed belief of these rotten Romans. These rotten Romans of the first three centuries of our era, instead of dozing away in idle profligacy, were the founders of thousands of flourishing cities in France, Britain, Germany, Austria, etc., with so many aquaducts for fresh water, with countless pikes and roads in almost all Europe, in Asia Minor, in Africa. These rotten Romans protected every body and persecuted nobody. It would be a simple waste of time to defend their religious tolerance, for this is now-a-days a settled question. They respected the religion of their subjects; Augustus humbly asked the Hebrews to pray for him in

the synagogue at Jerusalem. They cultivated literature and science, and a host of the greatest writers, thinkers and scientists the world has ever seen, like Strabo, Ptolomy, Galenus, Pappus, etc., lived under their mild rule. Commerce was protected and extended to the land of the Chinese and to the bays of Sweden. There was a most admirable postal system all over the vast extent of the empire, connecting the city of London with Alexandria in Egypt, and furnishing the greatest facilities for private correspondence. The innumerable nations under the scepter of these diseased Romans felt so happy that they never, or very rarely, thought of revolting against a ruler at once so mild and profitable. This is the real picture of the Roman Empire. Where can you detect the morbid sign of disease? Where are those frightful ulcers indicative of internal rottenness? Where are they?

Or will you perhaps argue the isolated stories of some profligate emperor? I do not think of denying some of them, but I dare say that the majority of those stories are miserable lies. They lack all reasonable evidence; you will find them in Suetonius, in Vopiscus, in Dio Cassius, in those anecdote-writers of Rome, in a few wretched pamphleteers, in the books of men who refused the responsibility of the real historian, who delighted in scandalous rumors and indecent narratives. But suppose all these stories are downright truth, pure, evangelical truth, what do they prove? Can these 200 or 300 scandalous stories outweigh the testimony of some 100,000 inscriptions exhibiting the happy, safe, pure life of the bulk of the nation? Can they outweigh the silent but effective traditions of those innumerable ruins of temples, bridges, asylums, roads and postal stations which display the peaceable, industrious, civilized minds of the Romans? They cannot. And thus we are forced to conclude that the decadence of the Roman Empire, as such, was not due to the

moral decadence of the people. Finally, it has been asserted that the Romans decayed because of their heathenish religion, of their polytheism, because of their belief in many gods and goddesses.

But this question stands in inseparable connection with the topic of my next lecture on the origin of Christianity. At present I shall state what I conceive to be the real cause of the downfall of the Roman Empire. It was not their immorality, nor their imbecility. The Romans erected their civilization on one foundation only; the whole of their civilization rested on it. I cannot repeat here what I have abundantly illustrated in my former lectures on Rome. I can only say that this sole foundation was the City. But with the enormous growth of the population this one foundation proved too narrow and insufficient, and thus it degenerated and had to give way. Hence the downfall of the Roman Empire was a death by starvation, not by disease. The organs of the Roman State were denied a proper nourishment, the country population of Italy as well as of the provinces neglected the old city institutions; these institutions were no longer adapted to the wants and desires of a rural population, and thus they decayed.

We notice the same process in the language of the Romans. The old Latin language was a city idiom, a language for city life, for the peculiar city life of the Romans. No sooner had this life ceased to fit the tastes of the country populations than they began to drop the ancient Latin and began to speak modern Italian. For modern Italian dates back to the 5th century after Christ. The downfall of the Roman Empire, therefore, was a downfall of institutions. The institutions of a people continue to exist while they really continue to fit the number, the quality and the occupation of the people. But the institutions both of Rome and Greece were, from their very

origin, intended for a select minority only. Women did not count, the majority of men were kept in bondage, and only a few, very few, individuals, comparatively speaking, were permitted to develop their souls, their mind, their character up to the highest type of perfect humanity. But this was not done through wickedness. That this was not the product of benighted, uncivilized or heathenish means, I have tried to prove. It was simply the inevitable outcome of inevitable circumstances.

We may congratulate ourselves that we are no longer under the necessity of keeping two-thirds of our fellow-beings, women and men, in bondage; we may be grateful to the Infinite Power who has freed us from such fearful responsibility. But we are not allowed or entitled to pride ourselves on this score; we have no claim whatever to a superiority over those great peoples of classical Greece and Rome. We are more fortunate than they; we enjoy some blessings that they had to forego; but, intrinsically, we are in the best case their equals, and not their superiors. They have bequeathed us some inestimable boons; they have left us a marvelous philosophy, an unrivaled art, a perfect law, immortal systems of science, and lastly, they have established a few doctrines which may safely be taken as the groundwork of the dearest hopes of this country. For the doctrines implied in the history of Rome are at the same time the greatest assurance of the stability and future greatness of this Republic of the United States of America. This Republic has avoided the enormous shortcomings of the Roman Empire. Instead of founding the whole Commonwealth on one single institution, on the institution of cities, it has construed a threefold foundation; it has built up in addition to its cities—the strong structure of the State and the still stronger structure of the Union. Thus there are three powerful forces instead of one; there is a system of checks and balances which will

prove firm and reliable under all vicissitudes of fate, and there is almost a certainty that this great Republic will flourish not only for twelve centuries, as did the Roman Empire, but for hundreds of centuries, and let us hope forever.



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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

With the exception of one of our lectures we have hitherto treated of subjects which, though interesting and sometimes even fascinating, are more or less too remote, too slightly connected with our present civilization as to rouse personal feelings of any kind. China and India, Egypt, Greece and Rome fill our hearts with wonder, with delight, with awe, but few of our personal, of our household feelings are concerned in them. We study them, we accept them as part of our general culture, we consider a knowledge of these civilizations as an indispensable element of our enlightenment, but all these accomplishments do not penetrate to the very heart of our hearts, to the inner focus of all our sentiments.

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In our present lecture, however, this is no longer the case. In our present lecture we begin to inquire into a topic of the most intense interest, into a subject that is not only a question of general history, but the anxious query of every man's personal history. Our heart claims its right just as well as our reason; and the penetrating inquiries of our intellect have to regard the dearest wishes and hopes of our sentiments. For our present lecture as well as the next lecture will treat of the origin and development of the most fundamental institution of our civilization: of Christianity. It would have been more prudent, perhaps, to omit a discussion of this topic, which with a great many individuals, especially professional persons, arouses a sensibility, a delicacy, that seems to exclude it from public lectures on history. But such an act of prudence and practical wisdom would have been utterly at variance with my confessed duties as an historian. In my very first lecture I promised you to treat of the chief institutions of mankind, and, consequently, it is incumbent on me to treat of the most fundamental of all institutions of modern civilization; of Christianity. And permit me to mention this much about my own person, that I have studied this great question with the utmost reverence and with the calm perseverance of real science. I have not hastily taken up the statements of second-hand, or third-hand books; but I have carefully studied the *original* sources of the question at issue, more especially the sources of the two first centuries of our era.

I am sorry to say that the vast generality of people entertain the erroneous idea that there are only *two* views of the matter: the orthodox view, and the negative view; that one must either accept everything and anything taught by the Church, or that one has to side with those poor persons who, like that well-known lawyer of New York, make professional ridicule of the whole sacred institution.



CHRISTIAN WIDOW IN THE ROMAN CATACOMBS.

From the painting by Georges Becker. (Fragment.)

This idea is entirely false. Downright orthodoxy is purely a matter of personal taste, and there is no use arguing matters of personal taste. But as to those other persons, who assail the institution as such—they are scarcely worth any consideration at all. None of them, and least of all the eloquent Colonel, have ever tried to study the original sources; their knowledge of the subject is miserable patchwork, they figure a puppet of their own invention, name it Christianity and bandy their cheap jokes at it.

But fortunately there is a possibility of a third view of the matter, of a view which is perfectly just, which has a legitimate title, a safe right of existence. This view starts with a profound reverence with regard to the subject. It willingly acknowledges the working of divine powers and even the mysterious functions of a superhuman agency. The partizans of this view are far from denying the immediate influence of that Eternal Cause, the existence of which is the most universal fact. They confess a firm belief in this Eternal Cause, they know that *all* events of this world ultimately depend on this Cause, and hence, that all history abounds in the signs of the infinite power of God.

I say *all* history—the history of the Egyptians just as well as the history of the Hebrews, Grecians and Romans. We can do very much towards a better understanding of the history, say, of Rome. We can discover some of the hidden springs of their system—we can explain a few of the more general features of their development—but after all our studies and after all the studies of all our successors we shall never be able to explain this one fundamental question: why was it the city of Rome, why not Veji, or Capua, or Præneste, or any other city of ancient Italy, that gradually became the centre of a vast empire?

This question for us is inapproachable. No human being can answer it; for this question implies a knowledge of things known only to Him who did not deign to reveal them.

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And such is the character of the history of every nation, of every institution. We can frequently go far in explaining some general fact of national history, some parts of an institution but we soon arrive at a certain limit where all human understanding is at an end, and where our hearts are filled with the reverential thought of the Lord's presence. Do you think that miracles and wonders were but the exclusive reward of a certain past period? That they have long ceased to exist? On the contrary! The world still abounds with them, they occur every day, every hour. Far from denying miracles, I rather assert, that miracles always existed and still continue to exist.

The undeveloped intelligence of people never wonders at events that they are used to, no matter whether they really understand them or not. They wonder at novel, at unexpected things. The refined mind, on the other hand, never ceases to gaze with wonder at some of the most ordinary occurrences. Plato taught, that all philosophy is nothing else but the ability to be astonished in the right place. I perceive a vast array of miracles and wonders in the history of Germany, of France, of England, of America, why should I not grant the possibility of miracles in the history of Christianity? In fact, I dare say, that all that I am going to tell in this as well as in my next lecture goes to prove that the very existence of Christianity is the greatest of all miracles. I shall establish this general observation with well authenticated facts, with facts which do not admit of the shadow of a doubt.

Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to call your special attention to this point, for it is the salient point of all that I have to say: I shall prove that we are absolutely at a loss how to account for the development of Christianity up to the year 150 after Christ. For the time following this year our knowledge becomes more substantial, and we begin to see some of the causes at work. Again and again do I ask

you to concentrate your thoughts upon this one point, that we have no *human* knowledge, or *human* explanation of the working of this sacred institution during the first century, and extremely little during the greater part of the first half of the second century of our era. In other words, our human evidences of this period amount to nothing, they can prove very little, they cannot help us to explain one particle of the whole process, and since the existence of Christianity in the second half of the second century is a well established fact, and since there is no human evidence of the preceding one century and a half, we have simply to abide by the fact, and ascribe its miraculous appearance to the general working of the ultimate Cause, of God.

Those teachers who tell you that there is abundant *human* evidence for the progress of Christianity during the first century, and the first half of the second century, those teachers, I say, do not know, or purposely ignore the truth. The truth of this part of the question has been established by the most pious theologians of Italy, Germany, France, and England, by Neander, Keim, Hilgenfeld, De Rossi, Martigny, Dean Milman, Venables, and numerous other theologians, and my statements are based exclusively on the precious labors of those pious and partly orthodox scholars.

Truth in this matter has nothing to do with the religious belief of individuals. I have to insist on the fact that there is, so far, a grievous lack of human evidence for the first century and the first half of the second century of Christianity. I have to do this in accordance with my strict obligation as an historian. But that does not preclude the probability that such human evidence consisting of ancient manuscripts, inscriptions, monuments, and the like, may be discovered by to-morrow or the day after to-morrow, or that it has been already discovered last night. Up to the beginning of this year such human evidence, such abundant human evidence has not yet been published.

You will notice that I am constantly speaking of *human* evidence. For of inspired evidence, (of course I mean the New Testament), I shall treat later on, in another part of my present lecture. But before I could proceed any further I have to circumscribe the exact meaning of Christianity. For I am treating of Christianity, not of the Christian religion. The Christian religion, the Christian dogma is only one of the elements of Christianity. There is one more element: the Christian Church.

Dogma, Creed and Church make up the whole of Christianity for the historian, and consequently my definition of Christianity, clothed in the most precise terms runs thus: *By Christianity I understand all the dogmas, symbols, or creeds, together with all those ecclesiastical, church institutions that have been laid down in the works of the Christian Fathers of the first four centuries of our era.* I am going to enlarge upon this definition; it being one of the utmost importance for our subject.

I said that Christianity for the historian consists of two parts, (1) of a creed, or rather of several creeds, and (2) of institutions, of ecclesiastical institutions, and, furthermore, I said, these creeds and these institutions have been propounded and taught by the Christian Fathers of the first four centuries. Of course it is almost needless to say that by Fathers of the Church we understand the aggregate of those teachers of the ancient Church, who, from the close of the apostolic age onwards, either orally or in writing, announced and defined the orthodox faith and came to be acknowledged as duly qualified exponents of her doctrines.

First, as to the creeds. Creeds are a gradual growth in the history of the Christian Church, but their rudiments may be said to have existed from the statement of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, x. 9: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine

heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." All subsequent confessions of faith are in fact more or less expanded development of the original baptismal formula, derived from the commission given by Christ to his apostles in the conclusion of St. Matthew's Gospel: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." It is not till a much later age—the age of Irenæus and Tertullian (175–200)—that we meet with any definite summaries of Christian belief; no summary of belief or creed is traceable in Christian literature before this period. It is not, then, till a good deal more than a century after the death of St. Paul, and only somewhat less than a century after the death of St. John, that we meet with any definite summaries of dogmatic belief in Christian literature.

The creed, as formulated by Irenæus, is very elaborate, he says in his treatise, *Adversus Hæreses*, IV, 33, §7, that he demands a "complete faith in God, Almighty, of whom are all things; and in the Son of God, Jesus Christ our Lord, by whom are all things, and His dispensations by which the Son of God became man; also a firm trust in the Spirit of God, who set forth the dispensations of the Father and the Son, dwelling with each successive race of men, as the Father willed." The creed of Tertullian, as set forth in his treatise, *de Virginibus Velandis*, runs thus: "The rule of faith is indeed altogether one, irremovable and irreformable; the rule, to-wit: in believing in one God omnipotent, the Maker of the universe, and his Son, Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, raised again from the dead on the third day, received in the heavens, sitting now at the right hand of the Father, about to come to judge the quick and the dead through the resurrection of the flesh as well as of the

spirit." Next in importance for our historical investigation is the creed as formulated by the first Universal Council of Nicaea, in 325. It sounds as follows: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things, both visible and invisible, and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only begotten, that is to say of the substance of the Father, God of God and Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made, both things in heaven and things on earth; who, for us men and for our salvation, came down and was made flesh, made man, suffered and rose again on the third day, went up into the heavens, and is to come again to judge the quick and the dead, and in the Holy Ghost." What is known as the Apostles' Creed claims our notice next. The growth of this creed is involved in hopeless obscurity. The tradition which ascribes it to the apostles themselves, it is needless to say, has no authority, and does not reach beyond the fifth century, if it can be carried back so far. Hence the Apostles' Creed belongs to a period which, by my definition of Christianity, does not fall within the scope of our investigation.

Finally, we have to mention the Athanasian Creed, or the *Symbolum Quicunque*, as it is often called. In one opinion all investigators are now agreed, that this so-called Athanasian Creed is not the production of the famous Father of the fourth century whose name it bears. This statement rests chiefly on the fact that there is no evidence of the existence of this creed even in the Western Latin Church before the end of the eighth or the commencement of the ninth century. Dr. Swainson particularly, in his elaborate work on the creeds, has exhausted all the historical evidence on the subject, and has proved in the most conclusive manner that the existence

of the creed cannot be traced before the age of Charlemagne. The Athanasian Creed, therefore, has no bearing on our subject either. The summary of our investigations into the creeds of Christianity in the first four centuries is this: Up to the time of the Nicene Council there existed a *regula fidei*, a rule of faith, as handed down by oral tradition, and as laid down in the writings of the Fathers, especially of Irenæus, Tertullian and Origen. This rule of faith was the established creed of the Christians of that time, and this rule of faith, with a few alterations, received the sanction of the Nicene Council. Thus much as to the first point of my definition of Christianity, as to the creeds.

The second element of Christianity I called the Church. I mean to say that the idea of a Church, of an *Ecclesia*, of a spiritual unity, of a purely mental government, of a purely ideal centralization of power, of a power regulating, not the external actions of men, but their consciences, their internal world; I say that the idea of such a system of internal politics, so distinguished from all external politics, was entirely novel; it had never existed before, it had never been thought of before. The Church (of course I mean the institution, not the building—the temple), the Church is essentially of Christian origin, as are the Christian creeds, and perhaps still more so. To the superficial observer the priestly order in Israel will be a satisfactory precedent to the Christian Church. But old John Selden already has refuted this opinion so completely that any further discussion of the matter would simply be a waste of time. Neither the Hindoos nor the Moham-medans, nor the Grecians or the Romans either ever thought of the possibility of a Church; they had priests and temples, and sacred sacrifices and oblations, but they had no Church. The essential distinction of the Church—of course I am always speaking of the Church of the first

four centuries—consists in the hierarchy, in the subordination of one spiritual office to a higher spiritual office, and so upward on to the highest office of the bishop or metropolitan. Such a graded system of spiritual offices, as distinguished from all civil and military systems, did never exist before the first centuries of our era. This is a fact of absolute certainty; it can be proved directly and indirectly with the greatest variety of conclusive evidence. I shall discuss the infinite influence of this fact in my next lecture; at present it will suffice to characterize its main features.

The Church, as I said before, is the second element of Christianity, so far as the historian of Christianity is concerned. The historian, I say, and not the individual Christian believer; for the individual Christian believer, looking upon my definition of Christianity, will sadly miss what he considers one of the chief elements of Christianity—I mean the Gospels, the New Testament. There is no mention made of the Gospels, of the other parts of the New Testament. But the historian of Christianity has to go not by the teachings of his individual Church, but by well ascertained historical evidence. The teachings of the Church, whose member you are, are binding on you in your quality as a member of the Church, and as long as you do not sever the connection; but an historian, as such, is no member of a Church, he has to abide by what his evidence teaches him. And the evidence in the question at issue teaches the historian that in an historical definition of Christianity—in an historical, not in a dogmatical definition of Christianity—the Gospels cannot enter as a constituent part. I say they cannot enter, for it is one of the best established facts of Church history, a fact corroborated from all quarters, that there is no mention made of the Gospels or of the New Testament during the first 120-130 years of Christianity. The Canon of the New

Testament, as we now possess it, namely, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, The Acts, Paul's Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, to Timothy, Titus and Philomen, to the Hebrews, Epistle of James, Peter, John, Jude, and Revelation—this canon was not known in the first century of Christianity. The Christians of that time did not know it, or in case they did, did not accept it as inspired, evangelical writings. The New Testament writings came into gradual use by the side of the older Jewish document, according to the times in which they appeared and the reputed names of the authors. No New Testament canon, except a partial and unauthoritative one, existed till the latter half of the second century, that is, till the idea of a Catholic Church began to be entertained. The proof of this statement is extremely conclusive. I shall adduce it presently; but I have first to say a few words about the Apostolic Fathers.

The Apostolic Fathers is a name given to certain writers in the earliest period of Christianity, who were believed to have been the disciples of the apostles and to have had intercourse with them. Those generally included under this title are Clemens, Romanus, Ignatius, Polycarp, Barnabas and Hermas. Now these immediate disciples of the apostles invariably quote from the Old Testament—to them an inspired and sacred thing. They have scarcely any express citations from the New Testament; allusions occur, especially to the Epistles, but none to the Gospels. One of them, Hermas, whose writings we now possess in a manuscript of the third century, found on Mount Athos, Hermas does not even mention the name of Christ, and he has but very slight reference to the Son of God. As far as we can judge from Eusebius's account of Papias, who died in 167 A. D., that Apostolic Father, or, at any rate, ecclesiastical writer, knew nothing of a New Testament

canon. Justin Martyr, one of the Fathers, about 150 A. D., knew only some of the synoptic Gospels, the first and the third. In Polycarp's epistle (150-160) there are indeed reminiscences of the Gospels, but the idea of canonical authority, or a peculiar inspiration belonging to these writings, is absent. Athenagoras, of Athens, wrote an apology for Christianity addressed to the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius. In it he uses written and unwritten tradition, testing all by the Old Testament, which was his only authoritative canon. He makes no reference to the Christian documents, but adduces words of Jesus with the verb "he says."

In short, one hundred and seventy years from the coming of Christ elapsed before the collection now known as the inspired writings of the New Testament assumed a form that carried with it the idea of holy and inspired. It is clear as sunlight that the earliest Church Fathers did not use the books of the New Testament as sacred documents clothed with divine authority, but followed for the most part, at least till the middle of the second century, traditions orally transmitted. In the second half then of the second century there was a canon of the New Testament consisting of two parts, called the Gospel (to evangelion) and the Apostle (ho apostolos). The first was complete, containing the four Gospels alone; the second, which was incomplete, contained the Acts and Epistles and the Revelation. How and where this canon originated is uncertain. Its birthplace may have been Asia Minor; but it may have grown about the same time in Asia Minor, Alexandria or Western Africa. Ever since the second half of the second century the Gospels especially have been taken as the chief source of Christianity. The Gospels are four in number, three are called synoptical Gospels, to-wit, Matthew, Luke and Mark; the fourth, the Gospel of John, stands separate.

The original copies of the New Testament writings were probably written on papyrus rolls, and were so soon worn out by frequent use that we do not even possess any historical notice of their existence. They must, however, have been written in uncial or large capital letters, without division of words or punctuation, without accents, breathings, etc. Even after the canon became fixed, manuscripts of the whole New Testament were comparatively rare. The Gospels were divided by Ammonius, of Alexandria, (220 A. D.) into short chapters. The oldest known copies of the New Testament were written in Greek—there is no Hebrew Gospel. The most ancient manuscripts that we still possess are the Codex Sinaiticus, found in a convent on Mount Sinai, and the Codex Vaticanus, in the Vatican library in Rome, both of the fourth century, that is to say, two hundred years older than the time when the Gospels were accepted as canonical writings. Next in age comes the Alexandrian manuscript, now in the British Museum, and the Codex Ephræmi, both of which are referred to the fifth century; but the latter is very imperfect, and barely legible. As to the first origin of translations of the Christian Scriptures into the vernacular of non-Hellenic Churches, there is no sure trace of a Christian literature in any other tongue than Greek till late in the second century. Even in the Churches of Gaul (France), Greek was the recognized language of Christian authorship, and in the earliest days of the Roman Church, Greek was the language of public worship.

And now let me sum up the results of the critical labors of the most celebrated theologians of Europe and America, the labors of Eichhorn, Gieseler, De Wette, Ewald, Bruder, Reville and others, in regard to the authenticity of the Gospels. These theologians, by the very fact of their being professional theologians, could not cherish any

other than the most reverential feelings for the contents of the Gospels. But their sincere and profound studies led them to believe that the synoptical Gospels, that is to say, Matthew, Mark and Luke, are *non-apostolic digests of spoken and written apostolic tradition*, and that the arrangement of the earlier material in orderly form took place only gradually and by many essays. The three first Gospels are often in such remarkable accord even in minute and accidental points of expression, that it is certain either that they copied one another or that all have some sources in common. For example, even if we suppose that the Gospel of Mark was used by the other two authors, or conversely, that Mark was made up mainly from Matthew and Luke, it is still necessary to postulate one or more earlier sources to explain residuary phenomena. And the longer the problem is studied the more general is the conviction of critics that these sources can not possibly have been oral. Hence the result is that neither of the three synoptical Gospels is a direct work of apostolic authorship, but that in all probability they are the indirect copies of apostolic traditions. The Tuebingen school, I mean the adherents of Professor Baur, of Tuebingen, however, strove to prove that a large proportion of the synoptical Gospels are direct forgeries, written in the interest of theological tendencies. You see the enormous difference between the two positions. In the one case the turning point is not whether the three synoptic Gospels contain any forgeries, because that is not assumed at all, but simply whether they are the direct work of apostolic authorship or mere copies of apostolic tradition; in the second case, in the case of the Tuebingen school, the question is as to alleged forgeries subservient to theological tendencies. Philosophically the Tuebingen school starts from the position laid down by David Strauss, that a miraculous interruption of the laws of nature

stamps the narrative in which it occurs as unhistorical. The application of this proposition would make a great part of the narrative of the Gospels and Acts appear as unhistorical indeed. But this whole proposition is void of any scientific value. David Strauss in general—although his very name seems to be dreaded by many religious souls—David Strauss, as well as both F. C. Baur and Bruno Bauer have one sad fault in common, which vitiates all their investigations from the very root. They were thorough and absolute adherents of that bewitching but, I am sorry to say, perfectly useless system of philosophy called Hegelianism.

For a Hegelianite there always is and always has to be an antithesis, or advance by antagonisms, or to use the words of the celebrated philosopher himself, “*die Synthese der These und Anthithese*,” the synthesis of the thesis and antithesis, or in plainer words, the continual process, the action and reaction between one idea and the opposite of this idea. This idea or fundamental thought pervades the whole mental system of Strauss, of Baur, Marheinecke, Daub, Michelet, Rosenkranz, and all the rest.

Hence they were bound to find an antagonism, even if there was no antagonism at all. Thus, with regard to the New Testament, they stated a fundamental antagonism between Peter and Paul, and consequently a tendency on the part of their respective partizans to falsify the Scripture. For the sake of proving this antagonism D. Strauss assumed the proposition just mentioned, that a miraculous interruption of the laws of nature stamps the narrative in which it occurs as unhistorical. But such a sweeping assertion is of very little value indeed. A tale, a narrative may contain ever so many miraculous interruptions of the laws of nature, or rather it may contain ever so many things that to the narrator seemed to be miraculous inter-

ruptions of the laws of nature, and still be thoroughly historical.

Take *e.g.*, the visit of the Magi of the wise men from the East to Jerusalem, who had seen the stars of the King of Jews in the East and had come to worship the King. It rests on the sole authority of St. Matthew, but there is no feature in his account, which is out of keeping with known events and possibilities. The Magi, Persian or Chaldaen astrologers were a class extremely common at that epoch, and under different names are repeatedly mentioned by the contemporary historians and satirists. That they were accustomed to wander to various countries and to interest themselves in horoscopes, we know from the story of Diogenes Laertius, stating that a Syrian Magus had foretold his death to Socrates, and from Seneca's statement, that Magi, who then chanced to be at Athens (so he says) had visited the tomb of Plato and offered incense to him as to a divine being. That they should have been deeply interested in any sidereal phenomenon is in accordance with what we know of their studies, and that a sidereal phenomenon of the rarest kind (namely the conjunction of three planets in the same constellation of the same trigon only occurs once in 794 years), and one which by the recognized rules of astrology was of stupendous significance, actually did occur at this very epoch we know by the independent and so to speak accidental investigations of the great Kepler.

He found that the three planets Jupiter, Mars and Saturn had been conjoined in Fish in a. u. c. 748, that is to say, in the 748th year of the era of the city of Rome, or 5 years before the beginning of our present era, in other words, in the very year when Christ was born. The conjunction of Planets which occurred on December 17, 1613, was followed the next year by the appearance of a new evanescent star of the first magnitude in the foot of

Ophinchus, which first attracted the notice of Kepler's pupil Brorowski, and continued to shine for a year.

Such phenomenon may have some bearing on the "star of the wise men," although taken alone it will not minutely correspond with the language of St. Mathew. Furthermore, according to the Chinese Astronomical tables, as given in Wieseler's Chronology, a new star actually did appear in the heavens at this very epoch. That such an astrological event would naturally turn the thoughts of the Chaldaeans to some great birth, and that its occurrence in the sign of the Zodiac which astrology connected with the fortunes of Judaea should turn their inquiries to that country, is again in accordance with the tension of Messianic expectations in those days, which especially effected the East, but which has left deep traces even on the pages of Roman writers.

This one example will show you that the general principle as applied by David Strauss is of very little value. We have so far come to the result, that the Gospels in their present form did not exist, or cannot be proved to have existed before the middle of the second century. The Gospels therefore cannot be used as an evidence for the history of the first century of Christianity. I am now about to prove that there is no other *literary* evidence either. By literary evidence I mean books, or letters. It has been frequently asserted, that there are abundant external proofs for the existence and progress of Christianity in the first century. It has been alleged that many Roman and Greek heathen writers of the first century mention the main facts of Christianity: The coming of Christ, his death, the formation of Christian communities, their creed, etc. This assertion, however, has no foundation whatsoever. In none of the numerous Greek, Roman or Hebrew writers of the first century is there one single mention made of the main facts of Christianity. There is

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no mention in Strabo, who lived in the time of Augustus and Tiberius, although Strabo wrote a geography consisting of 17 books, in the 12th of which he treats very elaborately of Palestine, and of the religion of the Jews; no mention whatever in the grand work "*Historia Naturalis*" of the elder Pliny, whose work we still possess and which is a complete cyclopædia of everything human and divine; no mention in Plutarch who lived in Greece and in Rome shortly after the time of St. Paul's activity in these countries, and whose voluminous works we likewise possess; no mention in Arrian, Dion Chrysostomos, in Seneca, although Seneca treated of the very things that form the centre of all Christian ethics; no mention in Quintus Curtius, in Martial, although Martial very frequently mentions the religious opinions of the Hebrews, and lastly no mention whatever in the extremely numerous works of Philo, who died seven years after the ever memorable scene on Golgatha, and who lived a few hundred miles from Jerusalem, busying himself with the very same problems that formed the divine legation of Christ.

All those great writers lived in the first century of our era; all of them wrote valuable works on topics closely connected with religious creeds of the different nations of the vast Roman Empire; all of them knew Palestine, some as Strabo, Pliny, Arrian, and Philo from personal visits to the land, some from the numberless books on travels, on geography, on different peoples, which at that time formed the bulk of general literature, and the titles of which you will find in the tenth volume of the *Bibliotheca graeca* of I. A. Fabricius.

Palestine at that time could be reached in three days from Athens, and in ten days from Brindisi, or in twelve days from Rome. The whole Roman world—and Palestine then was a Roman province—the whole Roman world was intimately connected and knit together by an

admirable system of postal stations and conveyances, legations from Palestine to Rome occurred five to six times in a year, and the Roman Senate and the people of Rome had a most accurate knowledge of the least little occurrence in the enormous Empire. These are facts; and it is our greatest moral obligation to acknowledge well established facts. Consequently we have to state that in the numerous and still extant Roman and Greek writings of the first century we cannot find one single line, one single word in support of the existence of Christianity. With *one* exception—this at least is the opinion of a few theologians.

These zealous men point to three passages in the Greek writings of Josephus, stating that these three passages, all written in the first century, contain an explicit mention of Jesus Christ and his life. One of these passages, however, speaks of John the Baptist only, the second merely mentions the name of the Saviour without any further addition, and the third is undoubtedly spurious, for it was entirely unknown to Origen in the second century, who with anxious zeal collected all passages bearing on Christianity, and who quotes Josephus very frequently. Accordingly the passages in Josephus have been given up by some of the most ardent and most orthodox theologians, as *e. g.*, by Reuss and Schuerer.

Hence we can safely repeat the historical statement, that in none of the numerous Greek, Roman or Jewish writers of the first century do we find any trace of the existence or progress of Christianity. At the beginning of the second century three passages from the writings of three Roman heathen writers are generally quoted as good historical evidence for Christianity. One of these passages is in Tacitus, in the 15th book of his *Annales*, the second in the 10th book of the *Epistles* of the younger Pliny, and the third in Suetonius, in his life of Claudius. But

Tacitus and Suetonius counterbalance, or rather destroy each other—for Tacitus speaks of a Christus in Jerusalem and Suetonius of a Chrestus in Rome, neither of them so much as mentioning the name Jesus. The younger Pliny who in the year 103--5 was proprætor, that is to say provincial governor of Bythinia in Asia Minor speaks of the Christians in that province. The passage where the word Christ occurs reads as follows: "Affirmabant, hanc fuisse summam vel culpæ suæ vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere," (x, 97) in other words, "the Christians assured Pliny, that the whole of their misdemeanor or error consists in meeting on a certain day before sunrise and of reciting a religious poem to Christ as to their Deity."

Pliny does not mention the name Jesus either; and as you may see, the whole passage is an extremely meagre report of the main fact of Christianity. Our external or internal literary evidences for the existence or for the progress of Christianity in the first century and in the first half of the second century are so few, that for a scientific discussion of the question they are perfectly useless. But in the last three centuries new and highly interesting evidence has been brought forward, evidence of a non-literary character, but still more conclusive and forcible than books or manuscripts. I mean the numerous catacombs and inscriptions found in Italy, Greece, in Asia Minor, in Africa. We have now to inquire whether these catacombs and inscriptions can furnish any historical evidence for the first century of Christianity. The catacombs have first been discovered in Rome in the year 1578, and ever since that time the sagacity and perseverance of the most learned scholars has been devoted to the study of these ancient remains. In the foremost rank of these scholars stand the venerable names of Bosio, Padre Marchi and Count de Rossi. It is chiefly, or rather exclusively the

results of their labor which form the bulk of our knowledge of the catacombs. Catacombs are subterranean (under ground) excavations for the interment of the dead, or in other words burial vaults. The visitor to the Roman catacombs finds himself in a vast labyrinth of narrow galleries, usually from three to four feet in width, interspersed with small chambers, excavated at successive levels, in the strata of volcanic rock subjacent to the city and its environs, constructed originally for the interment of the Christian dead. The galleries are not the way of access to the cemeteries, but are themselves the cemeteries, the dead being buried in long low horizontal recesses, excavated in the vertical walls of the passages, rising tier above tier like the berths in a ship, from a few inches above the floor to the springing of the arched ceiling, to the number of 5, 6 or 7, sometimes 12 ranges.

These galleries are not arranged on any definite plan, but intersect one another at different angles, producing an intricate network which it is almost impossible to reduce to any system. They generally run in straight lines and as a rule preserve the same level. The different stories of galleries lie one below the other to the number of 4 or 5 and communicate with one another by stairs cut out of the living rock. Light and air are introduced by means of vertical shafts running up to the outer air, and often serving for several stories. The graves, or loculi, as they are commonly designated, were in the Christian cemeteries with only a few exceptions, parallel with the length of the gallery. These loculi were usually constructed for a single body only. Some, however, were found to contain 2, 3, 4 or more corpses. After the introduction of the body the loculi were closed with the greatest care, either with slabs of marble the whole length of the aperture, or with huge tiles. The epitaphs are painted or engraved on the slabs in red or black paint.

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Padre Marchi has estimated the united length of the galleries at from 800 to 900 miles, and the number of interments at between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000. With regard to these catacombs and the innumerable inscriptions and symbols painted or engraved on their walls and tombs, the historian of the first century of Christianity begins his inquiry with asking: Do they furnish any evidence for the main facts of the beginning of Christianity?

Have we any or some satisfactory proof that the earliest of these Christian catacombs in Rome have been constructed in the first century of our era? And in general, how can we prove that such catacombs with loculi and inscriptions, whether in Rome, or Apulia, or Greece, or Euboea, or anywhere, are of Christian origin, that they actually are the burial places of Christians? The students of Christian archæology generally prove this assertion by pointing to the peculiar symbols on the walls and tombs of Christian catacombs. For there are very many pagan and Jewish catacombs in Rome and elsewhere, and consequently one has to look for a discriminating sign of Christian catacombs. Now it has been said that these discriminating signs and symbols to be found in Christian catacombs only are the following ones: the dove, the fish, the good shepherd, the anchor, the olive, the lamb, the palm leaf, the Greek letters alpha (a) and omega (o), the monogram of Christ (that is to say, the Greek capital letter Rho, which looks like our capital P, and the sign of an X under it), and lastly the cross. These symbols, together with a few other significant features in the style and outward appearance of the tombs are considered to be sure evidence of the Christian origin of such catacombs as contain these signs. The fish is a symbol of almost universal occurrence in the painting and sculpture of the primitive Church. Like the dove or the lamb, it is used in more than one sense. The Greek word for fish is *ichthys*, and

the single letters of this word are the initial letters of the five sacred words of the Church, namely, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Saviour.

The mystic senses assigned to the emblems by various Fathers of the Church often seem to the modern mind somewhat gratuitous. They strain their imaginations, apparently, to find reasons in the nature of types for a devoutly ingenious arrangement of initial letters, and seem to assume that there must be real analogy between the Divine Lord and the fish, because the initials of the name and titles of the one made the Greek name of the other. The use of this emblem is connected by Martigny, the great French archæologist, with the "*disciplina arcana*," with the mystic lore of the early Church. So amongst others, the *tesseræ*—small pieces of marble or glass—given to the newly baptized, were frequently in the form of the symbolical fish. Like the mystic fish and lamb, the dove has more than one meaning; it is used symbolically for the Divine Being and for the Christian worshiper, and is also represented in its own form on graves and the walls of catacombs. It is used very frequently with Noah in the ark, and in all representations of the Lord's baptism and elsewhere; the dove indicates the presence of the Holy Spirit. The next most frequent symbol in the catacombs is the combination of the Greek letters (a) alpha and (o) omega, evidently taken from the Revelation of St. John, where he says: I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. The cross, as a symbol, is of very frequent occurrence, too. And thus we should think that there was quite an abundance of distinctive signs, quite a multitude of peculiarly Christian symbols to distinguish Christian catacombs from pagan or Jewish ones. But this inference is incorrect; for none of the really Christian symbols, namely, the monogram of Christ, or the letters alpha and omega, or the cross, or the

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crucifixion can be found in any of the catacombs of the two first centuries. I say none of these undoubted symbols of Christianity can be shown to exist on any of the known tombs in Italy, Greece, or Egypt constructed in the first two centuries. The symbols on these early tombs and gravestones are the dove, the lamb, the anchor, the olive branch. These symbols, up to 1850, used to be taken as sure evidence of the Christian origin of such catacombs; but from 1850 to 1860 many, very many catacombs have been unearthed which show the very same symbols—the dove, the olive branch, the palm tree, and which, by their very inscriptions, point to a Jewish origin of the grave. In the year 1859, *v. g.*, a Jewish catacomb was discovered in the Vigna Randanini, on the Appian Way, about two miles from Rome. It has been minutely described by Padre Garrucci, a Roman Catholic priest. In this catacomb the graves and sarcophagi are sunk in the floor as well as in the walls. They are closed with terra cotta or marble slabs, and are otherwise, as the Padre says, very similar to those of the Christian catacombs. The dove and the olive branch and the palm are also frequently repeated. Such Jewish catacombs, scarcely or not at all distinguishable from the alleged catacombs of Christians, and anterior to the time of Christ, have been found in Rome and in other parts of Italy.

Now, then, we are in the most grievous predicament; we have either to date so-called Christian catacombs as early as fifteen years before the birth of the Saviour, or we are forced to state that these catacombs do not contain the bodies of Christians. And in fact none, not a single one of the 6,000 epitaphs or tomb inscriptions belonging to the first four centuries of our era and collected from the catacombs, can be proved to belong to the first century. The earliest dated inscription, which has been declared Christian, is from the year 107 after Christ. And

even this one poor inscription has no external sign whatever of its Christian origin. It has been accepted as a Christian inscription on the sole authority of Count De Rossi, but his arguments are mainly a reference to his personal conviction. But personal conviction is only an argument in the parlor; science requires much more than mere personal conviction. Nor was De Rossi successful in proving that some of the extant Christian catacombs were constructed in the first century. These are, according to De Rossi, (1) the cemetery of Priscilla, (2) the catacomb of Domitilla, (3) the crypt of Lucina, and (4) the oldest of all catacombs, dating, as De Rossi says, from the very times of the apostles, and now known as the Cemetery of the Font of Peter. But what is his evidence for this assertion? Has he sure dates? contemporary evidence? undoubted inscriptions? Nothing of the kind. I shall give you his evidence in a verbal translation of the Italian original. De Rossi says: "The evidence is presented by paintings in a pure classical style, with a very rare admixture of Christian symbols, decorations in fine stucco, displaying a chaste architectural spirit; crypts of considerable size, not hewn out of the living tufa, but carefully, and even elegantly built with pilasters and cornices and bricks and terra cotta; wide corridors with painted walls, and recesses for sarcophagi, instead of the narrow ambulacra with their walls thickly pierced with shelf-like funeral recesses; whole families of inscriptions to persons bearing classical names, and without any distinctively Christian expression." Such arguments would rather serve to establish the very opposite of De Rossi's opinion, for he has to concede that Christian symbols are very rare, and that no distinctively Christian expression can be found. These are the real facts of our knowledge of the catacombs of the first century.

This knowledge may be summed up in the statement

that we are so far not able to prove satisfactorily that any of the Christian catacombs in Rome has been constructed in the first century, or before 130 or 140 after Christ. Hence the catacombs do not furnish us any historical evidence whatever for the first century of Christianity. In stating this I am constantly conscious of the possibility that catacombs of an undoubted Christian origin and of the first century may still be found. But to the present day they have not yet been discovered, and it is my duty as an historian to accept actual realities only, and to disregard for the time being all future possibilities. And this is exactly the case with all other external or internal, direct or indirect evidence for the existence and progress of Christianity in the first century. I have established the fact that neither in the writings of the apostolic Fathers nor in those of the Greeks, Romans or Hebrews, down to the middle of the second century do we find the least little trace of the books of the New Testament. Nor do we find the main facts of Christianity mentioned by either the Greek, Roman, or Jewish writers of the first century of our era. And hence we have to wind up our historical studies of the first century of Christianity with the confession that this first century can form no subject of historical inquiries; the historian can no more speak or treat of this period than about the history of the Britains in the times previous to the Roman conquest, or about the history of the red Indians of America previous to the time of Columbus. The history, the so-called history of the first century is a mere matter of belief, of private credence, and not till the number of real historical sources will be augmented, not till then will history be able to speak of the events of those times in a scientific way.

Hence such wholesale condemnations of the Gospels, like the one perpetrated by David Strauss, or by those unscientific talkers, who call themselves freethinkers,

(most probably because they are free from the burden of thinking) are all childish, premature, dishonest. From the middle of the second century of our era Christianity assumes the most distinct forms, forms of such a gigantic size, that we are forced to infer, that the real fountain head of the enormous current must be located in the first century. This inference is valid, and thus the main facts of Christianity are not in opposition to the rules of probability. But History, in its present state, has to begin the study of Christianity in the middle of the second century, at a time when the genuine blessings of this institution began to be felt all over the vast Roman Empire.

Previous to that time the harvest of history amounts to very little. And accordingly, after having circumscribed the precise field of my activity as an Historian of Christianity in our present lecture, I shall in my next lecture discuss the chief points of those historical causes that promoted the existence and progress of Christianity beginning from the middle of the second century onwards. For there must have been a definite cause in existence, why this sacred institution was denied to the numberless millions of people who lived before Christ and why it was accorded to the people of the Roman Empire in preference to the vast population of China, or India, or Persia. All this then will form the subject of our next lecture.

At present I have to add a few more words about the sacred person of the Saviour. For the immense majority of people, a discussion of the origin and development of Christianity, is so intimately connected with the personality, the life and death of the Saviour, that it seems to them utterly inadequate to devote, as I have done, the bulk of my time to the discussion of things which apparently are in very loose connection with this central individuality of Christianity. All that I can answer is simply this: I am treating of the History of Christianity

as an historian. As a private individual I may enshrine his holy person in my heart, I may cherish the most tender hope of being united with him, of being saved by him.


All this I can do in my capacity as an individual or as a member of a church. But in my capacity as an historian I have to be silent. For, you see, History is a very poor science with regard to single persons, with regard to individuals. In such cases History wants for external evidence, for slips of paper, or slabs of marble, or chips of wood, or some external and direct evidence. It has been asserted, *e. g.*, that Napoleon I. was not born in 1769, but in 1768. If History wants to decide such a minute, microscopical point she cannot rely on general principles, on indirect sources, on her power of reasoning—she has to support her statements with documents, with the deposition of witnesses, and if these are missing, then History has to be silent, then her functions have ceased. And that is one of the chief reasons why modern and scientific History shows a very distinct disregard for, or at least an indifference to individuals. History wants to inquire into institutions, not into individuals. Institutions can be studied, at least very frequently, without the aid of direct and material evidence, with regard to institutions the power of reasoning, as distinguished from the bearing of mere facts, is supreme. We can sometimes explain the institutions of one people by an apt comparison with the institutions of another nation. But all these methods avail us not in the study of individuals.

Here we have to insist on direct evidence, on authenticated direct evidence, on letters, on diaries, on contemporary books or newspapers or inscriptions. Consequently the grand problem of Jesus Christ is a question of Biography, and not of History. The Science of History deals with institutions and not with single individuals. To

elevate individuals to the state of heroes, or to deify them. that is the province of Art, of Religion—Science cannot deal with that, for the influence of single persons far exceeds the compass of human comprehension. If some one person chooses to disbelieve certain biographies, if he wants to deny the existence of Romulus, of Homer, or of Shakespeare—let him do so. His results are perfectly indifferent to the Historian. He will never be able to deny the immortal institutions of Rome, nor can he deny the immortal poems of Homer or the immortal dramas of Shakespeare; nor will the most daring of unbelievers ever deny the immortal institution of Christianity. As to the details of the personal biography of some leading individuals of Christianity there may be many a difficulty, many a doubt—but what doubt can there be as to the boundless grandeur of the institution itself? As to the fact, that none of all institutions ever introduced did benefit a very considerable part of mankind as profoundly as did the institution of Christianity? What doubt as to the fact, that nearly all our great mental acquirements were, whether in accordance with or in opposition to Christianity, originated and occasioned by this one incomparable institution? That all Science and Art, all Literature and Law are under the very deepest obligation to the sacred institution of Christianity? The Historian as such cannot decide whether the Catholic or Protestant religion will save our souls in a *future* world—but the Historian can bear unequivocal testimony, that Christianity has actually saved the majority of the people of Europe and America here in *this* world, on *this* earth, that her institution proved to be the great benefactor of all classes of people, the moderator and regulator of many a struggle, and, in spite of all abuses, the friend and promotor of general civilization.

While therefore the Historian has to abstain from a dis-

cussion of the Life of Him by whom in all probability Christianity has been instituted, he will fervently join the universal adoration of a power, by which, in the most sober sense of the word, the vast, the infinite majority of civilized Europe and America has actually been saved ; a fact, the contemplation of which will induce the most philosophical and critical of inquirers to bow before the divine figure of the Saviour.



ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY.

II.

C. Schmidt, La Société civile dans le Monde Romain et sur sa transformation par le Christianisme, 1853. *I. L. Gennin*, De la société chrétienne au 4^{me} siècle d'après les lettres des Pères de l'Eglise grecque, 1850. *Fr. Muenter*, Die Christen im heidnischen Hause vor den Zeiten Constantin's d. Gr., Kopenhagen, 1828. *I. Venedy*, Roemerthum, Christenthum und Germanenthum, und deren wechselseitiger Einfluss bei der Umgestaltung der Sklaverei des Alterthums in die Leibeigenschaft des Mittelalters, 1840. *A. Riviere*, L'Eglise et l'Esclavage, 1864. *P. Allard*, Les Esclaves Chrétiens depuis les premiers temps de l'Eglise, etc., 1876. *Alteserra*, Asceticon, sive Originum rei monasticæ libri decem, Par. 1674. *Helvet*, Histoire des Ordres Religieux, 8 vols., 1714-1721. *C. W. Walch*, Pragmatische Geschichte der Moenchsorden, 1744. *Bingham*, Origines Ecclesiasticæ, book IV. and XVII. (on the hierarchy of the primitive clergy). *E. Hatch*, article "Holy Orders" in Smith's and Cheetham's "Dict. of Chr. Antiquities." *Manst's* Collection of the Acts of the Councils, in 31 folio vols., Florence and Venice, 1758-1799. *Hefele*, Conciliengeschichte, 7 vols., 1853. *Andreas Galland*, Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum, 14 folio vols., Venice, 1765-81, containing 380 "Fathers;" the most important are, for the Eastern Church: Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom and Gregory of Nazianzum; for the Western Church: Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

In our preceding lecture I have treated of the first century of Christianity, and after investigating into all kinds of human and historical evidences which still are at our disposal, into evidences of a literary or monumental character, into books, letters, tombs, catacombs and inscriptions, we have arrived at the conclusion that the historian, as such, is not enabled to give an authentic statement of the period just mentioned; that all he can say is this : About the middle of the second century Christianity, as defined in our preceding lecture, was an established fact. I take liberty to repeat my historical definition of Christianity as given last Saturday. I said that Christianity is the aggregate of those creeds or doctrines and ecclesiastical institutions, which have been propounded and established in the writings of the Church-Fathers of the first four centuries. Christianity, then, in this precisely circumscribed sense was an established fact about the middle of the second century of our era. And since facts of such a surpassing grandeur can not develop in five or six, or fifty to sixty years, we must, if

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not by historical evidence, so at least by logical inference come to the conclusion that the primary origin of it must be assumed in the first century of our era.

In our present lecture I am going to treat of Christianity during the period from 150 A. Chr. to 500 after Christ, that is to say of the historical period of Christianity, of the period, which by means of abundant human, direct and indirect, evidence can be reconstructed and cleared up by the historian. With regard to this period the historian has not to abide by merely negative results, he can give positive results, he can state the real causes and describe their course of action. In this period Christianity proceeded slowly, but in constantly advancing strides founding first a few isolated communities, then some little dioceses, afterwards, whole provincial church-districts, finally conquering the whole Roman Empire.

This conquest was done without the use of bloody arms, and was won over the most powerful commonwealth of many a century. The Romans ignored the first movements of Christianity, they occasionally persecuted some of its later manifestations, but in less than six generations (counting from 150 to 313) adopted both the creed and institutions of Christianity, acknowledging thereby its vast superiority over the political and ecclesiastical institutions of classical antiquity. In order to understand this grand historical process—I mean the adoption of Christianity by the population and lastly by the government of the Roman Empire—we have to be extremely careful as to the sense we attach to the term Christianity. I have stated already that Christianity for the historian does not consist of an aggregate, of a number of religious doctrines only. If we should try to examine our problem with thus restricting the historical meaning of Christianity we would never arrive at a reliable result. Christianity as opposed to Paganism is not only a number of new religious doctrines in opposition to a num-

ber of old religious doctrines, *e. g.* an opposition between Monotheism of the Christian and the Polytheism of the Roman, or between the conception of a Redeemer and Savior of Christians, and the total lack of such a conception with the Romans.

This one contrast, although nobody will think of denying its farreaching purport, this one contrast, I say, does not exhaust the numerous features of divergence and discrepancy between the Christian and the Roman. For the Mohammedans are likewise Menotheists and the Hindoos believe in a Saviour Chrishna. I may safely presume that all of you consider the Gods and Goddesses of Greece and Rome as purely imaginary beings, beings that never existed in reality, that were the beautiful creations of the poetical mind of Rome and Greece. You do think so chiefly in accordance with the teachings of our religion which comprises the belief in One God Almighty and simply denies the existence of other Gods. But this was not the case with the Fathers of the Christian Church; they were far from denying the existence of the several Gods or Goddesses of Pagan Antiquity. On the contrary, they had as firm a belief in their existence as had the pagans themselves, with this qualification: The pagan adored them as lofty deities and serene sublime beings. The Fathers, on the other hand, hated them as demons, as the authors, patrons and the objects of idolatry.

The Fathers taught that these demons had been degraded from the rank of angels, and cast down into the infernal pit, that they were still permitted to roam upon earth, to torment the bodies and seduce the minds of simple men. But they did not simply deny the existence of these deities, they only degraded them. Even St. Augustine himself is of the same opinion; you cannot read the first fifty pages of his admirable work, *The City of God*, without meeting with the most unequivocal statement that the Gods and Goddesses of Rome were degraded demons.

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This will show you that the contrast between Paganism and Christianity at that time was not the contrast of pure and unalloyed belief in One God Almighty and the belief of many Gods and Goddesses. And in general the contrast between belief of Christianity and the belief of Paganism was by no means a contrast between a pure and impure belief, a contrast between more enlightened and less enlightened ideas, between higher toned and lower toned morality. All these anthithetical terms have no relevancy to the real contrast. And since I am aware that this assertion will be, if not novel, at least shocking and painful to some who honor me with their presence, I am going to dwell upon it a little longer. I say that Christianity, although one of the greatest, if not the greatest, blessing conferred on western civilization can not be said to be *intrinsically, absolutely* higher than Roman Paganism. By using the word *intrinsically* and *absolutely* I mean to imply that the immortal services of this sacred institution apply only to *certain* periods, to *certain* nations, to *certain* circumstances, and not absolutely, that is to say, not to *all* nations, not to *all* times, and not to *all* circumstances.

Before entering into any elaborate proof of this assertion let me call your attention to the simple question : If you do believe in a God, in a benignant God, and if you do think that Christianity as such, *intrinsically* and *absolutely*, at all times and in all places is the greatest of blessings—how will you ever reconcile the divine benevolence of God with the undoubted fact that he has so far bestowed this blessing upon no more than the one thousandth, the millionth, say the one thousand millionth part of those unhappy human beings who were and are denied the bestowal of this blessing ? For Christians number by the tens, while non-Christians number by the millions, if we add the times previous to the Savior to the times subsequent to his death. This grand question, however, will be safely avoided, will

be deprived of all meaning, as soon as you accept the historical opinion, that Christianity is the greatest of blessings but for certain nations, certain peoples and certain times only.

And consequently while history willingly acknowledges the enormous superiority of Christianity, as opposed to Paganism, it does so simply because Christianity at the time of its more distinct manifestation was far better adapted to the circumstances of the Roman Empire than Paganism, and consequently Paganism succumbed. But 200 to 300 years previous to that time, Paganism was just as admirably adapted to Rome, as Christianity was 200 to 300 years later. This great historical truth will explain to you, by the way, the utter insufficiency of all Christian missionary work in countries which are not adapted for the institution of Christianity. The Church of Rome has wasted the most precious labors of her best skilled missionaries in China, and 500 years of unremitting work have produced no result whatever. For it is since over 500 years that Christian missionaries have been sent to China.

I have said and I have tried to prove, that the most conspicuous historical feature of Christianity is not to be found in the creed and in the dogma. On the contrary the momentous *historical* character of Christianity consists in its ecclesiastical institutions. But before we can commence to investigate into this the soul of Christianity as an historical event, we have to turn our attention to an other novel feature of Christianity, a feature which distinguished it very remarkably from both Judaism and Paganism. I mean the zeal to make proselytes so characteristic of Christianity from the very beginning of her institutions. This zeal, glorified in the venerable figures of the apostles who went out to baptize all nations, was of peculiarly Christian origin. Neither the Romans nor the ancient Hebrews had cultivated it. No Roman ever cared for the religious ideas of his

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subjects and very frequently the deities of conquered people were simply accepted into the long array of native Roman Gods or Goddesses.

To convert a person was an endeavor altogether unknown in Rome or Greece. Nor did the ancient Hebrews ever think of converting other nations to their religion. This statement has been frequently denied and the ancient Hebrews are said to have zealously propagated their doctrines. But this is absolutely untenable; 20 pages in John Selden's *Work on De jure naturali et gentium juxta disciplinam Hebræorum*, or the law of foreigners in Israel will be sufficient to refute it, and Selden's book contains 800 pages. And we can even without Selden readily see why the ancient Hebrews were averse to proselytes. To turn a Hebrew at that time did not mean a simple change of opinion, of belief; it meant a change in the citizenship, and the acquisition of the very precious rights of ancient Hebrew citizenship. For as I have shown in my lecture on ancient Israel, the citizens of ancient Palestine had the most extensive homestead laws, and furthermore a very efficient protection against the chances of extreme poverty. Now as a matter of course they were not very anxious to depreciate these valuable rights by granting them to anybody who happened to declare that he is willing to accept the doctrine of Hebrew monotheism.

And this was the simple reason why the ancient Hebrews were very indifferent to proselytes. But Christianity, from the very beginning, displayed an ardent zeal to convert all mankind. This very zeal is one of the most remarkable traits of this institution. It was entirely novel, and to the present day it stands unparalleled. Neither the Mohammedan muftis, nor the Buddhist priests—although both frequently engage in missionary work, have carried it to the amazing system of passionate ardour of Christian priests. The very first teachers, historical teachers of

Christianity, constantly insist on the necessity to convert all mankind to Christianity.

And now mark the immense significance of this one fact,—a fact, the elucidation of which will lead us to the deepest roots of the whole institution. I say the first historical teachers of Christianity constantly taught the conversion of all mankind. This conversion was to be effected by zealous preaching, by kind persuasions, by arguing the chief points of Christian doctrine, and so forth. Now let us imagine that one of those fathers, say Justinus Martyr or Irenaeus addressed a citizen of Rome with a view to convert him to Christianity. His first endeavor was to prove that the soul of the citizen was his really noble part, that the salvation of his soul was the only real object of his life and that this salvation depended on a belief in Christ.

The citizen of Rome (of course I mean any person in Europe, Asia or Africa, who enjoyed the citizenship of Rome)—this citizen of Rome would certainly fail to see why his soul should be considered the more important part of his being. For by all what he could see and hear and experience ever since he was living, it was not his soul but his Roman citizenship which proved to be his real protector. For if he should lose that—he lost everthing. If he lost his Roman citizenship, he was debarred from all chances to the great offices of the State, to all the profitable positions in the army, in the navy, in the innumerable colonies,—he lost the just and rapid judicial administration of Roman courts—he lost the assistance of the powerful Roman police—he sunk down to a mere resident, to a poor sojourner in the land. If you vividly represent that to your mind you will clearly see the enormous difficulty, to persuade such a Roman citizen, that the spiritual, ethereal interests of his soul ought to be his chief concern. But that was not all. His Christian teacher went still

farther. He not only advised him to cultivate the interests of his soul in preference to his bodily interests, his future salvation more than his present well-being—he required, he demanded much more than that. He demanded a thorough change in his whole social life. A convert had to observe, and strictly too the three hours of prayer, the 3rd, the 6th and the 9th, or according to the modern way of denoting time, 9 o'clock, a. m., 12 o'clock m. and 3 o'clock p. m.

Instead of attending the gorgeous plays of the arena—and you will remember from our lecture on the social life of the Romans, that these bewildering plays were given in almost every single city of the vast empire—instead, I say, of attending these highly attractive games, the convert had to abstain from them entirely. He was not permitted to see them, he was not allowed to join his older friends and enjoy what all the respectable and refined of his fellow-citizens did not hesitate to delight in. He had to stay at home and read the Scripture with his wife and children. The breakfast of the early Christians was taken at 9 o'clock in the morning, preceded, like every other meal, by a special prayer for the divine blessing. When this first meal was over, the mother and her children exchanged the kiss of peace and then separated for their daily tasks. Husband and wife were enjoined both to pray together and to study the Scripture together. In all these observances one feature is to be noted which offers the greatest contrast to the pagan domestic rites, namely, that they were not looked upon as a mystery to be guarded from the scrutiny of other families, but were, in keeping with the general spirit of Christian proselytism, readily shared with others. A convert could not partake of those numerous public plays (*ludi*) as the *ludi apollinares*, *liberales*, *florales*, *piscatorii*, the circus and the amphitheatre, which I described in our lecture on the social

life of the Romans. He could not go to the theatres, he could not read the immortal writings of the Greek and Roman authors, for circus and amphitheatre, theatres and authors were all saturated with the symbols and ideas of Paganism, and the newly convert had to shun the very appearance of anything heathenish. All these facts will show you that to turn Christian in the course of the first three centuries of our era was an undertaking beset with the most considerable difficulties. The convert had not only to change his ideas about religion, he had to give up all his accustomed relations, all his old ways of enjoying life, of spending his time, even of acquiring his livelihood. For many trades were strictly forbidden to a Christian. He was forbidden to engage in any art or occupation which either directly or indirectly subserved the rites of paganism, such as statuary or painting, the flourishing trade in idols, etc. He was persuaded to do what may seem to be a very trifling thing, but what in reality is a thing of great moment. I mean the Christian convert was expected to give up his old name, but not only this, he was expected to give up the old manner of naming himself. The Romans had three or four names; and to a Roman his name was of such an importance as to a modern European aristocrat. I think it would be next to impossible to persuade a Lord Dudley or Marquis Monthon, or a Prince Lichtenstein to give up his name and exchange it for Smith or Jones or the like. But the three names of a Roman citizen implied a very great significance, and accordingly we never hear of a Roman citizen who dropped his entire name, or who used only one of his names. But the Christian convert had to change his old pagan way of attaching three names to his person. He was expected to give up the custom of three names and to call himself with one single name, *e. g.* Christophorus, Redemptus, Salvius, Vivianus, Natalis, Sab-

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batus, or Benedictus, Deogratias, Pius, Sanctus. We can observe the changes on the catacombs in Italy and Greece. Now, such a change in the custom of naming yourself is one of the most difficult things in the world. Just think of it, if somebody would try to persuade you to give up your old way of signing and using your name and to accept one single, strange name instead; say, *e. g.*, instead of Mr. John E. Smith simply the one word Pious, or Good, or Beautiful. I do not think that anyone could persuade you. For our names are so intimately connected with our institutions, that a change in our way of naming ourselves goes like a nervous shock through the whole of our social system.

If you now consider all those really enormous obstacles to the conversion of a Roman citizen, this total change in all his doings and actions, you will easily see that there must have been some powerful causes at work, causes which could do away with some of the most elementary, and therefore most influential sentiments of our soul; with the love of pleasure, with the dictations of ambition, and with the fear of powerful superiors. The love of pleasure and the desire to be respected by your fellow-citizens are, together with the love of property, the three fundamental cravings of the human heart. Whatever our more sublime religious doctrines may choose to teach us, it is on these three pillars that the whole fabric of our domestic and social relations are resting. We want to enjoy life, we want to be respected by our fellow-citizens, we want to own property and money—and anything contrary to these three main currents of our souls is also contrary to our own self and becomes hateful. The first converts of Christianity had to forego the pleasure of the then life of the people, they were ignored, looked down upon and occasionally persecuted by their fellow-citizens, and they had less chance to acquire money and property than their con-

temporaries. Consequently these converts and, in general, all the first Christian communities, were acted upon by factors so utterly contrary to human nature, that we can not help gazing at a spectacle at once so rare and so unintelligible. And really, the incredible courage displayed by those early Christians, the courage to defy not only arms and dungeons, but something still more dangerous, still more indomitable, *the courage to defy custom and usage*—this courage really has the appearance of divine inspiration, and the historian can readily understand the feelings of pious souls when they point to the first Christians as an evident illustration of superhuman power.

I am now about to inquire into those causes which promoted the progress of Christianity in spite of the fact that the teachings of Christianity were contrary to the most fundamental cravings of the human soul. In doing so I have to ask you, although it may seem to be superfluous, to confer on me the honor of your most intense attention, for the question at issue is so vast, and my time is so inadequate to the comprehensiveness of my subject, that I have to use extremely succinct words, and, consequently, I am likely to be easily misunderstood. Again and again I take liberty to assure you that irreverence will not tinge a single word of all I have to tell you.

I have shown that conversion to Christianity was, in the first three centuries, beset with obstacles of an almost insurmountable nature; I have proved that the teachings of Christianity were opposed to the most elementary, egotistical cravings of the human heart; and it is now incumbent on me to explain how it came to happen that the fierce impulses of these elementary cravings were overcome, that these deep-rooted passions of the human soul were persuaded to obey the dictations of an institution which, as a whole, was at absolute variance with them. *Human*

passions—this is the teaching of my immortal Master—*human passions are not controlled by reason or reflection or thought of any kind, but by other passions of the same kind but of a greater force.* Thus love is controlled by ambition, and envy by fear, and sensuality by cruelty. If, therefore, the first converts to Christianity are said to have abstained from all pleasures and joys and ambitions of their times, that is to say, if they succeeded in subduing the fierce impulses of some of the most elementary passions of our soul, they must necessarily have been ruled by passions of a still stronger nature, by the impulses of cravings still more powerful. And the truth of this remark we will readily see if we inquire into the question, what kind of people formed the bulk of the first Christian converts? History answers: Women and slaves.

And here again I have to remind you of our lectures on Rome. In the course of our five lectures on the civilization of the Romans, I constantly tried to bring before you this one fact, that the civilization of the Romans—grand and colossal, refined and artistic, though it was—had one lamentable fault; it was a civilization for a few persons only, a civilization of cities, a civilization for a few men in cities, and that women and the vast number of slaves were not so much excluded by law, as simply superfluous; women did not play a prominent part in Roman civilization; they were not despised, not maltreated, but ignored—the worst kind of maltreatment. And that was practically the same case with the slaves. They were kept in pretty good and tolerable condition, they were (*de facto* at least) not declared beasts, they were treated very nicely, as I have proved in my second lecture on Rome; but they as well as women were set aside, ignored, they did not count, they were of no moment, they had no position in social life, no influence, no standing. Hence women and slaves in Rome were ready for a change; they were prepared

for a reformation of institutions. They were willing to accept a doctrine which was averse to the then state of social life, wherein they did not occupy an influential position; they were ready to abstain from the social amusements of their contemporaries, which were chiefly arranged for a restricted number of men, for they hoped that, by a change, they would satisfy that powerful craving of the heart—the craving for respect and esteem. For in the very earliest periods of historical Christianity do we observe the altered position of the mother of the family, a change so considerable as to bring about a completely different conception of the relations of womanhood to society. While obedience to the husband was enjoined as a duty upon the wife, that duty ceased when it came in collision with one of a yet higher order. She was looked upon as capable of attaining to an equal degree of perfection as his equal in all relations, and endowed with precisely the same nature. For the standard of value was an internal, a spiritual one, unlike the standard of the Romans, who esteemed a person by his military valor or by his success in political life, and who, consequently, never felt induced to place women on a par with men.

The Christian woman was to aspire to wisdom in a like degree with man. To the household industry of the Roman matron, she added the higher functions of instructing her children, and in this relation her influence was often of incalculable importance. The mothers of Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, St. Augustine, and Theodoret were mainly instrumental in the conversion of their sons. The great esteem in which women were held by the early Church manifests itself by the frequent ordinances discouraging second marriages. Chrysostom says that no one is more fit to instruct or exhort her husband than a pious woman.

Girls who devoted themselves to lives of virginity came in time to form a separate class or "ordo" (order) in the Church. The mere fact of virginity was considered a title to sacred respect. The Roman vestals were prompted by a desire to gain worldly honors, for many precious rights were conferred on them. But the Christian virgin who had taken the vow of virginity did not depend on honors to be bestowed upon her by the State. She herself was the donator as well as the recipient of the honor. Women were not only not excluded from Church-meetings, but they played a very prominent part in it. Church-meetings were considered *the* affair of every Christian's life—nothing surpassed them in point of importance, and accordingly women shared the honors of these meetings. The most momentous public meetings of the Grecians or Romans, however, were the political assemblies—the ecclesia in Greece and the comita in Rome, but the great honors of these meetings could not be shared by women. And thus everything tended to rouse the deepest sympathy of women for the cause of Christianity.

The second vast class of people who were almost bound to feel the most intense sympathy were the slaves of the Roman Empire. I should like very much to state the correct number of slaves at the time of Nero or Marcus Aurelius or Severus. But I am sorry to say that neither the rough estimation of Gibbon nor the elaborate investigations of Wallon and of Dureau de la Malle can safely be relied upon. In Rome, in the city of Rome, at least two-thirds of the entire population were servi, were slaves. As to the entire empire it will be fair to assume that the number of slaves exceeded the number of freemen. This assumption rests chiefly on the proportion of slave names on the known tombs of the Roman Empire to the names of free citizens. This numerical majority of the whole population was highly susceptible of the new doctrines of Chris-

tianity. Not as if the teachers of Christianity would have been in favor of the abolition of slavery. By no means. St. Paul himself had a slave, and he never broached the question of abolition.

The language of the early Fathers inculcated humanity on the part of the master by arguments which much resemble those with which the modern philanthropist urges the exercise of the same virtue toward the brute creation. In the slave himself they enjoined humility and resignation; Ignatius, one of the fathers of the church, warns the slave not to be arrogant on account of his spiritual equality with his master, but to serve him with greater zeal.

Tatian appears to regard the tribute paid by the subject and the service rendered by the slave as coming under much the same category. Tertullian teaches the exercise of patience, both on the part of the master and that of the slave. Clement, of Alexandria, in whom the allusions to slavery are frequent, urges that slaves are men like ourselves, but nowhere condemns the institution itself. It is an historical fact supported by the most positive of evidence that slavery in the Roman Empire was mitigated by the noble philosophy of the Stoics and not by the teachings of the Church Fathers who never thought of recommending the abolition of slavery. Chrysostom *e. g.* says that the exhibition of a state of slavery, in conjunction with that of spiritual liberty, (meaning that the Christian slave was spiritually free) was a greater moral triumph for Christianity, than its abolition, even, he says, as the spectacle of the Hebrew youth's walk in the furnace was a greater marvel than the exhibition of the flames would have been.

It was the philosophy of the Stoics, or rather those stoicians who filled the throne of Rome and by whose legislation the fate of Roman slaves was chiefly ameliorated. I mention these facts to avoid taking a false view of the

question at issue. While I do state that the doctrines of positive Christianity were cheerful forebodings to the slaves of Rome, still I do not state, or rather I can not state, that the chief forebodings consisted in the hope of the abolition of slavery, such hope could not be fostered by slaves of that period, who turned Christians. But there were other hopes, other expectations. Christianity by applying to the human being, to the individual, not to the political being, to the citizen, was from the very beginning averse to the exclusion of slaves.

It could not, by its very principles, exclude the slave from baptism or ordination. For these sacraments belonged to the immortal soul of the slave and not to his ephemeral and temporary position in the political commonwealth. Christian slaves often proved instrumental in bringing about the conversion of households to which they belonged. Callistus, bishop of Rome, in the beginning of the third century had been a slave and even his bitter enemy Hippolitus does not refer to the fact as involving any stigma.

Of the uniform disregard in the church itself of any distinction between the slave and the free man, the catacombs afford silent but significant evidence, for while it is impossible to examine the pagan sepulchral inscriptions of the same period without finding mentions of a slave or freedman, DeRossi, the great authority on catacombs, whom I mentioned in my last lecture, has not met with one well ascertained instance among the inscriptions of the Christian tombs. The priestly office and the monastic profession were largely recruited from the servile class, and very naturally so, because if the pious Christian master consented to the desire of his slave, the slave by the fact of his being a priest or monk, became a free man. In addition to these causes other equally powerful causes were at work.

The Christians of the first three centuries observed both Sabbaths, the Jewish Saturday and the Christian Sunday. The observation of these two days, however, was far from being identical with either the old Hebrew rigor of the Saturday or the modern anglo-American rigor of the Sunday. The Lord's day was a day of spiritual observance ; and so was the Saturday. The great rigor of the Sunday was of a much later date ; and still later was the conception that the Hebrew Sabbath stands in direct opposition to the Christian Sunday. But as far as the period I am treating of is concerned, Christians were observing both Sabbaths, and, accordingly, permitted their slaves to rest on both days. Hence the slaves of Christians were freed of two-sevenths of their drudgery, whereas the slaves of heathens had to endure the full weight of the whole week, a few festivals, the Saturnalia and Compitalia, excepted. Thus we can see why women and slaves of the Roman Empire, that is to say why the enormous majority of the population of the Empire did feel induced to sympathize with the cause of Christianity. In addition to the lofty teachings, to the consoling idea of a Saviour who had suffered for mankind in order to save it, in addition to all these heart-elevating doctrines, a series of other causes were at work, which contributed most powerfully to the progress of Christianity.

But these causes, I mean the influence of women on the one hand and slaves on the other, would not have been sufficient to bring about the grand change, the downfall of Paganism and the establishment of Christianity. Paganism had its numberless filiations and ramifications in the town, in the field, in the city, in the army—everywhere. Paganism appealed to one of the most enduring and most charming of senses, to the sense of beauty. All Græco-Roman Paganism was filled, was saturated with beauty of the rarest kind. Public as well as private life displayed the refined life of classical beauty, and to the

present day we use their symbols of art, of science, of trade, their Gods and Goddesses as the best representatives of the ideal conception of love, of justice, of benevolence, of amiability. Women though a great factor in the history of civilization, have never been the first and primary causes of great historical events. They were great and beloved and admirable factors in social, in domestic life, but as to general history, as to the few decisive institutions of all mankind, women have never played the decisive part. And consequently, if an institution applies to women more than to men, it is more likely to be of a minor importance as far as the generality of mankind is concerned.

But Christianity is *the* event of western civilization, an event of the most general significance, and hence, the causes of its progress must refer to more general factors of civilization—to men, to free men, to the free men of Rome. These free men must have slowly come to the conclusion, that at the very bottom of this new creed, of Christianity, there is a treasury of that most benevolent and most necessary of all things, a treasury of power. Of power over the inmost actions of men, a power controlling not the notions, these late fruits of our mind, but the mind itself, a power which while it controls everything is itself free of control, a power so overwhelming, so extensive that it has justly been called a divine power. Power of this or rather of a similar kind has always existed and must always exist. The associations of human beings have to be controlled by power; by using the term power, I do not mean to imply that this power must necessarily be a brutal power, a power of iron and blood. By no means. This power may consist in very gentle means; in persuasions, in flattery, in vanity; it consists in error and superstition—for error and superstition, far from being despicable and deplorable means, must be declared to be two of the great factors of civilization, two powers of vast influence, of

beneficial influence, and if we were to award the prize to either of the two, I would unhesitatingly award it to error, and not to truth, for error has done more good in this world than truth.

Truth is harsh and offensive, and, after all it may be nothing else but a species of error. Powers of that kind are always requisite to the conservation of society. Power as manifested in the institutions of ancient Rome was of a too precarious character, it depended either on the votes of the people, or on the good-will of a single emperor. But power must have resources of a far deeper character; it must be independent of the fluctuation of elections or the whim of a single individual. Power of such a character, however, was unknown to the Romans. Their whole civilization rested on one single institution, and consequently the fate of this single institution, of the city, was also the fate of the whole Empire. With the growth of Christianity a new institution arose; an institution endowed with new forces, with new and ample powers, an institution the power of which was far more comprehensive than all that the Romans were ever able to command. This new institution, this treasury of power, this novel mode of ruling the refractory tendencies of society, this inestimable boon was: the Church. It was the growth of the church which attracted the genius of Rome to Christianity, which converted some of the most stubborn and scornful Romans to the new creed. For the church disposed of a storehouse of power and influence, which was never thought of before. The offices of the church were for life-time, clothed with enormous authority and ample salaries.

On the other hand none of the offices of the Roman Empire was for life-time, none was clothed with theological authority. The church did not depend on political or geographical divisions of land; it had free access to all provinces, to all countries. The church official of Pales-

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tine was also the church official of Asia-Minor. There was no limit to the power of the church, for it was an internal conquest, a conquest of souls, of thoughts. The church did not recognize any difference between race or citizenship, and a municeps, or a person not endowed with the Roman citizenship, was just as likely to be appointed bishop or presbyter as the proudest of Roman citizens. And the church grew systematically. In the course of the second century begin to appear the outlines of a system which has done more than anything to shape the consequent form of Christianity. First of all the clergy of neighboring churches, and ultimately the clergy of the greater part of the Christian world came to be associated in a single organization.

This organization was a faithful copy of the political administration of Rome, and this one circumstance is evidence for the fact that the church was conscious of its rival position with regard to Rome. This is seen in the following respects especially:

1. In the Roman Empire every year deputies (legati) from the several towns of a province met together in a provincial council (concilium). They had a common fund from which they could build temples or erect statues; they decided as to the boundaries of the territories of the cities; they had the right of communicating directly with the emperor in regard to the civil and judicial administration of the province. From the heathenish provincial councils came the first beginnings of Christian ecclesiastical organization in similar assemblies or "councils" of the clergy. Such councils began in Greece and Asia Minor; in the time of Cyprian they were beginning to be a regular institution in North Africa, and from that time onward they became permanent factors in church history. These ecclesiastical councils showed their close connection with the Roman administration by the

simple fact that their lines of demarcation were determined by those of the Roman provinces.

2. In the civil councils of the Romans the president was an officer whose functions were to a great extent religious, and who bore the name of *Sacerdos provinciæ*. To him the other priests of the province were subordinate, and in some cases he appointed them. When the Christian councils came to be established, their president not only received the same old Roman name of *Sacerdos provinciæ*, but he was also invested with the right of confirming the appointment of the other bishops of the province.

3. Within the limits of the great provinces were smaller organizations. The provinces were subdivided into districts, partly for fiscal, partly for commercial, but chiefly for judicial purposes. These were known as *conventus*, *conventus juridici*, *dioikeseis*. Each of them had its center of administration, its "county town," with its basilika, or county hall. It was in these centers that Christian communities were first formed, and the area of the juridical *conventus* or diocese became naturally the area of the ecclesiastical organization.

How close the correspondence was between the ecclesiastical organization of the Greek Church and the civil organization of the Roman Empire can be shown from many instances in both East and West. The most interesting case in the West is that of Gaul, of France. Gaul was divided into two civil dioceses, *Diocesis Galliorum* and *Diocesis Viennensis*. The former was subdivided into ten provinces, the latter into seven provinces. Not only was the civil metropolis of each province an episcopal see, but in all cases except two (*Elusa* and *Elbrodunum*) the see has remained until modern times, and in almost all cases the metropolitan character of the see has also remained, the bishops being styled archbishops to the

present day. France preserves in its bishoprics to the present day the outlines of the Roman administration. But the tendency toward rule and government manifested itself in other institutions also. There arose a tendency to attach a clerk to a particular church and to give local limits to the exercise of his functions. In the earliest ages there is presumptive evidence that a member of the clergy of one church might freely pass to another. He might thus be on the roll of several churches at once. An ambitious or a disaffected clerk was able in this way to pass from a narrower to a wider sphere. But this came at last to be prohibited, except with the full consent of all who were concerned.

The earliest existing enactment in the east is the sixteenth chapter of the Nicene Council, which provides that no one who is on the clergy roll of any church shall leave it under penalty of excommunication. A second tendency, which arose in the course of the third century, took the double form of giving local limits to a bishop's powers and of subordinating him either to the provincial council or to a single superior. The distinction between clergy and laity was of slow growth. Even in divine service it was not strongly defined; in social life it hardly existed at all. Like the successors of the non-juring bishops of the eighteenth century, or like the earlier preachers of the Wesleyan Methodists, the officers of the early Christian communities worked at trades, kept stores, took part in municipal affairs, and wore the dress of ordinary citizens. There was no sense of incongruity in their doing so. The Apostolical Constitutions repeat with emphasis the apostolical injunction, "That if a man would not work, neither should he eat." In the first centuries the ecclesiastical regulations which affected the social life of church officers were comparatively few in number. In the east the most important of such regula-

tions were that clerks should not take usury, that they should not be present at masquerades or marriages, that they should not bathe with women, that they should not dine at club dinners or enter a tavern, except on journey. But although the regulations were neither numerous nor stringent, there is no doubt that by the end of the fifth century the officers of the church, throughout the greater part of Christendom, had become a class socially as well as civilly distinct from its ordinary members.

All these facts, I mean the division of the territory into ecclesiastical sub-divisions, the subordination of the clergy in a system of graded superiority, all these facts go to prove that the church was the conscious rival of Rome, applying all the statecraft of Rome, all the means by which Rome succeeded in retaining its enormous conquests, so that we may safely formulate the result of our historical investigation into the nature of the Christian Church of the first ten centuries of our era, by stating: *The Christian Church was the heir of Rome, continuing in a spiritual way what Rome had commenced in a material way.* This remarkable proposition is very aptly illustrated by a curious fact, by the costume of the Catholic Church. To the present day the priests of the Catholic Church continue to wear the old Roman tunica and toga with very slight alteration. It would be extremely difficult to misunderstand this one fact. The priests of the Catholic Church are the direct successors of the Roman magistrates, only their sphere of activity has been changed.

There is another highly remarkable illustration of the proposition just mentioned; I mean that the Church of Rome is the direct heir of the Emperors of Rome. The law of Rome has met only with one rival, with one law that amended and happily too the profound teachings of the Roman jurists. This one law which is a direct con-

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tinuation and occasionally a reformer of Roman law, this one law is the law of the Roman church, the canon law. For such is the intrinsic similarity between these two Empires that the law of the one frequently serves to improve upon the law of the other.

But the ancient Christian church had one more element, one more factor of perfectly gigantic influence, a factor, the very nature of which was entirely unknown to all classical antiquity. In addition to its refined moral doctrines, in addition to the adoption of Roman measures of administration, in addition to the formation of the separate class of the clergy,—in addition to all that the church made use of a new means, of an absolutely novel contrivance, of a contrivance, which is apparently so unfit for its object, so thoroughly inadequate to its aim, that we fail to see the connection between aim and mean, until we have widened the sphere of our studies, so as to attain to a more comprehensive view of historical events. You will readily understand this powerful contrivance, if you will contemplate the following facts: The more numerous our associations with our fellow-citizens are, the more persons we know, the more frequently we call on them and they on us, the more we join their entertainments and social gatherings, the more points of contact will also exist between ourselves and a series of friends and acquaintances. But these very intimate connections go with an augmented duty of tact, of consideration, of feeling. A person who used to be my guest, or the guest, the colleague, the friend of my father, or of my son, or of my daughter, such a person is not a total stranger to me. I regard him more or less as an individual who may claim very much more than general benevolence. I will certainly abstain from depriving him of his property, even if I should be able to do so, I will assist him in his undertakings, at least I will not hamper them, I will de-

fend his good reputation anxiously avoiding all slander—and all this for the simple reason, because I am in similar circumstances and I expect him to do the same to me.

Now let us suppose the case, that in a certain community or in a certain country there are a few hundred men who have the indomitable desire to rule the rest of the community, to subdue them, whether in a material sense or in the spiritual sense. This very desire will teach them that they can no longer continue their intimate associations with their fellow-citizens. For intimacy is the grave of authority. Hence these few hundred men will erect a bar between themselves and the rest of the community. They will lay down the rule: None of us, no member of our class is permitted to marry a member of the other classes. By this one stroke of ingenious policy they annihilate all social intercourse between their class, and the other classes; for where there is a prohibition of intermarriage there all social relations must necessarily cease. Such *e. g.*, was the policy of the aristocratic class in Europe. The imperial houses in Europe go still farther: The members of these houses are not only prohibited to marry a simple citizen—they are equally prohibited to marry an aristocratic person, not even a count or a duke; he or she must have the additional quality of being what the German imperial law calls *reichsunmittelbare Haueser*, and few families possess this right. This ingenious stroke of policy has been abundantly used in different countries of Europe and Asia. But in point of efficacy it does not begin to compare with another contrivance employed by a handful of men who were burning with a desire to rule not one country, but all countries. This contrivance shows the profound nature of that incomparable Spaniard who carried it into effect. This Spaniard said that if we want to rule men, we must be entirely estranged from them. No

intimacy whatever shall effeminate the stern impulses of ambition; if you want to rule your neighbors you have to divest yourself of all earthly frailties. You are no longer a son, for tender, filial sentiments may eventually get the better of you; you are no longer a brother, an uncle, a patriot, a friend, an enemy, a lover—you are nothing but the obedient tool of your virulent ambition, an ambition which, aided by such instruments, is sure of its success. Accordingly the Spaniard persuaded first a handful of men, later on hundreds of vigorous youths to divest themselves of all feelings, to sever all ties of friendship, of hope, of hatred, and to be the cool and unfailing servants of ambition.

Thus the disciples of this Spaniard were neither sons, nor brothers, nor fathers; they had given up their nationality. The Frenchman had to work in Russia, and the Russian in Spain. And by this total estrangement from all humanity the order of this Spaniard, Ignatius de Loyola, acquired a very considerable power over humanity. I have adduced this example in order to show that the most powerful rulers are those who are on no social terms whatever with the persons whom they rule. I have adduced it in order to show that seclusion from ordinary social life, although it may not seem to be conducive to any power over others, is nevertheless one of the most efficacious means of ruling. And it was precisely this means that was resorted to by the Church. *Asceticism* and *Monasticism* were those all-powerful contrivances that I had in view when I was speaking of the fact that the Church made use of a novel contrivance, of a means that was unknown to classic antiquity.

For about a century subsequent to 150 A. D. there began to be traces of an asceticism more sharply defined, and occupying a more distinct position than the few isolated examples of previous times. Athanagoras speaks of

persons habitually abstaining from matrimony; Eusebius and Clemens of Alexandria very frequently speak of devout ascetics, and in general there was an increasing reverence for austerities as such. This can be clearly seen in most of the sects which were prominent in the second century. The Montanists, *e. g.*, prescribed a vigorous asceticism, not for their more zealous disciples only, but for all indiscriminately. The Syrian Gnostics, the followers of Saturninus and Basilides, the Encratitæ, the disciples of Cerdo and Marcion, in Asia Minor and Italy, all carried the notion of there being an inherent pollution in the material world, and of it being the positive duty of Christians to shun all contact with it, to an extreme extent.

The middle of the third century makes an era in the development of Christian asceticism. Antony, Paul, Ammon and other Egyptian Christians, not content as the ascetics before them to lead a life of extraordinary strictness and severity in towns and villages, aspired to a more thorough estrangement of themselves from all earthly ties, and by their teaching and example led very many to the wilderness, there to live and die in utter seclusion from their fellows.

About the middle of the fourth century asceticism begins to assume a corporate character, and this has been universally accepted to be the work of Pachomius. It has been frequently asserted that monasticism was not the product of Christianity; that it was the inheritance from the Essenes, the Therapeutai and other oriental mystics. This statement is utterly at variance with historical truth. For monasticism, although not an entirely novel institution—we find monasteries, monks and nuns in Thibet a few centuries before Christ—was fervently embraced by Christianity. Passages laudatory of monasticism abound in the Christian writers, both Greek and Latin, of the fourth and fifth centuries. Profound thinkers, like Basil,


and men of action, like Augustinus, of Hippo, and Theodoret, of Lyons, all vie with one another in reiterating the praises of monasticism. Jerome goes so far as to speak of adopting the monastic life as a kind of second baptism. Over 1500 large monasteries were erected during the first seven centuries of our era. They commanded an immense influence. No doubt all of you have read the wonderful romance of Charles Kingsley, entitled "Hypatia;" this romance, which by the way, is an historical picture of great faithfulness, gives a powerful picture of the enormous influence of those secluded world-despisers and their leaders.

I have tried to state the main causes of the rapid growth of Christianity. I have stated the great zeal for proselytism; but instead of considering it a cause as did Gibbon, I considered it only as a symptom of a cause. I have stated that the rapid growth of this sacred institution was partly due to the vast number of women and slaves who had all possible reasons to embrace the new institution with ardent fervor. Lastly, I have shown that the predominating cause of this growth has to be found in the establishment of the church, together with the organization of the clergy and a system of Monasticism—the church being a treasury of that power which always was the central object of the desires of able and energetic men; the desire to rule and to govern, a desire which is perfectly legitimate and beneficial, and which has done more good than evil. In such an historical treatment of the grand subject some will sadly miss the influence of miracles, of wonders, which are so frequently mentioned as having been mainly instrumental in the establishment of Christianity. I must confess that such miracles and wonders are said to have happened so late as the time of Origen, that is to say, within the scope of the historical period of Christianity. But all we at present possess is

not the miracle itself, but the report of the miracle. The mere report of a miracle, however, is no historical evidence, or else the numerous miracles which still continue to occur in the Catholic Church would serve as fearful weapons against the Protestant faith. I am far from denying the miracles. How could I deny them? Have I such a boundless and perfect knowledge of nature as to be able to say such a thing may happen, and such a thing may not happen? Galileo himself, although one of the greatest physicists of the seventeenth century, Galileo himself would have declared that an instantaneous transmission of news from America to Europe is a miracle. Still all of us experience this miracle every day. But Galileo did not know the power of electricity. And thus I am far from denying the wonders and miracles of the primitive church or of any other church—but I can not use them. They are so wholly incoherent with my stock of historical evidence, they require so much more implicit faith than any other evidence, that I have to consider them incongruous, and consequently I can not use them. There must be a certain congruity in the evidence of an historical fact.

Finally I have to say a few words about the possible objection that I omitted to adduce the divine truth of Christianity as one of the chief causes of its propagation. At least such is the general belief—that it was the truth, the divine revelation of Christianity which promoted its development more than anything else. We all agree in the belief of the divinity of Christianity; we all believe that it contains an immortal germ of divine truth. But this our private belief has nothing to do with the facts of history. And the facts of history teach us one great doctrine, to-wit: *that nations never accept truth simply for its own sake.* Truth in itself has no influence whatever; much in it has to be accompanied by secondary interests

and advantages, it has to be clothed in the beguiling form of error, of superstition—but stern, naked truth has never made a conquest. The minds of the multitude—and it is the multitude that decides—the minds of the multitude are too blunt for the refined and subtle conception of truth; and thus truth has to look for an ally, for causes of a more material, more practical character—and allied to them it may shoulder its way. Hence, if we want to understand the development of Christianity it is not sufficient to consider its divine truth only, for truth, absolute truth, is only for Him who is the originator of all truth; but frail humanity was in need of material and egotistical causes in order to change the civilization of Paganism to the civilization of Christianity.



FIRST CONTROVERSIAL LECTURE ON THE ORIGIN OF CHRIS- TIANITY.

May 1, 1887.*

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I have to beg your pardon for deviating from the regular course of our lectures. Our present lecture is not in perfect keeping with the character of its predecessors. Hitherto we have inquired into the different periods of the history of civilization in a spirit of impersonal and objective research. We tried to understand the ever-changing phases of institutions, and all our efforts were directed towards a proper understanding of those events which, in their aggregate, form the leading features of history. There was no occasion or cause whatever why to spend one single minute with a consideration of personal affairs. The personality of the historian, of the writer or lecturer on history, is of so little significance for the statement of his science that it matters but very little what his personal relation may or may not be. To this rule of both common sense and science I have so far tried to conform. But to-night I am, much against my will, bound to make an exception. For such is the nature of our present case that before entering on the discussion of the scientific criticism of my lectures, I cannot avoid mentioning a few facts which are in very loose connection with our proper topic—facts of a merely personal hue.

Six weeks ago I delivered my first lecture on the Origin of Christianity. In this, as well as in all my lectures, I approached my subject as an historian, that is to say, I accepted none but historical evidences, discarding all other

*See Preface.

sorts of arguments like theological, poetical, ethical, political ones, and so forth. I took great pains to describe my position as an historian, as distinguished from a theologian, as an inquirer who has neither the intention of preaching the gospel nor of detracting one iota of the religious virtue of the sacred writings. All, or next to all, who then honored me with their presence expressed their great satisfaction with the lecture. Permit me to mention the fact that scores of ladies and gentlemen, whose firm belief in revealed religion is far above any doubt, thanked me personally for the quiet and impartial statement of historical facts. I continued the subject in my second lecture five weeks ago. After this I proceeded to a discussion of the Middle Ages. Weeks passed by, and none of my hearers seemed to notice anything deleterious or any wilful misstatement of facts in my lectures on Christianity. A little anonymous communication in the *Commercial-Gazette* in which I was charged, although very politely, with suppressing some important facts, proved to be a misunderstanding. For after having replied to the anonymous writer, I never heard of him again. And thus I felt confident that my lectures had been received in the same spirit in which they were given, that is to say, in the spirit of objective, cool research, without any side tendency to hurt or to shock or to seduce the feelings of my hearers.

While I thus cherished the pleasant feeling of being in perfect harmony with my audience, my attention was called to the announcement of a sermon in which, as it was expressed, my assertions were to be discussed from the pulpit. I did not fail to attend the sermon. It was said in the pulpit that inquiries about my record as a scholar resulted in the conclusion that I was unknown to fame, and that I have published nothing concerning my "wonderful historic researches." This is perfectly correct. I am un-

known to fame. I have not yet published any of my historic essays or books. But can that be considered an evident symptom of immodesty or of a lack of elaborate studies? I do not think it is. It is one of the most positive facts of general literature that the really valuable works of literature and science have, with very few exceptions, been written towards the end of the fourth decade of individual life: the vast majority of scientific books written before thirty-five have proved a failure. I know this to be the fact, I have almost boundless evidence for the truth of this fact. Shall I, therefore, be exposed to reproaches because I simply avail myself of an experience that has stood the test of 4,000 years, and because I do not consider myself more talented than the majority of writers of thirty years of age? As to my unpublished researches, I take liberty to say that, although many scholars may surpass me in point of sagacity or genius, very few are likely to surpass me in the extent and solidity of my studies. Any of my hearers will be perfectly welcome to take private insight of my careful studies of the topics of my lectures—studies that have been carried on for over eighteen years.

But let us drop this question; for what has my fame or my published or unpublished books to do with the good or bad quality of my lectures? I could be a famous scholar, and still deliver very bad lectures. And I could have published many a book without thereby enhancing the value of my lectures. Why not take my lectures as they are? Why inquire into things outside the scope of the discussion? Why not simply judge my lectures by their own merits? by the arguments and evidences given in the lectures themselves? I have been called a sceptic, implying that I am an unbeliever. After all that I have heard from the vast majority of my hearers, I consider it superfluous to dwell upon this point any longer. In addition, let me add this open and frank confession: If all

my studies have not made me more learned or more erudite, they have certainly made me more religious. True science, far from being antagonistic to religion, constantly corroborates a profound reverence for religious doctrines and religious institutions.

But another judgment was passed in the sermon—a judgment concerning my scientific character as an historian. And this judgment I *shall* dwell upon. For while all other judgments and statements are of a secondary and private character, this one statement touches upon the very root of my position as a lecturer on history. For this statement, this judgment simply goes to say, that I am a garbling historian, that is to say, an unfair, an unjust, partial historian; in other words, that I am no historian at all, nay more, that I am a forging historian. For to suppress facts bearing on the question is equivalent to forging imaginary facts of the same kind. This judgment was passed with regard to my first lecture on the Origin of Christianity. The bulk of our present lecture will consist of an examination of this charge concerning that first lecture.

But before entering on the details of this discussion I am going to say a few words about such a charge of being a garbling historian. When I first announced a course of lectures on the History of Civilization, I promised to give a faithful and coherent statement of the different phases of civilization, I promised to give well ascertained facts, unbiassed descriptions and I alleged that I have gone through a careful study of the original sources of history. If now it is asserted that I have not gone through a study of original sources, that I am not independent in my researches, that I am a partisan, pursuing certain definite aims and objects, distorting the facts of history so as to make them subservient to my intentions, my tendencies—then all my promises were vain-glorious, empty talk, and

the lecturer who has been honored by the attendance of a very considerable portion of the intelligent and distinguished society of this city is little more than a poor dilettant.

This statement or rather this accusation can not be passed over in silence. That has to be answered. I owe this to my hearers as well as to myself.

I said, and do say still, that I am a free and independent investigator of history. I am not salaried by any party or religious denomination. I have never received the least little salary from either the University of Cincinnati or from any college or high school in this town. Whether the results of my studies do or do not please the taste of some people, this is a thing of indifference to me, so long as I am able to adduce sure and irrefragable evidence for my statements. I do not pander to certain cherished systems of morality or ethics, and when, in my second lecture, several months ago, I had to treat of polyandry, that is to say, of that curious system of some nations like the 30,000 millions of Tibethans, or the Nairs in India, according to which several husbands have one and the same wife—I treated of this institution, not with the excitement of a missionary whose feelings revolt at such sacrilegious habits, but in the same calm spirit of inquiry in which I am about to treat of the polygamy of the Mohammedans. I have but one endeavor, but one goal, namely, to arrive at reliable facts, at absolute, positive facts, whether these facts do or do not taste well—this culinary question is beyond my scope. The fervor of the orthodox does not impress me, nor do I yield to the exactions of the free-thinker.

In fact, I entertain an open dislike to all so-called freethinkers. Whether their name be Voltaire or Johannes Scherr, Condorcet or Max Nordau—they are, as a rule, very, very poor scholars in history. They have seldom

or never undertaken to peruse the original sources themselves, and they are nothing but a crowd of shallow, intolerant squabblers. In my studies I have not been restricted to the literature of one people, and the sources of six languages were at my disposal. In mentioning this I do not want to parade my knowledge of languages. For that in itself is a very poor thing. Many waiters in the hotels of Germany know more than six languages, and some of the important idioms, like Sanskrit, Arabian and Chinese, I do not know. All that I want to say is this, that I have taken the trouble of descending “zu den Muettern” to the mothers, as Goethe says in the second part of his Faust, to the first and most authentic records of facts.

In the sermon, however, it has been said that I use obscure authorities, works of no scientific standing; and hence I am obliged to give you some account of my authorities. It is not very easy to give a proper definition of what constitutes an authority. Sometimes books written by celebrated writers are of very little authority. Such *e. g.* is the essay of Adam Smith on astronomy, or Hume’s essay on the development of religion. Both Adam Smith and David Hume belong to the upper tens of science; the said essays, nevertheless, do not command the smallest authority. This one example will show you that celebrity and authority are no synonyms; they are no interchangeable terms. A writer may be very celebrated without being an authority of the first order. The celebrity of writers very frequently depends on their pleasant style, on the interesting, attractive nature of their subject. Take Edward Gibbon. He is a great, a celebrated writer; his history of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire has been translated into almost all European and a few Oriental languages. His enormous success is due in the first place to the elegant and pleasing nature of his dic-

tion, to the multifarious and everchanging scenery of his narrative, and to his clever use of the sources. And no doubt he is a great writer. And so is Guizot, and Lecky and Herbert Spencer. But I am sorry to say that none of these writers can be considered an ultimate authority. Because a certain statement may be found in Gibbon, or in Lecky, or in Guizot or Spencer, this circumstance is yet very far from being an evident proof of the stability of the statement. In the very best case it will be more or less likely, probable, to approach truth or some side of truth. For none of these writers have studied their topic with the requisite concentration of forces. I mean to say, Gibbon as well as H. Spencer, try to cover a ground of such immense dimensions that it necessarily surpasses their powers to cover all the details, all the aspects of their subject. Gibbon undertook to write the history of over 1,000 years, the history of several hundred nations, of a score of religions and sects, of laws and sciences, of private individuals and of races, of thousands of battles and hundreds of sieges, of councils and bulls—in short, he undertook to write what but very few could write as well as he actually did, but what none could write well. To write an adequate and full history of one single institution is a task of almost insurmountable difficulty for a single inquirer, but to write the full history of so many centuries, of so many institutions, that is absolutely impossible. Hence you have never heard me quote Gibbon or Guizot or Lecky as authorities of the first order.

For the bulk of Gibbon's knowledge was taken at second-hand. Say, *e. g.*, his history of Christianity. Although he frequently quotes the Fathers, still any expert in this department of history will readily see that he had taken almost the whole of his facts from Mosheim, from Mattaire, from Fleury, Tillemont and from other authors, who, in fact, had studied the original sources. And this

holds good for his history of the Mohammedan civilization too.

But in order to circumscribe my view of a scientific authority still more precisely, let us take the case of a writer who is an authority of the first order, who is an original source. Say *e. g.*, Livy. The Roman historian Livy lived in the times of Augustus and wrote a history of Rome in 142 books, a third part of which we still possess. But do you think that Livy, simply on account of his being a Roman historian, can be taken as an authority on all questions concerning Rome, or even on all questions concerning the events he relates? By no means. Before accepting his writings as authoritative records we must first inquire into the nature of his sources. Very able essays have been written on the sources of Livy and the result amongst others was this, that the first five books of his history have to be used with the utmost caution, and the second and third decade are but fair narratives which ought to be contrasted with the full and highly reliable records of Polybius, who in fact is *the* authority of the very first order on Roman institutions during the Republic.

You will remember how very disparagingly I spoke of Suetonius when treating of those Roman Emperors whose lives he has written. Suetonius lived in the second century of our era— but that alone does not make him an authority. Even Tacitus himself has to be taken very carefully, with great caution and I do venture to say, that his delineation of Tiberius is a piece of great injustice and unfairness. You will ask me, how do I know all this? How can I say, that the historical statements made by Tacitus over 18 hundred years ago are not always to be relied upon? Simply because we have other and controlling evidence of those times. In addition to Tacitus we have inscriptions, coins, laws and law-books of those times, we have the remains of buildings and aqueducts, we have the poets and the philo-

sophers of those times, and by a careful comparison of all these evidences we can safely pass a judgment and even correct a statement of a contemporary writer.

With regard to the sources of history of Christianity the historian has to be still more cautious. None of the fathers, none of the ecclesiastical writers can be said to have been perfectly unbiassed. Each of them had a certain object in view. In the first four centuries the chief object was the conversion of the pagan world of the Romans. And accordingly we may say in the most explicit way that all the works of the fathers of the first four centuries are more or less polemical works. Whether you read Irenaeus, or Origen, or Tertullianus, or Chrystomus, or Jerome, or St. Augustine, you will invariably find them to be partizans. Partizans, it must be conceded, of a true cause, partizans of a good cause—but partizans after all. They are constantly busy at refuting either the doctrines of the Jews, as Justinus Martyr in his book against Tryphon, or against Pagans, as Origen against Celsus. They constantly fight, and the heat of fight is not the proper atmosphere of absolute truthfulness. Their intense fervor displays itself in a transporting force of oratory, in a vehemence of attack, in a persistency of defence, that presupposes a deep-rooted passion. They can see little good in the civilization of Greece and Rome, and the heroes of others appear to them insignificant if compared to the heroes of Christian martyrdom. Virginia is nothing if compared to the inmates of Christian nunneries. Aristotle and Plato are poor scribblers compared to the wisdom of Solomon, and so forth.

This then being the case, we have to be extremely careful in accepting or rejecting the *historical* testimony of the fathers. Thus the most pious and the most devoted theologians could not help acknowledging, that the number of Christian martyrs of the first three centuries has been

exaggerated by ecclesiastical writers to a very great extent. And even if we were to look upon the writings of the fathers as an absolutely unalloyed source of historical information—do you think, that that would avail us any? Try to read the fathers of the second century, read them without any interruption and try to form a clear and satisfactory picture—not of the dogmas and creeds of Christianity, but of its history. Try to, and you will soon find yourself in an inextricable labyrinth of contradictory statements. Clement of Alexandria says, that Jesus Christ taught only one year, and so does Origen say—Irenaeus however, says, that our Saviour taught three years. This is one of the numerous glaring contradictions of the fathers, whose principal aim was to spread the faith, and who never felt to be under any obligation whatever, to write pure history.

Thus it came that sects and religious denominations of the most opposed character, the Socinians as well as the Arminians, the Puritans as well as the Jansenists, have all equally appealed to the Fathers, proving their divergent tenets by quotations from the Fathers. In addition to all this the text of their writings is highly corrupt. It is, therefore, no wonder that Daillé, or Dalleus, one of the most learned Protestant divines in the 17th century, in his celebrated book, "*Du vrai Emploi des Pères*," came to the conclusion that the Fathers are of very little use at all. This, however, seems to be exaggerated. But if this is the state of these original sources, what shall I say about those numberless writers who published works on Church History, compiled from the Fathers, many of whom pass for great authorities, as Fleury, Mosheim, Neander, Charles Hase, Baur, Milman, Gieseler, and so forth? For the historian of civilization, although he cannot dispense with the study of the Fathers themselves, is frequently obliged

to resort to these historians, and consequently he has to make his choice.

And now we are at the point I am aiming at. In my first lecture on the Origin of Christianity, I made use of the works of these historians, mentioning amongst others the name of *Hilgenfeld*. In the sermon of last Sunday, however, it was said that Hilgenfeld is an obscure writer. It never entered my mind to think that persons who pretend to have studied Church history are unacquainted with the name and works of Hilgenfeld. This highly remarkable historian has written many and extremely valuable works on the first centuries of Christianity, and his name occurs and reoccurs in any essay or book on similar topics. In fact, with regard to some important questions of Christianity he is simply indispensable. So, amongst others, he is one of the highest authorities on the fundamental question of the apocryphal gospels, that is to say, on those gospels that have not been recognized by the Church, and consequently have not been received as part of the canon, similarly on the question of the authenticity of the Gospel of St. John. In the public library of this city you will find nearly all the works of Hilgenfeld, and this library, although under excellent management in the past as well as at present, was never intended to be a library for specialists or professional scholars only. Yet it possesses the works of Hilgenfeld.

But the argument was raised in the said sermon that Hilgenfeld has to be considered an obscure writer, for else he would have been translated into English. This, I must confess, is a new test of authority. If a foreign author has met with the chance of a translation into English, he is an authority; if not, he is an obscure writer; Hilgenfeld not having been translated into English, ergo. If that be a fair test then the greatest of all German philosophers, I mean Immanuel Kant, was until very recently

an obscure writer. His magnum opus, his master work is the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft." This work appeared in 1781, and nearly a century elapsed before it met with an English translation. Another of the great German philosophers, I mean Hegel, has never been translated into English—only detached portions of his books have been translated. Nor has Justus Moëser, the greatest writer on institutional history in the 18th century, been translated into English. And the same fate was allotted to the fundamental works of Maurer on the different municipal institutions of the Middle Ages, and to Comte's incomparable Cours de philosophie positive, and to Grassman's immortal work on a new branch of mathematics. But I am not going to tire you out with such lists of untranslated books. It is very easy to see that such or similar works have not been translated, partly because they would not pay, being, as they are, restricted to a very small circle of readers, and partly because it is expected, and rightly so, *that every fair scholar is able to read German*. To claim nowadays a vote of some weight in the court of science without a knowledge of German is simply infeasible. German, French and English cannot be dispensed with. These three languages, in addition to that of Latin, if not also Greek, are the minimum of scientific requisites. My good old Hilgenfeld, therefore, although he has not yet been published in the noble idiom of Shakespere, has still all possible claim to a profound authoritative position amongst Church historians. Of him it cannot be said that he "is unknown to fame;" on the contrary, his fame seems to be unknown to a selected few.

And now let us proceed to the actual point of discussion, to the very question, to the very statement that forms as it were the turning point of the whole controversy. In order to place everything in the best light, I shall begin with stating: 1. What I really did assert, and

2. What I was said to have asserted. I asserted that we have no contemporaneous historical evidences for the first century of our era concerning the existence and development of Christianity. In this statement the word contemporaneous is the salient point of the whole sentence. By contemporaneous again I mean an evidence of any kind whatever that has originated, and undoubtedly so, during the first century. This was my statement in my first lecture on Christianity. And this I still continue to state, and this I shall continue to state until I will be shown unequivocal evidences to the contrary. In the said sermon not the faintest trace of such contemporaneous, first century evidences were given. Not the faintest trace, I say. The sermon gave numerous evidences and good evidences. But all of the second or third or of later centuries. How shall these later evidences sap the foundations of my statement? Did I say that there are no evidences for Christianity? I never said that. I was only supposed to have said it; that is to say, I was supposed to have said the most flourishing nonsense in order to be refuted.

There are weighty and numerous historical evidences for Christianity.

But there is none of the first century.

This is the whole of my statement.

In order to prove the same, I enlarged upon all those evidences that are usually taken into consideration by historians. I inquired first whether any of the Roman or Greek or Jewish writers of the first century, writing during that century, do or do not make mention of Christianity. I examined the writings of *Strabo*, the great geographer of the first century, who had seen Palestine, and has left us a very elaborate geography of this country and an ample discussion of the Jewish religion, and who might have had some knowledge of Christ or of John

the Baptist. I examined the great cyclopædia of the elder *Pliny*, who lived and died in the first century, and whose work "*Naturalis Historia*" is a record of all remarkable events, ideas and theories of his time. I examined the voluminous works of *Plutarch*, who lived in Greece and in Rome shortly after the time of St. Paul's activity in these countries. I examined *Appian* and *Dio Chrysostomos* and *Seneca*. Seneca treats of the very questions that form the center of Christian ethics, he lived in the time of Nero when Christians are said to have been quite numerous in Rome. I took up *Martial*, I examined *Philo*, who died seven years after Christ, and who lived a few hundred miles from Jerusalem, busying himself with the very same problems that formed the divine legation of Christ. He has left us very many works. In all these writers of the first century we can not find the least trace of Christianity; although Palestine at that time was a Roman province and although a flourishing trade was carried on between Palestine and Rome, a trade the existence of which can easily be shown by the great number of Roman coins of the first century found in Palestine.

Well, then, this was the result of my inquiry into the Roman and Greek writers of the first century: that they do not furnish a single proof of the existence or development of Christianity. Has this conclusion been shattered to pieces? Has it been proved that there are such facts in the writers of Greece and Rome—has one single passage been adduced? Not one, not one single passage.

After having been unsuccessful with the writers of the first century, I tried to find some evidence in the catacombs of Rome, of Greece, and of Asia. These subterraneous excavations for the interment of the dead have been carefully examined by some of the most indefatigable and most learned scholars, pre-eminently by Padre Marchi, Bosio and Count de Rossi. We know the

minutest details of the endless galleries and loculi, or graves of these catacombs, and we have perfectly satisfactory evidence with regard to the question whether these catacombs do or do not contain the corpses of Christians. They do contain millions of Christians. But the question is, has any of these catacombs been proved to be of the first century so as to serve good evidence for that time? This question again resolves itself into the further question, what are the distinguishing signs of Christian catacombs and Christian graves? What marks them off against Jewish or Pagan catacombs? For the Jews as well as the Pagans of Rome and Italy used to build catacombs for the burial of their dead. The Jews had a considerable community of their own in Rome long before the birth of Christ; this can be clearly shown by the twenty-eighth chapter of Cicero's oration for Flaccus. Now then, what are the discriminating signs of Christian catacombs? It has been said by several antiquaries that these discriminating signs are: the dove, the fish, the anchor, the olive, the lamb, the palm leaf, the Greek letters *a* and *o*, the so-called monogram of Christ, (that is to say, the Greek capital letter *Rho*, which looks like our capital *P*, and the sign of an *x* under it) and lastly, the cross. These symbols, together with a few other significant features in the style and outward appearance of the tombs, are considered to be safe evidence of the Christian origin of such catacombs as contain these signs.

I then proceeded to discuss each of these signs as symbols of Christianity. I showed how the fish came to be a symbol of Christ, what the dove meant, and the letters *a* and *o*, evidently taken from the Revelation of St. John, and lastly the cross, and the monogram of Christ. The truly Christian, I mean the distinctively Christian signs among these symbols are the cross, the letters *a* and *o*, the monogram of Christ, the fish. And now I inquired, can

these distinctively Christian signs be proved to exist on catacombs of the first century? Do we possess graves, tombstones of undoubted Christian origin exhibiting one of these characteristic signs of Christianity? To this my answer was in the negative. We do not know of such catacombs. We do not know of such tombs or graves. We do know of some catacombs dating from the first century. But these catacombs and graves exhibit only the signs of the dove, of the anchor, of the palm-tree, of the olive—signs which regularly occur on all Jewish catacombs, and even on pagan catacombs—signs which occur on catacombs that have been erected previous to the first century of our era. What then is the clear inference from all these dates? That the catacombs and graves do not furnish us a single unequivocal evidence for the existence and development of Christianity. This was my conclusion in my lecture on Christianity.

Has this conclusion been proved futile? Has it been shown to rest on fragile evidence? Have catacombs and graves been conjured up from beneath the surface of the earth to prove the fallibility of my conclusion? Has it been shown that there are catacombs of the first century, and *Christian* catacombs of the first century? Has it been shown that the cross, the monogram of Christ, the letters a and o, that these distinctive signs of Christianity do occur on tombs of the first century?

Not the faintest effort has been made to show that.

And I add: not the faintest effort could have been made. For there are no such catacombs, at least not to-day. They may find them, as they have found Troja. But up to this year they have not yet found them.

After having been unsuccessful with the catacombs and graves I turned to the numerous inscriptions that are still extant. According to Martigny, (a very great authority even for those who require the test of an English transla-

tion, for he has been translated into English), according to him, we have over 6000 inscriptions dating from before the fourth century. But the earliest dated inscription which has been declared Christian is from the year 107 after Christ. And even this one poor inscription has been declared Christian solely on the personal authority of De Rossi, whose personal conviction it was, that this inscription is of Christian origin. But personal conviction is only an argument in a parlor-dispute. Science requires much more than personal conviction. This, then, was the result of my inquiries into inscriptions: they do not furnish one single case of fair evidence for the first century.

Has this conclusion been proved to rest on a false basis? Have undoubted inscriptions of the first century been adduced? Has it been shown that my facts do not stand the test of science?

Nothing of the kind. Not one single inscription has been adduced, the argument was not even touched upon.

Hence no passage of a Greek, or Roman, or Jewish writer of the first century making mention of Christianity, has been brought forth against my argument; nor has a catacomb or an inscription been pointed out to prove the fallacy of my statement, that there are no evidences of the first century. What, then, has been said in the sermon in the line of refutation?

It was said, first, that there is a passage in a Jewish writer of the first century in which unequivocal mention is made of Christ and his miracles, and second, that the Gospels, having been written in the first century, are full evidence of this century, being, as they are, genuine sources and reliable documents.

Accordingly I shall first discuss the alleged passage in Josephus and then the question, whether the Gospels can be proved to have been written in the first century?

First as to Josephus.

Josephus has left us a very elaborate book under the title of: *Antiquities of the Jews*, in twenty books, a comprehensive Jewish history from the earliest times down to the outbreak of the war in 66 after Christ. It was completed in the thirteenth year of Domitian, that is to say, in the year 93 or 94 after Christ, and thus it belongs to the first century of our era. In the eighteenth book of these antiquities there is a passage which speaks "of a certain Jesus, a wise man if indeed he was a man, for he was a worker of miracles and he was the Christ. At the instigation of the Jewish chief men Pilatus condemned him to the cross. But he appeared to his followers alive again on the third day." This passage in Josephus I had made mention of in my first lecture on the Origin of Christianity; but I refused to accept it as good evidence, saying that the passage is spurious, that the passage bears unmistakable signs of being an interpolation. In saying that I never thought of saying something new. I thought and I still think that this criticism of the passage in Josephus belongs to the well-ascertained results of philological science.

It was said in the sermon that my statement with regard to this passage is a surprising one. Surprising? It is now over 250 years that over one hundred scholars of all denominations, of all countries, of all professions have published books and essays and treatises on this one passage. And hundreds of these scholars have explicitly declared against the genuineness of it, have proved it to be an interpolation. And because I simply reiterate a statement that has been made by over a hundred scholars of all descriptions, and ever since 250 years—because I repeat their well-digested statements—does that entitle anybody to call my statement a surprising one? A statement may be called surprising when it is new, novel, unexpected, hitherto unknown; but when a statement is older than

250 years, when it has been already discussed from all points of view, from all sides—what reason is there to call it a surprising statement? Does that not look as if I were the sole originator of such a statement, as if it were founded on no other authority than mine? Whereas in reality it rests on the authority of men whose vote in science has long been recognized as one of decisive energy. Who has not read or heard of the greatest of all philologists in the sixteenth century, of Joseph Scaliger, a man to whom even the very smallest reference-book will devote a few lines; who is entirely ignorant of Dav. Heinsius and his inestimable labors in the field of text-criticism? And of J. F. Gronovius, L. Capelle, Dav. Blondel, Tanaquil Favre, El. du Pin, Gf. Less, Eichstädt? All these great philologists, without any exception pious devoted orthodox believers, have unanimously declared against the genuineness of this passage. They have considered it an evident interpolation. Ed. Reuss, professor of church-history in Strassburg, a man of world-wide fame, (and whose works have all been translated into English), sides with those who consider the whole passage not only a spurious one but a palpable interpolation. If all these names should not be sufficient I can serve with a few more. Here are the works of Bradly, of Knittel, of Strettenberg, of Bochmert, who wrote a separate book on this passage. I can serve with still more names if necessary, for the literature of this passage is enormous; it's a small library in itself.

Can, in the face of all these facts, my statement be called a novel one, a surprising one? Does my statement seem to rest on my own authority only? But I shall not only quote names and names. I shall give you the chief arguments why the passage in Josephus has been declared an interpolation, and why it can never be rescued from the charge of being spurious. It is true that all extant manuscripts of Josephus do contain this passage. Hence

we can take no argument against the passage from the manuscripts of the works of Josephus. But there is another argument. I said before that the writings of the early Fathers are all more or less polemical. They fight the doctrine of paganism and defend their own tenets, together with the historical events of Christianity. In order to prove, or rather illustrate, the latter, they very frequently, nay, in innumerable passages, make use of the writings of Josephus; they entertain a peculiar predilection for him; their judgments in this respect are absolutely unanimous. You will find all these highly laudatory judgments conveniently collected in the Havercamp edition of the works of Josephus. St. Jerome goes so far as to call him the Livy of the Greeks, and he receives him into the list of Christian authors.

But this one passage, the most decisive of all, the Fathers of the second and of the third centuries never quote.

They quote innumerable passages from Josephus; but they do not quote this particular passage, this, the decisive passage of all passages with regard to Christianity. Neither Justinus Martyr, nor Chrisostomos, nor Origen. What then could entitle anybody to say, as it has been said, that this passage had been quoted by the Fathers of the Church, whose works are extant and the authority of which has never been doubted? I have shown before that the authority of these Fathers has been doubted very much. But apart from this question, let the adversaries of my statement come forth with a quotation of the questionable passage in Josephus prior to Eusebius, that is to say, let them point out a Father of the *second* or *third* century who quote this so-called evidence. Let them do it—that's a very light duty. If they are so extremely confident to show such conclusive evidence,

let them show it; let them show such a quotation in one of the Fathers of the second and third century—and especially if they can do so in a Father of the second century, then I will give in—then I will say the passage in Josephus is likely to be a genuine passage, and no interpolation. But until this has been shown, but until such quotation in the works of the Fathers, not of the fourth and fifth centuries, but of the second and third centuries, are adduced, I cannot give up one atom of my statement. I never denied that the said passage in Josephus will be found quoted in Eusebius and in the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries. I only said, and I do still say, that it is never quoted in the Fathers of the second and third centuries. What is then the use of quoting Fathers and insisting on their great authority, and so forth, if these Fathers are of the fourth and fifth centuries? For it is this very circumstance which, in addition to other arguments, induced the learned and pious scholars mentioned a little while ago to drop the said passage in Josephus altogether. They said: if that passage in Josephus could have been found in the original manuscript of Josephus, in the manuscript, or manuscripts that had not yet been tampered with by dishonest copyists, why would the Fathers of the second and third centuries have neglected to quote such an excellent evidence, an evidence the more excellent because it came from a Jew? And why would they have? There is no sensible answer to this question save this, that they did not know of such a passage. This is the answer of Jos. Scaliger, Gronovius, Heinsius, Eichstaedt, David Reusz, and the rest of all those scholars.

Has any part of their arguments, with regard to the passage in Josephus, been destroyed by the sermon of last Sunday? Has it been shown that Fathers of the second and third centuries do quote the passage in Josephus?

Has that been shown to be the case? Nothing of the kind. But this is the turning point of the whole question with regard to Josephus.

In my first lecture on Christianity I mentioned the fact that there was another passage in Josephus in which he speaks of John the Baptist, and very elaborately, too. This passage, I have to confess, has not been disputed, but it does not mention Christ or Christianity.

I have now to discuss the last part of our present lecture, that is to say, the Gospels. In the sermon of last Sunday it was clearly perceptible that I was supposed to refuse the authority of the Gospels, as such. As such, I say, and I take liberty to call your special attention to these two words. I was supposed to question, or rather reject the authenticity of the Gospels, as such, in themselves; in other words, that I do not consider them to be reliable, trustworthy evidence. And then came a flood of all kinds of arguments proving, corroborating and confirming the authenticity of the Gospels. The legal aspect of the question was particularly laid stress upon; the whole question was put as it were before a court of law, and the experience and knowledge of the lawyers present were frequently appealed to.

Some of the arguments were very good: they refute excellently; but I do not know whom. Me, certainly not.

I never said that the Gospels were void of authenticity; I never said that they are unreliable documents; I never said that they are not trustworthy.

I never said any of these statements. How, then, shall I consider myself refuted by a refutation of these statements? They are not my statements. For my statement is this: As it cannot be proved that the Gospels were written during the first century, they consequently cannot figure amongst the evidences of the first century. I say

of the first century, not *for* the first century. Because evidences of the sixth century may do good services *for* the first century, but they can never be called evidences *of* the first century. We had the very same case with the catacombs, with the graves, with the inscriptions. We said, none of them is of the first century; but they can serve some indirect, circumstantial evidence for the first century. Is the difference between *of* and *for* really so subtle, so imperceptible, that it must needs lead to a misunderstanding of statements?

In fact, the whole controversy may be reduced to these two words—*of* and *for*.

I said there are no evidences *of* the first century; and I was supposed to have said, there are no evidences *for* the first century. This, then, being the case, I shall proceed to prove my real statement, namely: that we have no satisfactory reason to assume that the Gospels have been written before the fourth decade of the second century, or, in round numbers, before 150 after Christ. St. Paul never quotes the Gospels. Never, not once. In all the writings of St. Paul there are only two passages where he quotes a saying of Jesus. Only two. The one passage is different from the corresponding passage in the Gospel. The other passage contains words not found in any of our Gospels, namely, the words "it is more blessed to give than to receive." Nor is there a quotation from the Gospels to be found in the Epistles of Peter. The next witness is Clement Romanus. There is not one single passage in the writings of Clement Romanus, who wrote in the beginning of the second century, which bears unequivocal signs of being quoted from the Gospels; nor does he name the Gospels. Nor is there a quotation from the Gospels, or even mention made of the Gospels, in Barnabas, in Hermas, in Papias, all of whom are called Apostolic Fathers, all of whom lived in the first half of the

second century, all of whom wrote polemical works, referring to the events and tenets of Christianity. Why, then, do they not quote the Gospels? If the Gospels had been written in the first century, why were they not used by Christian writers of the first half of the second century? Simply because they were not yet written. Because either of the two: If the Gospels were written in the first century they must have at once commanded the utmost reverence, for they were written by inspired writers, and partly by apostles. Hence, if we see, as we are bound to see, that they did not command such a great authority, we have to conclude either that they have not been written by inspired writers and apostles, or that they have not been written in the first century. This is as clear as sunlight. A refutation of this statement can be achieved only by showing conclusively that the Fathers of the first half of the second century do quote the Gospels, as such, by pointing to such quotations, by citing the book, chapter, and subdivision of such quotations. If this will be done, then, but not till then, will I say the Gospels are likely to have been written in the first century.

Have such quotations been adduced in the said sermon? Have such quotations in Clement, in Ignatius, in Barnabas, in Hermas, in Papias, been pointed out?

Nothing of the kind.

Quotations from the Gospels were adduced; many, many quotations, but from Fathers like Tertullianus, Clement, not Romanus, but Alexandrinus, Irenæus, Origen, and so forth, that is to say, from Fathers who lived in the *latter* half of the *second* century. This I never denied. You cannot read five consecutive pages in these later writers without meeting with a quotation from the Gospels. But do these thousands of quotations from the Gospel explain why the Fathers of the *first* half of the second century do not quote the Gospels? Not in the least. The

more frequently the Fathers of the second half of the second century are quoting from the Gospels, the more astonishing it becomes why the Fathers of the first half of the same century do not quote it just as frequently. The more astonishing and the less explicable, unless we assume, what we are bound to assume, that the Gospels have not been written in the first century.

It was said in the sermon that even heathens like Celsus conceded the genuineness of the Gospels. This is at absolute variance with the facts. Celsus was a heathen who had written a work against Christianity, about the middle of the second century. This work Origen, one of the Christian Fathers, tried to refute in a book entitled *Against Celsus*. In this book Origen quotes considerable portions of the work of Celsus, so that we can form a very adequate idea of the drift of Celsus' opinions as well as of his arguments. This Celsus, it was said in the sermon, conceded the genuineness of the Gospels. Now if one single passage can be adduced, I say one single passage, in which Celsus, directly or indirectly, by express statement or by implication, does concede the genuineness of the Gospels, then I shall give up all my statements—then I am totally defeated. One single passage will suffice. I do not ask for two or three or an hundred, only for one. I do not ask for an explicit, direct expression—any concession will do. But such a concession on the part of Celsus is an absolute impossibility. He considered the narratives of Christian sacred books as mere myths; he refused to give them the least credence. His arguments against Christianity are almost identical with those of the most modern antagonists of Christianity. If he would have conceded the authenticity of the Gospels, why then he would have no longer remained what he was—a heathen philosopher.

It is with him as with David Strauss who, in the sermon of last Sunday, was said to have conceded the genuineness of the Gospels. This is again absolutely at variance with the facts. It was the chief results of Strauss' studies to reject the Gospels, to refuse their authority as an historical evidence. If Strauss can be shown to have conceded the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels, then anything, indeed, can be shown. Do you think that Strauss can be said to have conceded the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels, after having excluded the fourth Gospel, that of St John, altogether and unconditionally? Strauss would not accept or quote one single word of this Gospel, he would not quote a single passage from it; he rejected it altogether. And yet he conceded the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels! I fail to see the connection.

It was said in the sermon, that the Fathers never quote from apocryphal books, that is to say from books, that had not received the sanction of the church, from books written by uninspired writers; that they only quoted from the Gospels, thereby proving the vast superiority of the Gospels. This is again totally at variance with the facts. The first Epistle of Clement, an apocryphal writer, was read in the churches, is quoted in the same manner as Scripture by Irenaeus, and is found in the Codex Alexandrinus, in one of the oldest manuscripts of the New Testament, as part of this Testament, a manuscript that has been quoted in the sermon. The Pastor of Hermas, another apocryphal writing was also read in the churches and is quoted by Irenaeus, Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen, and is found in the Codex Sinaiticus, in the oldest copy of the New Testament still extant. This Codex was also mentioned in the sermon, and yet it was said that apocryphal writings were always excluded from copies of the New Testament, not being considered on a par with the works of inspired authors. I could easily multiply the number of cases, in

which apocryphal writings have been quoted by the Fathers. But these will suffice. This will suffice to show that the heathen Celsus did *not* concede the authenticity of the Gospels, and that the modern Strauss did not acknowledge it either ; and that the Fathers were far, very far from excluding any other writings but the Gospels.

If we now reconsider all the points under discussion, what shall we make of those long and elaborate statements of the sermon with regard to the different manuscripts of the Bible, to the different manuscripts of Greek and Roman classics, and to the assertion, that if arguments like mine should prevail against the authenticity of the New Testament, then it would be necessary to "reject Homer, Cicero, Horace, Livy or any other ancient writer," that, in fact, such arguments like mine would "wipe out all antiquity."

Let me recapitulate these surprising statements: First, the ancient copies of the Bible were enumerated. Very well. I did so too; in my first lecture on Christianity I enumerated all the extant copies of the Bible from the fourth and fifth centuries. I mentioned the Codex Sinaiticus, the Codex Alexandrinus, the Codex Vaticanus, the Codex Ephraimi, the very copies that were mentioned six weeks later in the sermon, with the exception of the Codex Ephraimi, which was not mentioned in the sermon. Then it was said in the sermon, that the text of the Bible is next to incorrupt. Then it was deduced, that the Bible is an absolutely reliable document, although the earliest copy extant of the Bible dates from the fourth century. And it was concluded, that if the New Testament should be rejected on the strength of the fact, that the earliest copy dates from the fourth and not from the first century—then all Roman and Greek classics have to be likewise rejected, because the earliest manuscripts, copies, of the majority of these writers date from the seventh, eighth and ninth


centuries after Christ. By way of exemplifying this, several incorrect numbers were made use of. So amongst others it was said that the most ancient copy of Homer was of the eighth century after Christ, whereas there are copies of very considerable portions of Homer's poems a thousand years older than the eighth century after Christ; copies from the second century before Christ, which are still preserved in the British Museum in London, and a description of which may be found in the Catalogue of Ancient Manuscripts in the British Museum, published in 1881.

But these are questions of secondary consideration. The chief question is: where and when did I say, that the age, the mere age of a manuscript has to be taken as its main characteristic quality? When did I say, that the New Testament can claim no authenticity, *because* its most ancient copies are of the fourth century? I never said that; indeed I do not think, that such a thing has ever been said. All I said was this: that we cannot prove the Gospels to have been written in the first century. Shall this statement be deemed refuted and defeated by adducing copies of the fourth and fifth centuries? I did not even touch upon the question of the authenticity of the Gospel. I did not broach it; I did not prove it, I did not refute it. I did not speak of it at all. And not having spoken of it how could I have attacked it? I have done what a score of the Fathers of the Church have done, what Clement, Ignatius, Papias, Hermas, and so forth, have done, in other words, I have not touched upon the authenticity of the Gospels? And what was holy in them is to be blamed in me? I have only done what I have promised to do, I have treated of my subject as an historian. An historian is merely a recorder, whatever he has to record whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the feelings or desires of people, he puts down on his records. He goes to China, to India, to the interior of Asia; and

in those countries as well as in others he frequently notices things and occurrences, which are so utterly aversive to his own feeling, that he can scarcely help disdaining them. But he does not disdain them; he quietly records them. For he has been taught by the first rule of his science that his doings as an historian ought not to be interfered with by sudden feelings or by romantical reminiscences. The course of his studies then brings him to the ever-memorable time when He was preaching his benign teachings to men. The divine figure of His exalted person fills the heart of the historian with awe, with love with fervent devotion. Oh how would he like to know every little trifle of this unique life—how anxiously does he watch all contemporary records, to find, if possible, every word that has been dropped from this prophetic mouth—how gladly would he learn something about the dear mother, about the dear father of this sacred circle. What delight would it be to the historian to know more of His youth, of His education, of His associates and colleagues, of the different phases of His inner development—with bitter envy does the historian point to the melancholy fact, that we know more about a monster like Caracalla than about the blessed person of Jesus Christ, more about some obscure Greek or Roman scribbler, than about the originator of the most human wisdom.

But the historian is a recorder. He has to state that he can not find a single contemporary record, and that even later records are contradictory and scanty. To confess that is a sacred duty; and my duty is all that I claim to have done. If any one can show that I have done my duty in a garbled way, in an unsatisfactory way, let him expose me; I do not entreat his mercy, his charity—but let him do it in a scientific way, let him use strong arguments, and arguments to the point. Let him refute *my* statements, not the statements of *others*. If, however, he

be unable to refute my scientific arguments, let him beware from doing injustice to my heart. For what injustice is it to say of me, that I do not believe in the supernatural! What injustice to say that of the pupil of a master whose chief teaching it was to view all events sub specie æternitatis, under the aspect of Eternity! Let us avoid thus interfering with the inner household of our souls. Are we not in a free country? Is not liberty the fundamental principle of this great country? Well, then, shall the liberty of conscience be alone excepted? Who will venture to say that? The great and free people of this republic has shown it numberless times, that it esteems the manifestations of free and independent inquiries; and therefore I cherish the cheerful conviction that the distinguished members of this people who have honored me with their presence will certainly hesitate before condemning me. They will inquire not into feelings and inner motives, but simply whether my statements have or have not stood the test of science. And so I leave it entirely to this intelligent circle of my hearers to decide whether I have or have not been a fair and impartial historian of the Origin of Christianity.



SECOND CONTROVERSIAL LECTURE ON THE ORIGIN OF CHRIS- TIANITY.

May 8, 1887.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

To our lecture of last Saturday a reply was given on last Monday in the Odeon. In the very beginning of this reply it was said that the assertion made about my being a sceptic is no longer in accordance with facts, and that my friends may feel assured that I am no sceptic, no unbeliever. This correction of an older assertion was highly gratifying to me. In *one* sense of the word, it is true, I wish to be considered a sceptic—I mean in that innocent, purely grammatical sense of the word in which it only conveys the idea of a doubting mind, of a mind which is not inclined to accept any evidence whatsoever, which does not believe without examination; in *one* word, a thoughtful mind. In the other sense of the word, however, I mean in the sense of being an unbeliever, I strenuously object to it; or rather I strenuously objected to it, for now this is no longer necessary—it has been declared in the Odeon that I am not a sceptic. This question, then, may be considered as settled. In the very able lecture delivered in the Odeon, I have been called, “my friend, Dr. Reich;” the lecturer being older than I, I can not but feel greatly honored by this attribute. Of all that friendship can grant, however, nothing seems to be more precious than the liberty of free address, the liberty to tell each other the truth, the open truth, the full truth.

I shall avail myself of this privilege; I shall tell the open truth, the full truth, without any restriction, without any qualification, and the first manifestation of this honest struggle for truth I have to formulate as follows: The lecture of last Monday in the Odeon fails to shake one brick, one piece of mortar of the edifice erected in our lecture of last Saturday. The edifice stands quiet and unmoved and the inhabitants of it enjoy the calm repose of an undisturbed life. I say the lecture in the Odeon fails to refute or upset one particle of my statements, and, accordingly, I am going to show that all the arguments and authorities accumulated in that lecture were unable to alter one single syllable in my sentences. I still state that we have no contemporaneous evidences of the first century, dating from the first century. In order to prove that I examined 1, the Greek, Roman and Jewish writers of the first century; 2, the catacombs; 3. the inscriptions of the first century. These were my three arguments, and, after having found that, 1, in none of the Greek, Roman, Jewish writers of the first century; and 2, that in none of the catacombs; and 3, that in none of the inscriptions do we find the least trace of Christianity, I concluded that, irrespective of the New Testament, of which I always treated separately, there is no evidence dating from the first century. These three arguments were not even touched upon in the sermon delivered a fortnight ago. At that time catacombs and inscriptions proving against me seemed to be unknown. But meanwhile such catacombs and inscriptions have fortunately enough been excavated and exhibited in the Odeon. At the first blush I felt a very profound satisfaction at seeing that my prophecy with regard to future excavations has come true. You will kindly remember that in my first lecture, as well as in my second and third lecture on the Origin of Christianity, I always spoke of the possibility of finding some

of those evidences which, I said, up to this date have not yet been found. I mentioned the marvellous excavations of Dr. Schliemann, who has given us irrefragable evidences for the Trojan war—evidences we had to miss for over 2,000 years. I said, up to this date we have no catacombs or inscriptions of the first century evidencing the leading facts of Christianity; but I added, such evidences may be found next month, next year, etc.

But the discovery of such catacombs and inscriptions came to pass by far sooner than I thought. At the first mention of these newly-discovered catacombs and inscriptions in the Odeon, I really indulged in the pleasure of imagining how delightful it will be to announce to my hearers in my next lecture, *habemus papam*, that we have at last found some undoubted evidences of the first century. But I am sorry to say that my pleasure soon came to a bitter end. I saw I was disappointed. It was said in the lecture, that H. L. Hastings, of Boston, a writer of great authority, has pointed out some wall inscriptions evidently alluding to Christians or Christianity, which have been found in the ruins of Pompeii, and since Pompeii was demolished in 79 after Christ, these inscriptions are positively dating from the first century. Moreover, it was said, that the same great authority has called attention to some Pompeian palaces on which inscriptions caricaturing God were found. And still more. In the same Pompeii the unfinished sculpture of a cross has been found—and such evidence, it was said, conclusively proves the influence of Christianity.

When in my first lecture on the Origin of Christianity I positively denied the existence of inscriptions of the first century, I did not do it after a superficial glance over some haphazard reference book. I went to the great collectors of Latin or Greek inscriptions, to Gruter, to Muratori, to Bœckh, to Orelli, Henzen, to Garucci, to

Rossi, and I perused their works with the greatest care, hunting and hunting a sentence, a word, a syllable, which could serve as an unequivocal evidence of Christianity. But I could not find it. Very well—I still continued the chase. There is a collection of Latin inscriptions found all over the world which is more comprehensive than either Gruter, Muratori, Orelli or the rest of the scholars just mentioned. This collection has been published at the expense of the Berlin Academy, under the superintendence of Theodore Mommsen, the celebrated historian, and with the assistance of Huebner, Zangemeister and other great authorities on epigraphy, on the science of inscriptions. This colossal collection comprises ten folio volumes, the fourth of which contains all the inscriptions found in Pompeii, with the facsimile of the inscription, copied on the spot, under the severe eyes of the best scholars of the age. This volume here (showing the volume) is the folio I am alluding to; it contains the Pompeian inscriptions. The majority of these inscriptions are called graffiti—scrawlings on the walls of houses or on columns. These graffiti are very numerous; such wall paintings and writings were greatly in use at that time, for there were no newspapers, and hence any kind of news and similar announcements or criticisms on current events were spread by writing them on the walls of buildings. It thus happens that these graffiti are a fair record of the entire life of those times. In this folio volume we possess the latest and most complete collection of all Pompeian graffiti and inscriptions. If, therefore, somebody asserts that there have been found inscriptions in the ruins of Pompeii which are of an unequivocally Christian origin, he has to point to the page and line of this volume, of this folio. But in this folio he will hunt in vain for such an inscription. One fragment of a Latin inscription is to be found in this volume under No. 679, in which

the syllables "Risti" can be read clearly, but whether these two syllables have to be supplemented by adding four letters to them and making them read Christiani or Christiane—this is more than doubtful. The whole sentence is utterly without any significance, it runs igni gaude Christiane, meaning, enjoy the fire oh Christian, and the reading of the main word Christian rests on a mere conjecture, which has been rejected both by Kiessling and Zangemeister.

But it was not this inscription to which allusion was made in the lecture. For *several* Pompeii inscriptions were mentioned, and here in this complete and original collection of inscriptions I can find none or eventually the pale shadow of one inscription, an inscription too poor or insignificant to be worth consideration. The alleged "several" inscriptions of Pompeii were said to be quoted in a work of H. L. Hastings, of Boston, and it was said that it is hard if not impossible to impose upon the scholars of Boston. That may be true, say more, it is true. But does that not presuppose, that Boston scholars have to take notice of a man's books before they can accept or refute them? And is it really beyond any doubt that the scholars of Boston did take notice of Mr. H. L. Hastings' books? I confess, I have never heard of Mr. Hastings' works.

But let Mr. Hastings be whoever he is, let him be the president of Yale College, or of all colleges in the Union—what does his mere name prove in the matter before us? I said, that there is no unequivocal Christian inscription of the first century. If my adversaries want to refute such a statement in a scientific way, let them point out such a Christian inscription of the first century, let them proffer a collection, an authentic collection of such inscriptions and say; here, here you have it. That is the way of scientific refutation. But if the whole refutation of my

statement consists in nothing else but in an appeal to a scholar in Boston, in nothing else but in these words: Mr. Hastings, of Boston, has said there are such inscriptions of the first century—then I will simply retort: But Mr. Smith of Chicago has said, there are none. That is not the way of science—that is childish and puerile. If there are such inscriptions, and if the whole issue of the discussion depends on such an inscription, why not show it, why not point to the page, and line of the work where they can be found? Why act as if everything would be settled by an appeal to this scholar or that scholar? If this collection here, this folio of Mommsen is considered insufficient or not absolutely complete, there are other sources undoubtedly well-known to the reverend lecturer, there is the *Bulletino di archæologia Christiana*, edited by De Rossi in Rome; there is the *Revue archæologique* of Paris; the *Archæologia* in London; the numerous periodicals in Germany. In all these periodicals all new excavations and finds are registered and recorded, all these periodicals are carefully indexed and they can be easily procured from the great libraries of this country. What can it avail the general public if one lecturer will, in support of his statements, appeal to Mr. Smith in Chicago, and another lecturer to Mr. Jones, of Boston? The public wants to judge not by the authority of Smith, Jones and Co., but by the authority of its own sound judgment. If an unequivocal Pompeii inscription will be shown the public, then the public itself will settle the whole question without the aid of any other authority. For everybody is aware of the fact that Pompeii was destroyed in 79 after Christ, and everybody will clearly see, that such an unequivocal inscription must necessarily date from the first century. This is in my opinion the only way to convince an intelligent audience. Any other way is inefficacious.

It was said in the lecture that part of a cross was found in Pompeii. This, again, was said exclusively on the authority of Mr. Hastings, without pointing to the work or collection where such a Pompeian sculpture can be seen and examined. But I shall not be too severe. Let us grant it for a moment; let us grant the fact that an unfinished piece of sculpture, which seems to be a cross, has been found in Pompeii. Very well; what does that prove? Does that prove that that cross, must of necessity have been a *Christian* cross, that such a cross is a sure sign of the existence of Christians in Pompeii? O, that is entirely novel. The cross has been freely used and applied by almost all nations of antiquity. It has been found as a sacred sign of the Assyrians, and hundreds of thousands of such crosses have been excavated in Nineveh, all dating from 800, 900, and 1,000 years before Christ. Dr. Schliemann found them in ancient Troy. The ancient Egyptians used the cross, and in Wilkinson's well-known book on the Manners and Customs of the Egyptians, you will find all kinds of old Egyptian crosses. The ancient Grecians, Etruscans, the Romans, as well as the Druids, the Mexicans and Peruvians all knew the cross as a sacred symbol, all used it. The mere presence of a cross, therefore, or rather of something which looks similar to a part of the cross, is no proof whatever of its being of Christian origin. This belongs to the A, B, C of the science of archæology. The use of the cross in Pompeii as a Christian symbol is the less probable because the use of this sacred symbol is of a very late date. In none of the unequivocally Christian catacombs of the second century do we find the cross, and not even in those of the third.

It was said in the lecture that caricatures ridiculing the crucified God have been found in Pompeii. Of the first period of Christianity, however, there is only one caricature, which has been found in *Rome*, and not in Pompeii,

in 1856 on a wall under the western angle of the Palatine. Here you may see the picture of this caricature. It is needless to go into the irreverent details of this caricature. It is only necessary to recall the fact that this caricature has been admitted on all hands to be a graffito of the second century. Not even the suggestion has been made of its having originated in the first century. This book gives a complete statement of nearly all the essays and treatises on the caricature. Its author is of a severely orthodox cast of mind. His name is Becker.

If, however, it be quite certain that similar caricatures have been found in Pompeii, why not proffer them? Why not let the public judge for themselves? Why leave everything to so-called authorities? I have shown you my original records, and I have confessed that I do not know of any other specimens. If original inscriptions or caricatures, or any other kind of evidence would have been brought forth, I certainly should have been the first to embrace them with all imaginable fervor. I do not glory in the absence of such inscriptions; the lack of them does not give me any satisfaction whatever. I simply state the fact that there are no such inscriptions, as far as my knowledge of such inscriptions goes, and I moreover state the fact that up to this hour I have not been shown such an inscription either.

In addition to my three arguments, I had also made mention of an alleged passage in Josephus. Josephus was a Jew of the first century, who wrote a book on the "Antiquities of the Jews," and it has been said that in the 18th chapter, or rather book, of this work Josephus does make mention of Jesus Christ. In my very first lecture on the Origin of Christianity, I said that the alleged passage in Josephus has been declared spurious and interpolated by a vast majority of scholars, by a vast majority of pious theologians and philologists. And I do still say,

and I shall say it for the rest of my life. Numbers are numbers, and cannot be played with. I have quoted a host of the most celebrated scholars, scholars like J. Scaliger, whose fame was so great that the most ancient universities of Europe offered him enormous salaries, not for teaching the students, but simply for living in the city where the university was situated; scholars like Dav. Heinsius, Gronovius, Ed. Reusz, Daubuze, Kittner, and Strettenberg, whose fame has long been settled, whose orthodoxy has never been impugned, and who have unanimously declared against the genuineness of this passage. I can not now repeat what I have said about this passage in my first and third lecture on the development of Christianity. I can only state the fact that in the lecture of last Monday I failed to hear the names of those numerous and great scholars who were inclined to accept the questionable passage as correct. I failed to hear the names, and I shall forever fail to hear them, because the simple fact is this, that the vast majority of scholars do not accept the passage. This also is the opinion of one of the Professors of Lane Seminary, who has, in a late issue of the *Evening Post* of this city, conceded that there is no profane writer of the first century (including Josephus) who mentions one of the facts of Christianity.

In the lecture of last Monday some effort was made to account for the remarkable fact that none of the Fathers quotes the questionable passage. It was said that the Fathers were afraid of the Jews, who at that time had great influence in Rome, and they therefore did not quote from Josephus. I must confess that such an argument, for a moment at least, quite bewildered me. The Jews were so powerful in Rome and at the Roman court? The Jews? And the Fathers consequently were afraid to quote from a Jewish writer?

Then, in fact, all history is a lie; then, in fact, all Fathers are impostors. For is it not Tertullian, one of the Fathers, who exclaims in a triumphant voice: *Implevimus palatium*—we have filled the palace in Rome? Were not the nurse and the teachers of the children of the Emperor Sept. Severus Christians? Do not the catacombs of the third century prove abundantly that men in the highest ranks, courtiers of all descriptions, had taken up the cross and had turned Christians? Do we not still possess the most stringent laws against the Jews of the third century? Well then, where do we perceive any ground or reason for the assumption that Christians of that time were less powerful than the Jews, and that the Fathers had to be careful in their quotations from a Jewish writer?

Not the faintest trace.

On the contrary, the Jews had all possible reason to be very peaceful and to live in the dark, for the Roman emperors did not easily forget the atrocities of the Judean war in the time of Hadrian. That war had cost sacrifices of quite extraordinary character, and the conquered Jews were amongst the most hateful of all provincials.

No, let us be honest. The questionable passage in Josephus cannot be rescued, it is lost on all points; and in a sober, unprejudiced view of text-criticism, it does not exist at all. It was said in the lecture that there is another passage in Josephus where mention is made of both Jesus and the brother of Jesus. Precisely so; and I did not fail to mention this second passage in Josephus, although neither in the sermon nor in the lecture has it been said that I did quote both passages in Josephus. I mention this only because many persons would otherwise be under the impression as if I had suppressed the existence of the second passage. But in the lecture the genuineness of this second passage was made dependent on the

genuineness of the first. And hence it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it any longer. And this the less so because in Josephus we read of many, many different persons by the name of Jesus. Jesus was a very common name at that time.

I have so far shown that not a single one of my three arguments has been either modified or annihilated by the discourse of last Monday. But it was said in the lecture that these three arguments are bad arguments altogether, because of their being *negative* arguments. Negative arguments, negative arguments it was said, and great emphasis was laid upon this innocent adjective. "Not a shadow of affirmative proof—all negative." That was the weighty charge levelled at my three arguments.

I do not deny it. It is perfectly true and correct. My arguments are what is usually called negative arguments. The negative word "not" forms a prominent part of my three sentences. The Greek, Roman, Jewish writers do *not* mention Christianity; the catacombs do *not* furnish evidence; the inscriptions do *not* testify to the history of Christianity. Correct, perfectly correct. But what now? Is a negative proof no proof? No good proof? Is it only the affirmative proof that may fairly be called a good proof? Ah, that is entirely new. I have made a very careful study of the science of logic, of the topica anterior and posterior of Aristotle, of Bishop Whateley, of George Boole, De Morgan and Stanley Jevons—I have never heard any of these profound thinkers lay particular stress on the fact whether a proof is "affirmative" or negative. This is a mere difference of form. Any sentence may be said affirmatively or negatively, as the case may be. I can say: Pleasant weather to-day, and I can say—The weather to-day is not annoying. Speaking of the evidences of Christianity, I can say affirmatively: These evidences are of the second

century; or I can say negatively: None of them are of the first century. But the essence in both cases is perfectly the same. Shall such a mere question of form effectively bear on the efficacy of a proof? Then I am sorry to say many of our greatest sciences will henceforth be divested of their scientific character. Take *e. g.* the Calculus, the pride of Leibnitz and Newton, the foundation of all higher mechanics, of the science of astronomy, of navigation, of physics. It rests on the purely negative idea of a differential; a differential being defined as a quantity, than which a smaller quantity can not be thought; hence the definition does not say what it is, but what it is not. But the conception of this differential has proved the most fruitful of all mathematical ideas. And why not? What does the so-called negative character interfere with the correctness or incorrectness of a proof? or of a sentence? Nothing—that is only a manner of talking, on the *substance* of our thinking, it does not exercise the slightest influence whatsoever.

In the lecture of Monday, however, it was said that in point of evidence, of legal evidence, a negative proof is of no import; in the lecture, great, great stress was laid upon the nature and character of legal evidence, of evidence as it is used in the courts of law, and frequent appeal was made to lawyers and to the rules of law. Nothing can be more welcome to me. Permit me to say: Anch'io sono pittore; in other words, I take liberty to say that law and the rules of law are not quite unknown to me. I have been studying law at the University of Vienna, Austria, for over six years, there I took my degree as Doctor of Laws, and for the subsequent six years law, together with the history of institutions, was the center of all my studies. I beg your pardon for mentioning these personals; I do so only for the sake of showing my great satisfaction at the fact that so much stress has

been laid on law and legal evidence. This is familiar ground for me; nothing could be more agreeable for me than to shift part of the controversy to the beloved plains of jurisprudence. But not in the manner of last Monday. Neither my old Roman jurists, nor Blackstone, Kent or Story would approve of such a manner.

It was said *e. g.* in the lecture that the working and significance of negative proof can be aptly compared to the following anecdote: John was charged with having stolen a horse. George is brought forth as a witness, and George says he has seen John stealing the horse. To this, however, John quickly replies: "Well, and I can bring ten witnesses who have *not* seen me stealing the horse." This anecdote was given as an illustration of the worthlessness of negative proofs. It was intimated that just like in this case John's negative reply can not acquit him, even so do my negative proofs fail to establish my statements.

But I beg to differ. John's reply is a joke and not a negative argument. My reply is a negative argument, and no joke.

The negative argument in John's case would be to bring ten witnesses who can prove that George could not have seen John steal the horse because of George's absence at the time the theft was committed, or because of John's absence at the same time, or because of any other reason. Such an argument would be called a negative argument, and such a negative argument would be perfectly efficacious. But John's reply as given in the lecture is no argument at all, neither a positive nor a negative one.

Under every word of those legal arguments that were given in the lecture, a fundamental error was lurking, an error which goes to prove that the rules of jurisprudence were totally misunderstood and quite inadequately applied. In the lecture it was given to understand that the

rules of legal evidence are the safest and best ascertained rules for the establishment, not of *legal* truth only, but of truth in general; of any kind of truth, of truth in history just as well as of truth in a law court. It was said that the rules of evidence as given in the works of our great authorities on legal evidence, are the fruit and result of the experience of centuries, and are better fitted for the exploration of truth than any other kind of proof.

This I peremptorily deny.

This I positively deny.

The rules of evidence as given in our legal works are wise and beneficial truth for the establishment of *legal* truth, but not for all kinds of truth. Not *e. g.* for historical truth. No real jurist who is not utterly destitute of any other knowledge can think of doubting this statement. In the law courts of all nations the principal object has never been to find the *absolute* truth of the case; for this has been found to be, in the majority of cases, unattainable. In the law courts of all nations the principal object has been to find relative truth, formal truth, legal truth, that is to say, truth which is at perfect harmony with the established rules of law and legal presumptions. If this formal truth should be rejected in favor of an imaginary absolute truth, nine lawsuits out of ten would never come to an end. And accordingly the rules of evidence do not and never will pretend to discover the absolute truth of the case, but only that formal, legal truth, which is considered sufficient by law. If legal evidence really were the absolute test of absolute truth, then it would be more than incomprehensible, why these rules of legal evidence were, as Lord Ellenborough said, different in the practice of the Northern and Western circuit of England from that of the Oxford circuit; and why they are so totally different in France from what they are in England; why a certain fact will

be thought perfect evidence in Germany, which is considered no evidence at all in England.

But the utter misunderstanding of the character of legal evidence shines forth best if we consider those numerous persons whose testimony or evidence has been rejected by the legislatures of nations. One legislature will reject the testimony or evidence given by a criminal, or the husband's testimony in his wife's case, or a Jew's testimony in a Christian's case, and so forth. Who can, in the face of these undeniable facts, assert that the rules of legal evidence seek to establish absolute truth, and not legal truth only? Why then reject a criminal's deposition? Can not a criminal be a reliable witness in a case totally alien to his crime? Can he not have repented his crime and depose as sincerely as any other man? Can not a person of a non-Christian confession, say a Turk, or an Indian, or a Chinese, be just as trustworthy as the Archbishop of Canterbury? And if one of these excluded witnesses should be the only witness in a certain case, will the rules of legal evidence then be able to detect the absolute truth of the case?

But I think it is superfluous to dwell upon this point any longer. Every fair jurist knows that the rules of legal evidence are rules for legal evidence only; that the idea of applying them to topics of a non-legal character, to topics, *e. g.*, of an historical character, is thoroughly incorrect. Greenleaf's treatise on the Gospels is a very good treatise, as such. He carries his point, *his* point I say; but not *the* point. *His* point is to show that the Gospels are likely to be considered a good document in court, and this point he really does carry—at least for English courts. But this point is not *the* point of the question. The point of the question consists in whether the Gospels would be considered absolutely faultless, not in the court of law, but in the court of history; and since the rules of evidence as

practiced in the court of law are inapplicable in the court of history, Greenleaf's treatise, although a very good one, is of no moment whatever for an historical consideration of the subject. And likewise of no moment whatever are all those paragraphs and sections quoted from legal treatises. The question at issue is not a question of legal evidence, but altogether a question of *historical* evidence. As to him who cannot see the vast difference between these two points there is only one possible explanation: he does not know neither what history nor what law is.

This will also explain the strange fact that in the lecture of Monday it was essayed to ridicule my three arguments by asking: If these three arguments be really to the point, then I fail to see how any one can prove my own (the reverend lecturer's) existence? There are no catacombs, no inscriptions, nothing of the kind, and his father's entry in the family Bible may be partially owing to the father's desire to make his paternal happiness date from an earlier time. This again bewildered me. I was in the expectance of some formidable attack, and lo! I saw that I had to take resort to weapons long used up in the times of boyhood. Are there really no catacombs and inscriptions proving the reverend lecturer's existence? O, I am so glad! For catacombs and inscriptions are generally given to *departed* persons. First let us live, and work hard, and then let us die, and then let us become historical persons, and then, then in three, four, or five centuries some great historian will hunt for our catacombs and inscriptions. But until then we must be diligent, and carefully try to avoid mixing up law with history, or theology with history.

If we really could accept the rules of legal evidence as adequate rules for the study of history or theology, then I am afraid to say all our belief in the sacred writings of Christianity could be easily deprived of its foundation. Let me explain that in a few words. Such a treatise as

that written by the great jurist Greenleaf on the Gospels, precisely such a treatise could be written on the sacred writings of the Indians, the Hindoo, on the Upanishads and Veda, on the Sutra and Brahmanahs. Every legal argument that has been made use of in Greenleaf's book can, without any further change, be applied to these writings of the Brahmans in India, and even to the writings of the ancient Persians, to the Zendavesta, and even to the sacred writings of the Chinese. In other words the arguments of Greenleaf prove too much. They not only establish the perfect reliability of the Gospels, but also the perfect reliability of the Indian, Persian and Chinese codes. His way of proving by legal evidence is equally applicable to the inspired writings of Christianity and to the so-called inspired writings of the Hindoos, etc. That is to say, his treatise is very good as far as legal evidence is concerned, but it does not prove anything at all with regard to the main issue of the question.

And even if we discard all juristic considerations, is it not self-evident that the rules of evidence as used in courts cannot be applied to the Gospels? The rules of evidence apply to ordinary affairs, to occurrences of every-day life; to events which frequently occur and re-occur in the course of things. They never reflect upon miraculous things, upon events which deviate from the common routine, upon marvels and wonders. Such miracles and wonders and marvels are in need of another kind of evidence. One set of evidence for the ordinary, another set for the extraordinary kind of events. But the Gospels are replete with all kinds of wonders. That is self-evident. It was said *e. g.* in the lecture that a false witness never enters upon the details of his narrative. The Gospels, however, abound with all kinds of details. I am far from disputing the authenticity of the Gospel; all that I say, with regard not to the authenticity, but to this argument,

consists in not accepting it. The Gospels are or are not authentic. This is a question I never broached, and never will broach. It is only with regard to this argument about the details of a narrative that I remonstrate. The amount of detail may be very fair evidence in a court of law, but it is not always so in the court of history. The simple proof is given by the following fact: The apocryphal Gospels, as edited by Tischendorf, *i. e.*, those Gospels which are on all hands considered spurious and not genuine, and which were known to exist early in the second century. These apocryphal Gospels contain the minutest details imaginable. What force, then, can be attributed to the argument of the details? The true Gospels contain abundant detail of narrative; but so do the spurious Gospels, also.

In the whole course of the controversy nothing seemed to be more astounding than the strange fact, that I was constantly said to attack the authenticity of the Gospels. All my most decided remonstrations against such an insinuation evidently failed to bring about the proper effect. I continued to be the man who assailed the Gospels. Shall I repeat it again and again, that I have never touched upon the question of the authenticity of the Gospels? That this question is a purely theological question—totally remote from any historical inquiries? Is it just to charge me with mixing up theology and history, because other persons cannot learn to see that there is a difference between history and theology, as well as between history and law? I said, we can not prove, we do not possess any historical proof for the assumption, that the Gospels have been written in the first century. So I said, and so I still say, and so I shall continue to say, until real historical proofs to the contrary will be proffered. I mean real historical proof—not those poor arguments, those poor, old, worn out arguments, that have long, long lost their force

on the minds of scholars, although they may exercise some influence on those who have never devoted their leisure to these studies. But is the statement that we can not-historically prove the Gospels to have been written in the first century—is this statement really equivalent to declaring the Gospels a forgery? Because I say this letter has been written⁸² in the evening, not in the morning, does that convey the idea that this letter is a forgery? Does any one who says the one, necessarily say the other? Where is the logical coherence? But logic is a hateful thing. When I say 7 and 8 are 15, I immediately hear the rejoinder, but 7 and 6 are not 15. To be sure, 7 and 6 are not 15. But did I ever say they are? I spoke of 7 and 8, and not of 7 and 6.

I say we can not prove the Gospels to have been written in the first century. Why does such a statement attack the authenticity of the Gospels? Does it exclude the possibility that the authors of the Gospels were inspired writers? *Could they not have been inspired in the second century?* The second century was still blessed with the power of working miracles; we read in Origen that inspiration and miraculous doings were still at work even in his time, in the beginning of the third century. Why not then in the beginning of the second?

It was said in the lecture that the authors of the four Gospels, namely, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, are sure to have written their Gospels before any of them were dead. This sagacious remark is perfectly correct. Neither Matthew, Luke nor John were likely to write after their respective deaths. Very well. But WHEN did they die? That is the question. No, that is not the entire question. The real question is, WHO were they who died? *Who* was Mark? And *who* was Luke? The ordinary man never investigates these questions. He knows that there is a Gospel by the name of Mark's Gos-

pel, and another Gospel by the name of Luke's Gospel, and he so often identifies the Gospel with its author, that Mark as well as Luke become distinct personalities in his mind, just as Napoleon or Washington, and he never thinks of seeking for some further details about their identity. There was only one man who was called Napoleon Bonaparte, and only one man who was called G. Washington. And likewise there was only one man who was called Mark, and one man who was called Luke, and these two men are considered apostles, immediate followers of Christ. So thinks the ordinary man.

But I am sorry to say this, our ordinary man, is thoroughly wrong.

We do not know who Mark is, nor do we know who Luke is.

We know most positively that Luke was no apostle, for Tertullianus in the fourth book of his work against Marcion calls Luke, nonapostolus sed apostolicus, *i. e.*, no apostle, only apostolic. Three Lukes are made mention of in the so-called letters of St. Paul to the Colossians, to Philemon and Timothy. Whether these three different Lukes apply to one and the same person, or whether only the first and the third, or the second and third apply to the same person we do not know. But even if we assume that one and the same Luke is meant in all the three passages, we continue to be at a loss as to who Luke is, where and when he was born and where and when he died. In the very beginning of the Gospel bearing his name we read that he had not seen the Lord in the flesh, that he was no eyewitness to the events he relates. Hence he might have been born in the year 40 or 50 after Christ, and he might have died in 120 or 130 after Christ.

As to Mark we are in the same predicament. The name Mark occurs in several books of the New Testament,

1. In the Acts of the Apostles. 2. Then in three Pauline epistles. 3. In one of Peter's epistles. Now, it has been supposed that the Mark of the Acts is the Mark of the Pauline epistles, but not the Mark of Peter; 2, that the Mark of the Acts, of Paul and of Peter are all different; 3, that the Mark of the Acts is the Mark of Peter, but not the Mark of Paul. Of neither of these Marks do we know where and when he was born, where and when he died. Nor do we know anything about the birth or death of Matthew. Of St. John it was conceded in the lecture that he is likely to have died in the second century.

Now, if you reconsider all these facts, and particularly if you represent to yourself the fact that Mark, Luke and John are just as likely to have died in the second century as in the first; if you furthermore consider the fact that we really can not identify the persons of Mark and Luke, what scientific meaning can be attached to the proposition so emphatically reiterated in the lecture, that the Gospels have been written by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John? What significance can such a question possess in the face of the fact that we do not know who Mark or Luke were, when they died and where?

I do not deny that these Gospels were written by men who were called Mark and Luke, respectively; I do not deny that the early Fathers, or some of their contemporaries, may have known particular persons who were denoted by these names; but I do deny that *we*, in the present century, and up to this date, have any means of ascertaining who Mark and Luke were, when they were born, when they died, when they wrote, etc. I beg to call your special attention to this point. Of course, some people will always say that I am attacking the Gospels, and no clear statement to the contrary will save me the trouble of being misunderstood. But I trust that my unbiassed hearers will readily see the great difference between what I do state

and between what I am said to state. I say the Gospels can not be proved to have been written in the first century; but in addition to that, I said in my very first lecture, that the Gospels are very likely to be digests of apostolic tradition, or copies of original apostolic gospels. The question of authenticity I do not even commence to discuss. This question is altogether outside the pale of my inquiries. And do I still assert that the Gospels are a forgery? Does the man, who readily concedes, who did so in his very first lecture on Christianity, that the Gospels, as we now possess them, are very likely to be digests of apostolic tradition, or copies of original apostolic gospels—does such a person say that the Gospels are a forgery, a fraud?

A fraud!

What a hideous word! I would not venture to apply it to the so-called holy writings of the Javanese or of the Burmese, how much less to those of Christianity! Instead of using such revolting attributes, we should rather calmly examine arguments against arguments, and evidence against evidence. My argument in support of my statement was as follows: I said the Gospels have not been written in the first century, because none of the early Fathers can be proved, and unequivocally so, to quote from the Gospels. I challenged any one to show me such an unequivocal quotation from the Gospels in any of the early Fathers.

In the lecture of Monday such a passage was shown to exist in Barnabas, one of the early Fathers. The passage in Barnabas, which is also found in Matthew, reads thus: "It is written, many called and few chosen." Such a quotation, of course, makes a deep impression on the mind of the unscholarly hearer. He never thinks of the possibility that the words, "It is written," may also refer to something else than to the Gospels. "It is written"

means the Gospels, of course. But why was it not mentioned in the lecture of Monday that Barnabas frequently quotes sentences, as if taken from the Scriptures, which cannot be found in any of the books of our New Testament? Why was it not mentioned that those words, "It is written," or, "says the Scripture," are frequently used in Barnabas to denote books, which we are ignorant of altogether? Why was it not mentioned that those few words, "many called, but few chosen," are the only, single, and solitary example of Barnabas quoting a sentence with the words, "It is written," which happens to coincide with a passage in Matthew? Why was it not said, that all other passages in Barnabas where the words, "It is written," occur, can not be found in our Gospels? This was not mentioned because—

But no, I am determined to drop all secondary considerations; but I am equally determined to say, without restraint, that my statements have not received the honor of being attacked by good and new weapons. The early Fathers cannot be proved, in an unequivocal way, to quote from the Gospels: that has been conceded on all sides. Take any better text book of church history, written by any of the independent historians—I mean by historian, one who can read Latin and Greek, and who have taken their information not from any "celebrity" in Boston or Chicago, but from the Fathers themselves—and I challenge any one to show me such a scientific church history where it is asserted that the early Fathers do quote from our Gospels, that their quoting from our Gospels is a case of clear and undoubted reality. There is no such scientific church historian, simply because he would immediately become the laughing stock of the whole republic of scholars. This question of the early Fathers quoting or not quoting from the Bible has been settled long, long ago.

Before approaching the last argument brought forth in the lecture, I mean the Epistles of St. Paul, it will be convenient to dispose of two incidental questions. *First*, of my good old Hilgenfeld. In one of the papers Hilgenfeld was called—I beg your pardon for the inelegant expression—a conundrum. I beg to differ. Hilgenfeld is no conundrum. He is a German divine, a scholar, a very learned, sensible scholar. But it was said in the paper, how Hilgenfeld could be quoted both in this hall and in the Odeon, and in both cases in support of antagonistic statements. This was said to be an impossibility. I beg to differ. It is the simplest thing in the world. There are four Gospels. Hilgenfeld denies the existence of the fourth Gospel in the first century; and for this reason he has been approvingly quoted here in this hall: but Hilgenfeld is more or less inclined to grant the existence of the second, or Mark's Gospel, in the first century, and for this reason he has been approvingly quoted in the Odeon. This, I think, is very simple.

Second, it was said in the lecture, that my treatment of the Gospels is animated by an unfairness of criticism which was never made use of in the treatment of the classics. It was said that the *corpus juris civilis*, the well known code of the Roman law, rests on much weaker evidence than the Gospels, and that it has, nevertheless, been accepted as the code of the Romans and as the common law of many nations. In the first place, it must be said, that the Florentina, that is to say, the earliest manuscript of the Roman Pandects, of the Roman code, is considerably nearer to the time of its first publication than either of the Bible manuscripts. But even if it would be 500 years younger, would that harm us any? Not in the least. The Roman law has been accepted, not because of its genuine old age, but because of its internal excellence. We have far older laws than the oldest laws of the Romans.

There is the immense inscription recently found in Gortyna, in Creta, from the eighth century before Christ. It contains a well arranged code of laws; a code far older, and partly, at least, far more genuine than many portions of the Roman law. But we do not mind it at all. And if a critic would succeed in proving that those parts of the Roman code which are now known under the name of Ulpian, have never been written by Ulpian, would such a statement, provided it rests on good evidence, alarm any of the students of Roman law? Not in the least. Whether Ulpian, or Papinian, or Julian, that is all the same. It is the work itself, not the author of the work, that causes scholars to study Roman law.

And there you see the enormous difference between classics and Gospels. If somebody were to prove that Mark did not write the Gospel commonly called after him, such a man is likely to be——sermoned and lectured upon. He rouses the bitter feelings of hundreds of men who think it an outrage to touch upon such sacred things. And they will go and tell you publicly that the profane classics of Greece and Rome have never been treated that way; that they have never been encountered in such a purely negative way. I must confess when I heard it said in a public place in the presence of an intelligent audience, that the authenticity of the classics has never been attacked in any way similar to what such and such has done with the authenticity of the Gospels—I stood aghast. I did not trust my own ears.

The classics, the authenticity of the classics has never been attacked?

Where shall I begin to quote those innumerable names whose bearers have done nothing else than attack the authenticity of this classic or that classic, of this or that line in a classic? Are the countless authors of *Variae lectiones*, *i. e.*, of improvements in the texts of classics, the Mureti,

Lipsii, Vossii, Casaubonii, and so forth, and so forth—are they totally forgotten? Did not Richard Bentley attack the authenticity of nearly every line in the then Horace? Did he not successfully deny the authenticity of the letters of Pharsalis? Have not whole works of Aristotle, of Cicero, of Homer, of Sophocles, of Plato, been declared unauthentic and spurious? Nay, has not Hardouin tried to prove that with the exception of Pliny's *Historia Naturalis*, Horace's *Satires*, Cicero and Homer, and Virgil's *Georgics*, the whole of all classics were nothing but the forgeries of mediæval monks? In fact we may say without fear of exaggerating, the classics have been far more severely attacked than the Gospels. The criticism of the Gospels dates only from the latter half of the 17th century, whereas the criticism of the classics goes back to the 15th century.


And now let me say a few words about St. Paul's epistles. It has been urged in the lecture that four, at least, of these epistles have never been denied to be authentic, and that consequently these four epistles must have been written in the first century. I beg to differ. All that has been conceded by the most sagacious critics of Germany and France consists in the possibility that these four epistles as we now possess them *may* be the epistles of St. Paul. Of the other epistles of St. Paul it has been proved or tried to be proved that they are not the very epistles written by St. Paul. Of these four epistles it has been conceded that they may possibly have been written by St. Paul. Such a *may* be, however, is too weak for an historical evidence. Moreover, our chronological knowledge of the life of St. Paul is next to nothing. We do not possess a single positive date of any event of his life, and in Canon Farrar's great work on St. Paul, you will find a table exhibiting the great discrepancies of biographers in regard to the dates in St. Paul's life. They sometimes differ with seven years.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to the best of my knowledge to clear up all parts of the question at issue. I have used the most explicit terms and well ascertained facts and arguments. More, I confess, I can not. I publicly declare this to be my ultimate and final answer. Any further discussion of the matter must necessarily enter upon scientific details of such nicety and subtlety as can not be supposed to be of any interest to the general public. I am ready to take up the discussion in any of the scientific monthlies of this country and to continue the same for any length of time. But here or in a similar place I shall not continue it. I hope you will not deny me the justice of approving of this my determination. I have left everything to your own sound judgment; I did not carry along the works of great authorities who happen to side with me, trying to overawe you by sonorous quotations from such authorities; least of all have I tried to edify you by a solemn appeal to Him who is the Authority of all authorities and who has been brought into play in the lecture of Monday. There it was said that if the Gospels be a forgery, then God Himself is an accomplice of this crime.

To such appeals I venture to retort with a passage of Goethe's *Faust*: *Lass unsern Herrgott aus dem Spass!* In this game let the Lord our God be!

The petty controversies of human mortals have nothing to do with the infinite Power. I leave it to your own taste to judge of such appeals, to judge of the strength of arguments which stand in need of no less an authority than God, of arguments for which the power of logic and sound reasoning is not sufficient. I appeal to nobody but to those who have honored me with their presence. I appeal to your feeling with regard to the repeated charge that I am attacking the Gospels. I appeal to your power of judgment with regard to the charge that I am suppress-

ing facts, and I appeal to your sense of honor, to your sense of liberty, whether it may in fair harmony with facts be said that I am disturbing the faith of the pious or the devotion of the believer? And in doing so I cherish the most confident assurance that your sentence, while it will approve of my scientific arguments, will also acquit me in my personal position in this question. In treating of the Origin of Christianity, I have done nothing else but what I promised to do six months ago in the very first of my lectures. I have given a fair and unbiassed statement of one chapter of the History of Civilization.



MIDDLE AGES.

I.

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

In our present lecture we begin to inquire into a period of history which by almost unanimous usage has been named the period of the Middle Ages. The reason of this name is obvious. The centuries of these ages occupy a middle place between antiquity and modern times, and

hence this name. I must confess this three-fold division of History into Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modern Times can claim only one advantage, the advantage of being a *convenient* division of historical periods, for in any other respect it is perfectly untenable. There is no more reason to call the times of the Grecians and Romans the times of antiquity, than our own times. For in the first place, the times of these noble nations are, in reality, very recent times, especially if we think of the enormous antiquity of Egyptian, Indian and Chinese civilization.

But this denomination is objectionable chiefly on the score of its conveying an altogether wrong idea, of which but very few minds can free themselves. By calling those times the times of antiquity we unconsciously accustom ourselves to look upon the ideas, the institutions, the habits, in one word, upon the whole of this civilization as an antiquated one, as an obsolete one.

Greeks and Romans slowly acquire the appearance of old, by-gone peoples, whose history may be the subject of very interesting reading, but who can no longer contribute to an improvement of our present civilization. Thus the ordinary man will speak of the Greek or the Roman in the way of the unfortunate Prince of Denmark: "What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?" But it is not only the ordinary man who uses such language. A man of world-wide fame, of a reputation that did survive the most virulent attacks of his numerous opponents, and even the notorious frailty of his own character, Lord Bacon himself has used similar words as to the obsolete and useless character of antiquity. He has sneeringly improved upon the denomination, saying that it is perfectly inadequate, in point of time as well as in point of value, to call the Greeks and Romans the Ancients, whereas they would rather deserve the name of children for their being mere primitive beginners in all those sciences and trades which really con-

stitute the welfare of our existence. It would be, said the ingenious Lord, much more appropriate to call ourselves the Ancients, for we surpass the Greeks and Romans in point of age, as well as in point of our vastly augmented knowledge.

These children, then, in the opinion of Lord Francis, were in a lower stage of civilization—they lacked our enormous improvements—they were only beginners. This opinion had, like all his opinions, a marvellous sway over the minds of his numberless readers, and to the present day it is customary to depreciate the value, the historical significance of Antiquity as contrasted with modern times.

But if this is the case with Græco-Roman Antiquity in spite of all its glorious thinkers and poets and scientists and artists and jurists and authors—what shall I say about the generally prevailing idea about the Middle Ages? On them a judgment of condemnation has been passed and almost universally so, that may be properly called a sentence of death without benefit of clergy.

The Middle Ages have been called the dark Ages, the Ages of benightedness, of glaring superstition, of illiteracy, of universal highway robbery, of hopeless bigotry, of stupidity—we have been taught to look down upon them, to pride ourselves on the enormous progress of our times, on the fact that we have at last freed ourselves from those half-savage institutions of mediæval times, that we are so infinitely more enlightened, in fact, that we are simply fearfully enlightened, bright, bright, so bright on all points of great relevancy that we may justly feast our minds with a contemplation of our brightness and enlightenment. We are told, and by very great scholars too, that those people of the Middle Ages were so utterly stupid as to believe the silliest things; that they were so very far behind ourselves that we can scarcely conceive of the fact

that we succeeded in getting rid of a superstition and stupidity so profound and so hopeless.

It will be both amazing and interesting to hear a number of those things that have been firmly believed in the Middle Ages. They have been collected by a great scholar and by one of those numerous writers, who points to these things as an irrefragable evidence of the deplorable inferiority of the Middle Ages. He glories in collecting these things; he does it with his heart swelling with pride and satisfaction, with the words on his lips: My Lord, I thank thee that I am not like one of them. He uses them victoriously to show by contrast our enormous progress, our magnificent civilization, our present enlightenment, for lo! we do no longer believe such things, lo! we are the children of truth, of veracity, of logical reasoning. The name of the author is Buckle. He says in the sixth chapter of his book on the History of Civilization in England.

“The aptitude for falsehood became so great that there was nothing men were unwilling to believe. Nothing came amiss to their greedy and credulous ears. Histories of omens, prodigies, apparitions, strange portents, monstrous appearances in the heavens, the wildest and most incoherent absurdities, were repeated from mouth to mouth, and copied from book to book, with as much care as if they were the choicest treasures of human wisdom. That Europe should ever have emerged from such a state is the most decisive proof of the extraordinary energy of Man, since we can not even conceive a condition of society more unfavorable to his progress.

“Touching the origin of particular places, the great historians of the Middle Ages are very communicative. In the accounts they give of them, as well as in the lives they write of eminent men, the history usually begins at a very remote period; and the events relating to their sub-

ject are often traced back, in an unbroken series, from the moment when Noah left the ark, or even when Adam passed the gates of Paradise. On other occasions, the antiquity they assign is somewhat less; but the range of their information is always extraordinary. They say that the capital of France is called after Paris, the son of Priam, because he fled there when Troy was overthrown. They also mention that Tours owed its name to being the burial place of Turonus, one of the Trojans; while the city of Troyes was actually built by the Trojans, as its etymology clearly proves. It was well-ascertained that Nuremberg was called after the Emperor Nero; and Jerusalem after King Jebus, a man of vast celebrity in the Middle Ages, but whose existence later historians have not been able to verify."

"At all events, the Scotch certainly came from Egypt; for they were originally the issue of Scota, who was a daughter of Pharaoh, and who bequeathed to them her name. On sundry similar matters, the Middle Ages possessed information equally valuable. It was well known that the city of Naples was founded on eggs; and it was also known, that the order of St. Michael was instituted in person by the archangel, who was himself the first knight, and to whom, in fact, chivalry owes its origin. In regard to the Tartars, that people, of course, proceeded from Tartarus; which some theologians said was an inferior kind of hell, but others declared to be hell itself. However this might be, the fact of their birth-place being from below was indisputable, and was proved by many circumstances which showed the fatal and mysterious influence they were able to exercise. For the Turks were identical with the Tartars; and it was notorious, that since the Cross had fallen into Turkish hands all Christian children had ten teeth less than formerly; a universal calamity, which there seemed to be no means of repairing."

“It would be easy to fill volumes with similar notions; all of which were devoutly believed in those ages of darkness, or, as they have been well called, Ages of Faith. Those, indeed, were golden days for the ecclesiastical profession, since the credulity of men had reached a height which seemed to ensure to the clergy a long and universal dominion. How the prospects of the church were subsequently darkened, and how the human reason began to rebel, will be related in another part of this Introduction, where I shall endeavor to trace the rise of that secular and sceptical spirit to which European civilization owes its origin.”

Here it is: These Ages were dark Ages, benighted Ages, Ages where the spirit of scepticism, the great benefactor of mankind, had not yet began spreading; where the human intellect was still fettered by the shameful chains of superstition.

Such and similar statements will be found in the majority of books, especially of English books written on the Middle Ages. Even good old Hallam, although his fair judgment did not easily yield to the dictations of fashion, even Hallam, together with Macaulay and Hume and Gibbon, can not abstain from acknowledging the vast superiority of our modern times. In the Middle Ages they can perceive little more than anarchy, superstition and illiteracy. And this very naturally is also the firm belief of the average modern man. This average modern man has been, from his very childhood, inured to the idea that the wonderful inventions of our century, together with the greater amount of political liberty and science, is a palpable proof of the immense superiority of our times. Why, says he, the railroad, the steamer, the telegraph, the telephone, Darwinism and a few other isms have done more good in the course of these last eighty years than all the rest of human attainments. Why, says he, we are far

ahead of all past centuries, and it is they that would learn from us and not we from them.

I consider it my chief duty as an historian, as an historian of the new school, as an investigator of institutional history, to contradict, to oppose, to annihilate these assertions. They are vain-glorious, empty talk. Their evidence is scanty, one-sided, insufficient. They are so utterly at variance with the experience of all mankind, they grate so disagreeably on the ears of those persons who have studied the question at issue in the original sources, at first hand, without any side glance at the other doctrines, without any regard for the pleasing or displeasing character of this idea, and without any partiality, that I made it my chief point to do away with them, trying to show you in the course of our lectures on the Middle Ages, that such sweeping and degrading opinions about the numberless millions of human beings who have lived from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries, are void of any value, are far from being supported by science, and have to be absolutely discarded.

The duty of the historian is frequently an unpalatable one. He has to say, to state what people dislike. It was not very agreeable for me to state the utter lack of historical evidence for the first century of Christianity. But an historian is no partisan, and so I had to so state it. On the other hand, I take particular pleasure and peculiar delight in rescuing those romantic and beautiful times of the Middle Ages from the unfounded slanders of so many writers. I take peculiar delight in doing so, because it furnishes me, for the first time, the occasion so fervently wished for, to speak of a point of the very greatest importance in the study of history ; of a point, of a question, the proper discussion of which will serve us with a clue into the labyrinth of facts and events of the Middle Ages.

This point, this question, may be expressed in one single word, in a word of boundless richness of contents, in a word which is the idol and deity of the present and the three preceding generations, in a word the truth of which seems to be an axiom, a truism, a tenet and a creed for millions and millions of intelligent people. This one word is the word, *Progress*.

Progress is the great word of our day and of this century. We are taught to look upon all past history as upon a mere preparation to the vast progress of our times. Progress is said to have entirely changed the face of the earth, the appearance of society, the feelings of the heart, like charity, humanity and liberty. Progress is the general panacea of the world. We think that our successors will be ahead of our times, just as we are ahead of previous times. Improvements of all kinds are being made and will continue to be made, etc., etc. Hence the Middle Ages are, in the very best case, a lower stage of civilization, an inferior degree, and we occupy a far higher degree of mature civilization, and are constantly on the verge of still grander strides toward a still higher degree of perfection. This is the great doctrine of our times, this is the great word, the *Logos*, to use the word of St. John; this is inculcated by our fathers, by our teachers, by our books and papers, by everybody. This is our standard, this is our measure.

Ladies and gentlemen, as far as the teachings of real and scientific history go, I do not believe in this great word, in this *logos*, in this marvellous progress. In spite of all my efforts I fail to see such marvellous regress in mediæval times and such miraculous progress in modern times. True, I can readily see great progress in some isolated lines of human activity. I say in some isolated lines; say, *e. g.*, I can readily see that we know more of mathematics to-day than in the times of Dante; more of

anatomy to-day than in the times of Thomas Aquinas, and likewise in a few other lines. But does all bliss consist in a more or less expanded knowledge of things mathematical, anatomical or physiological? I peremptorily deny it. No more ardent admirer of science than I; but for the vast majority of men science has no comfort, blessing whatever, and history has to consider the multitude, and not a few solitary scholars.

But you will object that medical science is nowadays able to cure many diseases which were inaccessible to the physicians of the Middle Ages, say to Albertus Magnus, or to the doctors of Salerno. True, perfectly true. But did you, on the other hand, count up the enormous augmentation of individual cases of sickness which are the direct outcome of our progressive civilization? For example, among others, of the greater facility of traveling, and of the greater risk of modern conveyances? The number of travelling persons who perish by railroad accidents in one year is ten times as large now as it used to be in times when travelling was done in stage coaches. In this statement allowance has been made for the increase of population. Or to take another example—take our nerves. They are so extravagantly taxed by the demands of our progressive civilization that innumerable cases of insanity and other psychical diseases result. If you now take up both facts, on the one side the undoubted increase in our knowledge of medicine, on the other side, however, the fearful increase of the chances to fall sick—what is this boasted progress after all? We have better physicians, but we are subject to more chances to turn sick; we have better machines, consequently a more rapid production of goods, and a more rapid circulation of money, but we have ten times less chance to keep, to preserve what we have earned, and to transmit to our children what we have acquired. We are very charitable, perhaps more so than

mediaeval persons. But on the other hand, the idea of honor and independence has been ripened into a feeling of such extreme sensibility that a person of some character will rather die than accept charity. We know more; all of us, or nearly all, can read and write, whereas in the Middle Ages comparatively very few people could read or write. True, very true. But what does that prove? Do you really think that these two poor accomplishments are an unfailing sign of culture, that when the members of a people can read or write, they are thereby entitled to the name of cultured persons? That is the manner of statisticians; they want to show the culture of a people by the number of persons who can read or write, by the number of schools, and so forth. But I am sorry to say that these dates do not prove anything at all. All they prove is this: that such and such a number of people can read or write. But does this also prove that such and such a number of people have turned their reading and writing to good account? That they have read the proper books and that they have digested those proper books? By no means; that is not implied in the statistical data—but that is the salient point of the whole question. There is scarcely any doubt whatever that the grand, the colossal and ever-beautiful poems of Homer have been composed at a time when the art of writing was entirely unknown to the Greeks. Well, then, did that circumstance prevent those Greeks to compose what by universal consent has been declared as the most enchanting of all epic poems, a treasury of art, of wisdom, of refined culture, of beauty—the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*? Go to Europe, and hunt up the peasantry of Italy, or Hungary or the Tyrol. Address the man in his native language, make him talk to you on his life, on the life of the forest, of the field, of the meadow, of the political events of his country, and be assured that this man in six cases out of ten, will pour out a whole treasury of keen

observations on nature, life and politics, that you will find him to be a free, sensible, jovial person, of great delicacy of feeling, of manly pride and imposing reserve. Of course you have to talk to him in his own language. But this man, in nine cases out of ten, will be entirely ignorant of the art of writing or reading. What then do these two accomplishments confer on us? Can they be used as sure and absolute evidence of progress?

But you will plead, perhaps, our great enlightenment, the fact that we have ceased to believe all those nonsensical things that were greedily taken in in the Middle Ages, that we are infinitely less superstitious, less benighted, that we do not believe any longer in sorcerers, in enchanters, in witches, etc., etc. This is a point of extreme delicacy. It is very difficult to treat of it without hurting the most personal feelings of men, and in my position as a lecturing, not as a writing historian, I have to avoid a few points which are decidedly too painful for a public discussion. But one general principle I shall not suppress, and howsoever you may accept it, I ask you to take it as the serious result of very serious studies, of studies that have been pursued with an earnest desire to attain to the real causes of history. This one general remark is this: What we are used to call enlightenment is only another expression for our indifference. With regard to some things, we are perfectly or considerably indifferent; say, *e. g.*, with regard to mathematical formulae. With regard to other things we are not so indifferent; *e. g.*, our passions are never roused by the study of mineralogy in general; but we have no sooner conceived of a possibility to manufacture gold or any other precious metal than all our passions begin to be roused. The passions, however, interfere very much with our judgment, and consequently the study of manufacturing gold has been very unsuccessful. Science prospers only on subjects of extreme indifference,

and that is one of the chief reasons why the science of history, which causes the very reverse of indifference, is still in its infancy. But whenever our indifference ceases then our passions set in and dim the cleverness of our judgment, and give rise to all kinds of perverse ideas and beliefs and superstitions. If, therefore, we turn with disdain from the numerous superstitions of the Middle Ages, we had better ask ourselves, not whether we still cling to the very superstitions that were afloat in the Middle Ages, because in this case we would have to congratulate ourselves on account of our great progress. We do no longer cling to the *very same* superstitions; the subjects of these superstitions have long ceased to be of any interest to us, and being indifferent to them, we judge them in a cool way, and hence discard them. It is, therefore, not this question that ought to be put. The question ought to be, whether we are free from superstitions with regard to those subjects which we do not consider with perfect indifference at least. *E. g.*, questions of nationality, questions of religion, questions of race, and so forth. If you will duly inquire into these great questions, and if you will carefully collect those numberless and equally hateful superstitions which are firmly believed by the members of one nation as affecting the members of another nation, or by the adherents of one religion as regarding the adherents of another religion, say, *e. g.*, the Mohammedans, or persons of different races, you will have to close up your studies with that great historical truth: *The ultimate amount of error and superstition is always and at all times the same; it is only in shape and appearance that they vary according to different centuries.* And this being the case, you will easily see the enormous significance of error, you will see that error is an inevitable part of every civilization, a constituent part, and hence a beneficent part. For it existed at all times, it never ceased to exist; nay, it

never ceased to form the greater part of the whole system, for truth is of such a refined and subtle nature that it can be enjoyed and utilized only by few minds. Truth cannot be acquired in the small intervals of the tear and wear of practical life; truth requires an unremitting application of great faculties, a deep study, a profound meditation. Error, on the other hand, is broad, accommodating, pleasing, easily understood, easily taught, addressing itself not to the subtle minds of thinkers, but to the naive mind of Mr. Everybody. This being the most general of historical facts, this being a fact of our modern civilization just as well as of the civilization of the Middle Ages, how shall we venture to look scornfully on the errors and superstitions of those times? How could we dare to do that? Simply because the error and superstition of those times are evident and palpable, whereas the errors and superstitions of our times are rather latent and less obvious? This is not the justice of history; this would be against all history.

And, consequently, we shall treat of the Middle Ages not as of a time of darkness and anarchy and retrograde illiteracy, but of one of those epochs when men were trying to do exactly the same thing that we are endeavoring to achieve; that is to say, to live honestly and peacefully if we can, and to remonstrate against everything inimical to this, our chief desire.

Take, *e. g.*, the mediæval belief in witchcraft. It is at present generally accepted that witches and sorcerers do not exist at all; that such things cannot exist, and that it was part of the undeveloped and low civilization of the Middle Ages that people at that time did cherish a belief in witchcraft and in sorcerers. We, the enlightened children of the nineteenth century, do not believe in such nonsense. We laugh at it. In fact, we cannot understand how people could have been so silly as to believe it. Now

let us inquire calmly and soberly into the question, can we really prove that there are no such things as witchcraft and the like? Do our modern sciences really furnish us satisfactory evidence as to the impossibility of witchcraft?

Ladies and gentlemen, modern science has never proved the impossibility of witchcraft; modern science can not prove it. On the contrary, modern science, at least, many modern scientists, went far to prove the existence of spirits and spiritual agencies. In London, as well as in Paris, in New-York and in numerous other cities, several scientific monthlies are being published, in which the existence and the functions of spirits are discussed and treated of as actual realities.

But spirits, the existence of spirits, is the central idea of the belief in witchcraft. If you once prevail upon yourself to believe, that there are such things as spirits, it takes but very little trouble to convince you, that these spirits are of two kinds, good and evil spirits, and that, consequently, evil spirits may eventually be at the disposal of some one person and serve the evil intentions of that person.

What is all modern mesmerism, hypnotism, animal magnetism and spiritualism, and a host of other isms, more or less than the old belief in witchcraft, in good and evil spirits? And if you think of the incredible extent to which these different isms have been taken up by millions of modern civilized persons, how can we dare to look upon the mediæval belief in sorcerers as upon a sure sign of lower civilization? I do not condemn these modern aspirations to look behind the great veil as altogether worthless. They may be true.

If a person will tell me the most incredible ghost stories or spirit stories, the most extravagant feats of spiritualism, I will not decline them right away. I will not refuse them all credit, all trustworthiness. On the contrary, I will

willingly concede the possibility of these things. All I will decline and refuse will be, not the possibility, but the provableness of the thing. For so far none of these ghost stories could be proved. But that they can not be proved does not therefore cease them to be possible. There may be some truth in spiritualism, as there may be some truth in mediæval witchcraft. The province of the historian is simply to point to the fact that the amount of unprovable things never changes, and since error is nothing else but a belief in things that cannot be proved, we may safely repeat our statement that the amount of error is constantly the same, and no alleged progress whatsoever can diminish it.

Error, that is to say, a belief in things unprovable, is an absolute necessity for civilization, and it is, therefore, the worst of all methods to decry the Middle Ages, because this or that error then prevailed. There is essentially very little difference between modern times and the Middle Ages. I say essentially, but, of course, comparing two countries, or two centuries, or two civilizations, is a very difficult task. The most ridiculous judgments have been passed on the people and the country of the United States by those foreigners who have compared Europe to America by contrasting the newspapers of the one country to the newspapers of the other; the books of the one to the books of the other; the schools and colleges of the one to the schools and colleges of the other. But this is absolutely false. The newspapers in America have another object in view, serve a different tendency, and consequently, while bearing the same name, they are essentially different from the newspapers in Europe, and hence can not justly be compared to them. But the rule holds good as to every other civilization as well.

If we try to compare the Middle Ages to our modern times, we have to be extremely careful in the selection of

the things to be compared. We have to be guided by a true historical view of the whole age, and then we shall see that essentially there is but little difference between those so-called Dark Ages and our own times of infinite enlightenment. The severe judgment on those times has been prompted by a mistaken religious feeling.

In the Middle Ages the power of the Papacy, of the Catholic church, was supreme. Thus it is but a natural consequence, that the historians of Protestant nations, like the Englishmen, many of the Germans and Austrians and Americans, were more or less disposed to view the Middle Ages in an inimical spirit. In addition to this, it became the domineering spirit of the last century, a fashion that had been inaugurated by those witty and brilliant French writers generally known as the Encyclopædists, by Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Condillac, and so on, to speak of the Middle Ages in the most scornful way imaginable. A reaction set in in the works of the so-called romantic school in France and Germany, in the works of Chateaubriand, Bernardin de St. Pierre, Sismondi, Victor Hugo, Tieck, Hauff, Eichendorff, and so forth, and slowly and slowly a juster view of the times was taken.

To the present time we do not possess a comprehensive and authoritative work on the Middle Ages, although there are numberless treatises on isolated features, or particular questions relating to mediæval times. The study of these times, therefore, is beset with peculiar difficulties. I have tried to fix our point of view, to point out the general historical character of the Middle Ages. Such a general view of a whole period is most essential, and absolutely indispensable, for all special facts receive their light from such general characteristics. I hope to have sufficiently shown the unsatisfactory nature of those historical judgments on the Middle Ages which are usually taught in our schools and in our books, and I trust that I shall be able

to give additional evidence by means of well authenticated facts of the history of those times. It is in the spirit and with a view to such an evidence that I am proceeding to the second part of our lecture, the special and direct discussion of the institutions of the Middle Ages.

As to the period of time which encompasses the Middle Ages, I have already mentioned that the Middle Ages comprise the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of our era. As to the locality, they involve all Europe and those parts of Asia and Africa which belonged to the powerful empire of the Mussulmans.

As to the countries of Europe, we shall treat chiefly of France and Germany, together with England and Italy. For two of the most influential institutions of the Middle Ages, I mean Feudalism and Burgess life (city life of the Burgesses, Burgeois, Buerger), originated, the one, mainly in France, the other mainly in Germany.

For our study of history is a study not of the sequence of kings and battles and wars, but a study of institutions. Institutions are the causes of all that a nation does or does not perform. Of institutions again, those that relate to the mode of government are the most important ones. Hence, we shall begin our special study of the Middle Ages with the question: Which was the mode of government, the manner of ruling, in the Middle Ages? To this a very precise answer can be given.

The people of those times were ruled by two powers. (1) By the Church, and (2) by feudal lords. Accordingly, I shall treat first of the Church.

The Church, the Catholic church of the Middle Ages, has to be considered as one of the great factors of those times, without which the nations and peoples of those times could not have existed for one single year. The Church, with that marvelous apparatus of officers and

priests of all kinds, who, in their aggregate, formed, as it were, a state in the state, the Church was the natural and only protector of the poor, of the weak, of the helpless. In order to understand this statement thoroughly, we have to represent to ourselves the then state of Europe, more especially the state of Europe in the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries.

Europe at that time was split up into hundreds of little territories, each independent of one another, each having its own chief, almost its own language, its own army. There was no solid Germany, no solid France, covering thousands of square miles. Germany was broken up into a score of petty little territories, into several landgraviates, margraviates, duchies, kingdoms, bishoprics and counties, the majority of which were scarcely as large as two American counties, many being much smaller than one American county. Italy consisted of numberless little republics after the old Italian fashion, each city forming a republic of its own that stood in no connection or interdependence whatever with other cities. There was a republic of Parma and Lucca and Genoa and Pisa and Venice and Ancona, etc., each trying to combat the other, to vie with the other, in military as well as in commercial enterprises. France consisted of a score of smaller and larger territories, under the rule of some duke or count, the king commanding very poor control over the country. In addition to that, Europe was divided into an apparently infinite number of nationalities. There were the Franks, the Saxons, the Thuringians, the Slavonians, the Suabians, the Frisians, Moravians, Tsechs, Sorabians, Wiltzians, Obotritans, and a host of other tribes and nationalities in Germany. Each of these tribes and classes had a dialect or language of their own, customs and manners and laws of their own. If, *e. g.*, the landgrave of Thuringia had to judge one of his subjects who happened to be an Alleman-

ian, the judgment had to be passed according to Allemanian law; and if the subject happened to be a Bajuvarian, he had to be judged according to Bajuvarian law.

In France there were the Britons, the Normands, the Burgundians, the Flamanders, and others, each with their own language, with their own customs, with their own laws. It was only in the South-east of Europe where the Byzantine emperors contrived to keep up, if not a real, at least an apparent unity of countries and dependencies. All Europe displayed a picture of utter incoherence, of disconnected little governments. The Emperors of Germany were clothed with great power indeed, but this power was of a military character only. The Emperor of Germany could not interfere with the internal affairs of the numberless little governments of Germany.

If we now compare this state of mediæval affairs with either the ancient Roman empire or our own modern countries, we will see at once that the Middle Ages lacked both the enormous centralization of Rome and the vast influence of the modern States. In ancient Rome the city of Rome was the unification of all countries, of all cities of antiquity, as I have abundantly shown in my preceding lectures. In modern times the State, or here in America, the Union, the Federal Government, is clothed with such enormous power that citizens can easily appeal to such a powerful factor. In the United States of America the worst evil may ultimately be removed by the National Government, the departments of this Government being the ultimate and sure redress in all cases where the single States of the Union prove helpless or refractory. In modern Europe the State, not the emperor or king, is invested with a vast influence on all affairs. The small State of Hungary (only three times as large as Ohio), has an annual income of 400,000,000 florins and a separate army of 400,000 soldiers. But in the Middle Ages we

look in vain for such a powerful central government like the Federal Government in the United States, or the State in modern Europe.

If evils there were, and of course they were just as frequently as nowadays, they could not be removed by a strong, central and equitable power, for such a power did not exist. The rulers of these petty little territories in the Middle Ages could not have been as just, as equitable, as unbiassed as the officials of a modern State. And consequently the citizens, the subjects of those numerous realms were frequently exposed to the tyrannical whims and inconsistencies of their rulers. It is perfectly in accordance with the frailty of human nature if we read of some incredible cruelties and atrocious crimes perpetrated by those haughty dukes and counts. They commanded a very considerable power, and were controlled by none. Hence subjects, the lower class citizens of Europe, were all equally craving for a great central power that would be able to check the dangerous ascendancy of the rulers, a power that would combat the oppressors of the people, not by means of armies, for such enormous armies could not be brought together without the aid of those very lords whom they were to subdue, but by means of spiritual influences, of influences of a subtle, supple and latent nature, influences which could not be controlled by the rude contrivances of warriors, and which work themselves indelibly into the hearts of men.

Such spiritual influences can be found only within the province of religion, of Christian religion. The Church, therefore, was the natural recipient of that enormous central power toward which the whole constitution of Europe was tending. And, as a matter of course, this central power was allotted to the Church of Rome—to the city of Rome. For the bishops of this city had long possessed an overtowering influence over the bishops and metropol-

itans of other cities or countries. As early as 445 after Christ the Emperor Valentinian III. had issued a decree in which the primacy of Rome is placed upon a triple basis: (1) The merits of St. Peter; (2) The majesty of the city of Rome, and (3) the authority of a council. To which of the councils reference is intended is by no means clear; but all bishops are required by this imperial edict to present themselves when summoned at the tribunal of the Roman Pontiff.

At the close of the eighth century the germs of the chief papal claims were already in existence. Already the pontiff claimed the dispensing power, *i. e.*, the right to dispense with the observance of the existing canonical law under conditions determinable at his pleasure. Already he claimed the right to confer privileges—a power subsequently wielded with enormous effect in enabling monastic and episcopal foundations to urge their encroachments on the rights and jurisdiction of the secular power. He assumed, again, in Western Christendom at least, the rights of an universal metropolitan—demanding that in all elections to bishoprics his sanction should be deemed essential; and the arrival of the pallium (of the consecrated vestment) from Rome was already awaited with anxiety by all newly-elected metropolitans.

By the encouragement which was systematically given to appeal to Rome, what had before been the exception became the practice, and that “extraordinary” authority as it was termed, which had been introduced, in the first instance, only under the pretext of providing a fixed court of appeal in cases of dispute which threatened otherwise to prove incapable of adjustment, developed into an immediate and ordinary jurisdiction—into an authority, that is to say, which in all questions of graver import set aside that of the bishop, and even that of the metropolitan, and made reference to Rome the rule, rather

than the exception. In theory, although the claim was admitted neither by the rulers of Frankland nor by those of England, the Roman pontiff already claimed also to present to all benefices, to all ecclesiastical livings. Although he had not, as yet, assumed the distinctive insignia of his office—the triple crown and the upright pastoral staff surmounted by the cross—he more and more discouraged the application of the name of “papa” (pope) to any but himself. The titles of “apostolicus,” “claviger,” (the bearer of the keys) and *servus servorum Dei* (the servant of the servants of God) were claimed in like manner as exclusively his.

But it was chiefly by the strenuous efforts of Gregory VII., who occupied the see of Rome from 1073–1085, that the real greatness of Popedom was established. This great man introduced, or rather reinforced what proved to be one of the most powerful institutions of the Catholic Church. Previous to his time the priests of the Church did not consider themselves under any restriction whatever as to marriage. Numberless priests lived in legal marriage, and celibacy was the exception not the rule. But Gregory enacted the most stringent laws as to the celibacy of priests, and married priests were declared to be deposed and their priestly functions invalid. By this one stroke of the most ingenious policy Gregory carried into effect what all the efforts of previous popes were unable to accomplish: I mean a perfect separation of ecclesiastical officers from civil ones. As long as priests were tolerated to marry, the incumbents of civil power, the kings the dukes and princes and landgraves were constantly trying to unite both powers in themselves—to be at the head of ecclesiastical as well as of civil institutions. Charlemagne frequently donated abbeys and monasteries to his generals, and thus made them lords of ecclesiastical benefices. This and similar encroachments on the

power of the church were no longer possible. For church power was declared to be inseparately connected with celibacy, and consequently no king, no duke or prince could appropriate the powers of a bishop or a priest, and all priests of Europe were declared exempt from the temporal government of the secular authorities. More than that, Gregory and his successors, especially Innocent III. and Boniface VIII., bluntly declared that the spiritual power of the Church is infinitely superior to the temporal power of secular authorities, and that kings and emperors can not ascend their thrones without having been inaugurated by the Pontiff of Rome.

Another movement at this period which gave effective aid in the diffusion of the papal influence and authority was the rise of the new religious orders—the Camaldules (c. 1012), the Cluniacs, the Carthusians and the Cistercians. Each of these orders professed a distinct rule and a sanctity and austerity of life which put to shame the degenerate Benedictines. They rejected the episcopal jurisdiction and purchased their local independence by complete and immediate subjection to the popes.

Infinitely more powerful, however, was the influence of those marvelous military and religious enterprises known under the names of crusades. It is, of course, impossible to enter into a minute description of the crusades; such a relation would require a number of separate lectures. But the main events are well known, and I can restrict myself to one point: to the connection of the crusades with the ascendancy of the Roman Pontiff and the Church.

Toward the end of the eleventh century the indignation of the people at the dire massacres perpetrated upon Christian men, women and children in Palestine by the Seljukian Turks, who at that time were in possession of Jerusalem, had been roused to fever heat by the preaching of Peter the Hermit. With the stature and ungainliness of a dwarf,

emaciated by the austerities of his self-imposed discipline, this man, who had forsaken his wife and abandoned his military standard under the counts of Boulogne, had returned from the Holy Land with his heart on fire, not so much from the memory of the hardships which he had himself undergone as for the cruelties and tortures which he had seen inflicted on his fellow-Christians. Simeon, the patriarch of Jerusalem, to whom he first betook himself, could only bewail the weakness of the emperor. "The nations of the West shall take up arms in your cause," was the reply of the Hermit, who soon afterward, armed with the special blessing of Urban II., mounted his ass, and with bare head and feet, carrying a huge crucifix, traversed the Teutonic lands, rousing everywhere the uncontrollable indignation which devoured his own soul. His vehemence carried all before him, none the less, perhaps, because he bade them remember that no sins were too heinous to be washed away by the waters of the Jordan, no evil habits too deadly to be condoned for the one good work which should make them champions of the cross. Pope Urban, however, and his counselors knew well that before the fatal die could be prudently cast, a serious task lay before them.

The system of mediæval feudalism (of which I shall speak in my next lecture), substituted personal ascendancy for the dominion of law, and wherever the personal bond failed, the resort was inevitably to private war. The practice of such wars had become virtually an organized trade, and if a large proportion of the population should be drawn away to fight against the infidels in Palestine, those who remained at home would be without defense. Such wars were, therefore, formally condemned, the women and the clergy, merchants and husbandmen, were placed under the special protection of the Church, and the Truce of God was solemnly confirmed. The very

first Crusade, therefore, placed almost all Europe under the immediate control of the Pope, and the following five or six crusades were constantly augmenting the supremacy of this universal protector. The enormous influence of this fact will be still more clearly seen if we represent to ourselves the internal state of affairs of the Crusaders. Of the thousands who hastened to put on the badge, a great number were animated, probably, by the most disinterested motives. But for the multitude at large, there was the paramount attraction of an enterprise which was put before them as a new mode of salvation, which allowed the layman, without laying aside his habits of wild license, to reach a height of perfection scarcely to be attained by the most austere monk or the most devoted priest. Nay, more, the assumption of the Cross set the debtor free from his creditor so long as he wore the sacred badge, opened the prison door for the malefactor, annulled the jurisdiction of the lord over the burgher or the peasant, and enabled the monk and the priest to escape from the monotony of the parish and the cloister. It might be thought that these privileges would tell hard on the creditor, the capitalist, the userer, but these reaped the most solid benefits. The princes who bound themselves by the vow must provide equipments for themselves and their followers, and carry with them sums of money sufficient for their needs. These sums must be raised by loan or mortgage, and as all wished to get horses, arms and money in exchange for lands, the former became inordinately dear, the latter absurdly cheap. Thus the real gain lay on the side of the merchant, the trader and a few land owners.

All this, however, had been effected by the authority and sanction of the Holy See, which had taken under its protection the dominions of all crusading princes. It was for the Pope to decide whether those who had taken

the vow should set off at once, whether some grace time should be allowed or whether the vow should be remitted altogether. The Pope became, therefore, possessed of a dispensing power which placed him virtually above all other sovereigns. His gains, moreover, were immediate. He was enabled, rather, he was constrained, to send his legatees into every land, both to enlist soldiers under the standard of the Cross, and to collect money for their support. He became, thus, the administrator of vast revenues. The lands of the Church, however, though money might be borrowed upon them, could not be alienated. The monastic houses might send some of their members to the Holy Land, the rest remained at home and became mortgagees or trustees of estates belonging to the Crusaders. But all these facts do not exhaust the vast gain of the Church occasioned by the Crusades. There was another feature of far-reaching influence, an institution, the charms of which have survived the last remains of its historical existence—I mean the institution of chivalry, which was most intimately connected with the Church.

It was in the times of the Crusades, when the analogy was first detected between the order of Knighthood and the order of Priesthood, and that an actual union of monachism and chivalry was effected by the religious orders of which the Knights Templars and the Knights Hospitallers were the most eminent examples. Since that time Chivalry, Knighthood, assumed forms of bewildering splendor. The knights of the Middle Ages were zealous patrons of religion, and most ardent devotees to honor. Honor in its most sensitive form was the idol of Knighthood, and they were taught to subordinate all other interests of life to that one sacred conception.

In the ordinary course of a chivalrous education the successive conditions of page and squire were passed through in boyhood and youth, and the condition of

knighthood was reached in early manhood. Every feudal court and castle was, in fact, a school of chivalry in which the sons of the sovereign and his vassals, or of the feudatory and his vassals, were reared in its principles and habituated to its customs and observances. The page, or, as he was more anciently and correctly called, the "valet" or "damoiseau," commenced his service and instruction when he was between seven and eight years old, and the initial phase continued for seven or eight years longer. He acted as the constant personal attendant of both his master and mistress. He waited on them in their hall and accompanied them in the chase, served the lady in her bower and followed the lord in the camp. From the chaplain and his mistress and her damsels he learnt the rudiments of religion, of rectitude and of love; from his masters and squires the elements of military exercise, to cast a spear or dart, to sustain a shield and to march with the measured tread of a soldier, and from his huntsmen and falconers (fawknars) he learnt the mysteries of the woods and rivers, or, in other words, the rules and practices of hunting and hawking. When he was between fifteen and sixteen he became a squire, but no sudden or great alteration was made in his mode of life. He continued to wait at dinner with the pages, although in a manner more dignified, according to the notions of the age. He not only served, but carved, helped the dishes, proffered the first, or principal cup of wine to his master and his guests, and carried to them the basin and napkin when they washed their hands before or after the meal. He assisted in clearing the hall for dancing or minstrelsy, and laid the tables for chess or draughts, and he also shared in those pastimes. He brought his master the "vin de coucher" at night and made his early refection ready for him in the morning. But his military exercises and athletic sports occupied an always increasing portion of the


day. He accustomed himself to ride the great horse, to tilt at the quintain, to wield the sword and battle-ax, to swim and climb, to run and leap, and to bear the weight and overcome the embarrassments of armor. He inured himself to the vicissitudes of heat and cold, and voluntarily suffered the pangs of hunger and thirst, fatigue and sleeplessness.

It was then, too, that he chose his lady-love whom he was expected to regard with an adoration at once earnest, respectful, and the more meritorious if concealed. And when it was considered that he had made sufficient advancement in his military accomplishments he took his sword to the priest who laid it on the altar, blessed it, and returned it to him. He now became a squire of the body. It was his function to display and guard in battle the banner of the baron or the plume of the knight he served, to raise him from the ground when he was unhorsed, to supply him with another of his own horses when he was disabled, to receive or keep any prisoners he might take, to fight by his side if he was unequally matched, to rescue him if captured, to bear him to a place of safety when wounded, and to bury him honorably when dead. And after he had worthily and bravely borne himself for six or seven years as a squire, the time came when it was fitting that he should be made a knight.

Two modes of conferring knighthood appear to have prevailed from a very early period in all countries where chivalry was known. The one was applied in the time of war, and the other in time of peace. According to the first mode he who was to create the knight addressed the candidate with these solemn words: "Au nom de Dieu, Saint Michael el Saint George je te fais chevalier." In this form a number of knights were made before and after almost every battle between the 11th and 16th centuries. On extraordinary occasions, indeed, the more elaborate

ritual continued to be observed. The candidate passed nights in prayer among priests in a church; he received the sacraments; he entered into a bath and was clad with a white robe, in allusion to the assumed purification of his life, his sword was solemnly blessed; he who knighted him took the sword and girded him with it, and then embracing him, he lifted his right hand and smote him on the neck or shoulder saying, "be thou a good knight," and kissed him. When this was done they all went to the chapel with much music, and the new knight, laying his right hand on the altar, promised to support and defend the Church. Whatever may have been the inherent vices and defects of chivalry, it is at any rate indisputable that it embodied some of the noblest sentiments and engendered many of the worthiest actions of contemporary mankind. It animated poetry and art, it created romance and heraldry, it determined individual ethics, modified the policy of States, inspired the energies, while it controlled the destinies of the nations of Europe. When not in camp, the home of the knight was in the court or the castle, and it was there that his prowess in the past campaign or present tournament was rewarded, often it might be rather generously than discreetly by the ladies, in whose cause he was partly enrolled. But if chastity was not among the cardinal virtues of chivalry, the catalogue of them included valor, loyalty, courtesy, and munificence. In a celebrated passage Burke describes chivalry as the unbought grace of life, the cheap defense of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise. I cannot finish my review of chivalry more appropriately than by quoting the great English orator's, statesman's and philosopher's beautiful characterization. He says: "Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience; that subordination of the heart, which kept

alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom; the sensibility of principle, that chastity of honor which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness."





BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.

(After the engraving of F. Fessard).

Born Nov. 24, 1632, died Feb. 21, 1677.

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

In our first lecture on the Middle Ages I tried to characterize the general drift and tendency of those times, and to describe one of the chief powers which exercised a domineering rule over the nations and peoples of mediaeval Europe, I mean the church. I mentioned, that in addition to the church there was an other powerful institution which forms as it were one of the pillars of the edifice of the then civilization, to-wit : mediaeval feudalism. This fundamental and highly interesting institution claims our special attention because it had a profound bearing on the government, laws and manners of Europe, and its consequences may still be felt in the common law of America, thus connecting the centuries of the Middle Ages with the modern times. The latter part of our lecture will

be devoted to a discussion of mediæval city-life, of the private and public life of the burgesses, of their guilds and clubs, and lastly to a consideration of the mental development of those times, or more properly to an inquiry into scholasticism, this being the collective name of the philosophy, theology and science of the Middle Ages. The word feudalism comes from *feodum*, a word which denotes property held as a reward, or in consideration of special service. The word itself is not found earlier than the close of the ninth century. Feudalism in a broad sense may be taken to mean a social organization based on the ownership of land and personal relations created by the ownership of land—a state of things, in which public relations are dependent on private relations, in other words were the capacity to hold an office, or a military rank, or to be member of a court depends on the fact of possessing a private estate, where political rights depend on landed rights, and the land is concentrated in the hands of few. Feudalism in this sense has existed and does still exist, *e. g.*, in India, and in various parts of the world; but the feudal system par excellence is always understood to mean that special form of feudalism which was developed on the soil of Gaul by the conquering Franks. Feudalism was a complicated system of tenures, which determined the political character of every European monarchy where they prevailed. To our modern minds it is not very easy to form a correct idea of the nature of this institution. In modern times there is only one single manner of acquiring landed estate gratuitously, namely by inheritance. Cases of mere donations to individuals are so rare that they cannot come into account. But ordinarily when we want to acquire the property of landed estate, we simply buy them and pay cash for them. In the Middle Ages the acquisition of land, the tenure of land was frequently made in the same way; but more frequently still by means of a feudal tenure,

of a fief, that is to say by means of a mutual contract of support and fidelity, no money question being transacted in the whole affair. The person who accepted the fief was called vassal, the person conferring the fief was his lord. Whatever obligations of service the contract laid upon the vassal to his lord, corresponding duties of protection were imposed by it on the lord towards his vassal. If these were transgressed on either side, the one forfeited his land, the other his seigniority or rights over it. Nor were motives of interest left alone to operate in securing the feudal connection.

The associations founded upon ancient customs and friendly attachment, the impulses of gratitude and honor, the dread of infamy, the sanctions of religion, were all employed to strengthen these ties, and to render them equally powerful with the relations of nature and far more so than those of political society. It was a question agitated among the feudal lawyers, whether a vassal is bound to follow the standard of his lord against his own kindred. It was one more important, whether he must do so against the king. A law of Frederick Barbarossa enjoins, that in every oath of fealty to an inferior lord the vassal's duty to the emperor should be expressly reserved. But it was not so during the height of the feudal system in France. The vassals of Henry II. and Richard I. never hesitated to adhere to them against the sovereign. The count of Britany, Pierre de Dreux, had practically asserted this feudal right during the minority of St. Louis. In a public instrument, he announces to the world, that having met with repeated injuries from the regent, and denial of justice, he had let the king know that he no longer considered himself as his vassal, but renounced his homage and defied him. For it was always necessary for a vassal to renounce his homage before he made war on his lord, if he would avoid the shame and penalty of feudal treason.

The ceremonies used in conferring a fief were principally three: 1. homage, 2. fealty, 3. investiture. The first was designed as a significant expression of the submission and devotedness of the vassal towards his lord. In performing homage his head was uncovered, his belt ungirt, his spurs and sword removed; he placed his hands, kneeling, between those of the lord and promised to become his man from thence forward, to serve him with life and limb and worldly honour, faithfully and loyally, in consideration of the lands which he held under him. None but the lord in person could accept homage, which was commonly concluded by a kiss. 2. An oath of fealty was indispensable in every fief; but the ceremony was less peculiar than that of homage and it might be received by proxy. It was taken by ecclesiastics but not by minors, and in language it differed little from the form of homage. 3. Investiture, or the actual conveyance of feudal lands, was of two kinds: proper and improper. The first was an actual putting in possession upon the ground, either by the lord or his deputy, which is called in English law, livery of seisin.

The second was symbolical, and consisted in the delivery of a turf, a stone, a wand, a branch, or whatever else might have been made usual by the caprice of local custom. Du Cange enumerates not less than ninety-eight varieties of investitures. Upon investiture the duties of the vassal commenced. Thus it was a breach of faith to divulge the lord's counsel; to conceal from him the machinations of others, to injure his person or fortune, or to violate the sanctity of his roof and the honor of his family. In battle he was bound to lend his horse to his lord when dismounted; to adhere to his side while fighting; and to go into captivity as a hostage for him when taken. His attendance was due to the lords' courts, sometimes to witness, and sometimes to bear a part in the administration of justice. His chief duty, however, con-

sisted in his military service, the measure of which was generally settled by usage. Forty days was the usual term, during which the tenants of a knight's fee was bound to be in the field at his own expense. This was extended by St. Louis to sixty days, except when the charter of infeudation expressed a shorter period. But the length of service diminished with the quantity of land. For half a knight's fee but twenty days were due, for an eighth part but five.

Independently of the obligations of fealty and service which the nature of the contracts created, other advantages were derived from it by the lords, which have been called feudal incidents. These were: 1. Reliefs. A relief was a sum of money (you see, even in those barbarous times, money was considered a relief) a sum of money due from every one of full age taking a fief by descent. This was in some countries arbitrary, and the exactions practiced under this pretense, both upon superior and inferior vassals, ranked amongst the greatest abuses of the feudal policy. 2. Closely connected with reliefs were the fines paid to the lord upon the alienation of his vassal's feud; the spirit of feudal tenure established so intimate a connection between the two parties that it could be dissolved by neither without requiring the other's consent. If the lord transferred his seignior, the tenant was to testify his concurrence, and this ceremony was long kept up in England under the name of attornment. The assent of the lord to his vassal's alienation was still more essential, and more difficult to be obtained. He had received his fief, it was supposed, for reasons peculiar to himself or to his family; at least his heart and arm were bound to his superior, and his service was not to be exchanged for that of a stranger, who might be unable or unwilling to render it. 3. Escheats. As fiefs descended but to the posterity of the first taker, or at the utmost to

his kindred, they necessarily became sometimes vacant for want of heirs; especially, where, as in England, there was no power of devising them by will. In this case it was obvious that they ought to revert to the lord, from whose property they had been derived. These reversions were called escheat. 4. Aids. Under this heading the lord was entitled to call for certain services in certain prescribed circumstances, such as an aid for the lord's expedition to the Holy Land, for marrying his sister, or eldest son, etc.

These feudal aids are deserving of our attention as the beginnings of taxation, of which for a long time they in a great measure answered the purpose. Furthermore, in England and Normandy, the lord had the wardship of his tenant during minority. By virtue of this right, he had both the care of his person and received to his own use the profits of the estate.

Lastly the right of marriage was given to the lord by the Norman and English laws; it consisted in tendering a husband to his female wards, while under age, whom they could not reject without forfeiting the value of the marriage, that is as much as any one would give to the guardian for such an alliance. This was afterwards extended to male wards, and became a very lucrative source of extortion to the crown and to the lords.

A still more remarkable law prevailed in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The lord might summon any female vassal to accept one of three whom he should propose as her husband. No other condition seems to have been imposed on him in selecting these suitors than that they should be of equal rank with herself. Neither the maiden's coyness, nor the widow's afflictions, neither aversion to the proffered candidate, nor love to one more favored seemed to have passed as legitimate excuses. One, only one, plea could come from the lady's mouth, who was resolute to

hold her land in single blessedness. It was that she was past sixty years of age, and after this unwelcome confession, it is justly argued by the author of the law book that the lord could not decently press her into matrimony. However outrageous such an usage may appear to our ideas, it is to be recollected that the peculiar circumstances of that little state (Jerusalem) rendered it indispensable to possess in every fief a proper vassal to fulfil the duties of war.

We have thus far confined our inquiry to fiefs holden on terms of military service, since those are the most ancient and regular. They alone were called proper feuds. A proper feud was bestowed without price, without fixed stipulation, upon a vassal capable of serving personally in the field. But gradually improper fiefs of the most various kinds were introduced. Women were admitted to inherit them, they were granted for a price, and without reference to military service. There is one extensive species of feudal tenure which may be distinctly noticed.

The pride of wealth in the Middle Ages was principally exhibited in a multitude of dependants. The court of Charlemagne was crowded with officers of every rank, some of the most eminent of whom exercised functions about the royal person which would have been thought fit only for slaves in the palace of a Roman Emperor. The free-born Frank saw nothing menial in the titles of cup-bearer, steward, marshal and master of the horse, which are still borne by the noblest families in every country in Europe and by sovereign princes in the German Empire. From the court of the king this favorite piece of magnificence descended to those of the prelates and barons, who surrounded themselves with household officers called ministerials, a name equally applied to those of a servile and of a liberal description. The latter of these were re-

warded with grants of land which they held under a feudal tenure by the condition of performing some domestic service for the lord.

But gentility of blood was not marked by the tenure of land only. This was supplied by two innovations devised in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. I mean, the adoption of surnames and of armorial bearings. Previous to these centuries people had only one name; *e. g.*, the name of the teacher of Charlemagne was Alcuin, but later on the nobility began to add the names of their estates to their own, and transmitted them to their posterity. Hereditary arms were, perhaps, scarcely used by private families before the beginning of the thirteenth century. From that time, however, they became very general. A line was drawn between the high-born and ignoble classes almost as broad as that which separated liberty from servitude. All offices of trust and power were conferred on the former. A plebeian could not possess a fief. A gentleman, on the other hand, could not exercise any trade without derogating, that is, losing, the advantage of his rank. But in nothing does the feudal haughtiness of birth more show itself than in the disgrace which attended unequal marriages.

In France the offsprings of a gentleman by a plebeian mother were reputed noble for the purposes of inheritance and of exemption from tribute. But they could not be received into any order of chivalry, though capable of simple knighthood, nor were they considered as any better than a bastard class, deeply tainted with the alloy of their maternal extraction. For several purposes it was necessary to prove four, eight, sixteen, or a greater number of quarters, that is, of coats borne by paternal and maternal ancestors, and the same practice still subsists in Germany. These noblemen, during the prevalence of feudal principles, especially in France, possessed quite a number of most precious privileges. So, amongst others, the right of

coining money. At the accession of Hugh Capet as many as 150 noblemen, peers and barons are said to have exercised the power of coining money. To this England forms the only exception. No subjects ever enjoyed the privilege of coining silver in England without the royal stamp and superintendence, and this is a remarkable proof of the restraint in which the feudal aristocracy were always held in that country.

Then these nobles had the right of waging private war. They were exempt from all public tributes, except the feudal aids. In the modern condition of governments taxation is the chief engine of the well compacted machinery which regulates the system. But the mediæval European kingdoms knew neither the necessities nor the integrity of modern finances. From their demesne lands the kings of France and Lombardy supplied the expenses of their courts. Even Charlemagne regulated the economy of his private farms with the minuteness of a steward, and a large proportion of his ordinances, or, as, they are called, Capitularies, are directed to this object. Hugh Capet was nearly indigent as King of France, though, as Count of Paris and Orleans he might take the feudal aids and reliefs of his vassals. The barons, furthermore, were entirely free from the legislative control of the King, and had the exclusive exercise of original judicature in their dominions. These rights of administering justice were possessed by the owners of fiefs in very different degrees, and in France they were divided into the high, the middle and the low jurisdiction. The first species alone—*la haute justice*, as it was called—conveyed the power of life and death. It was inherent in the baron. In England this privilege, with regard to thefts, was known by the uncouth terms of *Infangthef* and *Outfangthef*. But these customs were far less instrumental to tyranny than we might infer from their extent. For in all doubtful cases, and espe-

cially where a crime not capable of notorious proof was charged, the combat, the duel, was awarded, and the final judgment was left unto God. The nobleman fought on horseback, with all his arms of attack and defense. The plebeian on foot, with his club and target. If the issue of the combat consisted in a claim of money, the vanquished party, of course, forfeited his claim and paid a fine. Even the judge himself who had pronounced a hostile sentence could be called into the field.

To our modern view it seems to be utterly uncivilized and barbarous to decide lawsuits by an appeal to the uncontrollable chances of a duel or an ordeal. And this mediæval usage very frequently serves as a manifest proof of the backwardness of those times. People—and by people I mean very learned people—tell us that such a half savage way of settling court affairs must needs be the outcome of a very low civilization. But here again, as in so many other cases, our judgment is very likely to be unduly biassed by false ideas and misapplied conceptions. True, we do not decide our lawsuits by resorting to duels or to ordeals.

We go to the court and have the thing settled in a quiet way, by the calm procedure of our learned judges. But when we hear of a different way of settling such legal altercations, does that entitle us to hold up our way of acting as the standard, and any other way as the miscarriage of low civilization? By no means. If you would ask me: Could you encompass the most essential and most instructive result of your science into one small sentence? I would unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative, formulating my answer this way: The most essential result of science consists in being able to understand, to appreciate *the other one*; *l'autre*, to be, as A. Comte puts it, altruistic. To understand institutions different from ours, deviating from our usual methods and ways; to understand them, to ex-

plain them, to appreciate them—that is the ultimate goal of our science. But in order to do this, we must give up our own narrow standards. We must find standards and units of a novel kind. If we go on considering our own civilization as the model one, then of course any other civilization will be a lower, a worse development of humanity. But that is too narrow. Let me tell you, *e. g.*, a very striking example of the extreme divergence of feelings and opinions between two peoples, both of which consider themselves, and justly so, as perfect types of high civilization. I mean the continental nations of modern Europe, the French, the Germans, the Austrians on the one, and the people of the United States on the other hand. In Europe a criminal, when sentenced to death, is not allowed to have any official knowledge of his fatal judgment at any time previous to twenty-four hours before the execution has to take place. For it is thought a superfluous cruelty to let the man be under the terrible pressure of his doom for weeks and months before that doom is to be fulfilled. But in many States of the Union the cruelty of thus communicating a sentence of death months before it will be executed, does not seem to be felt at all.

There you have a very broad divergence of feeling, of opinion, just as in the case of mediæval legal combats and ordeals. But does such a divergence entitle us to call the Europeans more civilized than the Americans? By no means, I say again. For it is a fact of almost mathematical positivity that the Americans are more charitable than the Europeans, and if their charitable sympathy seems to fail with regard to criminals there must be some proper reason for it, reasons which are well known to every close student of American law. Now let us apply these principles to our present question.

Strange and uncivilized though these mediæval combats and ordeals may seem to us, still they are but the natural and very apt institution of a time in which any other way of deciding lawsuits would have been still more injurious. For in those times when Europe, as I have stated in my last lecture, was split up into numberless little territories, where judgment, independent and ultimate judgment was being passed on questions of law—in those times, I say, the subjects of those selfish lords, who were both their superiors and their judges, were perfectly at sea as to the guarantee of a fair judgment. If a man was sued for his property, the feudal lord, his judge, could easily manage to get part of his estate in case he decided for the plaintiff.

But such emergencies were easily obviated by a system of legal duels, by means of which questions of law were decided, not by the rapacious lord, but by the valor and dexterity of the contending parties themselves. The same reason is still the fertile cause of duels in Europe. In certain classes of Europe questions of honor are of such an extreme sensibility, that the parties concerned in the affair will not leave the decision of such questions to the sober and cool judgment of an official judge, and hence they resort to a personal decision by means of a duel. No amount of enlightenment will ever be able to eradicate this custom. Under certain circumstances it is an absolute necessity, and in the Middle Ages it was a necessity of daily occurrence. If we, therefore, do not use it as extensively as did the people of those times, it is not in consequence of greater enlightenment, but by dint of a less urgent necessity. For whenever a necessity of such kind presents itself we do exactly what those so-called barbarians of the Middle Ages were doing—we challenge our adversary and fight a duel. This is the true way of looking at the matter. All institutions of feudalism have

to be examined that way. We do not use feudalism any more; we have given it up. Very well. We have another system of government. *Another* one, but why a *better* one? Has an equal number of young men been slaughtered in one century during the Middle Ages as during the last twenty-seven years of Europe and America? No historian will venture to state it. The only difference is, we do the slaughtering by wholesale, whereas in the Middle Ages they did it by retail. But slaughtering it is in both cases. All those taxes, reliefs, and aids and tributes that were given to the feudal lords have to be paid nowadays to the county, to the State, to the national government. The money has to be paid in both cases; and the name does not make the slightest change in the odor of these roses. We are told all kinds of horrid stories about those mediæval knights and feudal lords who, descending from their solitary castles, lay in ambush to rob the poor merchant on the highways of the land. True, very true. Nowadays the thing is done more regularly. The gentlemen do no longer lie in ambush; they come forth freely and frankly. We do not call them knights and feudal lords, the name has been changed; we call them custom officers, and what they exact is called duty. Duty, as if it would be above all possible doubt that such a duty is not the most flagrant violation of civil rights! As if many of the most advanced thinkers, like Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Bastian, and a host of others, would not have declared against all obstructions of free trade; as if it would be absolutely sure that a so-called protective tariff and custom-houses are a beneficial thing!

But of course it is very, very difficult to recognize things under the various disguises of different ages. Things change their forms and appearances, but essentially they always remain what they used to be. Men and women in the Middle Ages were exactly the same kind of human beings

as ourselves. If they did not do precisely what we are doing, this was not a consequence of ignorance, of superstition, of backward civilization—but simply because it would not have availed them. Let me call your special attention to this point. I say, they established several institutions, like feudalism or the mediæval church, etc., not because of their benighted intelligence, but because of the usefulness of these institutions. Our modern institutions would have been utterly deleterious to their prosperity. Let me give you a very striking example. All jurists, lawyers and law-scholars in existence, American and English, as well as French and German, agree as to the unequalled superiority of Roman law. Some nations like the French or German have accepted Roman law almost entirely. Some, like the American and English refused to accept it. But do you think, that the French or Germans accepted it on account of its superiority, on account of a deliberate choice of a better Law? Or that the Americans and Englishmen refused to accept it on account of their being averse to a better law, on account of their being less advanced, less civilized? By no means. Roman law although highly useful to French or German civilization, would be highly injurious to English or American institutions, and hence these two great nations prefer to keep up their own law in spite of its being less perfect than the law of Rome.

But you might retort: If people in the Middle Ages were exactly of the same turn of mind as ourselves, why were they forced to have institutions so utterly divergent from ours? Why did our institutions not avail them? Simply because the population of Europe at that time was a much smaller one, and the distribution of the population a very unequal one. This one fact is one of the most decisive agencies in a nation's life. The proportion of square-miles to one individual is one of the leading

causes in all the institutions of a people. In the Middle Ages extensive territories, which now are inhabited by millions of people, were inhabited by so many thousands of persons. The contact of people being less intimate, their mutual bearing on one another, the number of their needs and desires were very considerably reduced and thus our institutions, which always presuppose several millions of people, were inapplicable to the Middle Ages. But in all these facts I cannot perceive the faintest little trace of a mental backwardness.

Permit me to go still deeper, to the very elements of the whole question. People, as a rule, cherish an idea, that nations are like individuals, and that, accordingly, nations have their childhood, their youth, their old age, their death, just as we are used to see individuals. This is a very favorite idea and it presents itself in such a plain, and as it were, forcible way, that the majority of people cling to it without giving it any further thought. They take it for granted. They consider it as a simple truism. And in accordance with that idea, they think, that the Middle Ages, *c. g.*, were the times of wild youth, and that only in modern times did we and do we slowly reach the times of maturity. This entire idea is utterly false. The whole simile, *the whole comparison between nations and individuals is absolutely wrong*. There is no such parallel development. There are no such things as childhood, youth, manhood and old age; there is no such sequence of these different stages. Nations cannot be compared to individuals. For as my immortal master has expressed it, *natura sane non creat nationes*—nature does not create nations, nature creates individuals. A nation is a mental thing only; its existence is in our mind, and all inferences from the development of individuals to the development of nations are utterly misplaced. Some nations, *e. g.*, never grow, they are never

old and never young. It is a great mistake to speak of this great Republic as of a young country. Why young? Russia as such is not very much older than America. This Republic is a great, a powerful country—no matter whether it is one hundred or fifty years old. It had all the conditions of greatness at its very start. In course of time it will be larger—but not greater.

On the other hand there are countries, there are nations, which number thousands of years, like the Persian Empire—but they still are where they have been one thousand years ago. A nation is not an individual. And therefore it is a very great mistake to look upon the Middle Ages as one of the lower stages of our development. There is no such connection of stages and ages. They had a civilization of their own, and we have a civilization of our own. But whether mediæval feudalism was so much worse than modern state-government—this great question can be answered only by Him, who has known all ages and all times, and who measures all events in a scale of infinite delicacy and super-human wisdom.

I am now going to treat of another important feature of the Middle Ages, of city-life and burgesses. In my lectures on Greece and Rome I continually enlarged on the great influence of cities on the course of civilization. We came to the conclusion that one of the marked characteristics of classical antiquity consists in the fact, that all Grecians, Macedonians, Cretans, Romans, Phœnicians, in short all, or almost all nations of classical Antiquity lived exclusively in cities, that they had none, or very few villages or hamlets, no country-life, whatever. I tried to show the great significance of that fact, its strong and lasting influence on the development of civilization. When the population of a country consists chiefly or exclusively of a city-population, this will inevitably hasten the process of evolution. The apparent simplicity and primitiveness of

mediæval times, on the other hand, is mainly due to the very small number of cities in mediæval Europe. Two thirds of Europe had scarcely any city at all as late as the eleventh century. The ancient Germans were particularly averse to cities, and they never built any. The majority of European cities are of a comparatively recent origin. If we try to compare that to the state of affairs in this republic, we will readily see the enormous difference between our ways and manners and those of the Middle Ages. In the United States of America more cities have been built in the course of fifty years than during two hundred years of mediæval Europe. In fact, our modern civilization is a city-civilization, whereas mediæval civilization to a great extent may properly be called a country-civilization, taking the word country in the sense of a contrast to city-life. Slowly, however, city-life began to develop, and in the two last centuries of the Middle Ages it was one of the prominent features of the time.

The population of cities in the eleventh century was divided into three classes. 1. To defend the new cities, the new communities, encouragement was naturally given to the only classes authorized to bear arms, and the only ones consequently acquainted with the art of war, to take up their abodes within the walls of the city. These were the nobles. Of the rural nobility in Saxony one ninth were by Henry the Fowler thus transferred from the fields to the cities. 2. The second class of city inhabitants were the free-burghers, the *ingenui* (as they were called), who possessed lands within the jurisdiction of the city; and, as in number they had greatly the superiority over the nobles, they soon obtained a voice in the local administration. Like the former their only profession was that of arms, they could not engage in commercial pursuits, which were universally abandoned to serfs and freedmen, without forfeiting the privileges of their order; and if they married below their

condition, their offspring became slaves. 3. The third class of city-inhabitants were the serfs and freedmen. On them devolved the labors of agriculture, the mechanical arts and the cares of commerce—occupations which were regarded as altogether servile. But in course of time, especially through the efforts of Henry V., this third class of low-born people were raised to the dignity of cives opifices, of workingman-citizens. They were now a free class and were distributed into corporations and guilds, according to their trades. The constitution of the trade-guilds was formed on the model of other associations; they appointed a master or alderman and other officers, made ordinances, including provisions for religious observances, mutual help and burial. As their principal objects, the craft-gildmen provided for the maintenance of the customs of their craft, framed further ordinances for its regulation (including care against fraudulent workmanship), saw these ordinances properly executed and punished the guild-brothers who infringed them. Each member took an oath and paid an admission fee and yearly contribution; they held regular business meetings and had an annual “guild-day.” Every guild had its livery, which the members were expected to wear at funerals, feasts and other public occasions, and they had strict rules for good life and behavior.

These local guilds were very numerous in England and in the Teutonic countries. There were, *e. g.*, fifty such guilds in the country of Cambridge, nine hundred and nine in Norfolk, eighty in Cologne, seventy at Lubeck, etc. But the real importance of these cities is to be dated from their famous union into the Hanseatic confederacy. The origin of this is rather obscure, but it may certainly be nearly referred in point of time to the middle of the thirteenth century and accounted for by the necessity of mutual defence, which piracy by sea and pillage by land

had taught the merchants of Germany. The nobles, of course, endeavored to obstruct the formation of this league, which indeed was in a great measure designed to withstand their exactions. It powerfully maintained the influence which the free imperial cities of Germany were at this time acquiring. Eighty of the most considerable places constituted the Hanseatic confederacy, divided into four colleges, whereof Lubek, Cologne, Brunswick and Dantzic were the leading towns. Lubek held the chief rank, and became as it were the patriarchal see of the league. The league had four principal factories in foreign parts, at London, Bruges, Bergen and Novgorod in Russia; endowed by the sovereigns of those cities with considerable privileges, to which every merchant belonging to a Hanseatic town was entitled. The good effected by the Hanseatic league was most striking, it repressed piracy on the deep, and plunder on the land; it carried civilization into every country surrounding the Baltic; it brought into contact the northern with the southern nations of Europe; it opened mines, it multiplied domestic manufactures; it transformed forests into plains covered with hemp, or flax, or corn; it caused towns to arise where there had only been hamlets, and villages where solitudes had formerly reigned; it benefited the points of habitable Europe by an interchange of commodities. For its own internal government it had recognized statutes, and it drew up codes of maritime law for the use of ports; of these the code of Wisby has the most celebrity.

But, on the other hand, this confederation produced considerable evil. Because such is the nature of men, that to possess power inevitably leads to an abuse of power. The towns, or rather the merchants belonging to the league soon regarded the shores of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Prussia, Poland and Russia as their own private domain; and they often seized the ships which other na-

tions sent into the Baltic. They enjoyed the exclusive right of herring-fishery in the Sound; they paid few duties at whatever port they touched, while in their own ports they exacted heavy ones; in all countries they insisted on privileges not conceded to the inhabitants themselves, and the refusal or revocation of any they punished frequently by destroying the commerce of the place. And well might a body which could equip a fleet of three hundred sail, laden with twelve thousand to fifteen thousand men regard itself as sovereign. Its internal harmony, its extensive operations, its engrossing monopoly, secured for it unrivalled prosperity.

Many of the German cities were celebrated for a magnificence not to be equalled anywhere but in the maritime regions of Italy. Nuremberg, Augsburg, Worms, Spire, Frankfort, Cologne, Hamburg and many others were renowned both for the extent and splendor of their edifices, and for the style of living in which the rich citizens indulged. There does not seem to be much exaggeration in the boast of Aenas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II., who visited most of Europe, that the kings of Scotland might envy the enjoyments of the meaner citizens of Nuremberg.

We have now to review the mental development of the Middle Ages. An inquiry into the mental activity of those times is mainly an investigation of mediæval philosophy; for natural sciences were cultivated only to a slight degree and the efforts of the most gifted persons of all Europe were constantly concentrated upon questions of philosophy. In numberless schools, chiefly in monasteries, years and years were spent with the solution of those eternal problems, which have busied the human mind ever since it has approached a degree of maturity. In these endless disputations we do not meet those wonderfully developed systems of philosophy which are the glory of the Grecian mind.

When we treated of Grecian philosophy we could scarcely master the vast number of elaborate systems of philosophy, systems like that of Parmenides, Zeno, Pythagoras, Heraklitos, Aritotle, Plato, Aristippos and Epicuros. If you should happen to glance over a treatise of a mediæval philosopher you will be struck by the utter absence of all decorative beauty. A dry style on dry questions. The general predilection of these writers tends towards logic. They prefer a study of logic to the study of Metaphysics and they have a marvellous faculty to put questions as to the logical structure of sentences, as to the logical roots of thoughts, as to the roots of these roots. Their hairsplitting subtlety is almost extreme. They divide and subdivide and divide again the subdivisions, until the whole of a system is reduced to innumerable parcels of atoms.

Still in spite of all the infinite variety of scholastic lore we can clearly perceive two main currents, two leading points, which are as it were the turning points of all scholasticism. These points are : 1. Nominalism, and 2. Realism. Without a thorough understanding of these two principles we are unable to appreciate the mental drift of those ages. And accordingly I shall try to explain these principles as precisely as I can. The philosophers and thinkers of those centuries were of opinion, that the central idea of philosophy has to be found in the question of universals. By universals they meant those general ideas, like virtue, vice, species, kind, quality, quantity, which indeed form the groundwork of our mind. In fact we cannot utter the simplest sentence, without at the same time using one or another of these universals. Say, *e. g.*, we would say : John is a good man. In this very simple sentence we had to use the universal : man, the type for humanity, or for manliness. Or when we say : Is Charles your friend ? Here again we use the universal : friend, the type for friendship, or friendliness. It is the same case with any other

statement or assertion. We constantly use words expressive of some general, universal meaning, words which may apply to many different individuals, and to each of them equally well. The question now arises: What are these universals? Are they really existent things or mere mental formations? Is virtue, or vice, or matter, or species a mere word, or are they more than that? Have they an existence of their own? And if not, can we say, that there are no other things but individual things? That all those generalities and universals are mere phrases? This great question was the central point of all mediæval metaphysics. One description of thinkers simply denied the independent existence of universals, and consequently they taught, that there are no other but individual things, and that those universals are mere names, or, in Latin, *nomina*; hence these philosophers were called Nominalists. Their head was Roscellinus. His doctrine seems to be in perfect accordance with what you might call common sense. For, as far as our senses are concerned, we really never see anything else but individuals. None of us has ever seen man in general, as it were manhood, or manliness, or humanity, or howsoever you may put it. All that we ever have seen or touched, or noticed was a particular man, an individual. And likewise we have never seen or touched, or tasted or noticed virtue itself, virtue as a universal, we have only seen particular virtuous men or women. And the same way with all other universals. And Roscellinus and his followers did not hesitate to say that such universals as nation, people have no real existence whatsoever. To him there are no nations, no races, like the German race, or the Latin race, or any other race. To him there are only so and so many individual people, who are not united by one common general feature—for such a universal feature he denied—but whom people are pleased to call *one* race, although such a universal thing has no real existence.

Roscellinus went still further. He said : the doctrine of the holy trinity is entirely subversive of logic. For the many, whether it be three, or five, or ten thousand, can never form one unity—hence three divine ideas cannot be united into *one* God, and therefore we have to speak of three Gods. Roscellinus therefore was called the Tritheist. But he met with very strong opposition.

Anselm of Canterbury, who assailed, and very vigorously, too, Roscellin's theological aberrations, but chiefly William of Champeaux. Permit me to call your special attention to that great man, whose own writings we do not possess any more, but whose opinions we know from the writings of his antagonist, Abelard, famous for his philosophy and for the love of Heloise. William of Champeaux simply denied the existence of individuals. This seems to be not only strange, but utterly ludicrous. We all know, or at least we feel, that there are individuals, particular things, things that have an existence of their own. We will never mix up this table with this glass, or one person with another person, or one tree with another tree. We think, that this table, this glass or this tree, have each a definite existence of their own, being particular, distinguishable, individuals, called by individual names. We will never call that much air (close your two hands) a particular thing, for it is not distinguishable from that much air in another part of the hall. But we do know that trees are individual things. And in the first place, we all know, and most positively, too, that each of us is an individual.

But this William of Champeaux peremptorily denied. Let us hear his arguments. He said amongst others : All will concede, that Mr. A when five years old, is totally different from Mr. A when twenty years old. Consequently, there must have also been a difference at the respective ages of six and twenty, and of seven and twenty,

and of eleven and twenty, and so on, of nineteen and twenty, and even a difference of twenty in the first and twenty in the last month of his twentieth year, and still further, of one day and another day, of one minute and another minute, of one second and another second, so that we are forced to say, that a so-called individual, like Mr. A, is in reality a collection of infinite individuals, and each of these infinite individuals again is a collection of other infinite individuals, so that even Mr. Vanderbilt himself could not afford to give a single dinner party to all those so-called individuals who went to constitute his own personality. The absurd result thus attained led our William to the absolute denial of all individuality.

He said, all particular things are mere appearances, mere affections of one real, universal substance, this substance being the only one that really exists, the only reale, as his Latin term goes. Hence, he became the true founder of scholastic realism. The realists taught that universals have a real existence and form the essence of things. These essences they multiplied indefinitely. Everything is composed by a number of essences and occult qualities, and some of their assertions read like that. Instead of simply saying, "John Smith, of Cincinnati," they would say: "A man, in whom the quality of John-ity, in addition to the essence of Smithism, is joined to the universal Cincinnatiity." This, of course, looks like very poor philosophy.

But by adducing such examples, I by no means intend to ridicule the realists, because their doctrines have been highly suggestive of some of the most beneficial and even practical ideas of later centuries. They, as well as the Nominalists, and, in general, all scholastic philosophers, were profound thinkers, who devoted an unremitting industry and marvellous mental faculties to the highest and most essential problems of the human mind. Men like

St. Thomas ab Aquinas, Albertus Magnus and Occam, all three scholastics, would have been an honor to every age. When we see the huge, ungainly folios of their apparently interminable works, we are easily induced to smile at the prolixity of such impractical labors. But the more we know of them the more we admire them. In fact, with regard to St. Thomas ab Aquina, a perfect revival of studies has of late been inaugurated. Modern men of the very highest standing in science, like Ihering in Goettingen, professor of law, or Endemann, in his studies on political economy, have declared that many of their very best ideas are nothing else but a reinvention of what has been taught by Thomas ab Aquina six centuries ago.

In the Middle Ages the teachings and writings of those scholastic doctors engrossed all schools, all studies, all mental activity. Those doctors were looked upon with sacred awe. They were given the most flattering titles. Thus, Alexander of Hales was called the Doctor Irrefragabilis, the irrefragable; Duns Scotus, the Doctor Subtilis; Aegidius of Colonna, the Doctor Fundatissimus, the well founded; John of Fidanza (Bonaventura), the Doctor Seraphicus, the seraphic; Occam, the Doctor Invincibilis; Roger Bacon, Doctor Mirabilis, etc; (By the way, the title of Doctor is of mediæval origin: The Romans had no such titles.)

Up to very modern times it was, and to a great extent it is still customary, to belittle all mediæval philosophy, all scholasticism, and to regard it as the barren result of an inferior civilization. This opinion is partly due to the general fact that we are fond of belittling other ages in order to raise thereby the level of our own, and partly to the writings of those witty and great French authors, who, like Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Condorcet, Hevetius and D'Alembert, were called the Encyclopædists. In their opinion, mediæval thought, mediæval philosophy, was

equivalent to the roving phantasms of a fanatical monk in his solitary cell. Although none of them, perhaps with the exception of Condorcet, had ever studied the works of those great doctors, they persistently declared war against them, and using the frightful weapon of satirical wit, they succeeded in changing the general opinion of their contemporaries and their successors.

Few, very few people take the trouble to investigate such matters independently, and thus all laughed with Voltaire and none cared for those admirable thinkers they were laughing at. But nowadays we frequently laugh, not with Voltaire, but at Voltaire, and we have learned to be just to Thomas Aquinas, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Occam, and the rest of the scholastics. It would be a very easy thing to show that two-thirds of the celebrated essays of Emerson, I mean two-thirds of their contents, are nothing but a reiteration of what some of the mediæval scholastics have said and written. Not as if I would charge Emerson with conscious plagiarism. You could just as well charge a rose with committing plagiarism on another rose, because they spread the same sweet odor. I mention this simply to illustrate the importance of those writers. And how shall we hope to belittle these writers with the faintest hope of success, when we hear that all their labor, that all their efforts, were principally concentrated upon the study of him who is, in all probability, the greatest of all thinkers—of Aristotle? For his writings were the chief fountain of mediæval scholasticism. Every line and every word of every line of his numerous works formed the basis of indefinite discussions and queries. But an age in which Aristotle was the center of thought, such an age can not be called an inferior one.

In Aristotle all powers of the unrivalled mind of the Grecian reached their highest perfection. Such a teacher requires congenial disciples, and it is his immortal name

which alone suffices to save the dignity of the mediæval thinkers.

The institutions of modern Europe may be characterized pretty fairly by comparing them to the institutions of the Middle Ages, out of which they developed, on the one hand, and to the institutions of the United States of America on the other. All institutions of the Middle Ages were feudal, that is, all institutions were occasioned by and saturated with the principle that all power has to be derived from a "superior," and that consequently the "inferiors," or what we generally call the "people," have no right, no claim, no privilege, but what has been granted by its superiors.

This is the central idea of mediæval institutions. To this the central idea of modern America (meaning, of course, the United States of America) forms a striking contrast. The Americans laid it down as the fundamental principle that all power rests with the people at large, that there are no born superiors, and that all rights, claims, and privileges originate with the people, and not with the incumbents of those rights and claims.

Modern Europe stands half-way between the Middle Ages and the United States. In most of the States of Europe the *legislative* power does rest with the people, and nothing can be done without the legitimate consent of the "inferiors," or their representatives. Hence the parliamentary system with two chambers (corresponding to the Senate and House of the American Congress) is the rule. But this democratic principle is restricted to the *legislative* functions of the State only.

Concerning the *executive* power (judges, officials of the administration, army, school, etc.) the American principle of election by the people has still to give way to the mediæval principle of appointment. The executive department of a modern European State is entirely feudal in its

character, and the bureaucracy displays all the attractive and repulsive features of the hierarchy of Rome, or of a mediæval kingdom.

Modern Europe still bears the indelible mark of those classes and castes that have been developed in the Middle Ages, and although, in point of law, there is no difference between one individual and another, in point of fact there is a vast difference between an aristocrat and a commoner. And justly so. For the aristocrat, even now, exercises a power which, in many respects, proves beneficial. Thus, by his greater devotion to the graces of life, he leaves most of the commercial and industrial branches to the undisturbed competition of the commoner. This again makes it possible that even very small capitalists can carry on a little trade, whereas in countries where all classes invest their money in business enterprises, there the wholesale trader quickly swallows up all minor traders and things tend to the aggrandizement of a few Rothschilds or Goulds, and still more to the establishment of those corporations whose "rights" soon degenerate into "monopolies."

It is in the highest degree unhistorical, *i. e.*, untrue, unfounded, to look down upon the classes and castes of Europe and to scoff at the "backwardness" of these institutions. Classes and castes in Europe do more for the preservation of order, of morals, of general security, of honor, than any other cause. Class-feeling and class-pride will more effectively prevent a person from evil-doing than all the ethical teachings in the Church, in the school, and even more than the admonition of parents. This is a sombre statement, but it is thoroughly true. The idea of contaminating his aristocratic name will be a more efficacious panacea against the evils of drinking, or gambling, or cheating than the sermons of evangelists or the mere reading of sacred books. The fruit of abstract teaching (preaching, sermonizing, etc.) are also abstract.

But pride or vanity, or the sense of honor, are ever reliable supporters of virtue, provided they feel induced to support it.

The chief difference, however, between the Middle Ages and Modern Times will be found in the more extensive cultivation of science. The glory of the last three or four centuries is to be found in those great thinkers who have widened our sphere of mental activity, who have successfully solved some of the most urgent problems of nature, life, and mind, and who have opened numberless new channels for the discovery of ever-new fields of scientific labor.

It was Goethe who said of the history of sciences, that it resembles a fugue, inasmuch as the "voices" of different nations set in after due intervals and finally combine to one harmonious structure. The Italians took the lead; there Galileo, Viviani, Torricelli, Malpighi, Morgagni, Spallanzani, Vico, Galiani, and others partly founded, partly enlarged the mechanical and organic sciences. In England W. Harvey, Isaac Newton, Rob. Hooke, Wren, Nehemias Grew, Priestley, Cavendish, Thomas Young, Faraday, Davy, Darwin, Huxley, Sir Rowan Hamilton, John Hunter, etc., etc., approached the problems of nature and mind with that peculiar profundity of the English, which, though generally one-sided, (or even because of its being one-sided) mostly attains to sharply-contoured results of an unequivocal character. The French never abounded in genius of the first order; but they have quite an inordinate number of men gifted with what in all probability is next to genius of the first class. Blaise Pascal, Descartes, Mersenne, Tournefort, Benh. de Jussieu, Lavoisier, Viqu d'Azir, Bichat, Laplace, Lagrange, Arago, Biot, A. Comte, etc., etc., have added an infinite array of fertile ideas and well-ascertained facts concerning the structure of the organic as well as inorganic world.

The Dutch (Hollanders) have furnished us with a vast number of the most valuable contributions to all sciences. In law they were inferior only to the French, who justly boast the two greatest luminaries in the science of law : Cujas (Cujacius), and Doneau (Donellus). In philology they had Vossius, Meursius, Lipsius, Burmann, Hemsterhuys, Ruhnken, etc. In natural science they gave us Leeuwenhoek, Muschenbroek, Swammerdam, S'Gravesande, etc. . But it is in the domain of philosophy where they can glory in the immortal name of the author of the "Ethica," in Benedictus de Spinoza, a genius of the very first order, whose works will forever continue to be both the delight and the despair of the few "chosen" to understand him. His was the life of a saint, and the intellect of the most philosophical mind of modern times.

The Germans have produced precious works in all departments of science. Kopernikus, Kepler, Leibnitz, Gauss, Jacobi, Steiner, Johannes Mueller, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Rokitansky, Goethe, Lessing, Herder, Kirchhoff, Karl Ritter, Alex. v. Humboldt, etc., etc., are amongst the chief leaders in science. As a rule the Germans are more comprehensive than clear, more elaborate than plastic, more scholarly than to the point. They not seldom suffer from the superabundance of their own language and thus become verbous and prolix.


The Americans have almost from the very beginning of their independence displayed the marvellous force of human inventiveness. Some of their typical representatives have been received into the Pantheon of all nations, like Benjamin Franklin, the men of letters, the inventor, the physicist, the statesman, the patriot, and the sage. The future of this grand republic will most assuredly manifest a still larger expanse of industrial and mental activity, but it will never surpass the splendor of that well-nigh miraculous period, which has now reached its end as the first century of the United States of America.

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